Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant, a long-serving secondary-school teacher, undertook two roles—mathematics co-ordinator and project-manager for publicity—in September 1995 after a school restructuring. He regularly worked between 61 and 70 hours per week. In May 1996 the Appellant took three weeks’ certified sick leave for “stress/depression.” On returning, he separately informed each member of the school’s senior management team (Person A, Person B and Person C) that his workload remained unmanageable. No adjustments were made. During the 1996 autumn term the workload continued unchanged; the Appellant consulted his doctor twice, wrote a detailed letter describing deteriorating symptoms, and in November 1996 suffered a breakdown at school. He retired early in March 1997 and has been unable to resume full-time teaching.
The Appellant sued the Defendant (his employer) in the county court. Judge Roach held the Defendant liable for breach of its duty of care and awarded just over £101,000 in damages. The Defendant’s appeal was heard with three other stress-at-work appeals; the Court of Appeal (judgment by Judge Hale) reversed liability, applying practical propositions formulated in Hatton v Sutherland. The Appellant appealed to the House of Lords. The majority (Judge Walker delivering the leading opinion) allowed the appeal, restoring liability but adopting an agreed lower multiplier for future loss, reducing the award to £72,547.02.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether psychiatric injury caused by occupational stress was reasonably foreseeable to the Defendant in June–July 1996.
- Whether, on those facts, the Defendant breached its duty of care by failing to investigate and alleviate the Appellant’s workload.
- The proper scope of appellate review of a trial judge’s evaluative findings on breach of duty.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The three-week certified absence for stress made further psychiatric harm plainly foreseeable.
- The senior management team’s failure to make enquiries, reduce workload or monitor the Appellant constituted breach.
- The Court of Appeal impermissibly substituted its own evaluation of the standard of care for that of the trial judge.
Defendant's Arguments
- All teachers were under similar pressure; nothing signalled that the Appellant faced a particular psychiatric risk.
- No practicable steps—short of advising resignation—were available given budgetary constraints and an imminent inspection.
- The Court of Appeal correctly lowered an unduly stringent standard of care adopted by the trial judge.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Stokes v Guest Keen and Nettlefold (Bolts and Nuts) Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 1776 |
General formulation of employer’s duty to devise a safe system of work. |
Used by Judge Walker as overarching statement; contrasted with stress cases where risk information comes primarily from the employee. |
| Hatton v Sutherland [2002] EWCA Civ 76 |
“Practical propositions” for stress claims: foreseeability, onus on employee to alert employer, required steps. |
Endorsed as useful guidance but not of quasi-statutory force; majority held Court of Appeal mis-applied its own guidance to the facts. |
| Clarke v Edinburgh & District Tramways Co Ltd 1919 SC (HL) 35 |
Appellate restraint: findings of primary fact should stand unless plainly wrong. |
Supported majority view that trial judge’s evaluative finding should not have been overturned. |
| Thomas v Thomas [1947] AC 484 |
Confirming Clarke on appellate deference. |
Same purpose as above. |
| Ross v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 768 |
Drawing favourable inferences where opposing party leads no contrary evidence. |
Judge Rodger relied on this to leave causation finding intact. |
| Walker v Northumberland County Council [1995] 1 All ER 737 |
Employer may be liable for stress-related psychiatric illness and may have to provide additional assistance. |
Cited by Appellant; distinguished but indicated duty can extend to workload reduction. |
| Withers v Perry Chain Co Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 1314 |
Employee may choose to run small risks; no duty to offer alternative safe employment. |
Discussed by Judge Rodger when questioning scope of any implied duty to modify contractual workload. |
| Johnstone v Bloomsbury Health Authority [1991] ICR 269 |
Interaction of tort duties with contractual terms on working hours. |
Used in analysing complexity of inserting workload-reduction terms into contracts. |
| Cross v Highlands and Islands Enterprise [2001] IRLR 336 |
Employer not liable where active monitoring and workload reduction occurred. |
Contrasted; present Defendant made no comparable inquiries or adjustments. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Foreseeability. The trial judge’s finding that psychiatric injury was foreseeable arose from the Appellant’s three-week certified absence for “stress/depression” and the subsequent meetings in which he expressly complained of overload. The House held this finding was open to the judge and not “plainly wrong,” therefore the Court of Appeal should not have disturbed it.
2. Duty and Breach. Once psychiatric harm was foreseeable, the Defendant had a duty to take reasonable steps. Judge Walker emphasised that, unlike physical hazards, information about stress often comes solely from the employee; nevertheless, a three-week certified absence demanded managerial inquiry. The senior management team neither investigated nor reduced workload, thereby remaining in “continuing breach” from June 1996 onwards. Minimal measures—sympathetic enquiry, temporary reallocation of duties, or use of a supply teacher—were practicable and might have prevented collapse.
3. Causation. The breakdown on 12 November 1996 was a direct consequence of the unchanged workload and absence of managerial support. Expert evidence confirmed that even modest workload relief could have averted or postponed the illness.
4. Appellate Review. Relying on Clarke and Thomas, the majority held that evaluative findings on breach are reviewable only if palpably wrong. The Court of Appeal had merely disagreed with the standard of care applied, which was insufficient to justify reversal.
5. Interaction with Hatton Guidance. The House accepted Judge Hale’s propositions as useful but warned against treating them as rigid rules; their application remained fact-sensitive.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: APPEAL ALLOWED; judgment for the Appellant restored in the reduced sum of £72,547.02 plus interest.
Implications: The decision re-affirms that once psychiatric harm is reasonably foreseeable, employers must actively inquire and, where feasible, adjust workloads or provide support. It limits appellate interference with first-instance evaluations of the standard of care, clarifies the fact-specific use of Hatton guidelines, and underscores that modest, practicable interventions may suffice to discharge the duty. No new doctrinal test was created, but the case illustrates the level of managerial engagement expected when employees exhibit stress-related illness.