DOUGHERTY JUSTICE.
ARGUED: April 14, 2021
Appeal from the Order of Superior Court at No. 3060 EDA 2019 dated September 3, 2020, reconsideration denied October 14, 2020, Reversing the Decree dated September 27, 2019 by the Montgomery County Orphans' Court at No. 2019-A0053 and Remanding.
BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.
OPINION
DOUGHERTY JUSTICE.
Id. at 9-10. The orphans' court thus determined Father did not exercise reasonable firmness to establish a relationship with C.M. and there was no post-abandonment contact with the child for the court to consider. The court further concluded clear and convincing evidence demonstrated grounds to terminate his parental rights pursuant to Subsection 2511(a)(1) of the Act. Id.
Addressing Father's argument the proposed adoption was a contrived effort to deprive him of his parental rights, the orphans' court found the testimony of Mother and Grandfather credible regarding their reasons for seeking the adoption, i.e., in light of Mother's diagnoses "which are debilitating and may prove fatal[, ]" the proposed adoption would provide C.M. with the stability of being raised by family members who have cared for C.M. since birth. Id. at 10. Citing Father's testimony admitting he shared no parental bond with C.M., the court further determined C.M. would suffer no detriment as a result of the termination of Father's rights, and the proposed adoption arrangement would best meet C.M.'s needs and welfare "under the unusual circumstances" of Mother's medical condition and voluntary relinquishment of her own rights to allow the adoption to proceed, thereby meeting the Act's additional requirements under Subsection 2511(b). Orphans' Court Opinion, 10/31/2019, at 3 (opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)); Orphans' Court Opinion, 9/26/2019, at 12, 13; see 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(b) (court "shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child"). By separate decrees issued September 27, 2019, the orphans' court terminated the parental rights of Father and Mother.
M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1129 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The "gamesmanship" of potentially any third party standing in as an adoptive parent, as forecast in M.R.D., is perhaps a more nuanced quagmire than the retributive filing of a termination of parental rights petition described by Father and the panel majority in the present case, but we recognize the danger of approving such petitions filed in the midst of acrimonious custody battles or in short sequence after a non-custodial parent files a complaint in custody, as was the case in M.R.D. though it was not then an issue before the Court. See id. at 1118; id. at 1134-35 (Wecht, J., concurring) (proposed adoption "lacked the required integrity, inasmuch as it appears to have been initiated merely to stave off and defeat Father's claim for custody[;]" custody court has "robust discretionary authority" to limit or curtail a parent's custody rights "without resort to the draconian remedy of termination of parental rights under the adoption laws"); see also L.J.B., 18 A.3d at 1110 (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court) (termination petition filed by parent absent stepparent adoption would provide parents with "a new, and in our view dangerous, tactic in heated custody disputes").
145 A.3d at 1132.
At the outset, we highlight that the orphans' court made a credibility determination in favor of Mother and the maternal grandfather, which we do not disturb. The motivation for the adoption is obvious from the credible testimony that they sought to terminate Father's parental rights in order to ensure that [Child] remains with Maternal Grandparents in the event that Mother's health deteriorates.
C.M., 2020 WL 5269235 at *5 (citation omitted).