THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2024-0544, State of New Hampshire v. Michael P. Sexton, the court on September 3, 2025, issued the following order:
The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(3). The defendant, Michael P. Sexton, appeals his convictions for driving with a suspended registration, see RSA 261:178 (2024), and theft of services, see RSA 637:8 (2016). He argues that the Circuit Court (Greenhalgh, J.) erred by depriving him of his right to due process and by crediting the State's evidence. He also asserts that the trial judge was biased against him. We affirm.
The defendant first argues that the trial court deprived him of his right to due process. The primary purpose of procedural due process is to provide parties with the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Bragg v. Director, N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 141 N.H. 677, 679 (1997). As an initial matter, the defendant has failed to show that he was denied adequate advanced notice of the State's witnesses and evidence, as he alleges. The State's two witnesses were the sheriff who interacted with him and the former host of the campground where he stayed overnight without paying the required fee. Moreover, the record shows that the defendant was given ample opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. The court ended the defendant's cross-examination of the sheriff only after the cross-examination had become repetitive. The fact that the judge threatened to find the defendant in contempt for repeatedly interrupting him does not constitute a violation of due process.
We construe the defendant's next argument, that the trial court erred in crediting the State's evidence, as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions, which we review de novo. State v. Collyns, 166 N.H. 514, 517 (2014). To prevail in his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant must prove that no rational trier of fact, viewing all the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The sheriff testified that, during a traffic stop on October 6, 2023, he informed the defendant that the State of California had suspended his motor vehicle registration. In support of the sheriff's testimony, the State introduced
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the defendant's registration record from the State of California and a report from the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, which stated that the registration had been suspended on July 10, 2023. The sheriff testified that when he informed the defendant of the suspension, the defendant told him that he would rectify the problem immediately. The sheriff testified that he later learned that the defendant did not re-register his vehicle until January 2024. The campground host testified that the defendant stayed overnight at the campground without paying the required fee. The defendant suggests that, through his cross-examination, he effectively discredited the testimony of the State's witnesses and their supporting evidence. He also asserts that the trial court should have afforded greater weight to his Arizona insurance card as proof of insurance. Evaluation of witness credibility, resolving conflicts in the testimony, and determining the weight to be given to the evidence are matters within the province of the trier of fact. See State v. Alwardt, 164 N.H. 52, 57 (2012). Moreover, the record fails to show that the defendant introduced the Arizona insurance card into evidence. See In the Matter of Birmingham & Birmingham, 154 N.H. 51, 56 (2006) (self-represented litigants are bound by the same procedural rules that govern parties represented by counsel). Even if the insurance card was admitted, the trial court was not compelled to find that, merely because the defendant produced an Arizona insurance card, the State failed to prove that he drove with a suspended license.
The defendant also asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the theft of services charge because the campground was in a "U.S. fee area."
However, the sheriff testified that there is a memorandum of understanding between the U.S. Forest Service and the sheriff's department that allows the sheriff's department to patrol the area, including the campground. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. See State
v. Collyns, 166 N.H. at 517. The defendant next argues that the trial judge was biased against him. A party seeking to disqualify a judge based upon a claim of bias must first raise this issue in the trial court. In the Matter of Nassar & Nassar, 156 N.H. 769, 780 (2008). The defendant has failed to show that he raised this issue in the trial court. Even if the defendant preserved this issue for review, he has failed to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have questioned the impartiality of the trial court. See Sup. Ct. R. 38, Canon 2.11; State v. Bader,
148 N.H. 265, 268 (2002).
To the extent that the defendant raises additional issues in his brief, we conclude that they are insufficiently developed to warrant review. See Anna H. Cardone Revocable Trust v. Cardone, 160 N.H. 521, 526 (2010) ("Judicial review is not warranted for complaints regarding adverse rulings without
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developed legal argument, and neither passing reference to constitutional claims nor casual invocations of constitutional rights without support by legal argument or authority warrants extended consideration."). Affirmed.
MacDonald, C.J., and Donovan and Countway, JJ., concurred.
Timothy A. Gudas, Clerk