II. SECOND ORDER
We have jurisdiction over the appeal of the Second Order as a final order of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Tavarez, 141 F.4th at 754-56. We review for abuse of discretion a district court's denial of a motion for early termination of supervised release. United States v. Hale, 127 F.4th 638, 640 (6th Cir. 2025); Tavarez, 141 F.4th at 756-57. As a general matter, "[a] district court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, or when it improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous legal standard." Tavarez, 141 F.4th at 757 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Carter, 463 F.3d 526, 528 (6th Cir. 2006)).
"But a court also abuses its discretion in denying a motion for sentence reduction when 'the record as a whole' fails to satisfy us that the district court 'considered the parties' arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.'" Id. (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1008 (6th Cir. 2020)). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), a district court may, after considering certain of the § 3553(a) factors,1"terminate a term of supervised release and discharge the defendant released at any time after the expiration of one year of supervised release . . . if [the court] is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice."
Missing from this list of factors is the retributive purpose of sentencing expressed in § 3553(a)(2)(A). Id. § 3583(e). As the Supreme Court explained in Esteras v. United States, exclusion of this factor means that district courts cannot consider "the need to exact retribution for the defendant's underlying crime." 606 U.S. 185, 194-95 (2025).
1 The relevant § 3553(a) factors are "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant," "the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for . . . the applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission," any pertinent policy statements from the Sentencing Commission, "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities," and "the need for the sentence imposed" to "afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct," "protect the public from further crimes of the defendant," and "provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner." 18 U.S.C § 3553(a); id. § 3583(e)(1) (listing § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7)).
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Our court has yet to address head-on the propriety of a district court's "custom" not to consider motions for early termination of supervised release before at least fifty percent of a defendant's supervised-release term has elapsed.2Doing so here, we conclude that district courts cannot employ a blanket rule requiring defendants to complete a certain proportion of their supervised-release term without conducting an individualized assessment of the relevant § 3553(a) factors, and that the district court therefore abused its discretion by failing to consider the relevant § 3553(a) factors in the Second Order. As recounted above, the sole enumerated basis for denying Collins's request was the district court's view of the motion as "premature."
R. 1720 (Second Order) (Page ID #6835). The court stated that Collins "has still not completed half of his term of supervision" and that "[a]s Defendant's counsel is aware, the [c]ourt, as a matter of custom, will not consider a defendant's request for early termination until he has completed at least half of his term of supervision." Id. The Second Order does not explain how, if at all, the proportion of his supervised-release term that Collins has completed pertains to any relevant § 3553(a) consideration. Indeed, it gives "no indication that the district court considered the relevant § 3553(a) sentencing factors." United States v. Zai, No. 22-3371, 2022 WL 17832201, at *7 (6th Cir. Dec. 21, 2022).
United States v. Evans is instructive. No. 25-5118, 2025 WL 2486607 (6th Cir. Aug. 26,
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explained that "[t]hough § 3583(e)(1) gives the court discretion in granting a motion for early termination of supervised release, the district court's failure to even consider such motions until twelve months before the probation's end-date completely disregards the statute it must follow."
Id. We find the Seventh Circuit's reasoning persuasive. The amount of time a defendant has served cannot be the sole animating force behind a court's early-termination decision—the statute mandates that such decisions flow from individualized inquiries based on the relevant § 3553(a) factors. A blanket rule, or custom, is not individualized.
We have reasoned similarly in the compassionate-release context. In United States
v. Bailey, we addressed an alleged "de facto 'presumption' against granting compassionate release whenever an inmate has served less than 50% of her sentence" adopted by courts in the Eastern District of Tennessee. No. 20-5951, 2021 WL 3631341, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 17, 2021). We observed that "[s]uch an approach would be problematic" because "[a] critical touchstone of sentencing or sentence-modification is that each defendant must receive individualized consideration under the § 3553(a) factors." Id. at *3. "A district court would contravene that requirement if it used a time-served presumption without otherwise considering all relevant § 3553(a) factors." Id.3
The Second Order still represents an abuse of discretion even if we consider the First Order as part of the relevant record. In the First Order, the district court explicitly stated that "it does not appear that further supervision is necessary to afford adequate deterrence or to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant." R. 1690 (First Order at 3) (Page ID #6760). The district court, therefore, could not logically have considered those factors as warranting further supervision in the Second Order. Additionally, although the First Order references the
"seriousness" of Collins's underlying offense and Collins's "extensive criminal history," id., those invocations are insufficient to adequately justify the Second Order. By the district court's own admission, those facts do not counsel in favor of further supervision because of a need for deterrence or protection. And per Esteras, the court cannot consider those facts for a retributive
3 The Bailey court ultimately concluded that, because the district court did raise other § 3553(a) considerations, reversal was not warranted. 2021 WL 3631341, at *3.
