S. M. v. 2nd Judicial Dist.

Under § 41-3-432(1), MCA, the court was required to conduct a show cause hearing within 21 days of the Department's filing of its petition, ^inthiscasenolater^thanDecember 16, 2025. The court attempted to hold a show cause hearing on December 3, 2025. However, S.M. did not appear as she was not served notice and she had not yet been appointed counsel. On December 5, 2025, the court issued ^anamended order granting EPS, in which it also ordered counsel be appointed ^forS.M.andreset^theshowcause .hearing for December 17, 2025, at 9:00 a.m.

On December 11, 2025, the Department attempted to serve ^S.M.notice^ofthe December 17 hearing, but she refused to answer the door. S.M.'s appointed counsel appeared at the December 17, 2025 show cause hearing, ^{butS.M.didnot.The}court continued the hearing.

Also on December 17, 2025, the Department removed A.M. ^fromS.M.'s care.^The court then conducted an EPS hearing on December 23,

2025.^S.M.personally appeared^at that hearing. She stipulated to EPS. However, she requested ^acontested^showcause hearing. The court stated it would set the hearing

within²⁰days. Thus,^bythecourt's^oral ruling, it should have set a contested show cause hearing ^fornolater^thanJanuary^6,2026. Instead, on January 27, 2026, the court issued an order setting the contested show ■ cause hearing for February 25, 2026—:64 days after ^theEPShearing. The court convened the contested show cause hearing on February 25, 2026. However, at the start of the hearing, S.M.'s counsel requested a continuance for two reasons: The Department had not responded to her discovery request, and S.M. had advised the Department the case might be an ICWA/MICWA case, ^buttheDepartment^hadnotsent letters or notice to the identified tribe. S.M.'s counsel

further advised^thecourt^she anticipated moving to dismiss the case "just because ^ofthetimeframes^andtheprocessⁱⁿ this case." The Department advised the court it could provide the discovery "by the end of this week" and it would send the ICWA/MICWA notices ^"assoonaswecan."^Thecourt directed the Department to notify the court when these

tasks^werecomplete^sothecourt could set a date for the contested show cause hearing.

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On March 5, 2026, S.M., via counsel, moved to dismiss the case. Pointing out that § 41-3-427(l.)(g), MCA, provides an EPS order may not be issued for a period longer than 90 days, S.M. alleged the Department was acting without

legal authority because^EPShad expired that day. S.M. further argued the court had

failed^toholdatimely^showcause S.M. argued these failures violated her

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hearing, to which she was statutorily entitled, fiindamental right to parent, denied her due process, ^anddenied^A.M.theright^to.bein S.M.'s care.

On March 16, 2026, the District Court issued an order

setting a contested adjudication hearing for March 25, 2026. At the outset ^ofthehearing, S.M.'s counsel advised the court the Department had not provided discovery—^which it had represented it would provide no later than February 27,2026—^until

March 23,2026,^{andshehadnothad} adequate time to review it and potentially to subpoena

witnesses^foracontested hearing. S.M.'s counsel also advised the court of the pending

motion^todismiss^andthatthe Department had not yet filed a response. The court

reset^thehearing^forApril^22,2026. The Department did not file a response to S.M.'s motion to dismiss.^ On April 8, 2026, S.M. submitted a Notice of Issue, informing the court the motion to dismiss was ripe for ruling. S.M. asserted the court should deem the

motion well-taken^duetothe Department's failure to respond. At the April 22, 2026 hearing, the court acknowledged ^itsawareness^thatS.M.had a pending motion to dismiss to which the Department had not filed a response, and it ' Section 41-3-432(l)(a), MCA, provides: "Except as provided in the federal Indian Child Welfare Act or the Montana Indian Child Welfare Act provided for in Title 41, chapter 3, part 13, a show cause hearing must be conducted within 21 days of the filing of an initial child abuse and neglect petition unless otherwise stipulated by the parties

pursuant^to41-3-434^orunless^anextension^of time is granted by the court. A separate notice to ^thecourt stating^thestatutory^timedeadline^fora hearing must accompany any petition to which the time

deadline applies."^Inthisinstance,^the initial child abuse and neglect petition was filed on November 25, 2025, thus giving the District Court until Monday, December. 8, 2025, to hold the

hearing since^thetwenty-first^dayfellon Saturday, December 6, 2025. ^ MUDCR 2(b) provides an opposing party shall file ^ananswer brief within^14daysofservice^of the movanf s brief. MUDCR 2(c) provides that an opposing party's failure to file an answer brief within the time allowed shall be deemed an admission that the motion is well taken.

