Florida Decisions Without Published Opinions App.dism.
sociation that Hunter has with those locations is in utilizing them in the management of each particular project. Moreover, upon completion of a project, Hunter's use of that particular business location ceases to exist. With regard to the advertising campaigns for the various projects, the circuit court correctly found that it is undisputed in the record that such advertising and promotional expenses are costs of the project paid exclusively by NLP and not Hunter. While Ms. Wilson claims that she may have helped design some of the ads, Mr. Murray explained, "[NLP] take[s] care of all the marketing [at NLP's home office in Massachusetts], we place classified ads, TV commercials, radio commercials, anything that's needed to market the project. We develop that in Massachusetts and take care of the . . . the placement." Likewise, none of the advertising campaigns actually advertised Hunter. Instead, as the circuit court explained, they advertised particular projects such as The Point or Ashton Woods. Based upon these facts, Ms. Wilson's argument that the circuit court erred is without merit.
In consideration of all of the above, it is clear that any goodwill attributable to Hunter is exclusively personal goodwill. There can be little argument against the fact that the future success or failure of Hunter is intrinsically tied to Mr. Wilson's reputation, knowledge, and skills, and thus, is not subject to equitable jurisdiction. Accordingly, the circuit court's order is affirmed to the extent that it finds that Hunter has only personal goodwill.
B. Manager Fees
Separate and apart from the issue of goodwill is the determination of the value of the manager fees, i.e., the profits from the six projects that were being managed by Hunter at the time the parties separated. In its order, the circuit court adopted the "construction spending theory" advanced by Mr. Wilson to determine the value of the manager fees on the projects. Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that Hunter's manager fees had a negative value of $(2,680,672.00) as of the date of separation due to construction costs and premature payments and overpayments of manager fees by NLP, and that Ms. Wilson was also responsible for half of that debt. The circuit court thereafter found that Ms. Wilson's prior advance payment toward equitable distribution in the amount of $4,337,438.00 resulted in an overpayment to her in the amount of $894,286.00. Therefore, she was ordered to pay that amount to Mr. Wilson in thirty days with interest. The circuit court then remanded the case to the family court to establish a value to the manager fees attributed to the remaining two projects based solely upon the percentage of construction spending for each project at the time of the parties' separation. Upon a thorough review of the record and consideration of the relevant case law, this Court finds that the construction spending theory is fatally flawed.
An exhaustive search by this Court of federal and state cases from throughout the entire country failed to locate a single case that referenced a "construction spending theory."
On June 1, 2005, Ms. Wilson filed a motion for an expedited hearing to preserve the marital estate stating that Mr. Wilson had transferred "in excess of Two Million Dollars to accounts of [Hunter]." There was testimony regarding Mr. Wilson paying money to NLP for overpayments even though the final net profits for that particular project had not been paid to Hunter. The argument was grounded in the principle that any attempt to liquidate, sell or transfer marital assets without the permission of all parties constitutes fraud if such transfer is made in an attempt to avoid equitable distribution. W. Va. Code § 48-7-108 provides, in pertinent part:
A husband or wife may alienate property at any time prior to the entry of an order under the provisions of this article or prior to the recordation of a notice of lis pendens in accordance with the provisions of part 7-401, et seq. [§§ 48-7-401 through 48-7-402], and at anytime and in any manner not otherwise prohibited by an order under this chapter, in like manner and with like effect as if this article and the doctrine of equitable distribution had not been adopted: Provided, That as to any transfer prior to the entry of an order under the provisions of this article, a transfer other than to a bona fide purchaser for value shall be voidable if the court finds such transfer to have been effected to avoid the application of the provisions of this article or to otherwise be a fraudulent conveyance.
The construction spending theory looks at construction spending as of the date of separation on each project and uses that figure alone to determine what work Hunter had done as of that period of time. As Mr. Wilson's counsel argued during the May 9, 2008, hearing, "The work that has been done and the percentage of that work as it relates to the project gives us, in our argument, . . . a percentage that is a . . . that is a marital share of the total." As his counsel further explained, his construction theory was critical to view "the percentage of construction spending as of the time of separation based upon the total spending, and those percentages are important to determine, in our view, the marital share of the total manager fees earned on projects that were pending and ongoing at the time of separation." By its very nature, such a theory is always going to show substantial debt during the infancy of a project between Hunter and NLP. This is backed by the testimony of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Murray, discussed herein, regarding their explanations of how a project is completed from beginning to end including various costs, payments, obligations, and finally, the realization of profits, oftentimes many years after a project begins.
