PER CURIAM:
Jamie McCord appeals the portion of the district court's or- der denying him official immunity under Georgia law on the tor- tious interference claims asserted by Bordeau Metals, LLC and BB&K Holdings, LLC. The court denied summary judgment on immunity grounds to Mr. McCord because it determined that the record raised a genuine dispute of material fact. Because we lack appellate jurisdiction over a denial of official immunity that turns on issues of evidentiary sufficiency, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
I
The Georgia Power Company contracted with Branden- burg Industrial Service Company to dismantle its newly decommis- sioned plant—Plant Hammond—in Floyd County, Georgia. Sub- sequently, Bordeau Metals, LLC, contracted with Brandenburg to purchase the scrap metal generated from Plant Hammond's dem- olition. Bordeau bought land from the Floyd County Develop- ment Authority to conduct its metal recycling operations.
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25-13982 Opinion of the Court 3 After Bordeau began processing and recycling Plant Ham- mond's scrap metal at its new facility, Floyd County residents be- gan lodging noise complaints to the County Board of Commission- ers. The Floyd County Manager, Mr. McCord, and the Board ap- proached Georgia Power about the noise complaints. Mr. McCord spoke with a Georgia Power representative about relocating Bor- deau's operations. Along with representatives from the Board and the local county development authorities, Mr. McCord also con- ducted two tours of Bordeau's facility and attended a meeting with Georgia Power representatives to discuss the viability of Walker Mountain Landfill as a potential relocation site. Yet Mr. McCord ultimately withdrew Walker Mountain Landfill from Georgia Power's consideration.
A conference call took place between a Georgia Power Ex- ecutive, Allen Reaves, and several Georgia Power representatives. During the call, Mr. Reaves stated that "the noise" at the Bordeau operations "must stop." On February 3, 2023, Georgia Power di- rected Brandenburg to cease operations because of "the numerous community concerns Georgia Power has experienced from the Bordeau facility." Six days later, Brandenburg terminated Bor- deau's contract to purchase Plant Hammond's scrap metal. Bordeau and BB&K Holdings, LLC (collectively, "Bordeau") asserted various state-law claims against Floyd County, Rome- Floyd County Development Authority, the Development Author- ity of Floyd County, and Mr. McCord. As to Mr. McCord, Bordeau
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-13982 asserted claims against him for tortious interference with contrac- tual and business relations, respondeat superior and agency liabil- ity, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 36-33 4. Bordeau also sought attor- neys' fees and expenses under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11. The parties filed multiple motions for summary judgment. The district court held a hearing on the motions and, as relevant to this appeal, denied Mr. McCord's motion for summary judgment on official immunity grounds as to Bordeau's tortious interference claims. Specifically, the court determined that the facts surround- ing Mr. McCord's official immunity are "hotly disputed" and pre- cluded summary judgment. For example, with respect to the issue of malice, the court noted that "a reasonable jury could find malice if they determine that [Mr.] McCord intentionally and wrongfully harmed Bordeau's contractual and business relations to mitigate the noise complaints." This appeal followed.
II
We review de novo a district court's denial of summary judg- ment based on official immunity. See Hoyt v. Cooks, 672 F.3d 972, 981 (11th Cir. 2012). We also review de novo our appellate jurisdic- tion. See Positano Place at Naples I Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Empire Indem. Ins., 84 F.4th 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 2023).
III
On appeal, Mr. McCord argues that the district court erred in denying him official immunity from Bordeau's tortious interfer- ence claims because there is no evidence that he acted with actual
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25-13982 Opinion of the Court 5 malice. Bordeau responds by defending the court's ruling and as- serting that we have no jurisdiction because, at its core, Mr. McCord's appeal is only a dispute about the sufficiency of the evi- dence. Bordeau is, we think, correct with respect to jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction to review "final decisions of the district courts." Generally, a final decision termi- nates the litigation. See Howell v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 524, 528 (11th Cir. 1983). Even so, the Supreme Court has held that an order that does not end the litigation is "final" if it fits in "that small class [of orders] which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be de- nied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudi- cated." Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949).
To that end, "[o]fficials 'may immediately appeal an order denying . . . official immunity, provided that the applicable state law defines the immunity at issue as one from suit instead of from just liability.'" English v. City of Gainesville, 75 F.4th 1151, 1156-57 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Jones v. Fransen, 857 F.3d 843, 849 (11th Cir. 2017)). Because Georgia law defines its official immunity as immunity from suit, see GA. C ONST. art. I, § II ¶ IX(d), we ordinarily have jurisdiction to review a denial of official immunity under Georgia law. See English, 75 F.4th at 1157.
