Dugas v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth.

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Docket Number

2021-00107JD

Judges

PATRICK E. SHEERAN Judge

Acts

— COURTS - GENERAL PROVISIONS - SPECIAL REMEDIESHABEAS CORPUS — Persons entitled to writ of habeas corpus
— CRIMES-PROCEDUREPARDON; PAROLE; PROBATION — Post-release controls - failure to notify offender

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Greg Dugas filed a complaint alleging false imprisonment against defendant Ohio Adult Parole Authority (APA). Plaintiff contends that the APA improperly tolled his period of post-release control (PRC) while he was serving a prison sentence in West Virginia, which resulted in his detention for 199 days beyond the scheduled end of his sentence. Specifically, plaintiff claims that APA's tolling of his PRC was unauthorized and that he was unlawfully confined and sentenced to additional prison time for violations of his PRC.

Procedurally, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on July 2, 2021, to which plaintiff responded with a combined memorandum contra and a cross-motion for summary judgment. The court granted plaintiff leave to file an addendum to his motion, denied certain motions for extensions as moot, and ultimately granted defendant's motion for summary judgment while denying plaintiff's motion.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) based on plaintiff’s prior habeas corpus petition.
Whether defendant Ohio Adult Parole Authority had lawful privilege to toll plaintiff’s PRC period while plaintiff was incarcerated in another state.
Whether defendant had statutory authority to impose additional prison time based on plaintiff’s violations of PRC conditions.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

APA improperly tolled plaintiff’s PRC period while he was incarcerated in West Virginia, resulting in unlawful confinement beyond his scheduled release date.
APA lacked statutory authority to impose PRC or to extend his confinement based on PRC violations, thus causing false imprisonment.
Seeks damages totaling $63,800.00 for the alleged false imprisonment.

Defendant's Arguments

APA’s tolling of PRC during plaintiff’s out-of-state incarceration complies with its established policy (§100-APA-27) and statutory authority.
APA is entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff’s prior habeas corpus petition bars relitigation of the issue of unlawful confinement under collateral estoppel.
Plaintiff was aware of APA’s tolling policy prior to release and transfer to West Virginia custody.
APA’s imposition of additional prison time for PRC violations was lawful and supported by statute.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996)	Initial burden on moving party to show absence of genuine issue of material fact in summary judgment.	The court applied the standard that the moving party must identify evidentiary materials showing no genuine issue of material fact.
Stroud v. Dept. of Rehab. & Correction, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-139, 2004-Ohio-580	Collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of issues fully litigated in prior action.	The court found collateral estoppel barred plaintiff’s claims because the issues had been decided in a prior habeas petition.
Thompson v. Wing, 70 Ohio St.3d 176, 1994 Ohio 358, 637 N.E.2d 917 (1994)	Elements of collateral estoppel: issue actually litigated, decided by competent court, and party against whom estoppel is asserted was party in prior action.	The court applied these elements to conclude plaintiff was estopped from relitigating unlawful confinement.
Whitehead v. Gen. Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St.2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969)	Defines collateral estoppel and its application.	Supported the court’s determination that issue preclusion applied to bar plaintiff’s claim.
O'Nesti v. DeBartolo Realty Corp., 113 Ohio St.3d 59, 2007-Ohio-1102, 862 N.E.2d 803	Issue preclusion applies even if causes of action differ.	Reinforced the court’s ruling that prior habeas petition precludes plaintiff’s current claim.
Bennett v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 60 Ohio St. 107, 573 N.E.2d 633	Definition of false imprisonment requiring confinement without lawful privilege.	The court used this standard to analyze whether APA had lawful privilege to detain plaintiff.
Feliciano v. Kreiger, 50 Ohio St.2d 69, 362 N.E.2d 646 (1977)	Clarifies elements of false imprisonment.	Applied in defining the legal standard for plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim.
Florence v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., C.P. No. 08CVH08-12427, 2009 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 5547	Upheld tolling policy for PRC under similar circumstances as lawful.	Supported court’s conclusion that APA’s tolling policy was lawful and not without privilege.
Dugas v. Harris, 2019-Ohio-3797, 131 N.E.3d 959	Ohio Supreme Court decision dismissing plaintiff’s prior habeas petition.	Served as basis for collateral estoppel in the current case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first recognized the applicable standard for summary judgment under Civ.R. 56(C), requiring no genuine issue of material fact and entitlement as a matter of law.

