D. CIRCUIT COURT RULING
¶63 At the close of evidence, the circuit court determined that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Behlmer was no longer coercing Stetzer when she was driving, because she did not reasonably believe there was an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm. The circuit court found her guilty of both the operating a vehicle while intoxicated and operating a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol content charges, and under WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(c), convicted Stetzer of the prohibited alcohol content offense. Stetzer appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. Stetzer appealed again, to this court.
II. ANALYSIS
¶64 Whether the State met its burden to disprove the defense of coercion is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. Jones v. State,
226 Wis. 2d 565, ¶61, 594 N.W.2d 738 (1999).
A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
¶65 The coercion defense allows a defendant to engage in unlawful conduct if the defendant reasonably believes that the conduct is the only means of protection from the threat of imminent death or great bodily harm. WISCONSIN STAT. § 939.46(1), specifically provides:
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CHIEF JUSTICE KAROFSKY, dissenting
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A threat by a person other than the actor's coconspirator which causes the actor reasonably to believe that his or her act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to the actor or another and which causes him or her so to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that act, except that if the prosecution is for first-degree intentional homicide, the degree of the crime is reduced to 2nd-degree intentional homicide.
¶66 Once a defendant puts forth sufficient evidence to assert the defense of coercion, the burden shifts to the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting lawfully. Moes v. State,
91 Wis. 2d 756, 766, 284 N.W.2d 66 (1979) ("[T]he law . . . requires the state to bear the burden of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt an asserted coercion defense."); see also State v. Kizer, 2022 WI 58, ¶9, 403 Wis. 2d 142,
976 N.W.2d 356. The jury instruction makes this clear: "The State must prove by evidence which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting lawfully under the defense of coercion." Wis. JI—Criminal 790 (2005).
¶67 The State's burden to disprove coercion is necessarily heavy; indeed it is the most rigorous burden of proof in our justice system. See Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz U.S., LLC, 2012 WI 57, ¶36, 341 Wis. 2d 119, 815 N.W.2d 314. As the jury instruction provides, "'reasonable doubt' means a doubt based upon reason and common sense. It is a doubt for which a reason can be given, arising from a fair and rational consideration of the evidence or lack of evidence." Wis. JI—Criminal 140 (2024) (citation omitted). In other words, if at the end of the trial, the evidence, or lack of evidence, leaves any doubt "for which a reason can be given" about whether the defendant was coerced, the State has not met its burden. Id. (citation omitted).
¶68 To prove that a defendant was not acting lawfully under the defense of coercion, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not being coerced at the time of the criminal act. Here the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Stetzer did not reasonably believe that driving was the only means of protecting herself from the threat of imminent death or great bodily harm. ¶69 The concepts of reasonableness and imminence are central to the analysis in this case. The coercion jury instruction identifies both:
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CHIEF JUSTICE KAROFSKY, dissenting
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The law allows the defendant to act under the defense of coercion only if a threat by another person (other than the defendant's co-conspirator) caused the defendant to believe that his act was the only means of preventing [imminent public disaster] [imminent death or great bodily harm to himself (or to others)] and which pressure caused him to act as he did. In addition, the defendant's beliefs must have been reasonable. A belief may be reasonable even though mistaken. In determining whether the defendant's beliefs were reasonable, the standard is what a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence would have believed in the defendant's position under the circumstances that existed at the time of the alleged offense. The reasonableness of the defendant's beliefs must be determined from the standpoint of the defendant at the time of his acts and not from the viewpoint of the jury now. Id. (emphasis added). Where the defendant is a victim of domestic abuse, the reasonableness of a defendant's belief and the imminence of the threat must assessed within the context of the abuse.
1. REASONABLE BELIEF
¶70 I agree with the majority that evidence of a defendant's personal history is relevant to coercion. "The personal characteristics and histories of the parties are relevant" to the reasonableness of the defendant's belief. State v. Johnson, 2021 WI 61, ¶24, 397 Wis. 2d 633, 961 N.W.2d 18 (citation omitted). The relevance of personal history is echoed in the jury instruction, which directs the fact-finder to evaluate what someone reasonably "would have believed in the defendant's position."
Wis. JI—Criminal 790 (2005).
