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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Olivine Corporation sued United Capitol Insurance Company seeking insurance coverage related to hazardous waste cleanup at premises leased to Clearwater Resource Recovery. Clearwater had purchased pollution liability insurance from United Capitol, listing Olivine as an additional named insured. After Clearwater ceased premium payments, United Capitol terminated the policy at the request of the premium finance company, TEPCO, which notified only Clearwater, not Olivine. Subsequently, the Whatcom County Health Department demanded Olivine remediate hazardous waste left by Clearwater. United Capitol denied coverage on the basis that the policy was cancelled, prompting Olivine's lawsuit.

The trial court granted summary judgment to Olivine on coverage and damages issues, which was affirmed in part by the Court of Appeals in 2001. Meanwhile, in November 2001, an Illinois court entered a liquidation order against United Capitol, enjoining all claims against United Capitol outside Illinois liquidation proceedings. Despite this, the Washington trial court refused to dismiss or stay the case. United Capitol appealed, leading to this Court of Appeals decision reversing the trial court and dismissing the case.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court should have dismissed or stayed the Washington insurance coverage action against United Capitol in light of the Illinois liquidation order under the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act (UILA).
  2. Whether Illinois qualifies as a reciprocal state under Washington's UILA, thus requiring Washington courts to respect the Illinois liquidation order.
  3. Whether United Capitol waived its right to a stay or dismissal by failing to promptly notify Washington courts of the Illinois liquidation order.
  4. Whether judicial comity and full faith and credit principles require Washington courts to respect the Illinois liquidation order despite United Capitol's noncompliance with a Washington trial court order.

Arguments of the Parties

Olivine Corporation's Arguments

  • United Capitol's position is contradictory because it benefited from the Washington Supreme Court's decision, yet now claims the Illinois liquidation order bars further proceedings.
  • The court could remedy this by vacating the Supreme Court's decision on jurisdictional grounds, reinstating the earlier appellate ruling favorable to Olivine.
  • United Capitol waived its right to a stay or dismissal by failing to promptly notify Washington courts of the Illinois order.
  • United Capitol lost the right to comity and full faith and credit because it disregarded a Washington trial court order requiring a cash deposit or bond, and Illinois failed to comply with the Washington order.

United Capitol Insurance Company's Arguments

  • The trial court should have dismissed or indefinitely stayed the Washington case due to the Illinois liquidation order, as Illinois is a reciprocal state under UILA.
  • Washington courts lack jurisdiction to proceed with the case once the Illinois liquidation order was issued.
  • United Capitol did not waive its rights, as it is unlikely to have consciously relinquished them despite delay in notifying the court.
  • Failure to comply with the Washington trial court's deposit/bond order was due to an Illinois conservation order restricting payments, which should have been communicated but does not negate Illinois' right to seek a stay.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Olivine Corp. v. United Capitol Ins. Co., 105 Wn. App. 194, 19 P.3d 1089 (2001) Affirmed coverage of Olivine under United Capitol's insurance policy Referenced as part of procedural history; later partially reversed by Washington Supreme Court
Olivine Corp. v. United Capitol Ins. Co., 147 Wn.2d 148, 52 P.3d 494 (2002) Clarified that United Capitol's failure to notify Olivine of policy termination left policy in effect; remanded for factual determinations Supreme Court decision reviewed but held not controlling after Illinois liquidation order; court declined to vacate it
Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act, 44 A.L.R.5th 683 (1996) Explains the purpose and scope of UILA for multistate insurer liquidations Used to interpret UILA's intent to provide orderly liquidation and equal treatment
Am. Star Ins. Co. v. Grice, 123 Wn.2d 131, 865 P.2d 507 (1994) Recognition of reciprocal states under UILA and enforcement of liquidation orders Supported the requirement to respect Illinois liquidation order as reciprocal state
Allied Fid. Ins. Co. v. Ruth, 57 Wn. App. 783, 790 P.2d 206 (1990) Washington courts must recognize liquidation orders from reciprocal states Applied to affirm dismissal based on Illinois liquidation order
Babcock v. Mason County Fire Dist. No. 6, 144 Wn.2d 774, 30 P.3d 1261 (2001) Standard of de novo review for legal questions Court reviewed trial court's refusal to dismiss/stay de novo
Allied Fid., 57 Wn. App. at 790 Requirement to vacate judgments entered by courts lacking jurisdiction Explained why vacating Supreme Court opinion was inappropriate due to lack of notice of Illinois order
Brickum Inv. Co. v. Vernham Corp., 46 Wn. App. 517, 731 P.2d 533 (1987) Trial court must vacate void judgments Supported principle that trial court must dismiss case upon learning of lack of jurisdiction
Saunders v. Lloyd's of London, 113 Wn.2d 330, 779 P.2d 249 (1989) Standard for waiver of rights in insurance context Applied to determine United Capitol did not waive right to dismissal/stay
Haberman v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 109 Wn.2d 107, 744 P.2d 1032 (1987) Judicial comity principles and discretion in applying comity Supported respect for Illinois liquidation order despite United Capitol's noncompliance with Washington order
State v. Gimarelli, 105 Wn. App. 370, 20 P.3d 430 (2001) Full faith and credit clause requires recognition of valid out-of-state judgments Applied to affirm that Illinois order must be respected unless jurisdiction lacking or constitutional invalidity present

