THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2025-0579, C.A. v. D.N., and Case No. 2025- 0580, D.W. v. D.N., the court on April 28, 2026, issued the following order:
The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on appeal, and has determined to resolve each case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(3). The defendant, D.N., appeals two civil stalking final orders of protection entered against him by the Circuit Court (Lombardi, J.) for the protection of the plaintiffs, C.A. and D.W., following a hearing that was held in both cases. See RSA 633:3-a (Supp. 2025). The defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to continue the hearing and that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he committed the offenses of stalking. We affirm.
The following facts are supported by the record. The plaintiffs, who are a couple, live together, and the defendant is their neighbor. The plaintiffs each filed a civil stalking petition against the defendant alleging that he had "caused [them] to fear for [their] safety." Specifically, they alleged that, over the course of several days, the defendant placed trash under the windshield wiper of D.W.'s vehicle, threw a bag of blueberries on the ground near D.W. and cursed at D.W., taunted D.W. by thumping his chest and challenging D.W. to a fight before calling D.W. a "coward." They also alleged that the defendant placed tape over the plaintiffs' doorbell camera, placed a container full of cigarette butts on the plaintiffs' porch, verbally assaulted the plaintiffs for approximately fifteen minutes, spat in D.W.'s direction, and threatened to "slap [C.A.] in her f**king mouth." C.A.'s petition further alleged that prior to these incidents, the defendant on multiple occasions had yelled at and threatened her while she was walking her dog.
On July 15, 2025, the trial court issued a temporary order of protection for C.A. and scheduled a final hearing for approximately one month later. At the hearing, the trial court considered both C.A.'s and D.W.'s petitions against the defendant. C.A. and D.W. were represented by counsel, and the defendant was self-represented. The trial court heard testimony from C.A., D.W., and the defendant and also reviewed video of some of the events giving rise to the petitions.
Following the hearing, the trial court issued final stalking orders of protection against the defendant for both C.A. and D.W. In C.A.'s final protection order, the court found that the defendant had committed stalking
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against C.A. by placing trash on D.W.'s windshield, throwing blueberries toward the plaintiffs, yelling at C.A. while she was walking her dog, verbally assaulting both C.A. and D.W., and threatening to hit C.A. The court further noted that the defendant's "ongoing course of conduct has caused [C.A.] emotional distress." In D.W.'s final protection order, the court found that the defendant had committed stalking against D.W. by placing trash on D.W.'s windshield, throwing blueberries toward the plaintiffs, placing a jar of cigarette butts on the plaintiffs' porch, and verbally assaulting both C.A. and D.W. The court further noted that, during this last incident, the defendant "aggressively approached [D.W.] while yelling at him and spit on the ground in [D.W.'s] direction" and the defendant "continued to yell at [D.W.] and aggressively approach him as if trying to instigate a fight." The defendant appealed both orders.
The defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to continue the final hearing. "The decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court." In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 793 (2015). We will not overturn the court's decision absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion. Id. The record shows that the trial court initially scheduled a final hearing for August 12. At the defendant's request and over C.A.'s objection, the trial court continued the hearing to August 27. On August 26, the trial court received the defendant's request for another continuance of a "minimum" of two months so that he could retain counsel. The following day, the parties appeared at the hearing, where the defendant reiterated that he "need[ed] legal representation" in order "to protect [his] interest" in these cases and a related criminal matter. Counsel for the plaintiffs objected, stating that the defendant had caused C.A. distress and that C.A. wanted a final order of protection. The trial court denied the motion, noting that the defendant "had a chance to seek legal counsel" and that the hearing had been "continued once already." It further noted that, unlike C.A., there was no temporary order in place relating to D.W., and D.W. therefore "probably would like to have" the hearing go forward, which plaintiffs' counsel confirmed was correct. Based upon these facts, we conclude that the defendant has failed to show that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in denying his second request to continue the final hearing. See id. The initial stalking petition was filed on July 15, over a month before the final hearing, and, as the trial court noted, the defendant had an opportunity to retain counsel. The trial court also noted that the defendant had already been granted one continuance. We cannot conclude it was clearly unreasonable for the trial court to decline granting the defendant's second request to continue the hearing. See id. The defendant suggests that there "would have been absolutely no prejudice" to the plaintiffs resulting from a continuance because C.A.'s
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temporary protection order would have remained in effect. We note that there was no temporary order pertaining to D.W, however, and even if there had been, the decision to grant or deny the defendant's request was within the trial court's discretion. See id. We further disagree with the defendant that the fact that the plaintiffs were represented by counsel — combined with the complexity of the issues at the hearing — necessitated the assistance of counsel. Cf. Sheedy v. Merrimack Cty. Super. Ct., 128 N.H. 51, 56 (1986) (upholding trial court's exercise of discretion in refusing to appoint counsel for petitioner who
"failed to convince us that the issues in this [civil] contempt proceeding are sufficiently complex or that he is so incapable of speaking for himself" that appointed counsel was necessary). To the extent that the defendant seeks to raise a constitutional claim regarding this issue, he has failed to demonstrate that he raised this issue in the trial court, and it is therefore not preserved. See State v. Winstead, 150 N.H. 244, 246 (2003); see also In the Matter of Birmingham & Birmingham, 154 N.H. 51, 56 (2006) (stating self-represented litigants are bound by the same procedural rules that govern parties represented by counsel).
