NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________
No. 25-12087
Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, versus
DEMETRIUS RENALDO BOWERS,
a.k.a. Fat Cat Bowers, a.k.a. Casino Bowers, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:12-cr-00550-MSS-TGW-1 ____________________
Before JORDAN, LUCK, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.
P ER CURIAM:
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2 Opinion of the Court 25-12087 Demetrius Bowers appeals the district court's partial denial of his compassionate release motion under 18 U.S.C. section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court reduced his total sentence from 2,324 months' imprisonment to 749 months' imprisonment, but Bowers argues that wasn't enough. After careful review, we af- firm.
I.
A jury convicted Bowers of eight counts of Hobbs Act rob- bery, see 18 U.S.C. section 1951(a), and eight counts of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, see 18 U.S.C. section 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Bowers would find fast-food restaurants late at night and break in by throwing a brick or block through a glass door or window. United States v. Bowers, 811 F.3d 412, 416- 21, 430 (11th Cir. 2016). Wearing a ski mask and gloves, and bran- dishing a pistol, he would demand the employees to put money in a bag and then flee. Id. For his crimes, the district court sentenced him to 2,324 months' imprisonment—a 140-month term for the Hobbs Act robbery counts and a consecutive 182-year term for the section 924(c) counts. Bowers appealed his convictions and sen- tence, and we affirmed. Id.
That was in 2013. After the First Step Act, Bowers moved for compassionate release under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing that the "enormous disparity" between his sentence and the sen- tence he would have received following the Act's elimination of
"stacking" section 924(c) convictions constituted an "extraordinary and compelling" reason to warrant a sentence reduction, and that
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25-12087 Opinion of the Court 3 he was otherwise eligible for relief. The district court partly granted his motion. It agreed with Bowers that he had presented extraordinary and compelling reasons supporting relief and he did not pose a danger to the community. But it did not reduce Bow- ers's sentence to the 153 months he requested, finding that the sen- tence he would receive at the time of his motion was more appro- priate after considering the 18 U.S.C. section 3553(a) factors. At the time Bowers was sentenced, the district court ex- plained, each additional section 924(c) offense after the first, includ- ing those charged in the same indictment, required a mandatory consecutive twenty-five-year sentence. But at the time of the com- passionate release motion, each of his section 924(c) offenses for brandishing would have required only a mandatory consecutive seven-year sentence. See Hewitt v. United States, 606 U.S. 419, 424 (2025) (explaining that "district court judges are not required to im- pose stacked 25-year sentences when sentencing first-time § 924(c) offenders"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (seven-year mini- mum for brandishing). The district court thus explained that, con- sidering the severity of Bowers's conduct and the evidence against him, and despite some factors that weighed in his favor, the section 3553(a) factors supported a sentence reduction from 2,324 to 749 months' imprisonment—the same sentence the district court would have pronounced if it were sentencing him for the first time. Bowers moved the district court to reconsider his motion, maintaining that a 153-month sentence was more appropriate. The district court denied the motion, explaining that Bowers had not
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-12087 identified a change in law, manifest error, or other basis for seeking reconsideration.
II.
We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a compas- sionate release motion. United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). We also review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for reconsideration. United States v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2004). "A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making its determination, or makes clearly erroneous factual findings." Giron, 15 F.4th at 1345. "We liberally construe pro se filings." Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation modified).
III.
A district court lacks "inherent authority" to modify a pris- oner's sentence. Id. Instead, it "may do so 'only when authorized by a statute or rule.'" Giron, 15 F.4th at 1345 (quoting United States
v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597, 606 (11th Cir. 2015)). The compassionate release statute—section 3582(c)(1)(A)—is an authorized statute. Under section 3582(c)(1)(A), a prisoner must show: (1) extraordi- nary and compelling reasons to reduce his sentence; (2) that a re- duction would be consistent with the Sentencing Commission's policy statements; and (3) that the section 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of a reduction. Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13). "Because all three conditions . . . are necessary, the absence of even one would
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25-12087 Opinion of the Court 5 foreclose a sentence reduction." United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 2021).
Bowers contends that the district court abused its discretion in applying the section 3553(a) factors and that he was entitled to an even larger sentence reduction than the district court gave him. We disagree. Here, the district court used the section 3553(a) fac- tors to "impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than neces- sary," to meet the purposes of sentencing.118 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court then carefully considered the section 3553(a) factors. It: explained the nature and circumstances of Bow- ers's conduct as "serious"; reviewed the kinds of sentences availa- ble, including by summarizing Congress's recent changes to sec- tion 924(c); discussed the changing approach to Hobbs Act robbery convictions under the sentencing guidelines; summarized and ap- plied the Sentencing Commission's changes to the relevant policy statements; and (5) considered unwarranted sentencing disparities
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6 Opinion of the Court 25-12087 stemming from Bowers's sentence and defendants sentenced after the First Step Act.