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by explaining that the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act (UILA) governs multistate insurer liquidations and aims to ensure orderly and equitable treatment of creditors. Washington has adopted UILA and recognizes reciprocal states that have substantially similar statutes. Illinois, having adopted UILA with provisions substantially similar to Washington's, qualifies as a reciprocal state. Because Illinois issued a liquidation order enjoining claims against United Capitol outside its liquidation proceedings, Washington courts must respect that order and refrain from adjudicating claims against United Capitol.

The court rejected Olivine's argument that the Washington Supreme Court's August 2002 decision should be vacated due to lack of jurisdiction, noting that this court cannot vacate Supreme Court opinions and that the Illinois liquidation order was not presented to the Supreme Court at the time. The proper course was for the trial court to dismiss the case upon learning of the Illinois order.

Regarding waiver, the court held that United Capitol did not intentionally relinquish its right to seek dismissal or stay despite delayed notification. The failure to promptly notify did not confer jurisdiction on Washington courts when a statute divests jurisdiction.

Olivine's argument that United Capitol lost the right to comity and full faith and credit due to noncompliance with a Washington trial court order was addressed. The court noted that United Capitol's noncompliance may have been due to an Illinois conservation order restricting payments, which should have been communicated but does not negate Illinois' authority. Principles of judicial comity and full faith and credit require Washington to respect Illinois' liquidation order.

Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's denial of United Capitol's motion to dismiss or stay and ordered dismissal of the case.

Holding and Implications

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order and dismissed the case.

The direct effect is that Washington courts must dismiss or stay proceedings against an insurer subject to a liquidation order from a reciprocal state, here Illinois, under the UILA. This decision enforces respect for multistate liquidation proceedings and prevents parallel litigation that would undermine the orderly liquidation process. No new precedent was set beyond affirming the application of UILA and principles of full faith and credit and judicial comity in this context.

OLIVINE CORPORATION, Respondent, v. UNITED CAPITOL INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner.

AGID, J.

Olivine Corporation sued United Capitol Insurance Company for insurance coverage. While the case was pending on appeal, an Illinois court entered a liquidation order against United Capitol. This order enjoined all parties from continuing to assert any claims against United Capitol outside the Illinois liquidation proceedings. The trial court nevertheless refused to dismiss or stay this case, and United Capitol appealed. Because Illinois is a reciprocal state under Washington's insurers liquidation statute, the trial court should have dismissed the action once it learned of the Illinois order. We reverse and dismiss the case.

FACTS

Clearwater Resource Recovery operated an incinerator in Whatcom County and leased its premises from Olivine Corporation. In 1997, Clearwater bought pollution liability insurance from United Capitol Insurance Company. Clearwater financed the policy through TEPCO Premium Finance and listed Olivine as an additional named insured. At some point, Clearwater stopped making premium payments, and United Capitol terminated the policy at TEPCO's request. TEPCO notified only Clearwater of the termination. Olivine received no notification from TEPCO or United Capitol. In 1998, the Whatcom County Health Department demanded that Olivine clean up hazardous waste and toxic substances left by Clearwater. United Capitol refused to cover the clean-up costs because the policy had been cancelled, and Olivine sued.

Both Olivine and United Capitol moved for summary judgment. In December 1998, the trial court granted summary judgment in Olivine's favor on the coverage issue, and in January 2000, the court granted summary judgment in Olivine's favor on the damages issue. In March 2001, this court affirmed, holding that the United Capitol insurance policy covered Olivine. In November 2001, an Illinois circuit court issued an order of liquidation with a finding of insolvency against United Capitol. This order prohibited parties from prosecuting claims against United Capitol outside the liquidation proceedings:

Olivine Corp. v. United Capitol Ins. Co., 105 Wn. App. 194, 198-200, 19 P.3d 1089 (2001), rev'd in part, 147 Wn.2d 148, 52 P.3d 494 (2002).