¶71 Personal history is particularly salient when assessing the behavior of domestic abuse victims. Hanusa framed it this way: "The question for victims of domestic violence isn't how a reasonable person reacts in this situation. The question is given trauma that the victim of domestic violence has received, how would a reasonable domestic violence survivor respond. That's the important question." The violence can have widespread effects. "As with victims of terrorism or those held hostage, a battered woman's perception of her situation and reality in general is changed and substantially altered. When this occurs, her capacity to evaluate options is diminished substantially." United States v. Dingwall, 6 F.4th 744, 749 (7th Cir. 2021). For a reasonable victim of domestic violence,
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CHIEF JUSTICE KAROFSKY, dissenting
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"[i]n situations of stress and trauma, there tends to be a narrowing or focusing on parts of the experience that the brain is appraising as really essential to survival and coping."5A domestic violence victim in survival mode will experience an "ignoring or non-processing of peripheral details."6
2. IMMINENCE
¶72 "Importantly, the word 'imminent' does not mean 'immediate.'" Kemper Ind. Ins. Co. v. Islami, 2021 WI 53, ¶53, 397 Wis. 2d 394, 959 N.W.2d 912 (Karofsky, J., dissenting) (explaining imminence existed when Islami's ex burned down her house, even though she was out of the country when the arson occurred). Black's Law Dictionary defines "imminent" as "dangerously impending" or "threatening to occur immediately," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 894 (12th ed. 2024), whereas it defines "immediate" as, "[o]ccurring without delay; instant," id. at 893. As the Kansas Supreme Court has explained the distinction when discussing domestic violence, immediate and imminent danger are not synonymous.
"[T]he time limitations in the use of the word 'immediate' are much stricter than those with the use of the word 'imminent.'" Kansas v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 478 (Kan. 1985).
¶73 Understanding the distinction between imminent and immediate is especially important when assessing the culpability of a domestic violence victim who engages in unlawful conduct to protect herself from the threat of imminent death or great bodily harm.
"Imminent" does not mean that the threat or harm is occurring this moment. Rather, "imminent" means that the threat or harm is impending.
"[T]he use of the word 'immediate' . . . obliterates the nature of the buildup of terror and fear which had been systematically created over a long period of time. 'Imminent' describes the situation more accurately."
Hundley, 693 P.2d at 479 (discussing the related self-defense statutory language). Conflating the two standards leads courts to improperly blame domestic violence victims for failing to exercise proper judgment. See, e.g.,
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CHIEF JUSTICE KAROFSKY, dissenting
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United States v. Dixon 901 F.3d 1170, 1179-80 (10th Cir. 2018) (holding Dixon failed to show imminence when she embezzled funds to prevent her abuser from moving in with her). Said differently, "the relevant question . . . concerns the relationship as a whole," not just the most recent incident of abuse.7
¶74 Hanusa explained how a domestic violence abuser is able to control his victim with imminent threats of violence. "[H]e doesn't have to beat her every day for him to use intimidation to get what he wants. The psychological abuse then can serve to modify her behavior. There's always that threat that he's capable and willing to use physical violence."
B. APPLICATION
¶75 When applying the proper reasonableness and imminence legal standards, reasonable doubt remains as to whether Behlmer stopped coercing Stetzer once she was driving. The circuit court erred in applying these standards and incorrectly concluded that the State met its burden. The majority compounds the circuit court's errors by misconstruing the circuit court's ruling as adhering to the proper legal standards. ¶76 Beginning with reasonableness, the State failed to meet its burden because the evidence clearly showed that Stetzer reasonably believed she was still being coerced when she drove past the police officer. Had the circuit court considered Stetzer's personal history throughout the entire incident, reasonable doubt—Stetzer's reasonable belief of on-going coercion—would have be have been apparent. In its ruling the court said it considered all of the circumstances and "can take everything as true up to the time that Stetzer leaves the driveway." So, the circuit court considered the evidence regarding Behlmer's abuse until Stetzer sat in her car. But once Stetzer starting driving, the circuit court disregarded her personal history entirely.
