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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Clarence King filed a complaint against Granite Loan Solutions, LLC ("Granite") and others in the State Court of Chatham County, alleging that after King’s home was foreclosed upon and no timely confirmation action was brought, Granite and co-defendants engaged in a fraudulent conspiracy to foreclose upon him a second time to extract further payments. King served Granite with the complaint on April 25, 2014. Granite failed to respond or file a defensive pleading. Following a bench trial on damages (which was not transcribed), on June 26, 2014, the trial court entered a default judgment against Granite, awarding actual and punitive damages totaling $4 million. Granite subsequently filed a motion to set aside the default judgment and open the default, or alternatively, to obtain a new trial on damages. The trial court denied this motion, and Granite appealed the denial.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Granite's motion to set aside the default judgment pursuant to OCGA § 9–11–60(d)(2) for fraud, accident, or mistake.
  2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Granite's motion to open the default pursuant to OCGA § 9–11–55(b).
  3. Whether the trial court erred in denying Granite's motion for a new trial on damages due to lack of evidentiary support.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Granite Loan Solutions, LLC)

  • The default judgment should be set aside under OCGA § 9–11–60(d)(2) because King obtained it by accident or mistake.
  • The trial court lacked proper venue at the time the judgment was entered because the only Chatham County resident defendant was voluntarily dismissed.
  • Granite was not given notice of the damages hearing.
  • Procedural errors occurred, including misnaming Granite in the complaint caption, incorrect identification of the trial court on the return of service form, and an incorrect date in the default judgment order.
  • The trial court erred in denying the motion to open default since the default was entered improperly.
  • The trial court erred in denying a new trial on damages because the evidence did not support the $4 million award.

Appellee's Arguments (Clarence King)