Still, our interlocutory jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment on official immunity, like qualified immunity,
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6 Opinion of the Court 25-13982 hinges on the type of issues involved in the appeal. See id. at 1155. For example, "we do not have interlocutory jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment where the only issues appealed are evidentiary sufficiency issues[,]" but we do "have interlocutory juris- diction over legal issues that are the basis for a denial of summary judgment on [state-law] immunity grounds." Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1484 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). See also English,
75. F.4th at 1157 ("But as in the qualified immunity context, we lack interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over the denial of summary judgment based on state-law immunity where the appeal turns on issues of evidentiary sufficiency.").1
Therefore, to determine whether we have interlocutory ju- risdiction to review the district court's denial of summary judg- ment on official immunity, we must first determine the nature of Mr. McCord's appeal.
Under the Georgia Constitution, Mr. McCord may be per- sonally liable only for ministerial acts performed negligently or dis- cretionary acts performed with malice or an intent to injure. See Cameron v. Lang, 549 S.E.2d 341, 344 (Ga. 2001). See also GA. C ONST. art. I, § II ¶ IX(d) ("[A]ll officers and employees of the state or its departments and agencies may be subject to suit . . . and may
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25-13982 Opinion of the Court 7 be liable for injuries and damages if they act with actual malice or with actual intent to cause injury in the performance of their offi- cial functions."). It is undisputed that Mr. McCord was performing discretionary functions. Thus, the only question for immunity pur- poses is whether he acted "with actual malice or with actual intent to cause injury in the performance of [his] official functions." Gil- bert v. Richardson, 452 S.E.2d 476, 483 (Ga. 1994). In the official immunity context, "actual malice" means "'ex- press malice,' i.e., a deliberate intention to do wrong, and does not include 'implied malice,' i.e., the reckless disregard for the rights or safety of others." Murphy v. Bajjani, 647 S.E.2d 54, 60 (Ga. 2007) (quotations omitted). "[A] jury can infer actual malice based on an offic[ial's] conduct[,]" but "unreasonable" or "recklessly illegal con- duct does not support an inference of actual malice." Black v. Wiginton, 811 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2016). The requisite intent for a showing of actual malice "must be the intent to cause the harm suffered by the plaintiffs." Murphy, 647 S.E.2d at 60. Bordeau offers several pieces of evidence to support the al- legations of actual malice. It claims Mr. McCord took "personal actions" to terminate its operations such as "proceed[ing] with at- tempts to relocate the . . . operations, despite never being author- ized to do so," and "interfer[ring] with the [p]laintiffs' contractual and business relationships." D.E. 176 at 19. Specifically, Mr. McCord, on behalf of the Board, "knowingly acted to pressure Georgia Power" into terminating the contract between Bordeau and Brandenburg. Id. at 9. Mr. McCord did this by contacting
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8 Opinion of the Court 25-13982 Georgia Power to set up meetings, making Georgia Power aware that the noise issue was a matter of public concern for both the neighbors and the Board, arranging a tour of Plant Hammond, pro- posing relocation options, and withdrawing an alternative site op- tion for Georgia Power's consideration—which immediately pre- ceded Georgia Power's decision to direct Brandenburg to send scrap metal to an alternative site. See id. at 10-11. Mr. McCord, for his part, disputes initiating the contact with Georgia Power offi- cials, arranging a tour of Plant, and proposing multiple relocation options. See D.E. 178 at 4.
Based on this record, we conclude that Mr. McCord's appeal only raises issues of evidentiary sufficiency. After an almost three- hour hearing, the district court denied Mr. McCord's motion for summary judgment based on official immunity. See generally D.E. 186 at 11. See also D.E. 191 at 97:20-25("I think a reasonable juror likely could conclude that Mr. McCord was . . . involved in pressur- ing Georgia Power to do whatever it took to end its Bordeau prob- lem, which evolved into Georgia Power taking a very aggressive position, instructing its contractor to cut off a subcontractor."). The court explained that the "facts are hotly disputed" and deter- mined it was "possible that a reasonable jury could find malice if they determined that [Mr.] McCord intentionally and wrongfully harmed Bordeau's contractual and business relations to mitigate the noise complaints." D.E. 186 at 10-11. Put simply, "the district court ruled against [Mr. McCord] because of a genuine dispute of material fact." English, 75 F.4th at 1156. "This is the type of ruling that we lack jurisdiction to review." Id.
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25-13982 Opinion of the Court 9 In short, the dispute in this appeal "is about what the evi- dence could prove at trial; it is not a dispute about principles of law." Id. Mr. McCord does not argue that he would not be entitled to official immunity if, as the district court determined a reasonable jury could find that, he acted with actual malice by exerting pres- sure on Georgia Power to terminate the Bordeau contracts. In- stead, Mr. McCord argues that he is entitled to official immunity because the facts show that he did not act with actual malice. Con- sequently, Mr. McCord's appeal "is simply an argument about the factual inferences the district court drew from a series of circum- stances." Hall v. Flourney, 975 F.3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir. 2020). Even if we disagree with the court's inferences, "review[ing] that determination now would amount to nothing more than weighing the evidence supporting the district court's summary judgment de- termination, which is precisely what the Supreme Court has said we cannot do at this interlocutory stage." Id.
IV
We DISMISS the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
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