Per agreement of the Parties, there shall be no requirement for the posting of a bond by any Party related to the Court's Injunction Order dated June 5, 2025 and/or the appeal thereof until fourteen
(14) days after the Court of Appeals issues its ruling. SD1 acknowledges, in its Response to Movants' Motion to Vacate and/or Modify the Kentucky Court of Appeals' Order Dissolving Injunction, that the agreed order "was an effort by the parties to maintain the status quo while the Injunction Order was under appellate review." This much is supported by the fact that Movants tendered another agreed order on the same day in which Movants agreed to stay enforcement of the injunction pending the outcome of the appeal. Both parties agreed to give up a right in order to facilitate the speedy process, keeping in mind that the situation grows more dire for Movants as each day passes. Certainly, the Movants are motivated to reach a quick resolution.
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What's more is that SD1 represented to the trial court that "[s]hould the Court stay enforcement of the Injunction Order pending review by the Court of Appeals, the issue of a bond need not be addressed unless and until the Injunction Order is affirmed by the reviewing Court(s)." SD1 now reverses course by raising the issue of bond as a reason to render the Injunction Order ineffective, despite having agreed to waive the bond issue and despite the Injunction Order having not been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In its Order Granting Interlocutory Relief, the Court of Appeals did not acknowledge or reference the parties' agreement to waive the bond requirement until after the Court of Appeals had rendered its decision. Because of this, it is difficult to know whether the parties' agreed waiver was of any relevance to their holding on this issue. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held the failure to issue a bond to be "fatal to enforcement [of] the trial court's temporary injunction." However, just several months ago, the Court of Appeals was faced with a similar situation in which an injunction order lacked a bond. The Court of Appeals, which had declined to dissolve the injunction, "directed the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine an appropriate bond amount" and, once that determination was made, required the party seeking an injunction to post a bond in that amount, with appropriate surety in accordance with CR 65.05(1). Svestka v. Oakes, No. 2024-CA-0748-MR, 2025 WL 1415813, at *2 (Ky. App. May 16, 2025). I think this is the more prudent course. In moving forward with these proceedings, I would follow the Court of Appeals' precedent
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in Oakes and remand to the trial court with instructions to order a bond in compliance with CR 65.05(1).
Limitations of this Holding
Lastly, I would clarify that this opinion is limited to the facts of this situation. Only in a situation where an alleged tortfeasor damages an alleged victim's home to the extent that remaining in the home poses a risk to the victim's health and safety, and where the victim faces constructive eviction from that home which could result in either homelessness or the loss of their home, would temporary injunctive relief be appropriate. Additionally, all other requirements of a temporary injunction in our Rules of Civil Procedure and case law must be met. This holding would in no way change the course of our jurisprudence in relation to foreclosure actions based upon default or other contractually related matters. This set of facts is one crying out for equitable relief, and this cry is one in which our courts of justice are already equipped to hear.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I would vacate the Court of Appeals' order granting interlocutory relief to Respondents and reinstate the temporary injunction order issued by Campbell Circuit Court. However, because the trial court did not set a bond in accordance with CR 65.05 in its temporary injunction order, I would direct the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine an appropriate bond amount and, once that determination was
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made, direct the trial court to require Movants to post a bond in that amount, with appropriate surety in accordance with CR 65.05(1). Thompson, J., joins.
ENTERED: FEBRUARY 19, 2026
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CHIEF JUSTICE