May, Judge
Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court The Honorable Andrew Hopper, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 48C03-1803-F2-792
Attorney for Appellant Paul J. Podlejski Anderson, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Jodi Kathryn Stein Ian McLean Megan Michelle Smith Deputy Attorneys General Indianapolis, Indiana
May, Judge
[¶1] Zachary Fix appeals following his convictions of Level 2 felony burglary while armed with a deadly weapon, Level 5 felony robbery, and Level 6 felony theft. He raises three issues, which we revise and restate as:
Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (2014).
Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (2017).
Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2 (2014).
1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence that Fix committed Level 2 felony burglary while armed with a deadly weapon based on evidence that he broke and entered the victim's home unarmed but subsequently obtained and used a deadly weapon against the victim;
2. Whether Fix's multiple convictions violate the Indiana Constitution's prohibition against double jeopardy; and
3. Whether the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences was authorized by law.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
We held oral argument on July 26, 2021, in the Indiana Court of Appeals Courtroom. We commend counsel for their able presentations.
[¶2] In 2017, Robert Mudd, who has a medical condition that causes progressive paralysis, lived alone in his home in Alexandria, Indiana. At the time relevant to this case, Mudd retained the ability to move his arms and left hand, but he was generally confined to a hospital-style bed located in his living room and required substantial care. His father, Larry Mudd ("Larry"), would visit him twice a day, once at 6:30 a.m. and again at 8:00 p.m. Larry would lock the back door every night when he left Mudd's house, and he would unlock the back door every morning. Pizza Hut would deliver Mudd lunch daily, and the restaurant instructed its drivers to enter Mudd's house through the back door to deliver food to him.
Larry Mudd passed away a few months prior to trial and, therefore, did not testify.
[¶3] During the early morning hours of July 7, 2017, Fix and Bobby Yeagy developed a plan to steal items that could then be traded or sold for drugs. Fix mentioned to Yeagy that a friend he met in prison told him about Mudd, and Fix thought Mudd would be an easy target. Yeagy was also familiar with Mudd because he had worked as a delivery driver for Pizza Hut and had delivered orders to Mudd. At approximately 3:00 a.m., Fix cut the power and cable lines into Mudd's house. Fix also disabled an outdoor surveillance camera. Mudd was awake at the time, and he heard Fix and Yeagy enter his house through the back door shortly after the power went out.
[¶4] Both Fix and Yeagy used flashlights to see as they walked through Mudd's house. They approached Mudd, and Fix shined his flashlight in Mudd's face. Fix and Yeagy searched the area around Mudd's bed and asked Mudd if he had any money. They found Mudd's wallet and asked Mudd for the PIN associated with his debit card. Fix threatened to kill Mudd if Mudd told them an incorrect PIN, but Mudd still relayed a false PIN. At some point, Fix shined his flashlight away from Mudd. Mudd then pulled out a handgun, which he kept hidden under his bedsheets, and pointed it at Fix. Fix saw the handgun and wrestled it away from Mudd's hand. Fix then hit Mudd across the side of the head with the handgun, resulting in a laceration above Mudd's left eye. Fix pulled the bedsheets off Mudd and took a cell phone Mudd had hidden under his leg. Fix also took Mudd's Life Alert pendent and a necklace Mudd was wearing.
[¶5] While Fix was occupied with Mudd, Yeagy searched the kitchen and the spare bedroom looking for Mudd's medications. Yeagy and Fix then searched the remainder of Mudd's house and collected all the items they wanted to steal into laundry baskets. They asked Mudd questions about certain items in his house, and they asked him to provide the combinations to open various safes. Before Yeagy and Fix left Mudd's house, Fix gave Mudd two Xanax pills to make him tired and warned Mudd that they would be coming back. Throughout the entire encounter, Fix repeatedly threatened to kill Mudd. Mudd was unable to contact anyone after Yeagy and Fix left his house because he was without power or a cell phone.