Though it found that some of the factors favored Bowers, the district court determined that the balance of the section 3553(a) factors, particularly the seriousness of Bowers's conduct, war- ranted a 749-month sentence—the same sentence the district court would have pronounced if it were sentencing him for the first time. Though Bowers may wish that the district court weighed the sec- tion 3553(a) factors differently, the "weight given to any specific [section] 3553(a) factor," here the seriousness of the offense, "is committed to the sound discretion of the district court," and Bow- ers does not explain why the district court's balancing was an abuse of that discretion. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1241 (citation modified). The district court also did not abuse its discretion when it denied Bowers's motion for reconsideration. Although no statute or rule permits motions for reconsideration in a criminal matter, we have nonetheless reviewed such motions. See United States v. Russell, 994 F.3d 1230, 1236 (11th Cir. 2021); see id. at 1243 n.4 (Branch, J. concurring) (explaining that "a motion for reconsidera- tion of a district court order in a criminal action is not expressly authorized" but "federal district courts necessarily have substantial discretion in ruling on motions for reconsideration," and may grant such a motion when (1) there has been "an intervening change in controlling law;" (2) "new evidence" is available; or (3) doing so would "correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice." (citation modified)). Bowers's motion for reconsideration did not point to
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25-12087 Opinion of the Court 7 any special circumstances that warranted reconsideration, and in- stead merely "ask[ed] the district court to reexamine an unfavora- ble ruling." See Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int'l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1344 (11th Cir. 2010).
On appeal, he argues that the district court made three er- rors in denying his motion. First, he contends that the district court erred in relying on Lora v. United States, 599 U.S. 453 (2023). As Bowers tells it, Lora is not relevant to his case because it was pri- marily about offenses under section 924(j), and it was a case about how a court should perform an original sentencing—not a resen- tencing under compassionate release. While Bowers is right about what Lora held, he's wrong that the district court "relied" on it in any meaningful way. Instead, the district court cited Lora for the uncontroversial proposition that section 924(c) requires consecu- tive rather than concurrent sentences. See id. at 457 ("Subsection
(c) also provides that 'no term of imprisonment imposed on a per- son under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person.'" (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii))). And the district court's purpose in highlighting this feature of section 924(c) was to explain what sentence Bowers might have received if he were sentenced at the time his motion was being considered—exactly what the guidelines asked the dis- trict court to consider. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (explaining that a district court determining if a sentence is unusually long should only consider a change in law "where such change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sen- tence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed").
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8 Opinion of the Court 25-12087 Second, Bowers argues that the district court erred in using the statutory minimums in section 924(c) instead of considering his individual circumstances and the section 3553(a) factors. A district court abuses its discretion "if the record is ambiguous as to whether the court understood it had the authority to reduce the movant's sentence." Russell, 994 F.3d at 1239. Here, the district court under- stood it had the authority to reduce Bowers's sentence, explained the basis of that authority, and did, in fact, reduce Bowers's sen- tence. The district court also did not think it was bound by the statutory minimums in section 924(c). Instead, the district court considered the sentence Bowers would receive if he had been sen- tenced at the time of the motion in determining whether he re- ceived an unduly harsh sentence, see U.S.S.G. section 1B1.13(b)(6), and as one of the section 3553(a) factors it weighed, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3).
Finally, Bowers asserts that the district court erred in defer- ring consideration of his motion until after the Supreme Court de- nied certiorari in United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 583 (2021), superseded in part by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (2023). But the district court enjoys "broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket." Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997). And the delay benefited Bowers. When Bowers filed his motion, we had already decided Bryant. There, we determined that the then-existing ver- sion of the guidelines did allow an "unusually long sentence" as an
"extraordinary and compelling reason" warranting compassionate release. Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1264-65. So his motion would have
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25-12087 Opinion of the Court 9 been denied after Bryant. By waiting until after the guidelines were amended, an "unusually long sentence" became a possible extraor- dinary and compelling reason allowing a reduction under section 3582(c)(1)(A). See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6).2
IV.
For these reasons, we affirm the partial denial of Bowers's compassionate release motion.
AFFIRMED.
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