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advised the parties it was "inclined to dismiss this

matter"^andshould^deemthemotion well-taken. However, the court declined to dismiss

the case at that juncture, stating it would reconsider if S.M. participated in drug testing ^andhadclean tests^forthenext30 days. S.M.'s counsel stipulated S.M. would agree to ^a30-day voluntary services agreement if A.M. were returned to her care that day. The court initially agreed but the Department objected, asserting S.M. had only had two drug tests

since A.M.'s removal^andfiirther asserting it had not inspected S.M.'s home to ensure ^itwassafeforA.M.'s return. S.M.'s counsel represented to the court that S.M. had only ^hadtwodrugtests since A.M.'s removal because the Department had only scheduled two tests. ^Shefurther represented^S.M.would agree to have her home inspected that day and she was willing to drug test more frequently. S.M. requested to have the agreement put in writing. ^Thecourt^thenstated, "We're done here. The motion is denied."

Once the court indicated it intended to proceed with adjudication, S.M.'s counsel advised the court no show cause hearing had been held ^inthecase.^Shefurther advised^the court that the question of ICWA status remained unresolved. ^Thecourt^thenruled^itwould consider the matter an ICWA case based on S.M.'s representations ^.S.M.'s counsel further advised the court the Department had not served adequate

notice^ontheidentified tribe. The court directed the parties to ascertain whether ^ashowcause hearing^had occurred and advise the court if one needed to be set.

It then adjourned the hearing. On April 29, 2026, with no further hearings occurring, ^thecourt issued^anOrder Following Show Cause Hearing - Setting Adjudicatory ^andDispositional Hearings.^Inher petition before this Court, S.M. asserts that, contrary ^totheDistrict Court's order,^noshow cause hearing had been held and, furthermore, the order

erroneously states^ICWAdoesnot apply, S.M. does not have current visitation with A.M., ^andtheidentity^ofA.M.'s birthfather is unknown.

On May 1, 2026, the District Court issued a written

Order Denying Motion^to Dismiss, in which it found the Department had failed to follow the statutory timeline but it was not in A.M.'s best interest to dismiss the case ^andreturn^A.M.toS.M.'s care.^The court further found S.M. had failed to cooperate with the Department, had submitted to

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only two drug tests, and declined the court's offer to dismiss the case if she agreed to comply with the Department and participate in drug testing for 30 days. On May 20, 2026, the court issued an Order Continuing

Hearing, setting a hearing for July 1, 2026. Mother then petitioned this Court for writ of supervisory control. Supervisory control is an extraordinary remedy that ^maybeinvoked^whenthecase involves purely legal questions and urgent or emergency'factors make the normal appeal process inadequate. M. R. App. P. 14(3). The case must ^meetoneofthree additional criteria: (a) the other court is proceeding under a mistake of law and is causing a gross injustice; (b) constitutional issues of state-wide importance are involved; or (c) the other court has granted or denied a motion for substitution of a judge in a criminal case. M. R. App. P. 14(3)(a)"(c). Whether supervisory control ^isappropriate^isacase-by-case decision. Stokes v. Mont. Thirteenth Judicial Dist.

Court, 2011 MT 182, ^ 5, 361 Mont. 279, 259 P.3d 754 (citations omitted). The Department argues this case is not susceptible ^toreview^onpetition^forwritof supervisory control because the District Court's decision ^tocontinue^theshowcause hearing beyond the 21-day deadlineTor good cause is ^oneofdiscretion. However, S.M.'s petition is not based on whether the court abused its

discretionⁱⁿcontinuing^thehearing; S.M. argues the District Court erred as a matter of law in denying her motion to dismiss because the Department had no continuing legal authority ^inthedependent-neglect^caseat that time. That is a legal question.

In addition to presenting a purely legal question, ^tobesusceptible^toreview^viawrit of supervisory control, the issue must also have no

adequate remedy^onappeal. M. R. App. P. 14(3). S.M. asserts the normal appeal

process^isinadequate^herebecause^'

. A.M. remains removed from her care and, if we allow

the dependent-neglect case to proceed, A.M. might remain out of her care for years

until^itisresolved.^S.M.argues^the Department has been operating without legal authority ^overA.M.since March^5,2026, when EPS expired, the court had no legal basis to deny ^hermotion^todismiss,^andthecourt is operating under a mistake of law in allowing the

Department^todetain^A.M.without^any

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legal authority to do so. S.M. argues the continuation of this case violates her right to due process and her entitlement to fundamentally fair procedures.

