II. DISTRICT COURT'S RULING ON JOHNSON'S PCRA PETITION ¶26 Johnson argues that even if "the district court owed no deference" to Johnson I, it nevertheless erred on the merits when it concluded that Johnson had not established the prejudice prong of Strickland. But it concluded that Johnson failed to establish the prejudice prong because the unchallenged first part of the lesser- included-offense instruction required the jury to eliminate the option of the greater offense of murder before it could convict for the lesser included offense.
¶27 The prejudice prong requires the petitioner to establish
"that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
"A reasonable probability that the result would have been different exists when petitioner's proof is 'sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" Newton v. State, 2025 UT 50, ¶ 34 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). And the Supreme Court stated in Strickland that "[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
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¶28 For purposes of this case, we assume without deciding that the district court correctly concluded both that Johnson's trial counsel rendered deficient performance by proposing an erroneous jury instruction and that Johnson's appellate counsel rendered deficient performance on appeal by failing to raise the issue under the ineffective assistance of counsel exception to preservation. But we agree with the district court that Johnson cannot establish "a reasonable probability that the result would have been different"
absent the error.
¶29 Where a defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel
"in the context of erroneous jury instructions," he must show "a reasonable probability the jury would not have convicted" if the
"instructions had been correct." State v. Grunwald, 2020 UT 40, ¶ 22,
478 P.3d 1. The district court ruled that Johnson had not made that showing because the first part of the lesser-included-offense instruction required the jury to find that the offense was committed under circumstances not amounting to murder. Because the jury found that Johnson's offense did amount to murder, the jury would never have reached the second part of the instruction that contained the misstated mens rea. Therefore, the district court concluded that the error had no reasonable probability of affecting the outcome. We agree. Appellate courts ordinarily presume that juries, properly instructed, follow the instructions given to them. State v. Chadwick, 2024 UT 34, ¶ 42, 554 P.3d 1098; see also State v. Suhail, 2023 UT App 15, ¶ 142, 525 P.3d 550. Because Johnson has not challenged the first part of the instruction, we presume that it was proper and the jury followed it.
¶30 As written, the first part of the instruction required the jury to find that Johnson, "under circumstances not amounting to aggravated murder, murder, or manslaughter, caused the death of [the victim]." Thus, under the unchallenged wording of the first part of the instruction, the jury could not convict on the lesser included offense unless it found that the circumstances did not amount to the greater offense of murder.
¶31 When assessing prejudice, this court conducts a counterfactual analysis. Ross v. State, 2019 UT 48, ¶ 76, 448 P.3d 1203. We consider a situation in which the error did not occur and ask whether there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different in that scenario. Id. ¶¶ 76-77. Here, we can assess prejudice by imagining the hypothetical situation where the second part of the jury instruction correctly stated the mens rea,
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that is, that the defendant caused the death "while intentionally or knowingly attempting, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another." Johnson I, 2014 UT App 161, ¶ 22, 330 P.3d 743, rev'd, 2017 UT 76, 416 P.3d 443 (cleaned up). But assuming, as we must, that the jury followed its instructions, it would still be precluded from convicting Johnson on the lesser included offense. Under the first part, it was required to find that the death was caused under circumstances not amounting to murder. Because the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson committed murder, there is no reasonable probability that it would have nonetheless convicted him of the lesser offense if the second part had been correctly stated.
¶32 While it is theoretically possible that the jury did not follow the instruction perfectly, Strickland's prejudice standard is framed in terms of reasonable probability of a different outcome but for the error, not a mere possibility.4 See State v. Bonds, 2023 UT 1, ¶ 53 n.12, 524 P.3d 581 (rejecting the court of appeals' description of the "reasonable probability" language from the Strickland standard as similar to a "significant possibility" and clarifying that
"we adhere to the 'reasonable probability' standard and the Supreme Court's analysis and application of this phrase" (cleaned up)). And because we presume juries follow their instructions, the mere theoretical possibility of a jury failing to follow the instructions as written does not rise to the reasonable probability standard mandated by Strickland. See State v. Nelson, 2015 UT 62, ¶ 28, 355 P.3d 1031 (explaining that the "likelihood of a different result must be substantial" (cleaned up)).
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¶33 Given the unchallenged wording of the first part of the instruction and the jury's guilty verdict on the greater offense, we presume that the jury ruled out the possibility of convicting on the lesser offense based on the first part of the instruction alone. This means that the jury was never confronted with the error in the second part. Consequently, even if the mens rea had been stated correctly, there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different result.5
¶34 Because Johnson cannot establish that he was prejudiced by the error, the district court correctly ruled that he had not established ineffective assistance of counsel and dismissed his petition for postconviction relief.
CONCLUSION
¶35 We conclude that because our decision in Johnson II necessarily vacated the court of appeals' ruling on prejudice in Johnson I, the district court did not err in analyzing prejudice without deferring to Johnson I. And we agree with the district court's analysis that the unchallenged first part of the lesser- included-offense instruction precludes a finding of prejudice. Therefore, we affirm.
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