JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County No. 17 M1 709335 Honorable Toya T. Harvey, Judge Presiding. JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice McBride concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Gordon specially concurred, with opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 Defendant Kenneth Matthews, pro se, appeals the entry of an order of possession in favor of plaintiffs Kevin Goodwin (Goodwin) and Ray Rabideau (Rabideau) (collectively plaintiffs) in a forcible entry and detainer action pursuant to the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (Act) (735 ILCS 5/9-101, et seq. (West 2016)). On appeal, defendant maintains that (1) the order of possession is void because plaintiffs failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for service of a five-day notice according to section 9-211 of the Act (735 ILCS 5/9-211 (West 2016)), (2) the circuit court erroneously struck his jury demand, (3) the circuit court erred when it did not hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion to quash, and (4) the circuit court erred in granting Goodwin's oral motion to amend the complaint. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶ 2 BACKGROUND
¶ 3 On June 9, 2017, Goodwin filed a complaint in forcible entry and detainer against defendant seeking possession of a property located at 5409 S. Princeton Avenue, Unit 1, Chicago, Illinois as well as rent and late fees totaling $10,000. After an attempt by the sheriff to serve defendant with summons failed, Goodwin was granted leave to employ a special process server to serve the complaint. After four attempts, the special process server filed an affidavit with the court indicating that defendant was unable to be served with the summons. Goodwin's counsel then filed an affidavit for service of the summons by posting indicating defendant was "concealed within the state; therefore, process cannot be served upon defendant." The sheriff posted the summons on July 17, 2017, and stated that defendant was required to appear on July 28, 2017. ¶ 4 On July 27, 2017, defendant filed a pro se motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2016)) in which he argued that Goodwin was not the owner of the property and therefore lacked standing. Attached to his motion was a copy of the warranty deed for the property indicating Rabideau was the owner of the premises. Defendant noticed the motion for July 28, 2017. ¶ 5 The record demonstrates that on July 28, 2017, plaintiffs' counsel and defendant were present before the circuit court. Although there is no record of proceedings included in this appeal, orders entered that day indicate (1) the complaint was amended to include Rabideau as an additional plaintiff, (2) Laskeshia Odoms (an individual originally named as a defendant) was had been filed. The five-day notice was not dated, was signed by McCarey, but was not notarized or sworn. Defendant appended McCarey's affidavit to the motions. McCarey averred that his signature on the five-day notice was forged and that he did not serve defendant with a copy of the five-day notice. ¶ 9 On August 21, 2017, the circuit court denied defendant's motions. In denying these motions the circuit court found defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the special process server's affidavit demonstrated due diligence. This appeal followed.
Another purported five-day notice was attached as an exhibit to defendant's emergency motion to stay filed before this court. This notice, however, was never presented to the trial court nor was it part of the official record filed with this court. In addition, defendant does not make any arguments in regards to this notice in his appeal.