  • The motion to set aside the judgment should be denied because Granite's default was due to its own negligence, specifically counsel’s failure to respond.
  • Venue was proper in Chatham County because the dismissal of the resident defendant occurred after the damages trial began, and under OCGA § 9–10–93, venue remains proper in such circumstances.
  • Granite waived notice of the damages hearing by failing to file pleadings timely.
  • The procedural errors cited were minor and did not affect the validity of the judgment.
  • The trial court properly denied the motion to open default because a final judgment had already been entered.
  • The damages award was supported by evidence, and the default admitted the material allegations of fraud against Granite.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
T.A.I. Computer v. CLN Enterprises, 237 Ga.App. 646, 648 (1999) Relief under OCGA § 9–11–60(d)(2) is only granted where grounds are unmixed with movant's negligence or fault. The court found Granite’s failure to respond was negligent and thus not grounds for setting aside the judgment under this statute.
Butterworth v. Safelite Glass Corp., 287 Ga.App. 848, 851 (2007) Neglect of a party’s attorney is attributable to the party and does not excuse failure to timely answer. Applied to hold that Granite’s counsel’s neglect did not justify setting aside the default judgment.
Miranda v. Stewart, 312 Ga.App. 290, 291 (2011) Trial court may set aside a non-jury verdict judgment within the same term for meritorious reasons; after term ends, only under OCGA § 9–11–60(d). The court confirmed the trial court retained authority to consider Granite’s motion as it was filed within the same term.
Piggly Wiggly Southern v. McCook, 216 Ga.App. 335, 337 (1995) Similar principle as Miranda regarding setting aside judgments within the same term. Supported the trial court’s exercise of discretion in denying the motion to set aside.
Gresham v. Harris, 329 Ga.App. 465, 466 (2014) Voluntary dismissal of a defendant who is not the only defendant requires court approval to be effective. Used to support the finding that dismissal of resident defendant occurred after trial began, preserving venue.
Kilgore v. Stewart, 307 Ga.App. 374, 375 (2010) Same as Gresham regarding voluntary dismissal requiring court order. Reinforced the timing of the dismissal affecting venue.
Anderson v. Bruce, 248 Ga.App. 733, 735-736 (2001) Caption is generally not part of the petition; misnomers are not material if identity is clear. Applied to conclude the misnaming of Granite in the caption was a mere misnomer not affecting judgment validity.
Memar v. Styblo, 293 Ga.App. 528 (2008) Supports the principle that substance controls over form in pleadings. Supported the court’s treatment of the misnomer as immaterial.
Southcom Group v. Plath, 257 Ga.App. 46, 48-49 (2002) Same principle on misnomers and pleadings. Further supported the court’s approach to the caption error.
L. Henry Enters. v. Verifone, Inc., 273 Ga.App. 195, 197 (2005) Misnomer of a corporation in judicial proceedings is not material if identity is clear. Applied to confirm Granite’s identity was clear despite caption error.
Miller v. U.S. Shelter Corp. of Del., 179 Ga.App. 469, 472 (1986) Mere misnomer of a corporation is not material or vital if identity is clear. Supported the court’s conclusion that caption error was not grounds to set aside judgment.
Northgate Village Apartments v. Smith, 207 Ga.App. 479, 481 (1993) Failure to timely raise objection to misnomer waives the objection. Applied to find Granite waived objections to caption error by raising it only after final judgment.
Cavin v. Powell, 276 Ga.App. 60, 62 (2005) Failure to file pleadings constitutes waiver of all notices including trial notices. Supported denial of Granite’s argument that it lacked notice of damages hearing.
Rapid Taxi Co. v. Broughton, 244 Ga.App. 427, 428 (2000) A trial court may open default only before final judgment. Applied to hold trial court properly denied motion to open default after final judgment.
Archer v. Monroe, 165 Ga.App. 724, 725 (1983) Same principle as Rapid Taxi on timing of opening default. Reinforced denial of Granite’s motion to open default post-judgment.
Cohran v. Carlin, 254 Ga. 580, 585 (1985) Defendant in default admits all material allegations except damages. Supported presumption that Granite admitted fraud allegations by default.
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Brown, 198 Ga.App. 653, 656 (1991) In absence of transcript, appellate court presumes trial court’s findings are supported by evidence. Applied to uphold damages award despite no transcript of damages hearing.
PHF II Buckhead LLC v. Dinku, 315 Ga.App. 76, 80-81 (2012) Order denying motion for new trial on damages is directly appealable even following default judgment. Supported appellate jurisdiction over Granite’s appeal.
Stamey v. Policemen's Pension Fund Bd. of Trustees, 289 Ga. 503, 504 (2011) Standard of review for denial of motion to set aside default judgment is abuse of discretion. Guided appellate review affirming trial court’s ruling.
Cherwood, Inc. v. Marlin Leasing Corp., 268 Ga.App. 64 (2004) Same as Stamey regarding abuse of discretion standard. Supported affirmance of trial court’s denial of motion to set aside judgment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed Granite's motion to set aside the default judgment and found no abuse of discretion by the trial court. Under OCGA § 9–11–60(d)(2), relief is only available for fraud, accident, or mistake unmixed with the movant’s negligence. Granite's default was due to its counsel’s neglect in failing to respond, which is attributable to Granite and insufficient to justify setting aside the judgment. Venue was proper in Chatham County because the dismissal of the resident defendant occurred after the damages trial began, supported by evidence including a court order signed after trial commencement, consistent with OCGA § 9–10–93.

The court rejected Granite’s claim of lack of notice of the damages hearing, holding that failure to file pleadings waives all notices, including trial notices. Minor procedural errors—such as a misnomer in the caption, an incorrect court name on the return of service form, and a clerical error in the judgment date—were deemed immaterial and did not warrant setting aside the judgment.

Granite’s motion to open default was properly denied because the trial court had already entered a final judgment; opening default is permissible only before final judgment. Finally, the court found no error in denying a new trial on damages, noting that the default admitted the material allegations of fraud and, absent a transcript of the damages hearing, the trial court’s findings are presumed supported by evidence.

Holding and Implications

The Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Granite Loan Solutions, LLC’s motion to set aside the default judgment, to open default, and for a new trial on damages.

The direct consequence is that the $4 million default judgment against Granite stands as entered by the trial court. The court’s ruling does not establish new precedent but reinforces established principles regarding the standards for setting aside default judgments, venue considerations when resident defendants are dismissed, waiver of notice by failure to plead, and timing for opening defaults.

GRANITE LOAN SOLUTIONS, LLC v. KING.

* McFADDEN, Judge.

Nicholas John Laybourn, Savannah, for Appellant.

Billy N. Jones, Hinesville, Jerry A. Lumley, Macon, Julian B. Smith Jr., Metter, Michael Brian Terry, Robert L. Ashe III, Atlanta, Bobby T. Jones, for Appellee.

Opinion

McFADDEN, Judge.

