Paul Michael Worman v. State of Alaska

NOTICE

This is a summary disposition issued under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(a). Summary dispositions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

PAUL MICHAEL WORMAN,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF ALASKA,

Appellee.

Court of Appeals No. A-14660 Trial Court No. 4FA-20-00423 CR

SUMMARY DISPOSITON

No. 0472 — March 4, 2026 Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Brent E. Bennett, Judge.

Appearances: David D. Biegel, Assistant Public Advocate, and James Stinson, Public Advocate, for the Appellant. RuthAnne Beach, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Stephen J. Cox, Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Terrell, Judges.

Paul Michael Worman pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to a consolidated count of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor, one count of second-degree sexual assault, and one count of possession of child pornography based on allegations that he sexually assaulted or abused teenage boys placed in his care as a foster parent

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in the 1990s and teenage boys who worked for him in 2018 and later.¹As part of the plea agreement, the parties agreed that Worman would receive a composite sentence of 50 years with 20 years suspended (30 years to serve). Probation conditions were left open to the superior court.

Worman now appeals, raising one issue with regard to his presentence report and five issues with regard to his probation conditions. First, Worman objects to a line in his presentence report that states that the situations of Worman's victims "very likely were further exacerbated by the defendant's sexual and psychological abuse and grooming of them." Worman objects to this line as overly speculative. But, as the State points out, the sentencing record includes interviews with Worman's victims that establish that Worman engaged in sexual and psychological abuse and grooming of his victims, many of whom were already involved in the juvenile justice system and particularly vulnerable. We agree with the State that it is a reasonable inference that the situations of Worman's victims were made worse by Worman's conduct. We therefore affirm the superior court's retention of this line in Worman's presentence report.

Second, Worman objects to Special Probation Condition No. 5, which requires Worman to "inform all person[s] with whom [he has] a dating or sexual relationship of [his] sexual offending history." The probation condition further states that "[p]ersons required to be informed will be determined in consultation with the approved treatment provider and/or the probation officer." Worman acknowledges that this probation condition has been upheld against previous challenges that it is

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unconstitutionally vague.²Worman nevertheless argues that the superior court should have struck this condition because Worman sexually abused teenage boys rather than adults with whom he was in a dating or sexual relationship. But, as the State points out, persons in a dating or sexual relationship with an established sex offender can themselves be vulnerable, particularly if they have children to protect. We accordingly uphold the imposition of this probation condition as within the superior court's broad discretion.³

Third, Worman objects to Special Probation Condition No. 10, which prohibits Worman from entering "places where children congregate such as parks, playgrounds, arcades, recreation centers, and (K-12) schools . . . without written permission of [his] probation officer." Worman objects specifically to the inclusion of

"parks" in the prohibition because, he claims, the condition will exclude him from national parks and other wilderness activities. But, as we have previously explained, the intent of such a condition is to exclude Worman from parks where children "typically gather as a group,"⁴not all state and national parks. This condition is well-justified in this case given that the sentencing record shows that Worman used a zipline park to groom one of his victims. Moreover, the condition also has a safety valve whereby the

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See Whiting v. State, 2014 WL 6713200, at *2 (Alaska App. Nov. 26, 2014) (unpublished); see also Moses v. State, 2024 WL 1554358, at *3-4 (Alaska App. Apr. 10,

probation officer can approve certain parks for Worman's use. Given the safety valve and the narrowing construction discussed above, we find no abuse of discretion in the imposition of this special probation condition.

Fourth, Worman objects to Special Probation Condition No. 11, which prohibits Worman from entering "any establishment whose primary business is the sale of sexually explicit material" and "any establishment where nude dancing or posing is part of the entertainment to include escort services or massage parlors . . . [u]nless [g]ranted permission by his probation officer in connection with any of his treatment providers as appropriate." Worman argues that the probation condition is not narrowly tailored because none of his crimes involved these types of professional establishments and because these types of establishments do not allow minors in any case. Because the sentencing record indicates that the court subjected the condition to heightened scrutiny and Worman's grooming of his teenage victims sometimes included the use of adult pornography and massage, we find no abuse of discretion.

Fifth, Worman objects to Special Probation Condition No. 13, which requires Worman to "install internet monitoring software onto any device connected to the internet at the request of the probation officer and pay for the associated costs."

Specifically, Worman objects to the requirement that he pay for the internet monitoring software (if it is requested). At sentencing, the probation officer testified that the cost of the internet monitoring software is $11 per month. Worman does not assert that such a cost would present a financial hardship. Instead, Worman's objection appears to be that it is unconstitutional to make him pay for any of his probation supervision without affirmatively considering less restrictive alternatives. But, as the State points out, there are other circumstances where defendants are statutorily required to pay for parts of their supervision,⁵and Worman provides no authority to suggest that such statutes are

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unconstitutional. We note that if Worman believes that the probation officer's request for internet monitoring is unreasonable or if paying for the monitoring presents an extreme hardship, Worman may petition the court for relief.⁶Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the imposition of this probation condition. Lastly, Worman objects to Special Probation Condition 14, which prohibits Worman from opening or accessing social media accounts such as Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp without prior written permission from his probation officer and treatment provider. The condition also states that "[i]f requested permission is denied, probationer may petition the court." Worman challenges this probation condition on the ground that it is insufficiently narrowly tailored given the ubiquity of social media interaction in today's society. But the condition does not preclude Worman from having a social media account; it simply requires written permission. Moreover, if that permission is unreasonably denied, Worman has recourse to the courts. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the imposition of this probation condition.

The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.

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