[¶6] Yeagy and Fix loaded the stolen items into Yeagy's car. They drove to the home of Yeagy's grandmother and unloaded the stolen items into the garage. Approximately thirty minutes later, they returned to Mudd's house and proceeded to steal more of his property. After about forty-five minutes, Fix and Yeagy left Mudd's house. Prior to leaving, they instructed Mudd to blame the robbery on a "black man with dreads, stocky build." (Tr. Vol. II at 180.) In total, Fix and Yeagy stole twelve firearms; thousands of rounds of ammunition; various tools, including a screw gun and a Caterpillar jump starter; a replica Tommy gun; batteries; several credit and debit cards; various medications, including Xanax and Klonopin; syringes; cameras; a safe; and various other pieces of property. Mudd later estimated that Fix and Yeagy stole $11, 000 worth of property from his house. Larry discovered Mudd and the ransacked house approximately two hours after Fix and Yeagy left, and he contacted the police.
[¶7] The stolen credit cards were used on July 9, 2017, and July 11, 2017. These transactions included charges from Oakwood Resort in Syracuse, Indiana; Finishline.com; and Amazon.com. Two of the Finish Line purchases used the e-mail address zachafix@gmail.com. Destini Lanning, the mother of Fix's daught it "is committed while armed with a deadly weapon." Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1(3)(A) (emphasis added). "Committed while" contemplates the time when the breaking and entering occurs. Just because our legislature elevated the offense of burglary where the proscribed conduct results in serious bodily injury, it does not follow that our legislature modified the time at which a burglary is deemed complete. Our Indiana Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the burglary statute to mean that the burglary offense itself is complete upon entry. See Swaynie, 762 N.E.2d at 114 (noting that culpability for burglary "is established at the point of entry," with the "criminal transgression . . . committed . . . at the moment the building or structure is broken into and entered"); Williams, 771 N.E.2d at 75 ("When [the defendant] broke into the apartment, the burglary was complete."). Therefore, we are unpersuaded by the State's arguments regarding the structure of the statute. The State presented insufficient evidence to convict Fix of Level 2 felony burglary while armed with a deadly weapon. See Chatham v. State, 845 N.E.2d 203, 208 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006) (holding State presented insufficient evidence to support sexual battery conviction).
Ultimately, it is not unusual that our burglary statute does not specifically establish liability for conduct beyond the threshold; this statutory approach comports with the common law view that burglary is an attempt-like offense primarily designed to protect the "security of habitation or occupancy[.]" Wharton's § 316. Moreover, although our legislature has not broadened burglary law beyond the traditional application, it is not as though the State lacks recourse for what happens beyond the threshold. Rather, Indiana has a robust body of criminal law to address subsequent transgressions. See, e.g., Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c) (criminalizing the knowing or intentional possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon); Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1(a) (elevating robbery to a Level 3 felony if committed while armed with a deadly weapon).
Fix challenges both the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of Level 2 felony burglary and the trial court's giving of Final Jury Instruction 9, which stated: "A person is armed with a weapon when that person uses or involves a weapon. A person is not armed merely by virtue of possessing a weapon. Rather, there must be something more indicating the use or involvement of the weapon in the crime." (App. Vol. II at 167.) While we reverse due to the insufficiency of the evidence, we wish to note that Final Jury Instruction 9 constitutes an inaccurate statement of law because the instruction implies that mere possession of a deadly weapon is insufficient to elevate the offense to Level 2 felony burglary while armed with a deadly weapon. A person is armed when he possesses a weapon. It is immaterial whether the person uses the weapon in the process of breaking and entering. Rather, the offense is properly elevated if the person possesses a deadly weapon when he breaks and enters. See Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1(3)(A) (elevating burglary if "committed while armed with a deadly weapon").
[¶22] Even so, "[w]hen a conviction is reversed because of insufficient evidence, we may remand for the trial court to enter a judgment of conviction upon a lesser-included offense if the evidence is sufficient to support the lesser offense." Id. Fix did break and enter the building or structure of another with the intent to commit a theft therein, and thus, we reverse Fix's conviction of Level 2 felony burglary while armed with a deadly weapon and remand the matter for the trial court to enter a conviction of a lesser-included form of burglary. See id. (remanding case with instructions for trial court to enter conviction of Class B misdemeanor battery).