¶77 The majority condones the circuit court's errant analysis with a wink and a nod, citing the circuit court's cursory statements that
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CHIEF JUSTICE KAROFSKY, dissenting
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the circuit court put itself in Stetzer's position and that Stetzer knew that there were other means of safety besides the lake house. Majority Op. ¶33. These isolated snippets do not establish that the circuit court actually considered Stetzer's personal history at the point in time she was driving. Upon closer examination, the record plainly shows the contrary. ¶78 The circuit court ruled that Stetzer "passed a police officer. She's in a city she knows. So beyond a reasonable doubt she knows there's other means of safety around." In deeming the police officer and the familiar city to be "means of safety," or alternatives to continuing to drive under the influence, the circuit court abandoned the legal principles defining reasonableness explained above, effectively excusing the State of its burden.
¶79 The police were hardly a means of safety for a reasonable person in Stetzer's position. Behlmer himself admitted that he had manipulated the police against Stetzer in the past. And that very night he taunted her with the threat that the police would come and "get you just like last time." Stetzer testified that if she contacted the police, they might return her to Behlmer. Stetzer learned from past experiences that the police do not believe her reports of domestic abuse. Why would the police believe her now? Why would the police keep her safe this time? The circuit court failed to consider whether a reasonable person with Stetzer's past experiences would believe that contacting the police would have interrupted the imminent threat. Had it done so, it would have identified reasonable doubt.
¶80 Likewise, Stetzer's familiarity with the area did not equate to safety for a reasonable person in Stetzer's position. The court never found that Stetzer knew of another safe place nearby, other than her lake house. The court noted that there was a hotel in the area. But Stetzer testified that she did not see any open businesses at 2:00 a.m., that Behlmer had followed her in the past, and that she believed he might be following her that night. Stetzer never testified that she viewed the hotel as a safe location. How could a hotel be safe at that time and when Behlmer might be following her? The court never evaluated whether a reasonable person in Stetzer's position would believe that the hotel was safe. Had it done so, it would have found reasonable doubt.
¶81 As for the imminence requirement, the circuit court improperly conflated immediate and imminent when assessing the reasonableness of Stetzer's belief that she was in danger. The circuit court
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CHIEF JUSTICE KAROFSKY, dissenting
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declared that Stetzer's reasonable belief in imminent harm disappeared the moment Stetzer drove past the police car. The circuit court reasoned that the instant Stetzer could have stopped to talk to the police, the threat of Behlmer suddenly extinguished. The majority fails to identify this error, much less account for it.
¶82 There is a material difference between imminence and immediate. See Kemper, 397 Wis. 2d 394, ¶53. Because imminence means something that is "dangerously impending" or "threatening to occur," it follows that Behlmer did not have to be physically present alongside Stetzer, or even close by, for him to remain an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm. In other words, imminence allows for a greater gap in time and distance between a potential attack and the decision Stetzer made in that moment. See Hundley, 693 P.2d at 478-79. And that is partly because this attack was not an isolated incident.
¶83 Mystifyingly, the circuit court made no mention of the years- long history of abuse that informed Stetzer's decision-making that night. Nor did it account for Hanusa's testimony that a domestic violence victim, having endured years of abuse, might behave in a state of fight-or-flight, which readily explains why Stetzer would flee. Stetzer had been a victim of Behlmer's physical abuse for years, and Behlmer's abuse that night had ricocheted between verbal (calling her names and threatening her), to psychological (calling 911 to get her arrested), to physical (throwing her down stairs, throwing a heavy pot at her, and pounding on the truck windows). Given the history of abuse and the events that preceded her driving, Stetzer was understandably still terrified of Behlmer once she started driving. And her fear did not diminish upon pulling out of the driveway. She thought the headlights behind her were Behlmer chasing her down as he had done in the past. Stetzer had no reason to believe Behlmer was no longer a threat to her. Stetzer, and any reasonable person in her circumstances, would believe that fleeing from Behlmer was her only means of safety. The presence of a police car did not alleviate the threat Behlmer posed—his aggression continued to be dangerously impending. In other words, a reasonable doubt remained as to whether the State proved that the threat was no longer imminent. ¶84 To summarize, the majority misses the mark by adopting the circuit court's incorrect conclusion that the State met its burden. The State's entire case, and the circuit court's conclusion, depended on two facts: the presence of an officer and Stetzer's familiarity with the area. Yet a diligent examination of the record—including those two facts—reveals
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CHIEF JUSTICE KAROFSKY, dissenting
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that the State failed to disprove Stetzer's coercion defense. The circuit court did not apply the correct legal principles in evaluating the State's case. Undoubtedly, Behlmer's history of abuse, and his manipulation of law enforcement, coupled with his threat to use the police to "get" Stetzer, would cause a reasonable person in Stetzer's circumstances to believe that seeking help from the police could catapult Stetzer back to Behlmer's violence and abuse. And being in a familiar place would be cold comfort to anyone in Stetzer's circumstances, given that the place was just as familiar to Behlmer, and he had followed her in the past. It was reasonable for Stetzer to believe that Behlmer's escalating physical abuse remained dangerously impending. At minimum, a reasonable doubt remained as to whether the State showed that Behlmer was no longer coercing Stetzer. The majority adopts the circuit court's legal error, effectively eliminating the coercion defense for a victim it was written to protect.
