THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2024-0564, In the Matter of Clara Carr and Ryan Carr, the court on September 17, 2025, issued the following order:
The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(3). The respondent, Ryan Carr (Father), appeals a decision of the Circuit Court (Steckowych, J.), issued following a hearing, that resulted in a modification to his child support obligation payable to Clara Carr (Mother). We affirm in part and vacate in part.
The parties have two minor children. On June 20, 2019, the trial court approved the parties' final divorce stipulation. The parties revised this stipulation in February of 2022. Per that revised agreement, Father paid Mother $174.00 biweekly. On October 23, 2023, Mother filed a petition to modify child support and the parenting plan. Father filed a cross-petition regarding both issues. The parties resolved their parenting-plan dispute by stipulation and thus proceeded to a hearing as to child support only.
The record supports that in 2023 Father earned: $9,575.73 per month in regular pay from his full-time employment; $14,464.80 as an annual bonus from the same employer; and $178 per month in veteran's benefits. Father testified through counsel that his annual bonus, "broken out per month . . . would be $1,205.33." Mother earned $9,025.15 per month between her salary from her regular employment and a $1,506.88 veteran's benefit.
The parties stipulated that a "substantial change of circumstances," see RSA 458-C:7, I(a) (2018), justified a modification to child support. Specifically, at trial, Father's counsel identified the changed circumstances as "Mother has relocated to a different home, and Father has started a new business[.]" Mother sought child support in accordance with the statutory guidelines, and Father sought a downward deviation.
The trial court declined to permit a downward deviation, and instead ordered Father to pay guideline support of $1,785.50 per month. In doing so, the trial court determined that:
Father has not met his burden of proof to show that he should be awarded a downward deviation in the child support amount. Father has not shown the court, or mother, the required information
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relative to the expenses he claims are necessary and reasonable to maintain this new business venture he started. It is unclear exactly what expenses he incurred and how they were paid from what he submitted.
In addition to guideline support, the trial court ordered Father to pay 50 percent of the children's extracurricular activity expenses and "other unanticipated costs."
On appeal, Father argues that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion when it failed to provide a written analysis explaining its rejection of each of the statutory bases upon which Father sought a downward deviation, specifically, RSA 458-C:5, I(b)(l), (d), (h)(2)(A) to (C), and (j) (Supp. 2024). These six statutory factors, Father asserts, are applicable because the parties have approximately the same incomes, similar expenses, and an equal parenting schedule. Father contends that because the statute requires the trial court "to make written findings of the applicability of any of the cited grounds for deviation," see RSA 458-C:5, I, the trial court erred by not setting forth a written analysis of the inapplicability of each statutory subsection identified by him. Mother asserts that Father's statutory argument is not preserved, and, alternatively, that the statute requires written findings only when a trial court deviates from the child support guidelines, which did not occur here. We agree with Mother that RSA chapter 458-C does not mandate a written assessment of each proffered basis for deviation when the trial court ultimately orders guideline support.1
When interpreting a statute, we first look to the statutory language, and whenever possible construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. In the Matter of Routhier & Routhier, 175 N.H. 6, 11 (2022). We interpret the statute as written, and we will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. RSA 458-C:4, II (2018) provides that:
There shall be a rebuttable presumption in any proceeding for the award of child support that the amount of the award which would result from the application of guidelines provided under this chapter is the correct amount of child support. A written finding or a specific finding by the presiding officer on the record that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case,
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as determined by using the criteria set forth in RSA 458-C:5, shall be sufficient to rebut the presumption in such case. Id. (emphases added). RSA 458-C:5, I, provides, in relevant part, that:
Special circumstances, including, but not limited to, the following, if raised by any party to the action or by the court, shall be considered in light of the best interests of the child and may result in adjustments in the application of support guidelines provided under this chapter. The court shall make written findings relative to the applicability of the following: . . . .
Id.
Thus, RSA 458-C:4 establishes a presumption of guideline support and sets the threshold for rebuttal. RSA 458-C:4, II. It requires the trial court to present factual findings to justify a deviation only. Id. Accordingly, when RSA 458-C:4 and :5 are read together, the plain language demonstrates that when a court determines that no special circumstances under RSA 458-C:5 apply, the presumption of guideline support remains intact, and written findings pertaining to a party's basis for a requested deviation are not required. See RSA 458-C:4-:5; In the Matter of Blaisdell & Blaisdell, 174 N.H. 187, 193 (2021) ("[W]e do not consider words and phrases in isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole."). Here, the trial court determined that Father failed to satisfy his burden of proof, thus it did not err by not making written factual findings assessing the inapplicability of each of the six statutory factors under which Father sought a deviation.
In addition to the statutory argument addressed above, Father presents multiple other challenges to the trial court's decision to decline to authorize a downward deviation. Trial courts have broad discretion in reviewing and modifying child support orders. In the Matter of Greenberg & Greenberg, 174 N.H. 168, 171-72 (2021). The trial court is in the best position to determine the parties' respective needs and their respective ability to meet those needs. Id. We will not disturb the trial court's rulings regarding child support absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion or an error of law. In the Matter of Ndyaija & Ndyaija, 173 N.H. 127, 140 (2020). We review only whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made, and we will not disturb the trial court's determination if it could reasonably have been made. In the Matter of Summers & Summers, 172 N.H. 474, 479 (2019). Our standard of review is not whether we would rule differently than the trial court, but whether a reasonable person could have reached the same decision as the trial court based upon the same evidence. Id. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Id. Nor will we reweigh the equities. Id.
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Upon review of the record before us, we determine that there exists an objective basis sufficient to support the trial court's decision to require Father to pay guideline support, and we therefore affirm its decision. Accordingly, the additional arguments that Father raises regarding the trial court's declination to deviate from guideline support do not warrant further discussion. See Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322 (1993).
Finally, Father argues that the trial court erred by ordering him to pay 50 percent of the children's extracurricular activity expenses in addition to guidelines child support. We agree. In In the Matter of Coderre & Coderre, 148 N.H. 401 (2002), superseded in part by statute as recognized in In the Matter of Regan & Regan, 164 N.H. 1 (2012), we held that extracurricular activity expenses fall into the same category as food, shelter, and recreation, and are therefore included in the total support obligation under the guidelines. Coderre, 148 N.H. at 406; see also In the Matter of Donovan & Donovan, 152 N.H. 55, 60 (2005) ("[T]he trial court erred in not applying our holding in Coderre when it recalculated the father's support obligation under the guidelines and required him to continue paying an additional $150 per month for extracurricular activities."). Therefore, we vacate the trial court's decision requiring Father to pay 50 percent of the children's extracurricular activity expenses and "other unanticipated costs."
MacDonald, C.J., and Donovan, and Countway, JJ., concurred.
Affirmed in part and
vacated in part.
Timothy A. Gudas, Clerk