Brian L. DeCerb

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In re: : Case No. 18-22681-GLT : Chapter 13

BRIAN L. DECERB, :

:

Debtor. : Related to Dkt. Nos. 191, 194, 201

:

Brian C. Thompson, Esq. Thompson Law Group, P.C. Cranberry Township, PA Attorney for the Debtor Ronda J. Winnecour, Esq. Owen Katz, Esq.

Office of the Chapter 13 Trustee Pittsburgh, PA

Attorneys for the Chapter 13 trustee

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Having failed to complete his chapter 13 plan in extra innings, debtor Brian L. DeCerb now seeks to vacate dismissal a month later and make a final curative payment.¹With the money in hand, the chapter 13 trustee does not oppose the relief. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the Debtor has not demonstrated any basis for reconsideration given the substantial grace period he was already afforded before the case was dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 6, 2025, after the expiration of the Debtor's 84-month plan term,²the chapter 13 trustee moved to dismiss the case based on a $33,248 arrearage.³The Debtor promptly responded that he was "contemplating various ways to pay the base balance, including the exempt proceeds . . . related to a personal injury claim."⁴The Court conducted an initial

1

2

hearing on September 15, 2025, where the Debtor explained substantial health issues impacted his ability to make the lump sum payments. The Court continued the hearing for about a month to afford the Debtor an opportunity to formulate a reasonable proposal to cure the plan arrearage. Meanwhile, regular wage attachment remittances continued.

On September 25, 2025, the Debtor reported that he had "begun the process of cashing out his retirement account" to complete the plan.⁵Shortly after a late October hearing, the Debtor added that the account manager "requested additional documentation" and that it will take "14 days to complete the process" once those documents are received.⁶At a third continued hearing on December 23, 2025, counsel represented that the withdrawal had been approved and the "check will be in the mail any day."⁷The Court continued the hearing one final time, warning that it had reached the limit of its discretion to allow a late curative payment under controlling precedent.

By the January 14, 2026 hearing, the Debtor had reduced the arrearage to about $11,612 through continued wage attachment but had not made a curative payment.⁸Instead, counsel explained that the Debtor received a disbursement letter indicating that a check would be sent roughly a week after January 31, 2026. In support, he filed a screenshot of the purported disbursement letter without any identifying information, leaving the Court unable to determine its authenticity.⁹Given that the curative payment was still at best a month away (if at all), the Court granted the trustee's motion and dismissed the case.

3

A month later, the Debtor filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal simply asserting that a curative payment was finally remitted to the trustee in what was effectively month 92.¹⁰During a hearing on the motion, the Court pressed the Debtor to articulate a basis for reconsideration. The Debtor suggested his delay was excusable neglect arising from the administrative difficulties in obtaining the retirement funds. The Court took the matter under advisement and, the following day, the Debtor filed an amended motion outlining theories for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and (b)(6) ("Rule 60(b)").¹¹

II. JURISDICTION

This Court has authority to exercise jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), 1334, and the Order of Reference entered by the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on October 16, 1984. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A).

III. DISCUSSION

Motions for reconsideration are not recognized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but requests filed more than 14 days after the order are generally considered under Rule 60(b).¹²To prevail under this rule, the movant must establish at least one of the six enumerated grounds for relief:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;

4

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.¹³

"It is well settled that a motion for reconsideration seeks an extraordinary remedy that upsets the finality of a decision and therefore should be granted only sparingly."¹⁴ Here, the Debtor suggests that relief from dismissal is warranted by excusable neglect under subsection Rule 60(b)(1) or Rule 60(b)(6). In Pioneer Investment Services v. Brunswick Assoc.,¹⁵the Supreme Court of the United States held that "neglect" "encompasses both simple, faultless omissions to act and, more commonly, omissions caused by carelessness."¹⁶It concluded that whether a party's neglect is "excusable" is "at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission."¹⁷ Factors informing the court's analysis include, but are not limited to: (1) "the danger of prejudice;" (2) "the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings;" (3) "the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant;" and

(4) "whether the movant acted in good faith."¹⁸In contrast, relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is

5

reserved for "extraordinary circumstances where, without such relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship would occur."¹⁹

The Debtor asserts that he acted in good faith to cure the default within a reasonable amount of time but was delayed by factors outside his control.²⁰He attributes the delay in securing the funds to a communication lag with the retirement plan administrator caused by substantial health issues he and his daughter experienced.²¹The Debtor also contends that the creditors are better off receiving payments from a completed plan and would be prejudiced by dismissal.²²Ultimately, the Court finds the Debtor cannot establish excusable neglect at this late stage.

