Smith v. Spizzirri

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Docket Number

No. 22-1218

Judges

SOTOMAYOR, J.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioners are current and former delivery drivers for an on-demand delivery service operated by respondents. They filed suit in Arizona state court alleging violations of federal and state employment laws. Specifically, petitioners claimed that respondents misclassified them as independent contractors, failed to pay required minimum and overtime wages, and failed to provide paid sick leave.

Respondents removed the case to federal court and moved to compel arbitration and dismiss the suit. Petitioners conceded that all of their claims were arbitrable but argued that §3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) required the District Court to stay the action pending arbitration rather than dismissing it.

The District Court issued an order compelling arbitration and dismissed the case without prejudice. It acknowledged that “the text of 9 U.S.C. §3 suggests that the action should be stayed,” but concluded that Ninth Circuit precedent allowed a district court either to stay or dismiss an action when all claims are subject to arbitration. Because all claims were arbitrable, the court exercised what it understood to be its discretion to dismiss.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. It recognized that “the plain text of the FAA appears to mandate a stay” but held that it was bound by Circuit precedent recognizing a district court’s “discretion to dismiss.” A concurring opinion in the Ninth Circuit stated that this position was wrong and urged the Supreme Court to resolve the question on which the courts of appeals were divided.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to answer the question it previously left open and resolve the Circuit split.” It ultimately reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether §3 of the Federal Arbitration Act permits a federal district court to dismiss a case, instead of issuing a stay, when the dispute is subject to arbitration and a party has requested a stay pending arbitration.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

Petitioners conceded that all of their claims were subject to arbitration.
They argued that §3 of the FAA requires a district court to stay the action pending arbitration when a party requests a stay, rather than dismissing the case.

