Factual and Procedural Background
In late 2005 and early 2006, Plaintiff underwent treatment at The Hospital and alleges he contracted an infection due to the hospital’s negligent infection control. In January 2009, Plaintiff initiated proceedings against The Hospital claiming damages for personal injury. Defendant, the widow of another patient who previously contracted the same infection at The Hospital, had settled her own claim against The Hospital but remained concerned about infection control procedures. On 26 May 2009, Plaintiff assigned his claim against The Hospital to Defendant for a nominal sum. Defendant subsequently pursued the claim in her own name, increasing the damages claimed.
The Hospital applied to strike out the claim on the basis that Defendant had no legitimate interest and that the assignment was void as contrary to public policy. The strike-out was granted by the District Judge, who found such claims incapable of assignment. Defendant appealed, but the appeal judge upheld the strike-out, holding the claim personal and incapable of assignment and that Defendant lacked sufficient interest to support a valid assignment. The appeal was dismissed, though Plaintiff was permitted to apply to continue the claim in his own name.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a cause of action in tort for damages for personal injury is capable of assignment.
- If so, under what circumstances such an assignment may be void on public policy grounds.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Trendtex Trading Corp. v Credit Suisse [1982] A.C. 679 |
Assignment of bare cause of action savours of champerty and is void as contrary to public policy. |
Applied to hold the assignment void as it involved purchase of a bare cause of action without legitimate interest. |
| Taylor (formerly Kraupl) v National Assistance Board [1956] P. 470 |
Certain claims (e.g., right to receive maintenance) are not legal choses in action and cannot be assigned. |
Referenced regarding the definition and scope of choses in action. |
| Ord v Upton [2000] Ch. 352 |
Claims for damages for personal injury are choses in action and a form of property, but rights relating to pain and suffering may not vest in trustees. |
Supported the conclusion that personal injury claims are capable of assignment as property. |
| Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 K.B. 427 |
Legislation on assignment of choses in action is procedural and does not create new assignable rights. |
Discussed in relation to the assignability of personal injury claims. |
| Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd [1902] 2 K.B. 660 |
Whether identity of obligee is essential to the obligation determines assignability. |
Used to analyze the personal nature of claims and assignability. |
| Peters v General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corporation Ltd [1938] 2 All E.R. 267 |
Insurance policies personal to insured and incapable of assignment. |
Illustrated claims personal to claimant may be incapable of assignment. |
| Ellis v Torrington [1920] 1 K.B. 399 |
Assignment effective where assignee has a genuine property interest incidental to the cause of action. |
Referenced as authority for exceptions to the prohibition on assignment. |
| Compania Colombiana de Seguros v Pacific Steam Navigation Co. [1965] 1 Q.B. 101 |
Assignee may acquire cause of action by subrogation supporting assignment. |
Used to illustrate exceptions to assignment prohibition. |
| Giles v Thompson and Devlin v Baslington [1994] 1 AC 142 |
Contracts allowing third parties to pursue claims without assignment do not amount to champerty if no interest in proceeds. |
Distinguished from assignment cases; confirmed that lack of interest negates champerty. |
| British Cash and Parcel Conveyors Ltd. v Lamson Store Service Co. Ltd. [1908] 1 K.B. 1006 |
Definition of maintenance as wanton and officious intermeddling without interest. |
Used to explain public policy concerns about assignments without legitimate interest. |
| R (Factortame) v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (No.8) [2003] QB 381 |
Conditional fee agreements evidence liberalisation of public policy regarding litigation funding. |
Referenced to show evolving public policy on litigation funding agreements. |
| Sibthorpe v London Borough of Southwark [2011] EWCA Civ 25 |
Agreements with non-advocates not offending public policy if unlikely to undermine administration of justice. |
Applied to distinguish permissible agreements from champertous assignments. |
| Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. v Belgium [1995] 21 EHHR 301 |
National law relevant in determining possessions under Article 1, Protocol 1 ECHR; interference must be justified and proportionate. |
Used to assess compatibility of assignment restriction with human rights. |
| Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No.2) [2003] 1 A.C. 816 |
Clarification of property rights and lawful restrictions under ECHR. |
Referenced to support view of assignment restriction as delimitation, not deprivation. |
| Pennycook v Shaws (EAL) Ltd [2004] Ch 296 |
Further authority on property rights and lawful restrictions. |
Supported the proportionality and fairness of restrictions on assignment. |
| Holden v Thompson [1902] 2 K.B. 489 |
Charitable interest sufficient to justify maintenance; exception to general prohibition. |
Distinguished as not supporting broader assignment interests outside charity. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by addressing whether a personal injury cause of action is assignable. It concluded that such claims are "legal choses in action" and thus in principle capable of assignment, rejecting the view that they are inherently personal and incapable of assignment. The court distinguished claims personal in nature where the identity of the claimant affects the obligation, noting that damages for personal injury arise by operation of law and are not dependent on the claimant's identity.
However, the court recognised longstanding public policy prohibitions against assignments of bare causes of action in tort due to the law of maintenance and champerty, which seek to prevent "wanton and officious intermeddling" by parties without legitimate interest in litigation. Applying the leading authority of Trendtex Trading Corp. v Credit Suisse, the court held that assignments made to enable assignees or third parties to profit from litigation without a genuine commercial or legal interest are void as champertous and contrary to public policy.
The court found that Defendant lacked a legally recognised interest in Plaintiff’s claim sufficient to justify the assignment. Defendant’s interest was collateral and related to a campaign against The Hospital rather than a genuine commercial or legal stake in the claim. The court expressed concern that recognising such an interest would encourage the purchase of claims for ulterior motives and distort litigation conduct.
The court also addressed the European Convention on Human Rights argument, holding that the restriction on assignment is a lawful, proportionate interference with property rights justified by the public interest in preventing trafficking in litigation. The restriction was characterised as a delimitation of rights rather than a deprivation.
Accordingly, the assignment was held to savour of champerty and was void. Defendant had not acquired any property interest in the claim, and the appeal was dismissed.
Holding and Implications
The court dismissed the appeal.
The holding confirms that while personal injury claims are in principle assignable as choses in action, assignments lacking a legitimate interest and made for the purpose of profiting from litigation are void as contrary to public policy on maintenance and champerty. The decision reinforces the requirement that assignees must have a genuine legal or commercial interest in the claim to avoid being guilty of "wanton and officious intermeddling." No new precedent was established beyond applying existing principles to the facts. The direct effect is that the assignment to Defendant is void and Plaintiff remains free to pursue the claim in his own name.