The court found that plaintiff’s prior habeas corpus petition, which challenged the lawfulness of his confinement based on APA’s tolling of his PRC, was dismissed by the Ohio Supreme Court for failure to state a claim. Because the same issue—whether plaintiff was unlawfully confined—was actually litigated and decided, and the parties are the same, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars plaintiff from relitigating this issue.

Turning to the merits, the court analyzed the statutory authority underlying PRC and the APA’s policy regarding tolling during out-of-state incarceration. R.C. 2967.28(C) mandates PRC for certain felony sentences and R.C. 2967.28(E) authorizes the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to adopt rules to assist APA in administering PRC. APA’s policy (§100-APA-27) defines "lost time" tolling for offenders released to out-of-state detainers, which applies here.

The evidence showed plaintiff was informed of this policy prior to his transfer to West Virginia custody and that his PRC did not commence until after his release from that custody. Consequently, APA had lawful privilege to detain plaintiff and impose additional prison time for PRC violations.

The court noted plaintiff failed to cite any authority invalidating APA’s tolling policy, and the court found persuasive a prior decision rejecting similar challenges. Thus, no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the lawfulness of plaintiff’s confinement.

Holding and Implications

The court GRANTED defendant Ohio Adult Parole Authority’s motion for summary judgment and DENIED plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

The holding rests on the application of collateral estoppel precluding plaintiff from relitigating the issue of unlawful confinement and the determination that APA had lawful authority to toll PRC and impose additional sanctions.

The direct effect is dismissal of plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim with judgment entered in favor of defendant. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing legal principles and prior rulings.

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GREG DUGAS Plaintiff v. OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY Defendant

PATRICK E. SHEERAN Judge

Sent to S.C. Reporter 11/5/21

Scott Sheets Magistrate

ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PATRICK E. SHEERAN Judge

{¶1} On July 2, 2021, defendant, Ohio Adult Parole Authority (APA) filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C). Plaintiff filed a combined memorandum contra and his own cross-motion for summary judgment on July 26, 2021, after which defendant filed a reply. Initially, the court GRANTS plaintiffs August 3, 2021 motion for leave to submit an addendum to his motion for summary judgment. Consequentially, the court DENIES plaintiffs August 20, 2021 motion for extension, which sought an extension to reply to defendant's memorandum contra to his motion for leave, as moot. The court also DENIES plaintiffs July 23, 2021 motion which seeks an extension to file objections to a magistrate's report and recommendation. The magistrate has issued no report and recommendation to which plaintiff could object. Turning to the motions for summary judgment, the court GRANTS defendant's motion for summary judgment and DENIES plaintiff's motion for summary judgment for the reasons stated herein.

Standard of Review

{¶2} Motions for summary judgment are reviewed under the standard set forth in Civ.R. 56(C), which states, in part:

Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits,

transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party's favor.

"[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record before the trial court which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on a material element of the nonmoving party's claim." Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). To meet this initial burden, the moving party must be able to point to evidentiary materials of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Id. at 292-293.

{¶3} If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party bears a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E), which states, in part:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party.

{¶4} Plaintiff's complaint alleges defendant falsely imprisoned him because it tolled his period of post-release control, (PRC) while he was serving a prison sentence in a different state, specifically West Virginia, and later sentenced him to additional prison time due to violations of his PRC (Complaint, p. 1). Plaintiff claims the tolling of his PRC was improper and resulted in defendant detaining him for one-hundred-ninety-nine-days beyond the term of his sentence. Id. Plaintiff argues that by improperly tolling his PRC while serving his sentence in West Virginia, the APA falsely imprisoned him beyond his scheduled release date. Plaintiff seeks $63, 800.00 in damages.

