"THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Court finds [Bateman's] fee is due to be paid as tendered, [Bateman's] bill of $6180.00 is reasonable and the previous Order, memorializing the party's agreement[,] stands. [Lee's] objection is DENIED."
(Capitalization in original.)
On January 24, 2020, Lee filed a notice of appeal to the Pike Circuit Court. On August 27, 2024, and September 17, 2024, the circuit court conducted hearings on the appeal, primarily addressing the
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reasonableness of Bateman's invoice. Afterward, it entered a judgment that provided:
"This matter came before the Court on appeal from Probate Court. Specifically, [Lee] objected to [Bateman's] invoice and bill. The parties stipulated and agreed that all other aspects of the Probate Court's final judgment were proper and should not be disturbed on appeal. [Lee] argued [Bateman's] bill was unreasonable and should be reduced on appeal. [Bateman] is a licensed attorney and charged $150.00 per hour for all services in this matter. [Bateman], however, did not perform legal services. The itemized invoice shows her time was spent handling routine functions associated with administering a simple estate such as making phone calls, setting up bank accounts, coordinating lawn services for the vacant residence, etc.
"Upon consideration of the Probate Court record, the
filings, and arguments of counsel, it is hereby, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED
"1. The Probate Court's Order dated December 20, 2019, is hereby REVERSED IN
PART.
"2. The Court finds [Bateman] shall be paid $70.00 per hour. This hourly rate is consistent with the rate paid by the State of Alabama for legal services pursuant to Ala. Code § 15-12-21. (Total hours invoiced (41 hours) minus travel time (12.1 hours) is $2,023.00.)
"3. The Court finds the standard mileage rate for transportation or travel expenses shall be paid at a rate of 58 cents per mile pursuant to the 2019 IRS mileage rate. (Total of sixteen (16) round
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trips to Brundidge (40 miles x 16 trips=640 miles driven) multiplied by .58 is $371.20.)
"4. Total payment due to [Bateman] is $2,394.20.
"5. All other provisions of the probate court's final judgment remain in full force and effect."
This appeal followed.
Standard of Review
"The appeal from the probate court to the circuit court in this case is governed by Ala. Code 1975, § 12-22-20.
" '[Section 12-22-20] does not allow for a trial de novo in the circuit court; rather, the circuit court acts in an appellate capacity and may not substitute its judgment for that of the probate court. Martin v. Vreeland, 526 So. 2d 24 (Ala. 1988). Where the evidence is presented ore tenus, the probate court's findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are plainly erroneous or manifestly unjust. Craig v. Perry, 565 So. 2d 171 (Ala. 1990).'
"Sanders v. Brooks, 611 So. 2d 336, 337-38 (Ala. 1992)."
Patterson v. Patterson, 765 So. 2d 8, 10-11 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999). Discussion
Bateman argues that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in reversing the probate court's order awarding her administrator-ad-litem fees. We agree.
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Regarding compensation for administrators ad litem, § 43-2-256, Ala. Code 1975, provides:
"Such administrator ad litem must be allowed for his services such compensation as the judge of probate or judge of the circuit court appointing him may direct, to be taxed and collected as part of the costs of the proceedings, either out of the estate represented by him, or out of the general fund administered therein or out of any party to the action who may be taxed therewith, as the court may direct."
Section 43-2-256 does not specify an hourly rate to be paid to administrators ad litem and does not set forth any factors for determining how much an administrator ad litem should be paid. In this case, the probate court conducted a hearing at which Bateman testified. Although we do not have a transcript of that hearing, in its order dated December 20, 2019, the probate court explained in detail its reasoning for appointing Bateman and its reasoning for awarding her requested compensation in the case.
" The rule is that where no testimony is contained in the record on appeal, a decree which recites that it was granted on pleadings, proofs and testimony will not be disturbed on appeal. Williams v. Clark, 263 Ala. 228, 82 So. 2d 295 [(1955)], 2 Ala. Dig., Appeal & Error [Key No.] 671(3). And it will be presumed that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict, finding, judgment, or decree where all the evidence is not in the record. Williams v. Clark, supra; 2 Ala. Dig., Appeal & Error [Key No.] 907(4).
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" A decree of the probate court will not be reversed if the evidence upon which it is made is not set forth, and there is no bill of exceptions, unless it appears in the decree that the court had no jurisdiction. Forrester v. Forrester's Adm'rs, 40 Ala. 557 [(1867) ]; McAlpine v. Carre, 203 Ala. 468, 83 So. 477
[ (1919) ]. ...
" The finding of the probate court, based on the examination of witnesses ore tenus, is presumed to be correct and will not be disturbed on appeal unless palpably erroneous. Cox v. Logan, 262 Ala. 11, 76 So. 2d 169 [(1954)], and cases there cited.
" We assume that the circuit court affirmed the decree of the probate court on the principles we have stated [above], and we have no alternative but to affirm the decree of the circuit court on the same authorities."
Davis v. Davis, 278 Ala. 328, 330, 178 So. 2d 154, 155 (1965).
"Under the ore tenus rule, when a trial court hears live testimony, its findings of fact are presumed correct and the resulting judgment will be reversed only if it is shown to be plainly or palpably wrong or against the preponderance of the evidence. Water Works & Sewer Bd. of Prichard[ v. Synovus Bank], 404 So. 3d [202,] 205 [(Ala. 2024)]. And an appellant cannot meet its burden of making that showing when a transcript of the evidentiary hearing -- or, if the transcript is unavailable, a 'statement of the evidence' that complies with Rule 10(d), Ala. R. App. P. -- is not included in the record on appeal. As our Court of Civil Appeals has succinctly explained, when ' " 'oral testimony is considered by the trial court in reaching its judgment and that testimony is not present in the record as either a transcript or Rule 10(d), [Ala]. R. [App]. P., statement, it must be conclusively presumed that the testimony [was] sufficient to support the judgment.' " ' Cockrell v. Cockrell, 40 So. 3d 712, 717 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (citations omitted). In such instances, we must
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affirm a trial court's judgment and have no need to address the merits of the appellant's underlying arguments. Id."
Island Girl Outfitters, LLC v. Allied Dev. of Alabama, LLC, [Ms. SC- 2023-0561, Mar. 21, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2025). In this case, the circuit court was sitting as an appellate court.
"In Prestwood v. Prestwood, 395 So. 2d 8 (Ala. 1981), we held that 'section 12-22-20 ... allows an appeal to this court or to the circuit court. It does not allow a trial de novo, with jury, in the circuit court, as appellant contends.' Under these statutory provisions, an appeal to the circuit court should follow the same procedure as an appeal to this Court, i.e., the appeal should be conducted in the manner prescribed by the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure."
Martin v. Vreeland, 526 So. 2d 24, 25 (Ala. 1988) (footnote omitted). The record in the circuit court did not include a transcript of the evidentiary hearing in the probate court, and the parties did not provide the circuit court with a statement of the evidence pursuant to Rule 10(d), Ala. R. App. P. Thus, the circuit court was required to conclusively presume that the testimony presented during that hearing was sufficient to support the probate court's order. Instead, the circuit court substituted its judgment for that of the probate court in reducing Bateman's compensation. Based on our examination of the record and
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relevant statutes and caselaw, we conclude that the circuit court erred in reducing Bateman's compensation.
Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, we reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand the case for proceedings that are consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Stewart, C.J., and Mendheim, McCool, and Lewis, JJ., concur. Shaw, Sellers, and Cook, JJ., concur in the result.
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