ORDER
After consideration of the parties' briefs and the record on appeal, and following oral argument, it appears to the Court that:
1. North American Fire Ultimate Holdings, LP ("North American Fire") appeals from a Court of Chancery decision dismissing its amended complaint for failing to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6). North American Fire filed the action against its former employee for violating restrictive covenants under an Incentive Unit Grant Agreement. The agreement granted the employee common units of North American Fire in exchange for an agreement to abide by certain
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restrictive covenants.1The Court of Chancery dismissed the amended complaint because it found that the restrictive covenants were unenforceable as a matter of law due to a lack of consideration at the time North American Fire enforced the agreement. Because consideration is measured at the time of contracting and not at the time of enforcement, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
2. Alan Doorly worked at Cross Fire & Security, Inc. ("Cross Fire"), a company he co-founded with his brother, for approximately twenty years. Cross Fire designed, installed, and serviced life safety systems, such as fire alarms and smoke detectors. In May 2021, North American Fire acquired Cross Fire and operated it as a stand-alone business. Under the acquisition agreement, Doorly continued in his position at Cross Fire and acquired 700,000 common units of North American Fire.
3. In February 2022, North American Fire reorganized its corporate structure. As a part of the restructuring, Doorly exchanged all his common units for 300,000 Class B units of North American Fire, which were subject to time and performance vesting requirements (the "Units").2The exchange transaction was
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governed by an Incentive Unit Grant Agreement (the "Agreement").3When Doorly executed the Agreement, he agreed to be bound by restrictive covenants, which included restrictions on "the use of confidential information, non-solicitation of employees and customers, and non-competition."4
4. About a year later, North American Fire promoted Doorly to Senior Executive and Business Unit Leader at Cross Fire. A few months after his promotion, Doorly started planning to leave Cross Fire and start a competing company. By May 2023, Doorly had formed an entity called "Empire Fire Alarm Specialist, LLC" ("Empire"). When North American Fire discovered Doorly's actions in December 2023, they terminated him.5North American Fire classified it as a for-cause termination. Doorly's for-cause termination triggered an automatic forfeiture of both his vested and unvested Units under the Agreement.6
6. In January 2024, North American Fire filed a complaint against Doorly for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and sought a declaratory judgment to toll the timeframe within which it could enforce the restrictive covenants (the "Contract Claims"). North American Fire also claimed that Doorly tortiously interfered with its prospective contractual
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business relationships (the "Tort Claim"). Doorly filed a motion to dismiss the Contract and Tort Claims. Instead of filing a response, North American Fire amended its complaint. Doorly filed a second motion to dismiss.
7. In March 2025, the Court of Chancery dismissed North American Fire's amended complaint. As to the Contract Claims, the court held that the Units were the sole consideration for the restrictive covenants, and that once North American Fire declared that Doorly had forfeited the Units, the contract became unenforceable for lack of consideration.7The court relied on Section 6 of the Agreement, which governed "Restrictive Covenants," as evidence that the Units were the sole consideration for the covenants.8The court dismissed the Tort Claim for lack of personal jurisdiction because "the contacts relevant to the tortious interference claim [were] entirely divorced from Delaware."9North American Fire appealed only the dismissal of the Contract Claims to this Court.
8. North American Fire raises two claims on appeal. First, it contends that the Court of Chancery erred when it assessed consideration at the time of the alleged
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breach of the restrictive covenants.10Instead, it argues, "the existence of consideration is measured at the time of contract formation, not the time of breach."11 Second, North American Fire contends that the Court of Chancery incorrectly concluded that Doorly did not receive any consideration other than the Units in exchange for the restrictive covenants.12
9. We review questions of law—including rulings on a motion to dismiss and a trial court's interpretation of a contract—de novo.13"[T]he formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and [] consideration."14It is a "general principle[] of contract law that
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consideration must be measured at the time the parties enter into their contract and that the diminished value of the economic benefit conferred, or even a complete lack of value, does not result in a failure of consideration."15Importantly, therefore, consideration is measured at the time of formation and is not reevaluated at the time of enforcement.16
10. To support this proposition, North American Fire cites Newell Rubbermaid Inc. v. Storm.17We find Newell instructive.18There, the plaintiff sought
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to enjoin a former employee from violating restrictive covenants contained in several restricted stock unit ("RSU") agreements.19Like incentive units, RSUs are a promise of equity in the company subject to vesting, which is often measured by time or performance.20The former employee asserted that the RSU agreements lacked consideration and were unenforceable because the RSUs were subject to vesting periods.21Under the agreements, if plaintiff was terminated for any reason before the vesting period, then the RSUs were automatically forfeited.22The Court of Chancery rejected the former employee's argument, observing that at the time of formation the former employee "was granted a benefit that held actual value."23The court noted that although "value is somewhat contingent, based on certain factors consideration at the time of enforcement. The court's holdings appear to support that, in the court's view, no benefit was received at the time of formation. See 2015 WL 7694865, at *3 ("NBTY seeks to enforce an agreement that has already expired and for which the individual defendants received no benefit that had any actual value" (emphasis added)).
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such as the time period in which the units will vest and [the former employee's] likelihood of future employment . . . [it was] not illusory."24
11. Doorly attempts to distinguish Newell by arguing that the plaintiff there, before the forfeiture, had also received "the cash equivalent of dividends."25By contrast, Doorly argues that "the clawback at issue here dispossessed [him] of all consideration he had received."26However, the former employee's receipt of a dividend equivalent was an independent form of consideration and was not material to the court's holding that "[a]lthough the [RSU] agreements contemplate a contingency . . . the inclusion of such a contingency does not convert the RSUs into illusory consideration."27Here, like Newell, although the value of the Units was
"somewhat contingent," it was not illusory at the time of formation.28The Court of Chancery erred in evaluating whether the Agreement was enforceable by determining whether there was consideration at the time of enforcement.
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Court of Chancery is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths Justice