The defendant next argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he stalked the plaintiffs. We review sufficiency of the evidence claims as a matter of law, upholding the trial court's findings and rulings unless they lack evidentiary support or are tainted by legal error. S.C. v. G.C., 175 N.H. 158, 162 (2022). We defer to the trial court's judgments as to the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony. Id. at 162-63. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party — here, the plaintiffs. Id. at 163.
A person commits the offense of stalking if he or she "[p]urposely, knowingly, or recklessly engages in a course of conduct targeted at a specific person which would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her personal safety . . . and the person is actually placed in such fear." RSA 633:3-a, I(a). A
"[c]ourse of conduct" is defined as "2 or more acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose," and may include
"[t]hreatening the safety of the targeted person," "[f]ollowing, approaching, or confronting that person," "[a]ppearing in close proximity to, or entering the person's residence," and "[p]lacing an object on the person's property." RSA 633:3-a, II(a)(1)-(3), (5).
Here, C.A. testified that the defendant picked up a piece of trash and placed it on the windshield of D.W.'s vehicle. Two days later, the defendant threw a bag of blueberries at the plaintiffs. Later that day, the defendant blocked the roadway with his vehicle and prevented the plaintiffs from leaving their residence. The defendant then "taunted" the plaintiffs by exiting his vehicle, "postur[ing]," and calling them "coward[s]" before moving his vehicle out of their way. The following day, the defendant placed tape over the plaintiffs' security camera, rendering it inoperable for a period of time. C.A.
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also described an incident that occurred the following week, when the defendant "started a significant verbal assault on [the plaintiffs], calling [them] names, threatening [her], [and] threatening to hit [her]." C.A. testified that the verbal assault continued "for about 10 or 15 minutes," and that she "was shaking." D.W. also testified that the defendant placed a jar of cigarette butts on the plaintiffs' porch prior to this incident. The plaintiffs played videos of these events without objection from the defendant. In his testimony, the defendant stated that he "had no alternative but to go out and confront them for their provocative behavior," and that he "felt it necessary to stop them from provoking [him], antagoniz[ing] [him], [and] bullying [him]."
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs as we must, it supports the trial court's finding that the defendant purposely engaged in a course of conduct targeted at C.A. and D.W. "which would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her personal safety." RSA 633:3-a, I(a); see S.C., 175 N.H. at 162-63.
As to the "actually placed in such fear" requirement, see RSA 633:3-a, I(a), the defendant argues that each plaintiff's testimony was "disjointed" and failed to explain how his conduct placed them in fear of him. Even if we assume this argument is preserved, we disagree. C.A. testified that she "was shaking" after being verbally assaulted by the defendant, and that since the temporary order was issued, C.A. had felt "a lot more at ease" and her "stress level [had] dropped quite a bit," which was "much better for [her] health."
Moreover, in his petition, D.W. alleged that the defendant's conduct had caused him "to fear for [his] safety," and after swearing in D.W. during the hearing, the trial court asked D.W. whether he "want[ed] to adopt as [his] testimony" the statements in his petition "as truth," to which D.W. replied that he did. To the extent that the defendant argues that the trial court's procedure allowing D.W. to adopt the statements in his petition and the defendant's alleged lack of an opportunity to cross-examine D.W. violated the defendant's constitutional rights, this issue is not preserved. See Winstead, 150 N.H. at 246. We conclude the evidence supports that the plaintiffs were actually placed in fear of the defendant. See RSA 633:3-a, I(a); S.C., 175 N.H. at 162. The defendant also argues that the trial court failed to consider the defendant's "rational explanations" behind what transpired between the parties. We defer to the trial court's judgments as to the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony, which includes the judgment whether to credit all, part, or none of a witness's testimony. S.C., 175 N.H. at 162-63. The defendant finally argues that the trial court erroneously allowed the plaintiffs to testify regarding allegations that were not included in their stalking petitions, but we note that the final stalking orders of protection do not rely upon the incidents that the defendant identifies as being beyond the scope of the allegations in the petitions. This argument, moreover, is not preserved. See Winstead, 150 N.H. at 246. Any issues the defendant raised in
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his notice of appeal but did not brief are deemed waived. See State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49 (2003).
Affirmed.
MACDONALD, C.J., and DONOVAN, COUNTWAY, and GOULD, JJ., concurred.
Timothy A. Gudas, Clerk
Distribution:
4th N.H. Circuit Court - Laconia District Division, 450-2025-CS-00099 and 450-2025-CS-00112
Honorable Laura E. B. Lombardi
Honorable Ellen V. Christo
Allison H. Schwartz, Esq.
Philip A. Brouillard, Esq.
Francis Fredericks, Supreme Court
Sherri Miscio, Supreme Court
File