After Clarence King obtained a default judgment against Granite Loan Solutions, LLC (“Granite”), Granite filed a motion seeking to set aside the judgment and open the default or, alternatively, to obtain a new trial. Granite appeals from the denial of that motion. We affirm the ruling because Granite has not shown that the trial court abused his discretion in declining to set aside the judgment and open default and because Granite has not shown by the record that it is entitled to a new trial.

1. Procedural background.

On April 4, 2014, King filed a complaint against Granite, among other defendants, in the State Court of Chatham County. The complaint alleged that after King's home was foreclosed upon and no timely confirmation action was brought, resulting in his discharge from further liability, Granite and its co-defendants engaged in a fraudulent conspiracy to foreclose upon him a second time and thereby create an apparent basis for extracting further payments.

King served the complaint upon Granite on April 25, 2014. Granite failed to answer or file another defensive pleading. After a bench trial on damages that was not taken down, on June 26, 2014, the trial court granted King a default judgment and awarded actual and punitive damages totaling $4 million against Granite. On July 28, 2014, Granite filed a motion in which it asked the trial court to set aside the default judgment under OCGA § 9–11–60(d)(2) for fraud, accident or mistake; to set aside the default pursuant to the trial court's broader authority over cases still within the breast of the court; or, alternatively, to grant a new trial on damages. The trial court denied this motion, and we granted Granite's application for discretionary review of that decision.

2. Appellate jurisdiction.

As an initial matter, we note that, although Granite sought discretionary review of the trial court's order, the order was directly appealable. Among other relief, in its motion Granite asked the trial court to order a new trial on damages because the evidence did not support the award, a request the trial court denied. Because the order on appeal included the denial of a motion for new trial, it was directly appealable. See generally PHF II Buckhead LLC v. Dinku, 315 Ga.App. 76, 80–81(2), 726 S.E.2d 569 (2012) (considering direct appeal of order denying motion for new trial on damages, which sought reexamination of issues of fact, in case involving default judgment). Because the order on appeal was directly appealable, the application for discretionary appeal, while not necessary, was due to be granted. OCGA § 5–6–35(j).

3. Motion to set aside judgment and open default.

Granite argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion to set aside the default judgment pursuant to OCGA § 9–11–60(d)(2) because King obtained the default judgment by accident or mistake. Granite argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion for three other reasons, as well: because at the time of the judgment venue was not proper in Chatham County, because Granite was not given notice of the damages hearing, and because procedural errors occurred in the case. Granite also argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion to open default. We review a ruling on a motion to

set aside for abuse of discretion and affirm if there is any evidence to support it. See Stamey v. Policemen's Pension Fund Bd. of Trustees, 289 Ga. 503, 504(1), 712 S.E.2d 825 (2011); Cherwood, Inc. v. Marlin Leasing Corp., 268 Ga.App. 64, 601 S.E.2d 356 (2004). As explained below, the trial court did not err in declining to set the judgment aside for any of the reasons argued by Granite. Consequently, the trial court had no occasion to reach the question of opening the default.

(a) Setting aside judgment for fraud, accident, or mistake under OCGA § 9–11–60(d).

Granite argues that the trial court should have set aside the default judgment pursuant to OCGA § 9–11–60(d)(2), which authorizes a trial court to set aside a judgment for “[f]raud, accident, or mistake or the

acts of the adverse party unmixed with the negligence or fault of the movant[.]” Granite asserts that some of the factual allegations in King's complaint were “patently false” and in conflict with positions King took in a prior case against a different set of defendants. But “[r]elief under OCGA § 9–11–60(d)(2) may be granted only where the grounds are unmixed with the negligence or fault of the movant.” T.A.I. Computer v. CLN Enterprises, 237 Ga.App. 646, 648(2), 516 S.E.2d 340 (1999) (citation and punctuation omitted). Where, as here, a “judgment against [a defendant] was entered because [the defendant] negligently allowed the case to go into default” and “[t]he essence of the mistake raised by [the defendant] is that it was unable to refute the allegations of the complaint,” a trial court “d[oes] not abuse [his or her] discretion in finding that this ‘mistake’ was not sufficient to support setting aside the judgment[.]” Id. (citation omitted). Although Granite asserts that its counsel was responsible for the default, “the neglect of [Granite's] attorney is attributable to [it] and cannot suffice to excuse [its] failure to timely answer.” Butterworth v. Safelite Glass Corp., 287 Ga.App. 848, 851(2), 652 S.E.2d 877 (2007) (citation omitted).

