SICHER, J.
Anthony G. Zingales for petitioner. Harry Mandell and Philip Silverman for respondent. SICHER, J. There is presented a jurisdictional question whether this proceeding falls within the ambit of the statutory provision that "A separation agreement shall in no way preclude the filing of a petition for the support * * * of a wife who is likely to become a public charge" (N. Y. City Dom. Rel. Ct. Act, § 137, subd. 5). On April 15, 1950, the parties, who had intermarried on July 26, 1924, entered into a formal written separation agreement, in conventional form, by which the husband agreed to pay to the wife "in full of his obligation for her care, support and Finally, petitioner's counsel's citation of Judge CURTIS BOK'S eloquent caveat — "It is not enough to send men and women away from court with a decision; there must also be a sense that there is wisdom in it, and a blessing upon it, and a touch of kindly magic to go with it." ("I Too, Nicodemus", p. 325) — invites the dictum that it is at least arguable that petitioner's welfare may be better served by her clinging to the fixed contract obligation of respondent rather than substituting for it the hazards of a Family Court support proceeding. Even though there be a decrease or stoppage of the earnings petitioner had when the separation agreement was consummated in her behalf on April 15, 1950, a support proceeding in this court would have to take into account also the asserted, if proved, change in respondent's circumstances that he is no longer gainfully employed but now maintaining himself wholly on the proceeds of the recent sale of the shop he had owned and operated on April 15, 1950. Unfortunately, this court is daily constrained to enter inadequate orders because there must be taken into account not only the needs of the dependent but also the inability of the person chargeable with support to contribute an adequate amount (see Domb v. Domb, 176 Misc. 409 [PANKEN, J.]). The net proceeds of such sale are available to respondent for performance of the separation agreement, and would be subject to execution on a judgment for breach of that contract; contrariwise, in City of New York (Sullivan) v. Sullivan (246 App. Div. 55), the Appellate Division, first department, reversed a support order predicated solely on a $5,000 cash legacy and ruled that the Family Court "in making an award should take into consideration not only the fact that the appellant is about to receive a legacy but should consider, in addition thereto, his advanced years, and the amount of money he may need for his support when he is no longer able to receive anything for his labors." (Pp. 56-57.) For the foregoing reasons the petition is dismissed, without prejudice, however, to whatever rights either party may have in any other court in respect of such separation agreement or the marital status, and also with leave to file a new petition in this court when and if the requisite jurisdictional facts hereafter occur. But no new petition shall be filed except with the consent of the Justice then sitting in the Part where the new proceeding would be heard. Notice shall be given pursuant to the subjoined direction. [*] The opinion as filed sets forth the true names of all parties but as here published substitutes fictitious names and disguises certain other details, in consonance with the spirit of section 52 of the Domestic Relations Court Act of the City of New York (L. 1933, ch. 482).