Burglary is a Level 5 felony, but the offense is elevated to a Level 4 felony "if the building or structure is a dwelling." Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1(1). There was testimony that the burglarized structure in the instant case was a dwelling. (See Tr. Vol. II at 157 (Mudd testifying that he was in his bed at the time of the burglary and that at around 3:00 a.m. "[t]he lights went off in the house.").) However, any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence, or the maximum sentence, is an "element" that must be found by the jury. Alleyene v. U.S., 570 U.S. 99, 115-16, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2162-63 (2013). Here, the trial court instructed the jury that in order to convict Fix of burglary, the State was required to prove:
II. Double Jeopardy
A. Burglary and Robbery
[¶23] Fix also argues that his convictions of burglary and robbery violate the Indiana Constitution's prohibition against double jeopardy. See Ind. Const. art. 1, § 14 ("No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense."). Fix recites the double jeopardy standard we utilized in Thompson v. State, 82 N.E.3d 376 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017), reh'g denied, trans. denied, which relied upon the double jeopardy analysis our Indiana Supreme Court laid out in Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999). However, in Wadle v. State, our Indiana Supreme Court expressly overruled Richardson and introduced a new framework for analyzing double jeopardy violations. 151 N.E.3d 227, 235 (Ind. 2020).
First, a court must determine, under our included-offense statutes, whether one charged offense encompasses another charged offense. Second, a court must look at the underlying facts - as alleged in the information and as adduced at trial - to determine whether the charged offenses are the "same." If the facts show two separate and distinct crimes, there's no violation of substantive double jeopardy, even if one offense is, by definition, "included" in the other. But if the facts show only a single continuous crime, and one statutory offense is included in the other, then the presumption is that the legislation intends for alternative (rather than cumulative) sanctions. The State can rebut this presumption only by showing that the statute - either in express terms or by unmistakable implication - clearly permits multiple punishment.
Id.
[¶24] Therefore, we must assess whether Fix's burglary and robbery offenses are either inherently included offenses or factually included offenses. The General Assembly has defined an "included offense" to be an offense:
(1) that "is established by proof of the same material elements or less than all the material elements required to establish the commission of the offense charged, "
(2) that "consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein," or
(3) that "differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to establish its commission."
Id. at 248 (quoting
Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168). As to burglary, Indiana's legislature provided:
A person who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person, with intent to commit a felony or theft in it, commits burglary[;]
Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1. As to robbery, the legislature provided:
a person who knowingly or intentionally takes property from another person or from the presence of another person:
(1) by using or threatening the use of force on any person; or
(2) by putting any person in fear;
commits robbery, a Level 5 felony. However, the offense is a Level 3 felony if it is committed while armed with a deadly weapon or results in bodily injury to any person other than a defendant, and a Level 2 felony if it results in serious bodily injury to any person other than a defendant.
Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1.
[¶25] The State argues burglary and robbery are not inherently included offenses because "[t]he taking of money supports the robbery and the breaking and entering support the burglary, but neither is an element of the other crime." (Appellee's Br. at 33.) The State also argues that Fix's offenses are not factually lesser-included offenses because "the burglary charge alleged a breaking and entering while the robbery charge separately alleged that Defendant took money from Mudd by force or fear[.]" (Id.) We agree with the State in both respects.
[¶26] While the State does not rely on our opinion in Morales v. State, 165 N.E.3d 1002 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021), the opinion appears prescient to the question of whether robbery is an inherently included offense of burglary. One offense does not constitute an attempt of the other and the two offenses do not differ solely in degree of harm or culpability. See id. at 1009 ("No attempted crime was charged, and the differences between Level 4 felony arson and Level 2 felony burglary vary in more ways than just level of harm or culpability."), trans. denied. However, burglary requires that the perpetrator break into a building or structure with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein, Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1, and robbery is a felony. Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1. We observed in Morales that
burglary does not
require commission of a second offense. Proof of mere intent to commit a felony at the time of the breaking and entering is sufficient to prove burglary. The prosecution may prove the accused committed the intended felony within the structure, a different felony within the structure, or no felony at all. Burglary occurs in each of those scenarios so long as the accused broke and entered the structure with the intent to commit any felony.
Id. at 1008 (holding arson was not an included offense of burglary) (emphasis in original). Thus, it follows that robbery is not an inherently included offense of burglary because the State is not required to prove that a robbery occurred to obtain a conviction of burglary.