Context is key. The Code sets a maximum plan term.²³In this case, a temporary amendment to section 1329(d) of the Bankruptcy Code²⁴authorized a post-confirmation plan modification that permitted the Debtor to extend payments up to 7 years (or 84 months).²⁵His undeniable failure to complete all payments within the plan term was cause for dismissal.²⁶But the Code does not require dismissal upon a material default at the plan's expiration. Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that "bankruptcy courts retain

6

discretion under the Bankruptcy Code to grant a reasonable grace period for debtors to cure an arrearage."²⁷And the considerations informing such an exercise of discretion are not dissimilar to the Pioneer factors.²⁸So based on his representations, the Court granted the Debtor nearly seven months to cure his plan default before concluding that no further extensions were appropriate and dismissed the case.²⁹In other words, the Court found that an additional month of grace was unreasonable.

Fundamentally, reconsideration is not a vehicle "to simply 'ask the Court to rethink what the Court had already thought through—rightly or wrongly.'"³⁰Yet the Debtor essentially begs the Court to re-weigh the same considerations that did not yield a further grace period in January to excuse his neglect in February. The Debtor's hardships and their apparent impact on his ability to access his retirement funds were known to the Court.³¹As was his continued wage attachment.³²The only real difference now is that the funds are in the trustee's

7

possession. Unfortunately, the eventual ability to cure a payment default in chapter 13 is not itself a basis to vacate a prior dismissal.³³Finality requires more, and the Debtor offers nothing else.³⁴The lesson here is that a debtor cannot reasonably expect to stack a grace period under Klaas with an additional period of excusable neglect following dismissal. Alternatively, the Debtor argues that reconsideration under Rule 60(b)(6) is appropriate "because Debtor had substantially completed his case" and "but for extraordinary circumstances that caused his default, he could have completed his Plan payments when required."³⁵In support, he cites three cases in which courts found cause under Rule 60(b)(6) to reinstate chapter 13 cases that were dismissed for lack of payment.³⁶Only one involved an expired plan and was otherwise factually distinct.³⁷

Even assuming the circumstances that lead to the Debtor's default and delayed cure were "extraordinary,"³⁸he has not explained how it will result in "extreme and unexpected hardship."³⁹Or even ordinary hardship for that matter. Rather, the Debtor focuses on a lack of sizeable plan arrearage was attributable to irregular lump sum obligations and grew despite the Debtor's regular wage attachment.

8

prejudice to creditors and the potential benefit of a final plan distribution.⁴⁰Of course, the Debtor could avoid such prejudice by paying the same retirement funds to those creditors outside of bankruptcy. The only difference is that he would not receive a discharge, which is hardly

"unexpected" following a material plan default. A review of the claims register suggests the Debtor has a relatively modest amount of dischargeable unsecured debt.⁴¹And unlike the debtor in In re Aubain, he has not modified the rights of any creditors such that dismissal would work a

"palpable injustice" by restoring their prepetition rights.⁴²The Court discerns no extremity to these circumstances.

In sum, the Debtor has not shown cause for reconsideration. Whatever prejudice he suffers is merely the natural consequence of his inability to complete his side of the chapter 13 bargain as the Code requires. While this may seem harsh with money in hand, the Debtor was afforded a generous grace period before dismissal—stretching Klaas to its breaking point—and then still needed more time. But chapter 13 is not open-ended, so there is inevitably a moment when a default crystalizes and becomes irreversible. That is the system Congress created and neither Klaas nor Rule 60(b) change that.

9

IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration must be denied. This opinion constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052. The Court will issue a separate order consistent with this opinion. ENTERED at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

____________________________________

Dated: May 21, 2026 GREGORY L. TADDONIO

CHIEF UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

Case administrator to mail to:

Debtor