Granite refers to its out-of-state counsel who served as its registered agent and received service of the complaint, not to its appellate counsel.
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(b) Remaining grounds for setting aside judgment.

Granite's remaining arguments for setting aside the judgment invoke the trial court's inherent power to exercise his discretion for meritorious reasons to set aside a judgment not based on a jury verdict that was entered within the same term of court. See Miranda v. Stewart, 312 Ga.App. 290, 291, 718 S.E.2d 123 (2011) (“Under our law, a judgment not based upon a jury verdict is considered within the breast of the court during the term of court in which it is entered, and a court may exercise its discretion for meritorious reasons to set aside

a judgment within the same term of court. Once that term of court has ended, however, a judgment may only be set aside under the procedures in OCGA § 9–11–60(d).”) (citations omitted); Piggly Wiggly Southern v. McCook, 216 Ga.App. 335, 337(1), 454 S.E.2d 203 (1995). The trial court retained this power in this case because Granite moved to set aside the default judgment during the same term in which the trial court entered that judgment. See OCGA § 15–6–3(17) (Chatham County terms of court commence the first Monday in March, June, September, and December); see also Maslia v. Hamilton, 239 Ga. 52, 235 S.E.2d 485 (1977); Piggly Wiggly Southern, 216 Ga.App. at 337(1), 454 S.E.2d 203.

(i) Venue.

Granite argues that the trial court should have set aside the default judgment because, when the trial court entered the judgment, venue was not proper in that court. Venue was not proper, according to Granite, because King voluntarily dismissed the only defendant who was a Chatham County resident. See generally OCGA § 9–10–31(d) (“If all defendants who reside in the county in which an action is pending are discharged from liability before or upon the return of a verdict by the jury or the court hearing the case without a jury, a nonresident defendant may require that the case be transferred to a county and court in which venue would otherwise be proper.”). But, as King points out, after the voluntary dismissal, the only defendants remaining in the case were out-of-state defendants subject to long-arm jurisdiction in Georgia. OCGA § 9–10–93 addresses venue in these circumstances:

Where an action is brought against a resident of this state, any nonresident of this state who is involved in the same transaction or occurrence and who is suable under the provisions of this article may be joined as a defendant in the county where a resident defendant is suable. Under such circumstances, jurisdiction and venue of the court of and over such nonresident defendant shall not be affected or lost if at trial a verdict or judgment is returned in favor of such resident defendant. If such resident defendant is dismissed from the action prior to the commencement of the trial, the action of the nonresident defendant shall not abate but shall be transferred to a court in a county where venue is proper.

(Emphasis supplied.)

The parties dispute whether King dismissed the Chatham County resident before or during the trial on damages. But there is evidence

to support King's position that the dismissal occurred after the start of the damages trial. King was required to obtain a court order approving the voluntary dismissal for it to become effective, because the dismissal did not cover all of the defendants in the case. See Gresham v. Harris, 329 Ga.App. 465, 466, 765 S.E.2d 400 (2014); Kilgore v. Stewart, 307 Ga.App. 374, 375, 705 S.E.2d 209 (2010); see also OCGA § 9–11–21. The record contains sworn testimony from one of King's attorneys that the trial court was presented with and signed that dismissal order after the damages hearing had begun. This evidence supports a finding that venue remained proper in Chatham County under OCGA § 9–10–93.

(ii) Notice.

Granite argues that the trial court should have set aside the default judgment because it did not receive notice of the damages hearing. But “[i]t is well settled that the failure of a party to file pleadings in an action shall be deemed to be a waiver by him of all notices, including notices of time and place of trial, and all service in the action.” T.A.I. Computer, 237 Ga.App. at 649(3), 516 S.E.2d 340 (quoting OCGA § 9–11–5(a)) (punctuation omitted). “Since [Granite] failed to timely file an answer, [it] waived any notice of further action in the case, including notice of the hearing on damages.” Cavin v. Powell, 276 Ga.App. 60, 62(2), 622 S.E.2d 415 (2005) (citation omitted).

(iii) Alleged procedural errors.

Granite argues that the trial court should have set aside the default judgment on account of three alleged procedural errors: King's use of an incorrect name for Granite in the caption of his complaint; a process server's use of a return of service form that incorrectly identified the trial court; and the trial court's inclusion of an incorrect date in his order granting default judgment. As explained below, these errors were minor and, whether taken separately or together, did not require the trial court to set aside the default judgment.