¶ 10 ANALYSIS
¶ 11 On appeal, defendant pro se maintains that (1) the order of possession is void because plaintiffs failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for service of a five-day notice according to the Act and thus lacked subject matter jurisdiction, (2) the circuit court erroneously struck his jury demand, (3) the circuit court erred when it did not hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion to quash, and (4) the circuit court erred in granting Goodwin's oral motion to amend the complaint. Although plaintiffs have not filed a response brief in this court, we may proceed under the principles set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976). We address each claim in turn. ¶ 12 Defendant first contends that he was not properly served with the five-day notice because he did not receive it prior to the filing of the complaint and the notice was not signed by the landlord or the landlord's agent. Section 9-209 of the Act provides that a landlord may notify the tenant in writing that the lease will be terminated unless payment of overdue rent is made within the time stated in the notice, which cannot be less than five days after service. 735 ILCS 5/9-209 (West 2016). Under section 9-211 of the Act, such notice may be served by (i) delivering a copy to the tenant, (ii) leaving a copy with an individual over the age of 13 who resides at the premises, or (iii) sending a copy to the tenant by certified or registered mail, with a returned receipt from the addressee. 735 ILCS 5/9-211 (West 2016). Section 9-211 further provides that if no one is in "actual possession" of the premises, service may be made by posting the notice on the premises. Id. ¶ 13 Asserting that he was in "actual possession" of the property, defendant argues that the service of the five-day notice by posting did not comply with section 9-211. Citing Figueroa v. Deacon, 404 Ill. App. 3d 48, 52 (2010), and American Management Consultant, LLC v. Carter, 392 Ill. App. 3d 39, 55-56 (2009), he contends that the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the action based on plaintiffs' failure to strictly satisfy the requirements of the Act. "Whether a circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a claim presents a question of law which we review de novo." In re Megan G., 2015 IL App (2d) 140148, ¶ 20. As discussed below, we reject defendant's jurisdictional challenge. ¶ 14 Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as the power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding in question belongs. LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, 2015 IL 116129, ¶ 39. Under the Illinois Constitution adopted in 1870, the circuit court's jurisdiction over special statutory proceedings, i.e., "matters which had no roots at common law or in equity," was derived from the legislature. Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 336 (2002). ¶ 15 In a series of cases referred to as the Belleville Toyota cases, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized the effect that the 1964 and 1970 amendments to the Illinois Constitution made to the power of courts to exercise subject matter jurisdiction. See In re Nathan A.C., 385 Ill. App. 3d by this proposed amendment, as he was the one who provided documents to the court and opposing counsel regarding Rabideau's status as the owner of the property. The amendment to the complaint was also timely, as it occurred before the entry of the order of possession. While Goodwin could have amended the complaint at an earlier date, the complaint had been filed less than two months before. Considering these factors, we conclude the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Goodwin's oral motion to amend the complaint.
Plaintiffs filed a response to defendant's emergency motion to reconsider this court's denial of an emergency motion to stay. Thereafter, plaintiffs' counsel withdrew from the case. --------
¶ 31 CONCLUSION
¶ 32 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the determination of the circuit court of Cook County. ¶ 33 Affirmed. ¶ 34 JUSTICE GORDON, specially concurring: ¶ 35 I agree with the majority on all of the issues except for the service of the five-day notice. Defendant claims that he was given the notice from another resident in the building after the lawsuit was filed. That type of service would be valid if done at least five days before the filing of the lawsuit for eviction for the failure to pay past-due rent. However, in the case at bar and in defendant's brief before this court, there is no evidence or even mention that defendant was a tenant. In fact, on the lease the defendant attached to a motion filed before this court, he is not listed as a tenant, and if he was not a tenant, he may not be subject to a five-day notice. Defendant attached two different five-day notices, one not dated and without an affidavit of service. The other notice is properly filled out. ¶ 36 When a tenant fails to pay rent on the due date, the landlord must serve a five-day notice. 735 ILCS 5/9-209 (West 2016). The notice must demand payment of a "sum certain" (Weinberg v. Warren, 340 Ill. App. 365, 368 (1950)), must adequately describe the premises (735 ILCS 5/9- 13 209 (West 2016)), must notify the tenant of his right to pay rent with the five-day period (Elizondo v. Medina, 100 Ill. App. 3d 718, 721 (1981)), and must notify the tenant that, if rent is not paid within five days of receipt, the tenancy will be terminated (Bank of Belleville v. Stidimire, 119 Ill. App. 3d 73, 78 (1983)). ¶ 37 In the case at bar, we do not have a complete record. As noted, there is no report of proceedings or bystander's report, so we do not know when defendant received the five-day notice. We do not know what type of tenancy existed, whether it was month-to-month, week-to-week, or what it was. We do not know whether defendant was even a tenant as he does not refer to himself as a tenant in the brief he filed before this court, nor is he on the lease. We do not know whether he was merely a trespasser. The landlord filed no brief and we really do not know whether the trial court held a hearing on the five-day notice issue. This record tells us nothing. As a result, there is no evidence for this court to review to determine the issue of the five-day notice. In fact, we do not know whether either notice was presented to the trial court because there is no report of proceedings or a bystander's report. Under these circumstances, we have no tools to guide us to give defendant the relief he asks.