People of Michigan v. Craig Lamont Buggs Jr

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Megan K. Cavanagh, Chief Justice Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood,

Justices

Order

June 12, 2026

SC: 168594

COA: 369698

Kent CC: 23-002460-FH, 23-002461-FC

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v

CRAIG LAMONT BUGGS, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant. On May 6, 2026, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the April 28, 2025 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

THOMAS, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

In this interlocutory appeal, defendant seeks to exclude from his upcoming trial evidence obtained from the searches of two residences. He argues that these searches violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution because they were not supported by probable cause to believe that evidence of suspected drug trafficking would be discovered in those residences. I disagree with the lower courts that there was probable cause to issue warrants to search both residences; I conclude that probable cause was lacking as to one of them. However, I agree with the Court of Appeals that under current law defendant's motion to suppress fails under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.¹

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Notwithstanding my agreement with the denial of defendant's motion, I dissent from the Court's decision to deny leave to appeal. This Court retains the discretion to resolve a Fourth Amendment question even if the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. See United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 925 (1984). The exercise of this discretion is especially important "[i]f the resolution of a particular Fourth Amendment question is necessary to guide future action by law enforcement officers and magistrates[.]"

Id.²Such guidance is necessary here. The United States Supreme Court has never addressed the circumstances under which there is probable cause to search a residence connected to a suspected drug trafficker, and there is minimal Michigan caselaw addressing that issue. Moreover, this case indicates an overly permissive view of when such searches comply with the Fourth Amendment.

It is well established that a search only satisfies the Fourth Amendment if there is a sufficient nexus between the alleged criminal behavior and the place sought to be searched.³Establishing probable cause to believe that criminal activity is taking place does not provide the government carte blanche to search every place that the suspect has ever been; there must be probable cause that evidence related to the specific criminal activity alleged will be discovered at a particular location.⁴Adherence to the nexus requirement is especially important for private residences, as "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." Payton v New York, 445 US 573, 585 (1980) (quotation marks and citation omitted).⁵

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The nexus inquiry is inherently fact-specific and defies rigid bright-line rules.⁶But extensive caselaw from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is instructive and provides some general guidelines for assessing whether there is a sufficient nexus between drug activity and a residence.⁷For example, the Sixth Circuit has held there is a sufficient nexus if a warrant affidavit establishes a direct connection between drug dealing and a residence⁸or, absent such evidence, if the suspect permanently resides at a location and is engaged in a continual ongoing drug operation involving large amounts of drugs.⁹On the other end of the spectrum, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that there is an insufficient nexus if there is evidence of only drug use (but not the sale of drugs) or evidence of only one drug transaction that did not occur at or near the residence.¹⁰The Sixth Circuit has also recognized that one's status as a drug dealer does not, standing alone,

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provide a sufficient basis to search that person's residence¹¹and that a nexus may be lacking if there is insufficient evidence that a suspected drug dealer lived at the residence.¹² The general principle reflected in these decisions is that the Fourth Amendment requires a connection between illegal drug activity and a residence that is "specific and concrete, not vague or generalized." United States v Brown, 828 F3d 375, 382 (CA 6, 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).¹³While probable cause that a suspect is engaged in drug dealing supports a search of a residence connected to that suspect, it is not per se sufficient in every case. It is not always appropriate to infer that somebody who has sold drugs stores incriminating evidence at their own residence, let alone another person's residence that the suspect only visits.¹⁴Instead, the nexus inquiry requires a more nuanced consideration of the precise nature of both (1) a suspect's alleged drug-trafficking activity, and (2) a suspect's relationship to the residence.

In this case, officers sought and obtained search warrants for two residences in the Grand Rapids area: an apartment on Logan Street and a house on Prospect Avenue. There is no dispute that the warrant affidavits established probable cause to believe that defendant was engaged in drug dealing, and the affidavits did not allege that narcotics sales occurred at either residence. The affidavits also indicated that defendant had some connection to

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both residences, but that he was not the primary occupant at either location. The question is whether the affidavits were sufficient to establish probable cause that evidence of defendant's suspected drug dealing would be discovered in these residences. I agree with the lower courts that there was a sufficient nexus to support a search warrant for the Logan Street apartment. While defendant was not named on the apartment's lease, there was evidence that he frequently resided there during the one-year period before the warrant affidavit was sworn.¹⁵Moreover, the warrant affidavit alleges that defendant sold heroin to a confidential informant five times over a four-month period, suggesting that he had an ongoing narcotics operation. Finally, the affidavit indicates that, one week before the affidavit was sworn, a police officer observed defendant travel directly from that apartment to a controlled drug buy and then return to that apartment immediately after completing the drug sale. Viewed together, these assertions established probable cause to believe that evidence of defendant's suspected drug trafficking would be discovered in that apartment.

However, I disagree with the lower courts that there was a sufficient nexus to support a search warrant for the house on Prospect Avenue. The warrant affidavit for that location includes no allegation of a direct connection between defendant's alleged drug dealing and that house, and there was no evidence that defendant resided there. The only evidence tying the house to defendant and his alleged drug dealing was that (1) two vehicles he used for drug transactions were registered to that address, (2) one of those vehicles was parked at the house continuously for 30 days leading up to the swearing of the warrant, and

(3) during that same 30-day period, defendant would drive his other vehicle to that house most days for several hours in the early afternoon and leave in the late afternoon. In essence, the affidavit established only that defendant frequently visited this house and that the vehicles he used for drug transactions had innocuous connections to it. While the affidavit indicated that defendant sold narcotics and had some connection to the Prospect Avenue house, it failed to provide a meaningful link between defendant's drug dealing and this location to support probable cause to believe that evidence of drug trafficking would be discovered in that house.

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I, Elizabeth Kingston-Miller, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. June 12, 2026

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Clerk While my disagreement with the lower courts on this point does not affect how I would resolve defendant's motion to suppress, this does not change the reality that the search of the Prospect Avenue home violated the Fourth Amendment. When performing their gatekeeping role under the Fourth Amendment, magistrates should avoid an uncritical approach that assumes officers can lawfully search any residence with some connection to a person suspected of illegal drug activities. I believe that crucial guidance in this area is necessary to ensure compliance with the Fourth Amendment and that this case offers the Court a good opportunity to provide such guidance. Thus, I respectfully dissent from the Court's denial order.

CAVANAGH, C.J., joins the statement of THOMAS, J.

HOOD, J., did not participate because he was on the Court of Appeals panel.

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