III. THE ELEPHANT IN THE COURTROOM
¶85 I pause to acknowledge some questions many reading this opinion may find themselves asking: Why does she stay? Why doesn't she disclose the abuse? Why doesn't she call the police?
¶86 Why does she stay? There are countless reasons a domestic violence victim does not leave her abuser, including economic uncertainty, a desire to protect her children, religious pressure, a lack of social support, housing insecurity, immigration issues, and shame. According to Hanusa, "One of the things we know that abusers are expert at is isolating the partner." She also might stay because leaving may be the most dangerous thing she could do in the short run. A Chicago study concluded that leaving an abuser was the direct precipitating factor in 45% of femicides.8"That abuse victims make many courageous efforts to flee the violence is too often overlooked in the process of judging them for now being with the batterer."9
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CHIEF JUSTICE KAROFSKY, dissenting
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¶87 Why doesn't she disclose the abuse to others? Domestic abuse victims may hide their experiences of abuse for a multitude of reasons. Hanusa testified in detail that domestic abuse victims like Stetzer do not talk about their abuse or seek help from others due to factors such as shame and embarrassment. "You don't have to be a woman of prominence to feel embarrassed that you made the bad choice of being with a partner who is going to abuse you and then worry about what people think if you make the choice to stay, which many battered woman do." Over time, the effects of not disclosing accumulate. Hanusa continued, "[A]fter a while, you know, your resolve starts to melt . . . [T]hese guys are adored and loved by a lot of people in the community . . . . Nobody knows what goes on behind closed doors." In the end, "[s]hame and embarrassment about the abuse may prevent the victim from disclosing it or may cause her to deny that any problem exists when questioned by well-intentioned friends, family, co-workers, or professionals."10
¶88 Why doesn't she call the police? Some domestic abuse victims do not seek assistance from law enforcement because they do not trust that police intervention will result in increased safety.11Hanusa made clear that there is a risk to police involvement because sometimes abusers are not held to account by law enforcement. According to Hanusa, when law enforcement does not hold an abuser accountable the violence and abuse can escalate. "That's our worst nightmare." In addition, "many battered women remain in the relationship because of lack of money, social isolation, lack of self-confidence, inadequate police response, and a fear (often justified) of reprisals by the batterer." People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d
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CHIEF JUSTICE KAROFSKY, dissenting
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1, 3 (1996) (emphasis added). "'It's been documented in research study after research study' . . . that when victims report to police, 'more often than not, they are not believed, they are not deemed credible, and there is no quality investigation done . . . . '"12
¶89 Now that we have answers to these perennial questions, perhaps we can refocus and ask instead:
Why did Behlmer use violence and abuse to control Stetzer?
Why didn't the police hold Behlmer accountable for his acts of domestic violence against Stetzer?
Focusing on the abuser rather than the victim may have saved Stetzer from having to flee in her truck, at 2:00 AM, all alone, in bare feet, praying for protection. "[W]omen face a legal twilight zone: laws meant to protect them and deter further abuse often fail to achieve their purpose, because women . . . are simply not believed."13
¶90 We must do better. All victims should be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect. They should be protected and feel safe. Indeed our society should be judged by how we treat our most vulnerable. I respectfully dissent.
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