Respondents' Arguments

Respondents moved in the District Court to compel arbitration and to dismiss the suit rather than stay it.
Before the Supreme Court, respondents argued that “stay” in §3 means only that the court must stop parallel in-court litigation, which they contended a court may accomplish by dismissing the action without retaining jurisdiction.
Respondents also argued that, notwithstanding the statutory language, district courts retain inherent authority to dismiss proceedings that are subject to arbitration.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998)	The use of the word “shall” in a statute “creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.”	Used to support the conclusion that §3’s command that courts “shall” stay proceedings is mandatory and leaves no discretion to dismiss when its conditions are met.
Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820 (1996)	“The inherent powers of the courts may be controlled or overridden by statute or rule.”	Cited to reject respondents’ reliance on inherent authority, explaining that §3 overrides any discretionary power to dismiss a suit on the ground that it is subject to arbitration.
Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000)	Noted that a stay instead of a dismissal would not be appealable, and expressly reserved the question whether a district court should enter a stay rather than dismissing in this context.	Referenced as an earlier case in which the Supreme Court left open the question now decided in this opinion.
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U.S. 176 (2019)	Reiterated that the Court had reserved in Randolph the question whether §3 requires a stay rather than dismissal, and stated that the question remained unanswered.	Cited to show that, before this case, the Supreme Court had not resolved the issue addressed here.
Arabian Motors Group W.L.L. v. Ford Motor Co., 19 F.4th 938 (6th Cir. 2021)	Read §3 to mandate a stay when all claims are subject to arbitration and a party properly requests a stay.	Used as one example of courts of appeals holding that §3 requires a stay in these circumstances.
Katz v. Cellco Partnership, 794 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 2015)	Held that §3 mandates a stay when all claims are arbitrable and a party requests a stay.	Cited on the “stay-mandatory” side of the circuit split.
Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC, 369 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2004)	Held that §3 requires a stay when all claims are subject to arbitration and a proper stay request is made.	Cited as part of the group of courts reading §3 to mandate a stay.
Adair Bus Sales, Inc. v. Blue Bird Corp., 25 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 1994)	Reached the same conclusion that §3 mandates a stay when all claims are arbitrable and a party requests a stay.	Referenced as another court of appeals decision aligning with the mandatory-stay interpretation.
Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)	Also read §3 to mandate a stay in these circumstances.	Cited as further support for the view that §3 requires a stay when its conditions are met.
Halim v. Great Gatsby's Auction Gallery, Inc., 516 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 2008)	Reached the same conclusion that §3 requires a stay, even where no party requested a stay.	Cited as an example of a court requiring a stay under §3 even absent a party’s request.
Green v. SuperShuttle Int'l, Inc., 653 F.3d 766 (8th Cir. 2011)	Recognized a district court’s discretion to dismiss, rather than stay, an action where all issues are subject to arbitration; also flagged a potential statute-of-limitations problem if a new suit must be filed after dismissal.	Cited as part of the opposing line of authority allowing dismissal, and later referenced regarding practical concerns about requiring a new suit.
Bercovitch v. Baldwin School, Inc., 133 F.3d 141 (1st Cir. 1998)	Recognized a district court’s discretion to dismiss, rather than stay, when all issues are subject to arbitration.	Listed among courts of appeals holding that dismissal is permissible in such cases.
Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992)	Also recognized district court discretion to dismiss instead of stay when all issues are arbitrable.	Cited as part of the line of cases permitting dismissal.
Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988)	Likewise recognized discretion for a district court to dismiss, rather than stay, where all claims are subject to arbitration.	Identified as Ninth Circuit precedent underlying the lower courts’ approach in this case.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005)	Observed that federal district courts are “courts of limited jurisdiction” that “possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.”	Cited in a footnote to clarify that §3 does not prevent dismissal on independent grounds such as lack of jurisdiction.
Maine Community Health Options v. United States, 590 U.S. 296 (2020)	Explained that, unlike “may,” the word “shall” usually signifies a requirement rather than discretion.	Used to reinforce the reading of “shall” in §3 as imposing a mandatory duty to stay proceedings.
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985)	Held that the FAA “mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed,” and that neighboring FAA sections using “shall” leave “no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court.”	Cited by analogy to show that similar “shall” language in §3 likewise removes discretion and requires a stay.
Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, 599 U.S. 736 (2023)	Described Congress’s choice in §16 of the FAA to provide immediate interlocutory appeals from orders denying, but not granting, motions to compel arbitration.	Used to support the structural argument that allowing dismissal (which is appealable) after compelling arbitration would contravene Congress’s design in §16.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)	Stated that the FAA’s purpose is “to move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible.”	Cited to show that the FAA’s purpose aligns with the statutory structure that favors nonappealable orders compelling arbitration and supports requiring stays rather than dismissals.
Forrest v. Spizzirri, 2022 WL 2191931 (D. Ariz. June 17, 2022)	District court decision noting that §3’s text suggests a stay but, relying on Ninth Circuit precedent, holding that the court could dismiss when all claims are subject to arbitration.	Described as the District Court ruling under review, illustrating how existing Circuit precedent allowed dismissal despite §3’s text.
Forrest v. Spizzirri, 62 F.4th 1201 (9th Cir. 2023)	Ninth Circuit decision acknowledging that “the plain text of the FAA appears to mandate a stay” but holding that it was bound by Circuit precedent recognizing a district court’s “discretion to dismiss.” A concurrence argued the Circuit’s position was wrong and urged Supreme Court review.	Cited as the Court of Appeals decision that the Supreme Court reverses in this case.
Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale's, Inc., 755 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2014)	Ninth Circuit precedent stating that, “notwithstanding the language of §3, a district court may either stay the action or dismiss it outright when . . . the court determines that all of the claims raised in the action are subject to arbitration.”	Quoted by the District Court as the controlling authority that permitted dismissal instead of a stay.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court treated the case as one of statutory interpretation and concluded that the text, structure, and purpose of the FAA all indicate that a district court must stay an action when a dispute is subject to arbitration and a party has requested a stay.

1. Statutory text. Section 3 provides that a court “shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action” until arbitration has been conducted according to the agreement, so long as the applicant is not in default in proceeding with arbitration. The Court emphasized that “shall” creates an obligation “impervious to judicial discretion,” relying on prior cases and noting that in neighboring sections of the FAA, the same word has been understood to impose mandatory duties on district courts. Thus, when §3 says a court “shall” stay the proceeding, the court must do so.

The Court then focused on the term “stay.” It rejected respondents’ contention that “stay” merely requires cessation of in-court litigation, which could be accomplished through dismissal. At the time of the FAA’s enactment, “stay” had a long-established legal meaning as a “temporary suspension” of legal proceedings, not a final termination. The Court further explained that the surrounding statutory text is incompatible with equating “stay” and “dismiss.” Section 3 contemplates that the court will maintain the case on its docket while arbitration proceeds, so that the parties can return to court “if arbitration breaks down or fails to resolve the dispute,” provided the applicant is not in default. That “return ticket” is unavailable if the suit is dismissed.

