United States v. Bernard Moore

2 Opinion of the Court 25-13539 922(g)(1); and of possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug traf- ficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 2. At Moore's sentencing hearing, the district court concluded that he qualified for 18 U.S.C. § 924's 15-year mandatory minimum and sentenced him to a total sentence of 240 months imprison- ment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (requiring a person who violates

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) to serve a mandatory minimum imprisonment sentence of 15 years if the defendant has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses, or both, "committed on occasions different from one another"). Moore appealed his sen- tence, and we affirmed. See United States v. Moore, 954 F.3d 1322, 1325, 1338 (11th Cir. 2020).

Moore then filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sen- tence, which the district court denied. And in July 2025, he filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). According to Moore, at the time of filing that motion he had served

"8 years, 8 months, and 11 days in federal custody." The district court denied the motion. Moore filed a motion for reconsidera- tion, which the district court also denied.

Moore, proceeding pro se, timely appealed. And the govern- ment filed a motion for summary affirmance. The government's motion is GRANTED, and we affirm.

I.

We "review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sen- tence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)." United States v.

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25-13539 Opinion of the Court 3 Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). If a prisoner is eligible, we review for abuse of discretion a "district court's denial of a pris- oner's § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion." Id. "A district court abuses its dis- cretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making its determination, or makes clearly errone- ous factual findings." Id. We also review for abuse of discretion a district court's denial of a motion for reconsideration. United States

v. Llewlyn, 879 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2018). Cases that call for summary affirmance include ones where

"the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case[] or where . . . the appeal is frivolous." Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).¹This is one of those cases.

II.

Moore contends that the district court erred in denying his compassionate release motion in three ways. He argues that the district court 1) "refused to consider" a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States as "a relevant change in law"; 2) "mis- read" U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6), "transforming a policy benchmark into a jurisdictional bar"; and 3) "mischaracteriz[ed] a minor, de- fensive act with a broom handle as proof of dangerousness, thereby

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4 Opinion of the Court 25-13539 discounting eight years of rehabilitation and preparation for reentry."

A district court may grant a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A) if (1) an extraordinary and compelling reason exists,

(2) a sentence reduction would be consistent with the policy state- ments contained in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, and (3) the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of a sentence reduction. United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 2021); see also Con- cepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 495 (2022) (noting that Con- gress "expressly" placed a limitation on district courts' discretion to modify a sentence "by requiring courts to abide by the Sentencing Commission's policy statements").

Because Moore's first and third arguments involve the pol- icy statement found in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5), we address those first and discuss his argument under § 1B1.13(b)(6) last. A. Section 1B1.13(b)(5)

The policy statement in § 1B1.13(b) lists qualifying circum- stances that constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason to warrant a sentence reduction: the defendant's medical circum- stances, the defendant's advanced age, the defendant's family cir- cumstances, or if the defendant was the victim of abuse while serv- ing a term of incarceration. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)-(4). Section 1B1.13(b)(5) also provides a catch-all "other reasons"

category that allows a court to consider "any other circumstances"

of the defendant "or combination of circumstances that, when considered by themselves or together with any of the [previously

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25-13539 Opinion of the Court 5 listed] reasons . . . are similar in gravity to those [reasons previously] described[.]" Id. § 1B1.13(b)(5); see also id. § 1B1.13(c) (providing that where "a defendant otherwise establishes that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction under this policy statement, a change in the law (including an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be con- sidered for purposes of determining the extent of any such reduc- tion") (emphasis added).

Moore makes two arguments invoking the catch-all policy statement found in § 1B1.13(b)(5). First, he contends that the "dis- trict court erred by categorically excluding a constitutional change in law from its compassionate release analysis," where it should have considered the "constitutional change" as part of his circum- stances "in determining whether extraordinary and compelling rea- sons exist" under § 1B1.13(b)(5). Second, he contends that the dis- trict court mischaracterized the factual scenario surrounding his disciplinary citation in its analysis of his rehabilitation, which ac- cording to him was "outcome-determinative" because "rehabilita- tion is a critical consideration under § 1B1.13(b)(5)."

First, Moore doesn't argue that the district court abused its discretion in assigning too little weight to what he calls "a relevant change in law supporting extraordinary and compelling reasons"

for a sentence reduction. He argues that the district court "re- fus[ed] to weigh Erlinger at all,"² and instead viewed his reliance on

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6 Opinion of the Court 25-13539 Erlinger as a collateral attack to the constitutionality of his sentence. See generally Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821, 835 (2024) (hold- ing that the Constitution requires that a unanimous jury, not a judge, find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant's prior of- fenses were committed on different occasions for the ACCA en- hancement to apply).