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purpose. The mention of those facts thus does not shed any light on the court's consideration of the relevant factors in the Second Order.
Nor does the district court's observation that "Congress mandated a minimum term of supervision of eight years for those with a record and conviction similar to that of [Collins]," id., justify the Second Order. By the time Collins moved for early termination a second time, he had served an additional 16 months of supervised release, meaning that he completed a total of 34 months of supervision. But the district court did not address whether granting early termination at that point would still lead to an unwarranted sentencing disparity. Furthermore, notwithstanding the eight-year statutory minimum, district courts remain empowered to terminate supervision any time after one year has expired. See United States v. Harris, No. 21-5805, 2023 WL 4030070, at *1 (6th Cir. June 15, 2023), abrogated on other grounds by Tavarez, 141 F.4th at 754-56. Congress, therefore, clearly did not believe that all early terminations result in unwarranted sentencing disparities. In sum, the First Order does not provide any relevant consideration of the pertinent § 3553(a) factors that can be imputed to the Second Order, and the district court abused its discretion in failing to engage with, or even mention, the relevant § 3553(a) factors in the Second Order.
III. THIRD ORDER
We have jurisdiction to review the Third Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Although Collins's third motion was filed, and the Third Order was entered, after Collins noticed his appeal of the Second Order, Collins moved for an indicative ruling under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 37. Rule 37(a) provides that "[i]f a timely motion is made for relief that the court lacks authority to grant because of an appeal that has been docketed and is pending, the court may (1) defer considering the motion; (2) deny the motion; or (3) state either that it would grant the motion if the court of appeals remands for that purpose or that the motion raises a substantial issue." FED. R. CRIM. P. 37(a); see also FED. R. APP. P. 12.1. The district court, therefore, had jurisdiction to deny Collins's third motion, and we have jurisdiction to review that denial. Cf. United States v. Gowder, No. 20-6117, 2021 WL 1328601, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2021) (order); United States v. DeLong, Nos. 21-3255/3429/3509, 2022 WL 816957, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 24, 2022) (order).
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The district court abused its discretion in denying Collins's third motion. The Third Order appears to be an attempt by the district court to backfill analysis evidently missing from the Second Order. Walking back its invocation of its fifty-percent custom in the Second Order, the district court insists that the custom is only a guideline applied with a view toward individual circumstances. But the reasoning in the Third Order falls flat in light of the text of the First and Second Orders.
It may be the case, as the district court asserts, see R. 1727 (Third Order at 3-5) (Page ID #6860-62), and the Government echoes, see D. 13 (Appellee Br. at 17), that the proportion of their supervised-release term that a defendant has completed may be relevant to a court's determination of whether supervision remains necessary to deter or rehabilitate the defendant, or to protect the public. See United States v. Butler, No. 22-5877, 2023 WL 6552878, at *2 (6th Cir. June 14, 2023) (order) ("The short amount of time Butler has served on his term is relevant to many of the § 3553(a) factors, including deterrence and avoiding unwarranted disparities."), abrogated on other grounds by, Hale, 127 F.4th at 642. We do not decide that here. But assuming arguendo that the proportion completed can be considered for its bearing on some relevant § 3553(a) factor(s), a district court would need to be explicit in drawing that connection for a particular defendant: The proportion standing alone is not a relevant consideration. See Tavarez, 141 F.4th at 758 (the mere fact that a defendant "ha[d] not yet served half of the term of his supervision" does not "concern[] any of the relevant § 3553(a) factors" (first alteration in original) (quotation omitted)). Congress imposed a minimum time requirement of one year, and a court may not add to that time requirement without tying its decision to the relevant statutory factors.
In the instant case, the district court concluded in the Third Order that "the need to
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changed its mind. Not did it offer any other § 3553(a) factor to which the proportion of the term completed is relevant. The Third Order, therefore, represents an abuse of discretion.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we REVERSE the decisions of the district court and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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