The Court also rejected respondents’ reliance on inherent judicial authority. Even assuming such authority exists to dismiss proceedings subject to arbitration, statutes and rules can override inherent powers. Section 3, by its mandatory language, “does exactly that” with respect to dismissals based solely on the arbitrability of the dispute.

In a footnote, the Court clarified that §3 does not bar dismissal on independent grounds unrelated to arbitrability, such as lack of jurisdiction; in such cases, §3 does not prevent a dismissal for reasons like those described in Exxon Mobil.

2. Statutory structure. The Court next examined the FAA’s structure, especially §16. Section 16(a)(1)(C) authorizes immediate interlocutory appeals from orders denying requests for arbitration, while §16(b) generally forbids immediate appeals from orders compelling arbitration, absent certification under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). This asymmetry matches Congress’s purpose of moving arbitrable disputes into arbitration “as quickly and easily as possible.” If a district court could dismiss a case after compelling arbitration even when a party requested a stay, that dismissal would be a final, immediately appealable order, effectively creating a right to immediate appeal where Congress intended to bar it. This would undermine the structure Congress enacted.

3. Statutory purpose and judicial role. Finally, the Court reasoned that requiring stays is consistent with the supervisory role the FAA envisions for federal courts. The FAA authorizes courts to assist arbitration by appointing arbitrators, enforcing arbitral subpoenas, and facilitating recovery on arbitral awards. Keeping the case on the court’s docket facilitates that ongoing role and avoids the additional costs and complications that would arise if parties had to file a new lawsuit, pay a new filing fee, and potentially confront limitations issues after a dismissal. The Court observed that district courts can adopt administrative practices to minimize any burden from required stays.

Based on this combined analysis of text, structure, and purpose, the Court held that when the statutory conditions of §3 are satisfied and a stay is requested, the district court lacks discretion to dismiss the action on the ground that it is subject to arbitration.

Holding and Implications

Holding: When a district court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration, §3 of the FAA compels the court to issue a stay, and the court lacks discretion to dismiss the suit on the basis that all claims are subject to arbitration. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Implications: In this case, the District Court must stay, rather than dismiss, petitioners’ lawsuit while arbitration proceeds, so long as §3’s conditions are met. More generally, the opinion resolves a circuit split by clarifying that, whenever a dispute is subject to arbitration and a party requests a stay under §3, federal district courts must stay the action instead of dismissing it on that basis. The opinion notes no broader implications beyond this clarification and the direct effect on the parties and lower courts’ handling of similar FAA §3 questions.

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601 U.S.___(2024) v. SPIZZIRRI et al. SMITH et al.

SOTOMAYOR, J.

Argued April 22, 2024

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) sets forth procedures for enforcing arbitration agreements in federal court. Section 3 of the FAA, entitled "Stay of proceedings where issue therein referable to arbitration," provides that when a dispute is subject to arbitration, the court "shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration." 9 U.S.C. §3. In this case, petitioners filed suit against respondents in state court alleging violations of federal and state employment laws. Respondents then removed to federal court and filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss the suit. Petitioners agreed their claims were arbitrable, but contended that §3 of the FAA required the District Court to stay the action pending arbitration rather than dismissing it entirely. The District Court issued an order compelling arbitration and dismissed the case without prejudice. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Held:

When a district court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration, §3 compels the court to issue a stay, and the court lacks discretion to dismiss the suit. Statutory text, structure, and purpose all point to this conclusion. The plain text of §3 requires a court to stay the proceeding upon request. The statute's use of the word "shall" "creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion." Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35. The obligation is to "stay" the proceeding. Respondents insist that "stay" "means only that the court must stop parallel in-court litigation, which a court may achieve by dismissing," Brief for Respondents 15, but respondents' reading disregards the long-established legal meaning of the

word "stay" as a "temporary suspension" of legal proceedings. And respondents' attempt to read "stay" to include "dismiss" cannot be squared with the surrounding statutory text, which anticipates that the parties can return to federal court if arbitration breaks down or fails to resolve the dispute. Notwithstanding §3's text, respondents suggest that district courts retain the inherent authority to dismiss proceedings subject to arbitration. But even assuming such inherent authority, "the inherent powers of the courts may be controlled or overridden by statute or rule," Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823, and §3 does exactly that.