First, Granite points out that the caption of King's complaint misstates Granite's name as “Granite Solutions, LLC.” But “a caption is generally not considered a part of the petition in Georgia.” Anderson v. Bruce, 248 Ga.App. 733, 735(2), 548 S.E.2d 638 (2001) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Courts refrain from attaching too much importance to the merely formal parts of a complaint and construe pleadings so as to do substantial justice. Substance, rather than nomenclature, controls. Thus, the character in which a party is sued may be determined from the substance of the allegations of the petition, considered in its entirety.

Id. at 736(2), 548 S.E.2d 638 (citations and punctuation omitted). See also Memar v. Styblo, 293 Ga.App. 528, 667 S.E.2d 388 (2008); Southcom Group v. Plath, 257 Ga.App. 46, 48–49(1), 570 S.E.2d 341 (2002). Here, because the body of King's complaint repeatedly and consistently identifies Granite by its correct name, “Granite Loan Solutions, LLC,” it is clear that “Granite Loan Solutions, LLC” is a defendant in this action. See L. Henry Enters. v. Verifone, Inc., 273 Ga.App. 195, 197(1), 614 S.E.2d 841 (2005). Consequently, the incorrect caption “evinces no more than a mere misnomer,” and a “mere misnomer of a corporation in a judicial proceeding is not material or vital in its consequences, if the identity of the corporation intended is clear.” Miller v. U.S. Shelter Corp. of Del., 179 Ga.App. 469, 472(2), 347 S.E.2d 251 (1986) (citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted). The record shows that Granite's registered agent received service of the complaint, notwithstanding the mistake in the caption. Although Granite argues that King never sought to correct the misnomer, because Granite did not raise the issue until after final judgment, it has waived any objections to the mistake. See Northgate Village Apartments v. Smith, 207 Ga.App. 479, 481(2), 428 S.E.2d 381 (1993).

Second, Granite points out that the return of service form reflecting service of the complaint upon Granite's registered agent included a heading that incorrectly identified the trial court as the “UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT[,] Chatham District of Georgia.” Nevertheless, the trial court accepted this form for filing, and Granite has pointed to no authority suggesting that the error in the heading made the document an inadequate proof of service. See generally OCGA § 9–11–4(h) (setting forth requirements for return of service).

Finally, Granite points out that, in the order granting the default judgment, the trial court incorrectly stated that the hearing on damages had occurred on January 6, 2014, rather than June 26, 2014. Granite offers no authority for the proposition that this type of clerical mistake, which a trial court may correct at any time of its own initiative, OCGA § 9–11–60(g), required the trial court to set aside the default judgment.

(c) Opening of default.

Granite argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion to open default pursuant to OCGA § 9–11–55(b), which authorizes a trial court, in its discretion, to open default under specific circumstances “[a]t any time before final judgment.” (Emphasis supplied.) The trial court here had entered a final judgment. So it could not open the default without first setting aside the final judgment, which it had declined to do. See Rapid Taxi Co. v. Broughton, 244 Ga.App. 427, 428(1), 535 S.E.2d 780 (2000); Archer v. Monroe, 165 Ga.App. 724, 725(2), 302 S.E.2d 583 (1983).

4. Motion for new trial.

Granite argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for new trial on damages because no evidence supported the damages awarded by the trial court. On appeal from a ruling on a motion for new trial, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion to determine whether there is any evidence supporting the judgment. See Holland v. Holland, 267 Ga.App. 251, 252, 599 S.E.2d 242 (2004). By virtue of its default, Granite admitted that it had participated in the fraudulent conspiracy alleged in the complaint. See Cohran v. Carlin, 254 Ga. 580, 585(3), 331 S.E.2d 523 (1985) (“a defendant in a default is in the position of having admitted each and every material allegation of the plaintiff's petition except as to the amount of damages alleged”) (citation and punctuation omitted). And where, as here, there is no transcript of the evidentiary hearing, “we must presume ... that the trial court's finding ... was supported by the evidence presented at the hearing.” Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Brown, 198 Ga.App. 653, 656(2), 402 S.E.2d 753 (1991) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the motion for new trial.

Judgment affirmed.

ELLINGTON, P.J., and DILLARD, J., concur.

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Granite Loan Solutions, LLC v. King
(Nov 2, 2015)