Melissa Madaffari v. Hayes Wood

25-14291 Opinion of the Court 3 and entities as defendants but "fail[ed] to allege what acts or omis- sions any individual Defendant has committed." Instead, the mag- istrate judge continued, Madaffari had relied on "vague and con- clusory" allegations of wrongdoing. The magistrate judge also concluded that the allegations were too vague and conclusory to establish a viable claim.

So the magistrate judge directed Madaffari to file a second amended complaint within fourteen days. In so doing, the magis- trate judge instructed Madaffari that the second amended com- plaint must be a "single document that contains all of [her] allega- tions against Defendants," in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10, and that she "may attach any relevant exhibits to the Second Amended Complaint." The magistrate judge warned that she would "recommend [] dismissal of this mat- ter" if Madaffari failed to file an amended pleading that complied with the federal rules and the court's order.

Madaffari promptly filed a second amended complaint, along with several attachments. Again, Madaffari named twenty (or more) defendants who allegedly "operated as an association-in- fact enterprise," but she failed to include any factual details about what acts or omissions any individual defendant committed. In describing the claims, the second amended complaint simply recited the elements of the causes of action and referenced an attached exhibit, which contained a table listing the name, role, and "verified misconduct" of each defendant. But apart from con-

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4 Opinion of the Court 25-14291 clusory assertions that the defendants engaged in various miscon- duct—such as fraud, sabotage, retaliation, perjury, collusion, breaches of patient privacy, and "ADA exclusion"—the exhibit failed to offer any underlying factual details about the defendants' conduct. Instead, it cited various "exhibits" not attached to the pleading. Another attachment vaguely indicated that Madaffari's claims arose from "judicial, administrative, and insurance" pro- ceedings relating to a claim for mold damage at her home and al- leged that the defendants had acted with the "shared purpose of suppressing verified harm, obstructing judicial relief, and conceal- ing settlement exposure."

Meanwhile, over the course of the litigation, Madaffari reg- ularly filed motions and evidence. Among other things, these fil- ings purported to document criminal conduct, to show inconsist- encies and patterns of "suppression" in the defendants' positions through "contradiction mapping," to document respiratory injury and educational risk to her minor children, and to vaguely request accommodations under the ADA. Madaffari also filed several mo- tions for recusal, seeking the removal of the magistrate and district court judges who had been assigned to her case.

U.S. District Judge Rodney Smith recused from the case. The case was then reassigned to U.S. District Judge William P. Di- mitrouleas. The next day, Judge Dimitrouleas entered an order dismissing the second amended complaint with prejudice. The district court found that the second amended complaint remained a shotgun pleading because it provided "nearly no factual

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25-14291 Opinion of the Court 5 allegations with respect to the actions committed by each Defend- ant," which prevented individualized scrutiny of its claims and wasted judicial resources. For similar reasons, the court found that Madaffari's conclusory allegations failed to state a plausible claim to relief. Nor, the court determined, did Madaffari's attachments supply the missing factual predicate for her claims. Instead, the court said, they "contain[ed] further references to filings and docu- ments outside the pleading," in violation of the magistrate judge's order. The court directed the clerk to close the case and deny as moot any pending motions. Madaffari timely noticed an appeal of this decision.

Only after filing her notice of appeal did Madaffari move to remove Judge Dimitrouleas and the assigned magistrate judge, as- serting that the dismissal order reflected bias and prejudice against her, and requesting other relief from the judgment. The district court denied the motion, finding that it lacked jurisdiction because of the pending appeal, and that judicial rulings were not grounds for recusal, in any event. Madaffari did not separately appeal that ruling.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Madaffari argues that (1) the district court erred in dismissing her second amended complaint and failing to con- sider her filings, and (2) the district court judge should have recused himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Madaffari's second amended complaint as a shotgun pleading. And we hold that we

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6 Opinion of the Court 25-14291 lack jurisdiction to consider Madaffari's claim that the district court judge abused his discretion when he did not recuse himself. We therefore affirm in part and dismiss in part for lack of jurisdiction.

A.

We review for abuse of discretion review a district court's dismissal of a complaint as a shotgun pleading. Barmapov v. Amuial,

986 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2021). Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the second amended com- plaint as a shotgun pleading.

"A shotgun pleading is a complaint that violates either Fed- eral Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both." Id. A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "A party must state its claims . . . in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). And "[i]f doing so would promote clarity,"

then "each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence

. . . must be stated in a separate count." Id. Such pleading practice ensures, among other things, that a pleader presents his claims dis- cretely and succinctly to allow his adversary to discern the claims and respond. Barmapov, 986 F.3d at 1324.

We've explained that "the spirit, if not the letter," of the Fed- eral Rules "flatly forbid[s]" shotgun pleadings because they are con- fusing and "waste scarce judicial resources, inexorably broaden the scope of discovery, wreak havoc on appellate court dockets, and

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25-14291 Opinion of the Court 7 undermine the public's respect for the courts." Id. (quotation marks omitted). So we have "little tolerance" for them. Id. at 1324. We've identified "four rough types or categories of shot-gun pleadings": those that (1) contain "multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts"; (2) are "re- plete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action"; (3) do "not separate each cause of action or claim for relief into" separate counts; or (4) assert "multiple claims against multiple defendants without speci- fying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions." Id. at 1324-25 (quotation marks omitted). Our "shot- gun-pleading rule applies to everyone, [but] we ordinarily give pro se litigants more leeway when it comes to drafting." Pinson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 942 F.3d 1200, 1208 (11th Cir. 2019) (emphasis omitted).