The FAA's structure and purpose confirm that a stay is required. Section 16(a)(1)(C) of the FAA authorizes an immediate interlocutory appeal of the denial of an arbitration request. By contrast, Congress made clear in §16(b) that, outside of a narrow exception not applicable here, an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable. If a district court could dismiss a suit subject to arbitration even when a party requests a stay, that dismissal would trigger the right to an immediate appeal where Congress sought to forbid such an appeal. Finally, staying rather than dismissing a suit comports with the supervisory role that the FAA envisions for the courts. Keeping the suit on the court's docket makes good sense in light of the FAA's mechanisms for courts with proper jurisdiction to assist parties in arbitration. Pp. 3-6.

62 F. 4th 1201, reversed and remanded.

OPINION

SOTOMAYOR, J.

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) sets forth procedures for enforcing arbitration agreements in federal court. Section 3 of the FAA specifies that, when a dispute is subject to arbitration, the court "shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until [the] arbitration" has concluded. 9 U.S.C. §3. The question here is whether §3 permits a court to dismiss the case instead of issuing a stay when the dispute is subject to arbitration and a party requests a stay pending arbitration. It does not.

Petitioners are current and former delivery drivers for an on-demand delivery service operated by respondents. They sued respondents in Arizona state court, alleging violations of federal and state employment laws. Petitioners claimed that respondents misclassified them as independent contractors, failed to pay required minimum and overtime wages, and failed to provide paid sick leave. After removing the case to federal court, respondents moved to compel arbitration and dismiss the suit. Petitioners conceded that all of their claims were arbitrable, but they argued that §3 of the FAA required the District Court to stay the action pending arbitration rather than dismissing it entirely.

The District Court issued an order compelling arbitration and dismissing the case without prejudice. The court noted that "the text of 9 U.S.C. §3 suggests that the action should be stayed," but that Circuit precedent "instructed that 'notwithstanding the language of §3, a district court may either stay the action or dismiss it outright when, . . . the court determines that all of the claims raised in the action are subject to arbitration.'" Forrest v. Spizzirri, 2022 WL 2191931, *1 (D Ariz., June 17, 2022) (quoting Johnmo-hammadi v. Bloomingdale's, Inc., 755 F.3d 1072, 1074 (CA9 2014)). Because "all claims raised [were] subject to arbitration," the District Court concluded that it "retain[ed] discretion to dismiss the action." 2022 WL 2191931, *1.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. While that court likewise acknowledged that "the plain text of the FAA appears to mandate a stay," the court explained that it was bound by Circuit precedent recognizing the District Court's "discretion to dismiss." Forrest v. Spizzirri, 62 F. 4th 1201, 1203, 1205 (2023). Judge Graber, joined by Judge Desai, concurred, asserting that the Ninth Circuit's position was wrong and urging this Court "to take up this question, which it has sidestepped previously, and on which the courts of appeals are divided." Id., at 1206 (citation omitted).

This Court granted certiorari to answer the question it previously left open and resolve the Circuit split. 601 U.S. ___(2024).

This Court has previously reserved the question presented by this case. See Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 87, n. 2 (2000) ("Had the District Court entered a stay instead of a dismissal in this case, that order would not be appealable.... The question whether the District Court should have taken that course is not before us, and we do not address it"); see also Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U.S. 176, 181, n. 1 (2019) (noting that the Court reserved this question in Randolph and that it remained unanswered). The split on the question has since deepened. Compare Arabian Motors Group W.L.L. v. Ford Motor Co., 19 F. 4th 938, 941-943 (CA6 2021) (reading §3 to mandate a stay when all claims are subject to arbitration and a party properly requests a stay); Katz v. Cellco Partnership, 794 F.3d 341, 345-347 (CA2 2015) (same); Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC, 369 F.3d 263, 269-271 (CA3 2004) (same); Adair Bus Sales, Inc. v. Blue Bird Corp., 25 F.3d 953, 955 (CA10 1994) (same); Bender v. A.G. Edwards &Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 699 (CA111992) (per curiam) (same); Halim v. Great Gatsby's Auction Gallery, Inc., 516 F.3d 557, 561 (CA7 2008) (reaching the same conclusion even where no party requested a stay), with Green v. SuperShuttle Int'l, Inc., 653 F.3d 766, 769-770 (CA8 2011) (recognizing a district court's discretion to dismiss, rather than stay, action where all of the issues are subject to arbitration); Bercovitch v. Baldwin School, Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 156, n. 21 (CA11998) (same); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161, 1164 (CA5 1992) (same); Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 637-638 (CA9 1988) (same).

In this statutory interpretation case, text, structure, and purpose all point to the same conclusion: When a federal court finds that a dispute is subject to arbitration, and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration, the court does not have discretion to dismiss the suit on the basis that all the claims are subject to arbitration.