[all parties] having knowledge of this Order of Liquidation, are hereby restrained and enjoined from bringing, asserting or further prosecuting any claim, action or proceeding, at law or in equity or otherwise, whether in this State or elsewhere, against the Defendant, United Capitol, . . . except insofar as those claims, actions or proceedings arise in or are brought in these liquidation proceedings. . . .

One month after this order was issued, the Washington Supreme Court agreed to review our March 2001 decision. It appears that neither Olivine nor United Capitol notified the Supreme Court of the Illinois court's order. In August 2002, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that United Capitol's failure to notify Olivine of the policy termination "left the policy in effect with respect to Olivine's interests" but that the trial court must still determine whether any issues of material fact on the coverage issue remained. On remand, in September 2002, United Capitol moved to dismiss the action or, in the alternative, stay the proceedings in light of the Illinois court's order. The trial court stayed the action for 90 days. In March 2003, United Capitol renewed its motion to dismiss or stay the proceedings. One month later, the trial court denied the motion and ordered discovery. We granted discretionary review.

Olivine Corp. v. United Capitol Ins. Co., 147 Wn.2d 148, 166, 52 P.3d 494 (2002).

DISCUSSION

The Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act (UILA), chapter 48.99 RCW, governs the liquidation, rehabilitation, and reorganization of insurance companies having assets and liabilities in more than one state. It aims to "provide consolidated, orderly and equitable liquidations of multistate insurers and to secure equal treatment of all creditors wherever situated." Washington has adopted UILA. And, if another state has adopted UILA and is a reciprocal state under Washington's statute, Washington courts must recognize its right to stay all proceedings against a defunct insurer. United Capitol thus argues that the trial court should have dismissed or indefinitely stayed this case in light of the Illinois court's liquidation order. This is a question of law that we review de novo.

Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act, 44 A.L.R.5th 683, 703 (1996).

Am. Star Ins. Co. v. Grice, 123 Wn.2d 131, 134, 865 P.2d 507 (1994) (citing G.C. Murphy Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 54 N.Y.2d 69, 79, 429 N.E.2d 111, 444 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1981); Prof'l Constr. Consultants, Inc. v. State ex rel. Grimes, 1982 OK 61, 646 P.2d 1262, 1266).

See RCW 48.99.010-.080.

Id.; Allied Fid. Ins. Co. v. Ruth, 57 Wn. App. 783, 785-86, 790 P.2d 206 (1990).

Babcock v. Mason County Fire Dist. No. 6, 144 Wn.2d 774, 784, 30 P.3d 1261 (2001) (citing Mountain Park Homeowners Ass'n v. Tydings, 125 Wn.2d 337, 341, 883 P.2d 1383 (1994)).

Whether the trial court should have dismissed or stayed the proceedings depends on whether Illinois is a reciprocal state for UILA purposes. Washington defines "reciprocal state" as "any state other than this state in which in substance and effect the provisions of this chapter are in force, including the provisions requiring that the insurance commissioner or equivalent insurance supervisory official be the receiver of a delinquent insurer." Like Washington, Illinois has adopted UILA. And Illinois is a reciprocal state, as its version of the statute is substantially similar in substance and effect to Washington's. Moreover, Olivine does not contest Illinois' status as a reciprocal state. Because Illinois is a reciprocal state, we must respect the Illinois court's decision to enjoin parties from prosecuting actions against United Capitol outside the liquidation proceedings.

RCW 48.99.010(7).

Lawrence v. Ill. Life Health Guar. Ass'n, 293 Ill. App. 3d 489, 495, 688 N.E.2d 675, 227 Ill. Dec. 982 (1997). Illinois' version of UILA is codified in 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. (ILCS) 5/221.1-5/221.13 (1995).

RCW 48.99.010 corresponds to 215 ILCS 5/221.1; RCW 48.99.020 corresponds to 215 ILCS 5/187-5/221; RCW 48.99.030 corresponds to 215 ILCS 5/221.2 and 221.8; RCW 48.99.040 corresponds to 215 ILCS 5/221.3; RCW 48.99.050 corresponds to 215 ILCS 5/221.4; RCW 48.99.060 corresponds to 215 ILCS 5/221.5, .6, .7; RCW 48.99.070 corresponds to 215 ILCS 5/221.9; and RCW 48.99.080(2) corresponds to 215 ILCS 5/221.13. RCW 48.99.080(1) is Washington's severability provision, and Illinois has no similar provision. But this is insufficient to render Illinois a nonreciprocal state. See Allied Fid., 57 Wn. App. at 786-90 (comparing the insurance liquidation statutes in Washington and Indiana and concluding that the two were of similar substance and effect because Indiana has an equivalent section for each provision of Washington's statute with the exception of Washington's severability provision).