Still, "[a] district court has the inherent authority to control its docket and ensure the prompt resolution of lawsuits, which in- cludes the ability to dismiss a complaint on shotgun pleading grounds." Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). Before dismissing a com- plaint on shotgun-pleading grounds, though, the court must "sua sponte allow a litigant one chance to remedy such deficiencies." Id. The court should "explain how the offending pleading violates the shotgun pleading rule" and order the plaintiff to replead the case. Id. at 1295-96. Once a court does so, if the plaintiff persists in the defects, the district court acts within its discretion by "dismissing

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8 Opinion of the Court 25-14291 the case with prejudice on shotgun pleading grounds." Jackson v. Bank of America, N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1358 (11th Cir. 2018). Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dis- missing the second amended complaint as a shotgun pleading. Even construed liberally, Madaffari's second amended complaint fails "to identify [her] claims with sufficient clarity to enable the de- fendant[s] to frame a [responsive] pleading." Sledge v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires N. Am., Ltd., 275 F.3d 1014, 1018 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001). The second amended complaint names at least twenty defendants and asserts violations of the RICO Act, the ADA, and Florida stat- utes, but it does not allege any specific facts describing what each individual defendant did, when, or how those actions harmed Ma- daffari.

For example, in Count 1, Madaffari alleged a Civil RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). But in support, Madaffari made only conclusory statements that the "[d]efendants operated as an enterprise engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity. Acts in- clude mail fraud, wire fraud, obstruction, retaliation, and suppres- sion of sealed filings." The complaint offers similar insufficient con- clusory allegations with no factual basis as support for Counts 2, 3, and 4.

While Madaffari included additional details in attachments to her second amended complaint, none of the attachments con- tained information about specific acts or omissions each defendant engaged in. One exhibit included a table purporting to identify predicate acts and each defendant's individual role, but the table

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25-14291 Opinion of the Court 9 did not list any specific acts for each defendant. Rather, the table simply noted the statutes the defendants allegedly violated and made conclusory statements about each defendant's misconduct without any factual basis.

As a result, neither the defendants nor the district court could discern from the complaint what conduct was attributed to whom, or what claims were asserted against which defendants. Be- cause the complaint was "replete with allegations that 'the defend- ants' engaged in certain conduct" without a way to determine what each defendant was accused of doing or which claims applied to whom, the complaint was correctly dismissed as a shotgun plead- ing. Magulta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2001). The district court gave Madaffari notice of these pleading deficiencies when the magistrate judge screened her amended complaint. But Madaffari still failed to cure them in the second amended complaint. Thus, the district court did not abuse its dis- cretion in dismissing the second amended complaint as a shotgun pleading.¹Vibe Micro, 878 F.3d at 1295.

Madaffari raises several other arguments on appeal. None warrant relief. Madaffari contends that the district court violated her due-process rights by disregarding her various motions and ev-

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10 Opinion of the Court 25-14291 identiary submissions, and by deeming them moot upon dismiss- ing the case. But she has not shown that she was denied a reason- able opportunity to be heard on her allegations or was otherwise subject to unfair procedures. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) ("The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a mean- ingful manner.") (quotation marks omitted).

Consistent with the federal rules, our precedent, and the IFP screening requirements of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the district court or- dered Madaffari to submit her allegations and any exhibits as part of a single filing, and the court warned her that the failure to do so could result in dismissal of the case. Thus, in reviewing the suffi- ciency of her second amended complaint, the district court had no reason or obligation to consider allegations or evidence presented in other filings that were not attached to that pleading. See Adinolfe

v. United Techs. Corp., 768 F.3d 1161, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that it's "improper [to] focus on evidence outside the four corners of the second amended complaints in addressing the legal suffi- ciency of those complaints"). While courts must liberally construe pro se pleadings, Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), they may not "rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action," Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd.,

760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). And the record otherwise shows that the district court properly considered the attachments to Madaffari's second amended com- plaint when it dismissed that pleading.

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25-14291 Opinion of the Court 11 Madaffari also asserts that the district court failed to consider her "ADA accommodation requests." But she does not identify what accommodations she requested or how they affected the pro- ceeding. Insofar as Madaffari sought leave to e-file, it's clear from the record that this limitation did not harm her ability to litigate the case, given her more than 200 filings over a three-month pe- riod. In short, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dis- missing Madaffari's second amended complaint with prejudice as a shotgun pleading.

B.

Generally, we review for abuse of discretion a judge's deci- sion whether to recuse himself. Jenkins v. Anton, 922 F.3d 1257, 1271-72 (11th Cir. 2019). But appellate courts may consider only those rulings that the appellant has designated for review in the no- tice of appeal. Weatherly v. Ala. State Univ., 728 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2013). While we don't apply technical rules rigidly when interpreting the notice of appeal, we will not infer an intent to challenge an omitted order unless that intent is evident from the notice itself. Id.; see Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1374- 75 (11th Cir. 1983).

Before us, Madaffari argues that Judge Dimitrouleas, who entered the dismissal order, should have recused himself. But Ma- daffari did not move for Judge Dimitrouleas's recusal until after the final dismissal order on appeal was entered on December 16, 2025. And she did not file a notice of appeal from the ruling on that mo-

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12 Opinion of the Court 25-14291 tion. Madaffari's notice of appeal designates only the dismissal or- der, and a notice of appeal generally does not confer jurisdiction to review other, later orders. Id. So we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of recusal.²We therefore dismiss this aspect of Madaffari's appeal.

III.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Madaffari's complaint, and we dismiss Madaffari's appeal to the ex- tent she purports to challenge Judge Dimitrouleas's decision not to recuse himself.

AFFIRMED IN PART and DISMISSED IN PART.

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