That is not to say that the court is barred from dismissing the suit if there is a separate reason to dismiss, unrelated to the fact that an issue in the case is subject to arbitration. If, for example, the court lacks jurisdiction, §3 is no bar to dismissing on that basis. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005) (observing that "[t]he district courts of the United States . . . are 'courts of limited jurisdiction'" and" 'possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute' ").

Section 3 of the FAA, entitled "Stay of proceedings where issue therein referable to arbitration," provides that, when any issue in a suit is subject to arbitration, the court

"shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial

of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration."

Here, as in other contexts, the use of the word "shall" "creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion." Lex-econ Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998). That plain statutory text requires a court to stay the proceeding. See Maine Community Health Options v. United States, 590 U.S. 296, 310 (2020) ("'Unlike the word "may," which implies discretion, the word "shall" usually connotes a requirement'"). Indeed, this Court previously noted that the use of "shall" in neighboring sections of the FAA created a mandatory obligation that left "no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court." Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985) (discussing §§2-4 and explaining that the FAA "mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed"). The same is true here. When §3 says that a court "shall . . . stay" the proceeding, the court must do so.

Just as "shall" means "shall," "stay" means "stay." Respondents insist that "stay" in §3 "means only that the court must stop parallel in-court litigation, which a court may achieve by dismissing without retaining jurisdiction." Brief for Respondents 15. There are, however, two significant problems with that reading. First, it disregards the long-established legal meaning of the word "stay." Even at the time of the enactment of the FAA, that term denoted the "temporary suspension" of legal proceedings, not the conclusive termination of such proceedings. Black's Law Dictionary 1109 (2d ed. 1910) ("Stay of proceedings"). Second, respondents' attempt to read "stay" to include "dismiss" cannot be squared with the surrounding statutory text. By directing a court to stay the proceeding "until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement," and only so long as "the applicant . . . is not in default in proceeding with the arbitration," §3 ensures that the parties can return to federal court if arbitration breaks down or fails to resolve the dispute. That return ticket is not available if the court dismisses the suit rather than staying it.

It is no answer to say, as respondents do, that a party can file a new suit in federal court in those circumstances. Even if that is true as a practical matter, but see Green, 653 F.3d, at 770 (flagging potential stat-ute-of-limitations problem), requiring a party to file a new suit ignores the plain text of §3.

Respondents also suggest that, notwithstanding the statutory language, district courts retain inherent authority to dismiss proceedings subject to arbitration. This attempt to evade the plain meaning of the text also falls short. Even assuming district courts have this inherent authority, "the inherent powers of the courts may be controlled or overridden by statute or rule." Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996). Section 3 does exactly that. It overrides any discretion a district court might otherwise have had to dismiss a suit when the parties have agreed to arbitration.

If there were any doubt, the FAA's structure and purpose confirm that a stay is required. When a court denies a request for arbitration, §16 of the FAA authorizes an immediate interlocutory appeal. See 9 U.S.C. §16(a)(1)(C). When a court compels arbitration, by contrast, Congress made clear that, absent certification of a controlling question of law by the district court under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b), the order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable. See 9 U.S.C. §16(b). The choice to "provid[e] for immediate interlocutory appeals of orders denying-but not of orders granting-motions to compel arbitration," Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, 599 U.S. 736, 740 (2023), is consistent with Congress's purpose in the FAA "to move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible," Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983). If a district court dismisses a suit subject to arbitration even when a party requests a stay, that dismissal triggers the right to an immediate appeal where Congress sought to forbid such an appeal.

Finally, staying rather than dismissing a suit comports with the supervisory role that the FAA envisions for the courts. The FAA provides mechanisms for courts with proper jurisdiction to assist parties in arbitration by, for example, appointing an arbitrator, see 9 U.S.C. §5; enforcing subpoenas issued by arbitrators to compel testimony or produce evidence, see §7; and facilitating recovery on an arbitral award, see §9. Keeping the suit on the court's docket makes good sense in light of this potential ongoing role, and it avoids costs and complications that might arise if a party were required to bring a new suit and pay a new filing fee to invoke the FAA's procedural protections. District courts can, of course, adopt practices to minimize any administrative burden caused by the stays that §3 requires.

* * *

When a district court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute, and a party requests a stay pending arbitration, §3 of the FAA compels the court to stay the proceeding. The contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.