Fix raised for the first time at oral argument the issue of whether his robbery and theft convictions violate the Indiana Constitution's prohibition against double jeopardy. However, we need not opine on this issue because issues raised for the first time at oral argument are waived. See Harris v. State, 76 N.E.3d 137, 140 (Ind. 2017) ("issues are waived when raised for the first time at oral argument"). Nonetheless, as we must remand the case back to the trial court, Fix may present the issue on remand.
B. Level 3 Felony Armed Robbery
[¶27] In addition to finding Fix guilty of Level 2 felony burglary while armed with a deadly weapon, the jury returned guilty verdicts on the counts of Level 3 felony robbery resulting in bodily injury and Level 3 felony armed robbery. The trial court then entered judgment of conviction on only the lesser included offense of Level 5 felony robbery so as not to run afoul of the Indiana Constitution's prohibition against double jeopardy. However, given that we must vacate Fix's conviction of Level 2 felony burglary while armed with a deadly weapon, the trial court on remand should enter judgment of conviction of Level 3 felony armed robbery and sentence Fix on that count. See Taflinger v. State, 698 N.E.2d 325, 328 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998) (holding defendant could be resentenced on jury verdict finding him guilty of neglect of a dependent causing serious bodily injury after defendant's attempted murder conviction was vacated).
III. Consecutive Sentences
[¶28] Fix further contends that the length of his aggregate sentence exceeds the maximum aggregate sentence allowed by Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2 (2016). Generally, "it is within the trial court's discretion whether to order sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively." Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069, 1082 (Ind. 2015), reh'g denied. Nonetheless, "[t]he legislature fixes penalties for crimes, and a trial court's discretion in sentencing does not extend beyond the limits prescribed by statute." Riffe v. State, 675 N.E.2d 710, 712 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996), reh'g denied, trans. denied.
While we must remand this matter back to the trial court for resentencing, we address this issue because of the likelihood that it will reappear on remand. See Irvine v. Irvine, 685 N.E.2d 67, 71 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997) (addressing whether trial court could award post-judgment interest because the issue was likely to appear on remand).
[¶29] Subsection (d) of Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2 (2016) caps the aggregate sentence a trial court may impose for a single episode of criminal conduct based on the most serious crime for which the court is sentencing the offender. Subsection (b) of the same statute defines "episode of criminal conduct" as "offenses or a connected series of offenses that are closely related in time, place, and circumstance." However, subsection (c) of the statute provides that the caps in subsection (d) do not apply in relation to crimes of violence, and subsection (a) enumerates the eighteen crimes designated crimes of violence. Robbery as a Level 3 felony is one of the enumerated crimes of violence. Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(a)(12). Therefore, on remand, Fix's sentence associated with Level 3 felony armed robbery should not count toward the aggregate statutory cap. See Ellis v. State, 736 N.E.2d 731, 737 (Ind. 2000) (holding consecutive sentencing between a crime of violence and an offense that is not a crime of violence is exempt from aggregate statutory cap).
Conclusion
[¶30] The State did not present sufficient evidence to prove Fix committed Level 2 felony burglary while armed with a deadly weapon because Fix was not armed when he broke and entered the burglarized building, even though Fix subsequently acquired a firearm and used it against Mudd. Nonetheless, we affirm the trial court's finding that Fix can be convicted of both burglary and robbery without violating the Indiana Constitution's prohibition against double jeopardy because the two offenses are neither factually included offenses nor inherently included offenses. Therefore, the trial court on remand is to vacate Fix's conviction of Level 2 felony burglary and enter convictions of Level 3 felony armed robbery and a lower-level burglary offense. These modifications will require the court to resentence Fix, and any sentence for armed robbery will not count toward the statutory cap listed in Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2. We affirm the trial court in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[¶31] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Bailey, J., and Robb, J., concur.
1) the Defendant
2) knowingly or intentionally
3) broke and entered
4) the
building or structure of Robert Mudd
5) with the intent to commit a theft[.]
(Tr. Vol. V at 50) (emphasis added). The trial court did not instruct the jury to determine whether the burglarized building or structure was a dwelling.