But he's wrong. The district court did consider Moore's con- stitutional challenge in its § 1B1.13(b)(5) analysis. As an alternative holding, the district court concluded that "even considering [Moore's] purported rehabilitation together with his proposed re- lease plan and constitutional challenge, these circumstances are not similar in gravity to a medical or family circumstance, advanced 821 (2024), is a 'relevant fact' that must be considered in a compassionate re- lease proceeding." See generally Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 486-87 (holding that a

"district court adjudicating a motion [for a sentence reduction] under the First Step Act may consider other intervening changes of law (such as changes to the Sentencing Guidelines) or changes of fact (such as behavior in prison)" and explaining that unless "Congress or the Constitution limits the scope of infor- mation," a district court is free to use its discretion as to what it should "con- sider in deciding whether . . . to modify a sentence"). But in Concepcion, the government conceded that the prisoner was eligible for a sentence reduction, and so the only question there was what information the district court could consider in reducing his sentence. See id. at 488. Not so here. In this case, the issue is "whether [Moore was] eligible for compassionate release in the first place. And on that score, Congress has expressly cabined district courts' dis- cretion by prohibiting a reduction in sentence unless a court finds that extraor- dinary and compelling reasons warrant it." Rutherford v. United States, No. 24- 820, 2026 WL 1485535, at *2 (U.S. May 28, 2026) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

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25-13539 Opinion of the Court 7 age, or being the victim of abuse while in custody."³The district court did not err in concluding that Moore failed to establish that he met the requirements that would entitle him to relief under the catch-all provision. See generally Rutherford, 2026 WL 1485535, at *8 ("While the terms 'extraordinary' and 'compelling' leave room for judgment, they are not so flexible as to encompass any considera- tion. Their meaning depends on context[.]").

Because the district court did in fact consider Moore's con- stitutional challenge to his sentence in its § 1B1.13(b)(5) analysis, his argument that the district court should have weighed Erlinger is frivolous. See generally Trump v. Clinton, 161 F.4th 671, 693 (11th Cir. 2025) ("An appeal is frivolous when the legal claim at issue lacks an underlying factual basis, or when appellants ignore the governing law and rely on clearly frivolous arguments.") (quotation marks and brackets omitted). Because the district court did consider Er- linger in its compassionate release analysis, we need not decide whether it was required to do so.

Second, Moore contends that the court clearly erred in find- ing insufficient evidence of his rehabilitation based on a single dis- ciplinary citation.⁴He argues that the court failed to evaluate the

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"nature and circumstances of [his] conduct" when it assessed his

"dangerousness." And he argues that his "eight years of program participation, discipline, and preparation for reentry far outweigh [the] single, defensive act" of grabbing a broom handle during a prison riot in self-defense.

Again, the district court did, in fact, consider what Moore argues it did not. To repeat, the district court concluded that "even considering [Moore's] purported rehabilitation together with his pro- posed release plan and constitutional challenge, these circum- stances are not similar in gravity to a medical or family circum- stance, advanced age, or being the victim of abuse while in cus- tody." Only after that conclusion did the court add that it thought Moore's recent disciplinary citation "cut[] against his assertion that his rehabilitation is 'beyond reproach.'"

And regardless of how the district court characterized Moore's admitted disciplinary citation for possession of a danger- ous weapon, he didn't carry his burden to show the existence of an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a reduction. See Giron, 15 F.4th at 1346 (acknowledging that it's the defendant's bur- den "to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release"); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) ("Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.").

raised for the first time in his reply brief. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681-83 (11th Cir. 2014).

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25-13539 Opinion of the Court 9 The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Moore's stated reasons fell "well short of establishing extraor- dinary and compelling reasons warranting a reduction in his sen- tence."

B. Section 1B1.13(b)(6)

Moore contends that the district court erred in treating the ten-year imprisonment requirement of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) as mandatory rather than a flexible policy benchmark. The govern- ment is clearly correct as a matter of law that the district court did not err in finding Moore ineligible for a sentence reduction under § 1B1.13(b)(6) because he has not yet served ten years of his sen- tence. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (directing the Sentencing Commission to "describe what should be considered extraordinary and compel- ling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be ap- plied"); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (allowing an "unusually long sen- tence" to be "considered in determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason" for a sentence reduction but only where the prisoner "has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment"); see also United States v. Handlon, 97 F.4th 829, 833 (11th Cir. 2024) ("Congress delegated the power to define what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction to the Sentencing Commission, not the courts.") (quotation marks omitted).⁵

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10 Opinion of the Court 25-13539 The district court did not err in treating U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6)'s 10-year imprisonment requirement as mandatory.

III.

Finally, Moore abandoned any challenge to the district court's order on his motion for reconsideration by failing to ade- quately brief the issue in his opening brief. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 683 (explaining that issues raised for the first time in a reply brief come too late and are deemed abandoned). And even if he had adequately briefed that issue, the district court did not err in deny- ing his motion for reconsideration where Moore simply rehashed the same arguments he had raised in his motion for compassionate release. See Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir. 2009) ("A motion for reconsideration cannot be used to reliti- gate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.") (quotation marks omitted).

The government's motion for summary affirmance is

GRANTED, and the district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.⁶ other factors - can[] make a prisoner eligible for compassionate release." 2026 WL 1485535, at *10. But here, Moore's § 1B1.13(b)(6) argument is based on "a change in constitutional law." Because Moore did not meet § 1B1.13(b)(6)'s ten-year requirement, we need not decide whether Rutherford extends to his argument.

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25-13539 Opinion of the Court 11

AFFIRMED.

v. United States, No. 24-556, 2026 WL 1485476, *3 (U.S. May 28, 2026) ("A pris- oner who collaterally attacks the validity of his conviction must proceed through 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not 18 U.S.C. § 3582.").

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