The Department responds that S.M. has not demonstrated her remedy on appeal would be inadequate because this Court could, on appeal,

review^theclaims^sheraisesⁱⁿ her petition. However, in .J .V v. Mont. Eighteenth ^Jud.Dist.^Ct.,409Mont.^555,512P.3d 1174, Order (May 4, 2022), we concluded that in a dependent-negl ^ectmatter,^aparent whose child is removed from their care has no adequate remedy on appeal where, without acceptance of the writ, the parent will be denied placement ^ofthechild^intotheir custody, the parent will be subject to a treatment plan, and the parent may ultimately be stripped of parental rights. Those circumstances exist in the present

case. In this case, the initial petition was filed on November 25, 2025, and, contrary to the District Court's April 29, 2026 Order, no show cause

hearing^hasbeenheld.^S.M.argues the District Court's denial of her motion to dismiss,

in spite of its failure to hold a hearing and the Department's loss of legal authority to act ^inthiscase, calls^intoquestion^the fundamental fairness of the proceeding and violates her due process rights. A natural parent's right to care and custody of a child ^isafundamental liberty interest, which courts must protect with fundamentally ^fairprocedures.^Thekey components comprising fundamentally fair proceedings ^arenotice^andanopportunity^to be heard. In re .TC., 2001 MT 264, ^ 22, 307 Mont. ^244,37P.3d70(citations omitted). In In re 2012 MT 220, H 28, 366 Mont. 320, 286 P.3d ¹²⁰¹(citations omitted),^we explained, "[NJatural parents have a long-recognized

fundamental liberty interest^inthe eare, custody, and management of their child. We therefore ^lookclosely^atstate action^that interferes with fundamental parental rights, and it ^iswell-established^thatproceedings involving the termination of the parent-child relationship ^mustsatisfy strict constitutional due process guarantees."

Section 41-3-432(l)(a), MCA, provides:

Except as provided in the federal Indian Child Welfare ^ActortheMontana Indian Child Welfare Act provided for in Title 41, chapter 3, part 13, a show cause hearing must be conducted within 21 days of the

filing^ofaninitial child abuse and neglect petition unless otherwise stipulated ^bytheparties

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pursuant to 41-3-434 or unless an extension of time ^isgranted^bythecourt. A separate notice to the court stating the statutory ^timedeadline^forahearing must accompany any petition to which the time deadline

applies. Section 41-3-432(3), MCA, provides, in part, the parent "must be given the opportunity to admit or deny the allegations contained in the petition at the show cause hearing." With regards to the substance of the hearing, the statute directs that it shall provide an opportunity for the parties with physical or legal

custody^toprovide testimony,^andthe court shall explain the procedures and rights of the

parties^andallow^theparties^with custody to admit or deny the allegations of the petition. ^InreD.B.J,^TI41.Throughout these proceedings, the Department and the District Court have shown a puzzling reluctance to conduct the required, and relatively routine, contested ^showcause hearing.^BothS.M. and the Department acknowledge—and our review of the

record confirms—that^ashow cause hearing as provided in § 41-3-432, MCA, did not

occur^inthiscase. S.M. asserts her due process rights were violated because ^shewasnotafforded^a show cause hearing in which she would have had the right to be heard and to contest the Department's allegations. The Department responds §

41-3-434(2),^MCA,allows^acourt to continue a show cause hearing if it has good cause ^todoso.However,^theDistrict Court has not merely continued the show cause hearing in ^thiscase.^Itissued^anorder finding probable cause in the absence of a hearing, thus denying ^S.M.theprocess^towhich^sheis due under Title 41, Chapter 3. In In re D.BJ.^ f 33, ^weheldacourt "rectified"^theearlier, erroneous exclusion of a guardian from meaningfril participation in a show cause hearing by allowing the guardian to fully participate at a

subsequent^showcause hearing.^Nosuch rectification occurred here. Section 41-3-427(l)(g), MCA, provides that an EPS order ^maynotbeissued^fora, period of longer than 90 days. In this case, the parties

stipulated^toEPSandtheDistrict Court granted it on December 17, 2025. Thus the Department's

authority^forEPSexpired after 90 days on March 17, 2026. Even assuming the

District Court^hadgoodcause^for continuing the show cause hearing, the Department's

apparent basis^foritscontinued exertion of authority over this family is prior case ^lawinwhich^weexcused procedural

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errors where courts acted to protect children's best

interests.^InInreB.W.S.,^2014MT 198,376 Mont. 43, 330 P.3d 467, we held district courts

were not divested of subject matter jurisdiction where hearings in a dependent-neglect case occurred beyond their statutory timeframes. However, in so holding, we noted that mother challenging the court's subject matter jurisdiction did not claim she was prejudiced by the "slight" delays or dispute the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. In re B.W.S.. H 14. B.W.S. is readily distinguishable from the present case, where the delays are not "slight" and S.M. is disputing the fundamental fairness of the proceedings.

Having considered the petitions and responses filed, ^weagree^withS.M.theDistrict Court violated her due process rights by failing to hold a show cause hearing. Moreover, the Department has no basis to assert continuing authority ^overthiscasesince^EPSexpired on March 17, 2026. S.M. is entitled to the relief she

seeks^fromthisCourt.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this Petition for a Writ

of Supervisory Control is ACCEPTED and GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is REMANDED ^totheDistrict Court with instructions for that court to GRANT S.M.'s motion ^todismiss^thismatter. The Clerk is directed to provide immediate notice of ^thisOrder^tocounsel^for Petitioner, all counsel of record in the Second Judicial

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