{¶5} Defendant APA asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment on several grounds. Defendant submitted the affidavit of Michael Anderson as well as several documents including the judgment and sentencing entries associated with plaintiffs convictions, and the terms of his PRC. Also attached to Anderson's affidavit is a copy of APA's policy regarding "lost time" and tolling of PRC for offenders who are released directly to another detaining authority after the current term of their incarceration ends.

Facts

{¶6} Defendant's motion and the evidence submitted with it establish the following material facts. In November of 2013, plaintiff pled guilty and was sentenced by the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas to three years' incarceration for felonies he committed there (Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Exh. A). As part of his sentence, plaintiff was subject to a period of three years' PRC following his release from incarceration and was informed that any violation of the terms of his PRC could result in additional prison time. Id. On September 25, 2015, plaintiff was released from incarceration under the supervision of APA. Id. However, plaintiff was immediately transferred into the custody of the West Virginia Division of Corrections pursuant to an out-of-state detainer to complete his sentence for offenses committed in that state. The West Virginia Division of Corrections released plaintiff on June 24, 2018, but plaintiff failed to comply with the reporting obligation imposed by his PRC and was declared by APA to be a violator at large. Id. Subsequently on April 3, 2019, plaintiff was arrested in Missouri and returned to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction for a hearing for violating his PRC terms. At the hearing it was determined that plaintiff committed nine violations of his PRC terms, and as a result was sentenced to one-hundred-fifty-one-days imprisonment. Id.

{¶7} Defendant maintains a policy regarding time calculations for individuals who are subjected to PRC but are released to an out-of-state detaining authority. Defendant's policy §100-APA-27 states that "[i]f a PRC offender is released to an * * * out-of-state detainer, the time between the date the offender is released to the detainer and the date the offender is released from the detaining authority shall be 4 considered lost time." (Anderson Aff., ¶ 10; Exh. A-2). This policy also defines "lost time" as "the specific period of time during which an offender's period of supervision or prison term is tolled or not credited." Id

{¶8} On July 29, 2019, while still incarcerated, plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to R.C. 2725.01 in the Ohio Supreme Court (Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Exh. B). In his petition, plaintiff claimed the additional one-hundred-fifty-one-day sentence imposed for violating his PRC terms resulted in him being unlawfully confined. Id. Plaintiff argued that because APA tolled his PRC period while he was incarcerated in West Virginia, he was unlawfully confined past the expiration of his sentence. Id. Plaintiff's petition specifically challenged APA's tolling procedure found in policy §100-APA-27. Id. However, the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed plaintiff's habeas petition for failure to state a claim (Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Exh. C).

Res Judicata

{¶9} In its motion for summary judgment, defendant initially argues that plaintiff's prior habeas petition bars plaintiff's claim based on the doctrine of res judicata (Defendant's motion for summary judgment, p. 5). The doctrine of res judicata encompasses two distinct yet related preclusive effects-claim preclusion (estoppel by judgment) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). Defendant specifically raises the issue of collateral estoppel. "Collateral estoppel * * * prevents parties or their privies from relitigating facts and issues in a subsequent suit that were fully litigated in a prior suit." Stroud v. Dept. of Rehab. & Correction, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-139, 2004-Ohio-580, ¶ 21, citing Thompson v. Wing, 70 Ohio St.3d 176, 183, 1994 Ohio 358, 637 N.E.2d 917 (1994). "Collateral estoppel applies when the fact or issue (1) was actually and directly litigated in the prior action, (2) was passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) when the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party in privity with a party to the prior action." Id., citing Whitehead v. Gen. Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St.2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969), paragraph two of the syllabus. Issue preclusion applies even if the causes of action differ. O'Nesti v. DeBartolo Realty Corp., 113 Ohio St.3d 59, 2007-Ohio-1102, 862 N.E.2d 803, ¶ 7.

{¶10} The court finds issue preclusion bars plaintiffs claims in this case. Because the issue of whether plaintiffs confinement was unlawful (1) was actually and directly litigated in plaintiffs prior habeas petition, (2) was passed upon and previously determined by the Ohio Supreme Court, and (3) because the parties named in plaintiffs habeas petition are the same as in the present case, the court concludes plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of whether he was unlawfully confined. See Dugas v. Harris, 2019-Ohio-3797, 131 N.E.3d 959. Furthermore, the 10th District Court of Appeals has previously upheld the preclusive effect of a habeas petition to a state law tort claim. See Stroud, supra.