But Olivine notes that United Capitol's position is contradictory because it benefited from the Supreme Court's decision, yet now claims that the Illinois order that was issued before the Supreme Court's decision bars further proceedings. Olivine suggests that this court can remedy that problem by vacating the Supreme Court's decision on the grounds that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In other words, if the Illinois order divested Washington courts of jurisdiction, then the Supreme Court's August 2002 opinion, issued after the Illinois order, was void. By vacating the Supreme Court's opinion and reinstating our March 2001 opinion, we would allow Olivine to win its case against United Capitol.

But this argument is flawed. First, this court cannot vacate a Supreme Court opinion. And second, a judgment entered by a court that lacks jurisdiction must be vacated once that lack of jurisdiction is brought to the court's attention. Even if we could vacate the Supreme Court's opinion, it would be inappropriate to do so because the Illinois order was never brought to that court's attention. The order was not introduced until the case returned to the trial court. At this point the trial court should have recognized that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the case. "A trial court has no discretion when dealing with a void judgment; the court must vacate it." The issue here is not the validity of the Supreme Court's previous ruling but rather the effect of the Illinois court's order on this case in its present posture. Because we must respect the Illinois order, we reverse the trial court's order denying United Capitol's motion to dismiss or stay the proceedings.

Allied Fid., 57 Wn. App. at 790.

Id. (citing Brickum Inv. Co. v. Vernham Corp., 46 Wn. App. 517, 520, 731 P.2d 533 (1987)).

Olivine also argues that United Capitol waived its right to a stay or dismissal by failing to promptly alert the appropriate Washington court to the Illinois court's order. Waiver applies in the insurance context if the insurer voluntarily and intentionally surrenders a known right or if its conduct may be interpreted as relinquishing this right. An insurer waives a right only if it made a conscious decision to do so, and the insurer "must know that certain conduct has the effect of relinquishing a right." Here, United Capitol's behavior does not amount to a waiver, as it is unlikely that United Capitol consciously intended to waive its right to a stay or dismissal. United Capitol should have notified the court as soon as it became aware of the Illinois order. But its failure to do so does not confer jurisdiction on Washington courts under these circumstances when a statute deprives us of that jurisdiction.

Saunders v. Lloyd's of London, 113 Wn.2d 330, 339, 779 P.2d 249 (1989) (citing Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Lewis County v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 104 Wn.2d 353, 365, 705 P.2d 1195, 713 P.2d 1109 (1985)).

Id. at 340 (citing Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 104 Wn.2d at 365).

Id. (citing McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wn.2d 299, 308, 738 P.2d 254 (1987)).

Finally, Olivine argues that United Capitol lost its right to comity and full faith and credit by disregarding a trial court order. On November 2, 2001, the trial court ordered United Capitol to tender a cash deposit to the court or post a supersedeas bond by November 12, 2001. United Capitol failed to comply. The Illinois court issued its liquidation order two days after the cash deposit/bond was due. Olivine claims that because United Capitol and the state of Illinois failed to comply with the Washington order, Illinois failed to give full faith and credit and act with judicial comity. Therefore, we need not apply comity or full faith and credit principles here.

Judicial comity allows one jurisdiction's court to give effect to laws of another jurisdiction out of deference and respect. Haberman v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 109 Wn.2d 107, 160-61, 744 P.2d 1032, 750 P.2d 254 (1987) (citing Mianecki v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 99 Nev. 93, 97, 658 P.2d 422, cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 806 (1983)). Whether to invoke comity is within the court's discretion. Id. at 161 (citing Mianecki, 99 Nev. at 98).
Under the United States Constitution's full faith and credit clause, another state's judgment is valid in Washington unless the foreign state lacked jurisdiction or the judgment is constitutionally invalid. U.S. CONST. article IV, § 1; State v. Gimarelli, 105 Wn. App. 370, 377, 20 P.3d 430 (citing State v. Berry, 141 Wn.2d 121, 127-28, 5 P.3d 658 (2000)), review denied, 144 Wn.2d 1014 (2001).

In response, United Capitol points out that the Illinois court issued an order of conservation in September 2001. This order enjoined United Capitol from paying any claims or contractual obligations without the court's approval. If this is, in fact, the reason why United Capitol failed to comply with the trial court's order, United Capitol should have called it to the attention of Olivine and the trial court. Nevertheless, United Capitol's failure to comply with the trial court's deposit/bond order is an insufficient reason to disregard Illinois' right to seek a stay of the proceedings. Notions of judicial comity and full faith and credit direct us to respect the Illinois court's order by dismissing the case.

We reverse and dismiss the case.

COLEMAN and SCHINDLER, JJ., concur.

Review denied at 153 Wn.2d 1011 (2005).

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OLIVINE CORP. v. UNITED CAPITOL INS. CO
(May 24, 2004)