CRADLE, J.
Argued April 12, 2021
Procedural History
Action for the dissolution of marriage, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Litchfield, where the court, Shah, J., rendered judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief in accordance with the parties' separation agreement; thereafter, the court, Danaher, J., granted the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant's motion to modify custody, and the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed; further proceedings.
Christopher G. Brown, for the appellant (defendant).
Steven H. Levy, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Elgo, Cradle and Harper, Js.
OPINION
CRADLE, J.
The defendant, Marianella Perez-Swan-son, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her post judgment motion to modify custody of the parties' children on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to enter further orders regarding the custody and visitation of the children under General Statutes § 46b-115l (a) (2) because the children had resided with the plaintiff, Ronald Swanson, in North Carolina for at least six consecutive months. Specifically, the defendant claims on appeal that the trial court erred by concluding that it no longer had jurisdiction to enter further orders because the court failed to consider two of the three statutory requirements: namely, whether the defendant maintains a significant relationship with the children and whether substantial evidence concerning the children was available in Connecticut. We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the claims on appeal. The parties were married on April 17, 2004. On January 20, 2015, the plaintiff initiated an action for marital dissolution and physical custody of the parties' three children. On January 21, 2016, the court rendered a judgment of dissolution, finding that the parties' marriage had broken down irretrievably. Pursuant to the judgment and fully incorporated separation agreement, the parties shared joint legal custody of the children, and the plaintiff had primary physical custody.
On May 16, 2018, the defendant filed a motion seeking to preclude the plaintiff from relocating to North Carolina with the children. On June 5, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion for modification, requesting permission to relocate with the children to Greensboro, North Carolina. On August 14, 2018, the parties entered into an agreement, which gave the parties joint custody of the children but provided for physical residence with the plaintiff in Greensboro, North Carolina. The agreement also established a visitation schedule, which allowed the defendant extended visits with her children in Connecticut during certain months and, during the months the children did not have an extended visit in Connecticut, the defendant had a right to visitation in North Carolina. Additionally, the agreement provided that the plaintiff was to pay the defendant a travel allowance of $800 per month for her visitation related expenses.
In August, 2018, the plaintiff and the three children relocated to North Carolina, while the defendant continued to reside in Connecticut. On July 10, 2019, the parties entered into another postjudgment agreement modifying the plaintiff's obligations and stipulating that either the court in ‘‘[Connecticut] or [North Carolina] [would] have jurisdiction to decide any issues relating to custody [and/or] visitation.''
The plaintiff filed a petition for registration of a foreign child custody order, dated July 29, 2019, in the district court in Guilford County, North Carolina. On October 7, 2019, the court in North Carolina entered an order confirming the registration of Connecticut's child custody order.
On October 22, 2019, the defendant filed, in Connecticut, a motion for modification claiming that the plaintiff failed to pay the travel allowance and alimony in accordance with the postjudgment agreement, which was preventing her from visiting the children in North Carolina. She asked the court to return the children to her physical custody in Connecticut and, in turn, to implement a visitation schedule for the plaintiff. On November 5, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the defendant's motion for modification, alleging that North Carolina was the children's home state and, therefore, the Connecticut court should decline to exercise jurisdiction because it was no longer a convenient forum. The defendant filed a reply on November 15, 2019, in which she asserted that the Connecticut court has continuing jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), codified in General Statutes § 46b-115 et seq., because she still resides in Connecticut, she has a significant relationship with her children, and substantial evidence related to the children is still available in Connecticut.
On December 9, 2019, the parties appeared before the court, Danaher, J., for a hearing on their motions. At the hearing, the defendant, through her attorney, acknowledged that the judgment had been properly registered in North Carolina, that the children had resided in North Carolina for at least six months, and, consequently, that North Carolina was now the children's home state as defined by the UCCJEA. Accordingly, on that same date, the court issued a written order granting the plaintiff's motion to dismiss. The court reasoned that ‘‘[t]he defendant acknowledged, in open court, that the custody and visitation orders entered in this court have been properly registered in North Carolina. The defendant further acknowledged that North Carolina is the ‘home state' of the three . . . children, as that phrase is defined in General Statutes § 46b-115a (7), in that the children have resided in North Carolina since the summer of 2018. Therefore, this court no longer has jurisdiction to enter further orders regarding custody and visitation of the . . . children. General Statutes § 46b-115l (a) (2).'' This appeal followed.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by concluding that it lacked continuing jurisdiction to modify custody solely on the ground that North Carolina is the children's home state. She argues that the court failed to consider whether the children had a significant relationship with the defendant, who resides in Connecticut, and whether there was substantial evidence related to the children still available in Connecticut, both of which are required to terminate jurisdiction under § 46b-115l (a) (2) of the UCCJEA. We agree.
‘‘At the outset, we note our well settled standard of review for jurisdictional matters. A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. When . . . the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Firstenberg v. Madigan, 188 Conn.App. 724, 730, 205 A.3d 716 (2019).
‘‘The purposes of the UCCJEA are to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in matters of child custody; promote cooperation with the courts of other states; discourage continuing controversies over child custody; deter abductions; avoid [relitigation] of custody decisions; and to facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states. . . . The UCCJEA addresses [interjurisdictional] issues related to child custody and visitation. . . .
‘‘The UCCJEA is the enabling legislation for the court's jurisdiction. . . . The UCCJEA, as adopted in [§ 46b-115 et seq.], provides Superior Courts with exclusive jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree . . . .'' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Iliana M., 134 Conn.App. 382, 390, 38 A.3d 130 (2012).
The UCCJEA, in § 46b-115l (a), provides in relevant part that, ‘‘a court of this state which has made a child custody determination . . . has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until: (1) A court of this state or a court of another state determines that the child, the child's parents and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state; or (2) a court of this state determines that (A) this state is not the home state of the child, (B) a parent or a person acting as a parent continues to reside in this state but the child no longer has a significant relationship with such parent or person, and (C) substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training and personal relationships.''(Emphasis added.)
Here, although the defendant conceded that the children had continuously resided in North Carolina for more than six consecutive months with the defendant and, therefore, that North Carolina was the children's home state, that alone is not sufficient to terminate the Connecticut court's continuing jurisdiction. As provided in § 46b-115l (a), a court of this state has continuing jurisdiction over the custody order until it has been determined that Connecticut is not the home state of the children, and that the children lack a significant relationship with the defendant who resides in Connecticut, and that substantial evidence concerning the children's care, protection, training, and personal relationships is no longer available in Connecticut. Thus, all three of the aforementioned factors must be met and, here, the court made its determination on the basis of only one factor without addressing the remaining factors. Because the court based its determination that it lacked jurisdiction solely on the fact that Connecticut is no longer the home state of the children, it erred in granting the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant's motion to modify custody.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.