on the case as a whole." RULING, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Here all three of the remedies invoked by trial counsel were alternative efforts to find some way, notwithstanding Cook, to vindicate the Constitutional rights imperiled by trial counsel's mistake. And all three were denied in a single order that disposed of the case as a whole.
It follows that the enumeration is ambiguous and must be liberally construed. OCGA § 5-6-30. So I turn to context.
The enumeration of errors is immediately preceded by a section entitled
"Specification of Orders and Judgments Being Appealed." That section would suffice as an enumeration of errors. See OCGA § 5-6-51 ("The following suggested forms are declared to be sufficient, but any other form substantially complying therewith shall also be sufficient[.]"). The first specification says:
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1. Order denying Mother's motion to set aside, motion for new trial, and motion for out of time appeal filed September 19 and October 2,
2023.
(Emphasis supplied.) The second specifies the termination order. Of course, as noted above, a brief cannot expand an enumeration of errors. Wallace, 303 Ga. at 37-38 (2). And it is true that the appellant's brief is not among the items OCGA § 5-6-48 (c) requires us to consider. That omission makes sense. Requiring us to consider the appellant's brief would go a long way toward defeating the purpose of an enumeration of errors. But neither does the Appellate Practice Act prohibit us from considering it in an appropriate case. On the contrary, the Act "shall be liberally construed. . . ." OCGA § 5-6-30.
This is an appropriate case. Here the brief as a whole — particularly the Specification of Orders and Judgments Being Appealed, which appears alongside the Enumeration of Errors — provides context to the Enumeration. It is clear from the brief, and unmistakable when the first enumeration is read alongside the first specification, that the omission to explicitly list the motion for out-of-time appeal in the enumeration was simply an oversight.
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Notwithstanding that oversight, the materials before us are not muddled or confusing. The mother's brief is well written. When her enumeration of errors is read together with the notice of appeal and the record, particularly the order appealed from — as subsection (f) requires — it is clear that her first enumeration encompasses the dismissal of her the motion for out-of-time appeal. We may not seize on trial counsel's oversight as justification for ignoring the mother's best and only viable argument. The Appellate Practice Act, particularly "OCGA § 5-6-30[,] puts a legislative thumb on the scale in favor of reaching the merits. . . ." Premier Pediatric Providers v. Kennesaw Pediatrics, 318 Ga. 350, 359 (3) (898 SE2d 481) (2024). So we must
"shoulder [our] constitutional responsibility" and our "statutory duty" and decide the issue. See Felix, 271 Ga. at 539.
2. The juvenile court erred in denying the motion for out-of-time appeal on jurisdictional grounds
The juvenile court denied the mother's motion for out-of-time appeal on the ground that he lacked jurisdiction because, under Cook v. State, supra, 313 Ga. 471, out-of-time appeals are no longer permitted. The question whether motions for out-of- time appeal remain available in termination-of-parental-rights cases after Cook arose in a case before us last year. Interest of J. L. O., 366 Ga. App. 452 (883 SE2d 386)
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(2023). We determined that we did not need to decide that day whether we remained bound to follow In the Interest of B. R. F., 299 Ga. 294, 296 (788 SE2d 416) (2016), in which our Supreme Court recognized a right to out-of-time appeals in termination-of- parental-rights cases, or were now bound under Cook to disregard B. R. F. Interest of J. L. O., supra at 453. But that question is squarely before us today. How those two case are to be reconciled is a hard question. As reflected in its summary paragraphs, which are set out in the margin, Cook's analysis turned on the availability of relief under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1967, now codified at OCGA § 9-14-40 et seq., which provides a post-conviction procedure by which criminal defendants can raise constitutional claims.1
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It is not clear whether there exists an analogous procedure by which parents whose parental rights have been terminated may raise the claim that they were denied effective assistance of counsel in pursuing an appeal. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1967, which Cook found to be dispositive, does not apply to terminations of parental rights. See OCGA § 9-14-41 ("this article provides the exclusive procedure for seeking a writ of habeas corpus for persons whose liberty is being restrained by virtue of a sentence imposed against them by a state court of record"). Other sections of our Code provide, in some instances, for a person with a custodial interest in an illegally detained child to seek a writ of habeas corpus. See OCGA §§ 9-14-1 (b), 9-14-2. But I am not aware of any decision holding that those Code sections provide a vehicle by which parents whose rights have been terminated may raise constitutional challenges to the termination order.
Moreover, as Cook made clear, use of out-of-time appeals as a vehicle for pursuing constitutional claims in criminal cases developed over the course of several decades. See Cook, 313 Ga. at 475-484 (2). The availability of a similar vehicle in our common law nor established by statute — this Court acted not as a body of judges, but as a body of lawmakers.
Cook v. State, 313 Ga. 471, 479 (2) (a) (870 SE2d 758) (2022) (footnote omitted).
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termination-of-parental-rights cases has a different and much more recent provenance. See In the Interest of B. R. F., 299 Ga. at 299-300. The continued viability of B. R. F.'s holding on a parent's right to out-of-time appellate review would require a different stare decisis analysis than that in Cook.
But that hard question is not ours to answer. Our Supreme Court has held that an out-of-time appeal is an available remedy in termination cases, In the Interest of B. R. F., 299 Ga. at 299-300, and it has not overturned that case. Until and unless it does, this court and the trial courts remain bound to follow B. R. F. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. VI ("The decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind all other courts as precedents.").
So I would vacate the juvenile court's ruling on the motion for out-of-time appeal and remand the case for that court to address the motion's merits in the first instance. See In the Interest of B. R. F., 299 Ga. at 298.
Given B. F. R.'s requirement that the trial court first address the mother's argument for an out-of-time appeal, I have not formed an opinion about the termination order. But I have reviewed it and am prepared to say this much. When an appellant's failure to invoke our jurisdiction or preserve an issue prevents us from reaching the merits of an appeal, we often have the consolation that it was clearly
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meritless anyway. About this termination of parental rights, we do not have that consolation.
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