People v. Mueller

JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of McHenry County. Nos. 17-DT-109 17-TR-4537 Honorable Joel D. Berg, Judge, Presiding. JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Birkett and Spence concurred in the judgment and opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Amy Lynn Mueller, was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2016)) and improper lane usage (ILU) (id. § 11-709(a)). She moved to quash her arrest and suppress evidence, contesting the initial stop of her vehicle for ILU. The trial court granted the motion and denied the State's motion to reconsider. The State appeals. We affirm.

¶ 3 At the hearing on defendant's motion, the sole witness was Trent Raupp, a McHenry County sheriff's deputy. He testified as follows. On February 11, 2017, at 1:40 a.m., he was on ¶ 13 Finally, the court held, Heien and People v. Gaytan, 2015 IL 116223, which adopted Heien's holding, did not apply. In those cases, the statutes involved were ambiguous; here, the ILU statute clearly required a lane deviation, which meant crossing over a line. Thus, Raupp's mistake of law had not been reasonable. The court denied the motion to reconsider. The State appealed (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(a) (eff. July 1, 2017)).

¶ 15 On appeal, the State contends that (1) the trial court applied the wrong legal standard to the motion to quash and suppress; (2) the court erred in holding that there was no reasonable suspicion to stop defendant for ILU; (3) even if defendant had not actually violated the ILU statute, Raupp's mistake of law in believing otherwise was reasonable, thus giving him a reasonable suspicion to stop her; and (4) alternatively, under Greco, Raupp had a reasonable suspicion to stop defendant for driving erratically. ¶ 16 The State's first argument need not concern us. We review the trial court's judgment, not its reasoning, and we may affirm on any basis called for by the record. See People v. Cleveland, 342 Ill. App. 3d 912, 915 (2003). The State's fourth argument need not concern us either. The State concedes that it forfeited the Greco argument by failing to timely raise it. See Hanley v. City of Chicago, 343 Ill. App. 3d 49, 54 (2003). We decline to disregard the forfeiture, as the State's tardiness in raising the Greco argument denied defendant the opportunity to introduce evidence against it. See In re Marriage of Rodriguez, 131 Ill. 2d 273, 279 (1989). We note that the trial court found the argument both forfeited and meritless on the facts. ¶ 17 We turn to the State's second and third arguments. The State contends that, under section 11-709(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-709(a) (West 2016)), a person commits ILU when his or her vehicle touches the yellow line or the fog line, even if it never crosses over Therefore, Heien and Gaytan do not apply and the stop cannot be validated as based on a reasonable mistake of law. ¶ 28 In any event, we note that a stop for ILU is valid when "a police officer observes multiple lane deviations, for no obvious reason." (Emphasis added.) Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 28. Here, even if defendant's multiple touches could be considered "lane deviations," the road's "twists and turns" provided an innocent (and obvious) explanation for those brief touches. Thus, under any construction of section 11-709(a), the trial court correctly granted defendant's motion to quash and suppress.

¶ 30 We affirm the order of the circuit court of McHenry County. ¶ 31 Affirmed.