{¶11} In this case, plaintiff alleges false imprisonment which, as discussed below, requires confinement without lawful privilege. At the time of filing his habeas petition, plaintiff was incarcerated. In dismissing plaintiffs habeas petition and finding it failed to state a claim, the Ohio Supreme Court actually and directly addressed whether he was unlawfully confined, as this is the only issue raised through a habeas petition. R.C. 2725.01. Therefore, plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of whether his confinement was lawful here, i.e., whether defendant confined him without lawful privilege. Consequently, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

False Imprisonment

{¶12} In his complaint, plaintiff alleges defendant falsely imprisoned him when it tolled his PRC while he was incarcerated in West Virginia and/or when it sentenced him to additional prison time based on violations of conditions of his PRC. He claims that plaintiff did not have the statutory authority to impose PRC, and thus he was falsely imprisoned (See generally Complaint). "False imprisonment occurs when a person confine another intentionally 'without lawful privilege and against his consent within a limited area for any appreciable time, however short.'" Bennett v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 60 Ohio St. 107, 109, 573 N.E.2d 633, quoting Feliciano v. Kreiger, 50 Ohio St.2d 69, 71, 362 N.E.2d 646 (1977). As previously mentioned, for plaintiffs false imprisonment claim to succeed, he must demonstrate defendant did not have the lawful privilege to detain him pursuant to his PRC.

{¶13} Here, both the imposition of PRC and defendant's policies in administering PRC stem from statutory authority.

{¶14} R.C. 2967.28(C) states:

Any sentence to a prison term for a felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree that is not subject to division (B)(1) or (3) of this section shall include a requirement that the offender be subject to a period of post-release control of up to three years after the offender's release from imprisonment, if the parole board, in accordance with division (D) of this section, determines that a period of postrelease control is necessary for that offender. [Emphasis added]. In addition, R.C. 2967.28(E) provides the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC) with the power to adopt rules to assist the APA in determining postrelease control sanctions. Per this authority, DRC adopted a "lost time" policy that tolls the running of an offender's PRC while he or she is detained in another state (See

Anderson Aff.; Exh. A-2). Defendant's policy §100-APA-27 states: "[i]f a PRC offender is released to an * * * out-of-state detainer, the time between the date the offender is released to the detainer and the date the offender is released from the detaining authority shall be considered lost time." Id. at p. 5. Furthermore, "lost time" is defined as "the specific period of time during which an offender's period of supervision or prison term is tolled or not credited." Id. at p. 2. As already noted, defendant also points out that plaintiff was aware of this policy prior to his release and transfer to the custody of the West Virginia Division of Corrections (Anderson Aff., ¶¶ 11-12; Exh. A-3; Exh. A-4). Defendant's evidence demonstrates that plaintiff's PRC period of three years did not commence until after release from custody of the West Virginia Division of Corrections in June 2018. Therefore, defendant has demonstrated it had the lawful authority to impose on plaintiff an additional one-hundred-fifty-one-day prison sanction for his PRC violations (Anderson Aff., ¶ 16; Exh. A-6, p.1).

{¶15} Further, plaintiff points to no authority, and the court could locate none, that found the policy at issue in this case to be unlawful. In the absence of such authority, the court cannot conclude that defendant's effectuation of its tolling policy and/or its sentence and incarceration of plaintiff was without lawful privilege. In fact, at least one other court has considered and rejected arguments similar to those plaintiff asserts here in finding that the tolling policy implicated in this applied under identical circumstances and was promulgated pursuant to statutory authority. See Florence v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., C.P. No. 08CVH08-12427, 2009 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 5547, at *10 (Sep. 3, 2009).

Conclusion

{¶16} Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. For these reasons defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and judgment is hereby rendered in favor of defendant. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot. Court costs are assessed against plaintiff. The clerk shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal.