State v. Daigle

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

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Docket Number

No. 2018–KD–0634

Attorney(S)

Judges

PER CURIAM

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Louisiana Supreme Court addressed supervisory writs from the Fourteenth Judicial District Court in Calcasieu Parish concerning recusal of the trial judge in a capital case. The trial judge had a longtime working relationship and social-media relationship with the victim’s widow, who was also a court employee and designated penalty-phase witness. [1][2]

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial judge was constitutionally required to recuse himself because the circumstances created an objectively intolerable probability or risk of actual bias. [3][4]
Whether the collective circumstances—including the judge’s relationship with the victim’s widow and irregularities in the recusal procedure—required recusal despite the absence of an allegation or showing of actual bias. [2][5]

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Rippo v. Baker, 137 S.Ct. 905, 907 (2017)	Recusal is required when, objectively, the probability of actual bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. [3]	The court treated the standard as requiring recusal to protect against an impermissible risk of bias, even without proof of actual bias. [3][5]
State v. LaCaze, 16-0234 (La. 3/13/18), ___So.3d.___	The Rippo standard requires proof of a probability, risk, or potential for actual bias that is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. [3][4]	The court found that the collective facts satisfied both LaCaze requirements and required recusal. [4]

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first recognized that, under Rippo and LaCaze, actual-bias evidence is unnecessary when circumstances create an objectively excessive risk of bias. [3]

The record showed that the trial judge had a longstanding working relationship with the victim’s widow, maintained a social-media relationship with her that he initially denied but later acknowledged under oath, and took steps prohibited by the Code of Criminal Procedure that could have prevented another judge from considering the recusal motion. [2]

The court also considered that the widow was a designated penalty-phase witness and that another judge described aspects of the recusal procedure as “very odd.” [2][6]

Although any individual fact might not have required recusal, the court assessed the circumstances collectively. It concluded that the record demonstrated both a probability or risk of actual bias and a level of risk too high to be constitutionally tolerable. [4]

The court emphasized that it did not find or rely on any showing that the trial judge actually was biased or that he was not a diligent judge. Nevertheless, given the unique circumstances and the capital nature of the case, constitutional safeguards required recusal. [3][5]

Holding and Implications

Writ granted; stay lifted; trial judge required to recuse. [1][4]

The decision removes the trial judge from the matter to protect the defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial decisionmaker, notwithstanding the absence of proven actual bias. [3][5] No broader implications were discussed, and the opinion applied the recusal standards identified in Rippo and LaCaze rather than announcing a new precedent. [3][4]

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STATE OF LOUISIANA v. KEVIN DALE DAIGLE

PER CURIAM

ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CALCASIEU PER CURIAM Writ granted; stay lifted.

In Rippo v. Baker, 137 S.Ct. 905, 907 (2017), the United States Supreme Court recently ruled that "[r]ecusal is required when, objectively speaking, the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable." (internal quotes omitted). This court has very recently examined the Rippo recusal standard in State v. LaCaze, 16-0234 (La. 3/13/18), ___So.3d.___, and observed that under Rippo's mandate, "evidence of actual bias is not necessary to require recusal." LaCaze, 16-0234, p. 10, ___So.3d. at___. In other words, recusal may be required as a constitutional safeguard against the risk of bias and, because the defendant here faces the possibility of a death sentence, every reasonable effort must be made to ensure constitutional safeguards are met.

The record here demonstrates that the trial judge had a longtime working relationship with Mrs. Vincent, the victim's widow and a court employee; has a social media relationship with Mrs. Vincent that he initially denied in a formal opinion, but later admitted under oath; and has taken steps barred by the Code of Criminal Procedure which, if not corrected by the appellate court, would have thwarted another judge from considering his recusal. Mrs. Vincent is not only the victim's widow, she is designated as a penalty phase witness in this capital case.

Another judge allotted to hear the recusal motion referred to some of the events surrounding the recusal procedure as "very odd," and commented, "I still don't quite understand why these things happened."

Perhaps, if viewed in isolation, any one of these facts would not be sufficient to require recusal. However, viewed collectively, this record satisfies both prongs of proof required by this court in LaCaze. First, "[t]he Rippo standard clearly requires proof that an appearance of bias gives rise to a 'probability of actual bias,' also referred to as a 'risk of bias' or 'potential for bias.'" LaCaze, 16-234 at 13, ___So.3d.at ___. "Secondly, the defendant must prove that the probability of actual bias rises to a level that 'is too high to be constitutionally tolerable' under the circumstances." Id. Thus, the trial judge must be recused.

We hasten to add that there has been no allegation or showing that the trial judge harbors any actual bias or that he is not a diligent district court judge. However, on these unique facts, the standard recently enunciated by the Supreme Court dictates recusal on this matter.