A major flaw with the construction spending theory, as applied to the specific circumstances of the Management Agreement in this case, is its basic disregard for the recognition that net profits are not paid to Hunter until completion of a particular project. As such, the receipt of those profits necessarily reflects efforts by Hunter that occurred from the very inception of a project, and throughout each and every phase thereafter, until a project's completion. Said another way, NLP invests millions of dollars during the infancy of a project, with the expectation of reaping the rewards of potentially tens of millions of dollars in returns that will not be realized for several years later. At that time, Hunter also receives his manager fees.
It is important to note that the money used to finance every aspect of each of the projects in this case was provided entirely by NLP and not Hunter. As such, even though Hunter does not have to set aside any money for the construction costs, payment of employees, payment for marketing costs, or any costs associated with a project's expenses, the circuit court nonetheless allocated a value to be charged against Ms. Wilson based upon NLP's money expended at a particular point in the project. Determining manager fees for a project utilizing the construction spending theory during the early period of a project, especially when the money and risk at that moment was NLP's money and not Hunter's, is entirely unreasonable given the nature of the agreement between Hunter and NLP.
It has been established that Hunter does not get paid until NLP gets its twelve-and-one-half percent and that Hunter's eventual profits are even dependent upon factors such as the sale of timber on the land associated with a particular project. Likewise, as previously stated, Hunter does not get paid until after all of the costs associated with the project are paid including, but not limited to: the acquisition of property; development of the roads; installation of utilities; subdivision design and development; legal expenses; sales; marketing; general administration costs; interest expenses on bank loans which are necessarily higher at the beginning of a project; engineering costs; installation of signage; soil testing, contingency accounts and other unforeseen problems; fuel costs; material costs; project overruns; payment of NLP's tax liability associated with a particular project; and any other expenses related to the project. It is only then, when all expenses have been paid in full, that Hunter receives any payment of net profits under the Management Agreement. In his "Bench Brief of Respondent Leon Hunter Wilson" filed on May 7, 2008, which was the same date as one of the underlying hearings before the circuit court, Mr. Wilson, through counsel, explains:
While it is correct that the Management Agreement states that NLP can distribute manager fees based upon mutual assent of NLP and Hunter, it is equally clear that such profits are generally distributed at the completion of a project. In fact, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Murray stated repeatedly throughout the myriad filings and hearings before the family court and circuit court that compensation is not paid to Hunter until a project is completed and all other costs are paid.
Thus, Hunter Co. does not receive any compensation for its services
until a project or scheduled property is completed. This is called a "management fee" and consists of the net profits, if any, of a project or scheduled property as defined in the Management Agreements. If there are no net profits, Hunter Co. must absorb the losses of a project, as set out in the Management Agreements.
(Emphasis added). Mr. Wilson's counsel further explains,
The development and resale of a property can take many months or years, depending upon the size of the project, market factors, and other intangibles. Hence, there are development projects that were begun by Hunter Co., prior to the parties' separation,
that have not matured or been fully realized at this date since the net profits, if any, are contingent upon the sale of the developed lots, completion of construction, or other factors.
(Emphasis added). Likewise, Mr. Murray explained that a manager's management fee is paid "at the completion of a project which we define as all lots being sold, all debt being paid, all construction being completed, all bonds being returned. . . ."
Mr. Apple further discussed the front-loading of expenses in relation to the construction spending theory as follows:
Well the concept there would be if you were on the cash basis of accounting, which is what most of us understand, it's income when I got the money in my hand. It's an expense when I pay it out. Okay. But cash-basis accounting is not generally accepted accounting principles. Generally accepted accounting principles require that you match the expenses to the recognition of the income. So when you're talking about a development, a real estate development company like we have here, for instance if you haven't sold any lots yet but you've spent a million dollars building roads and putting in utilities, on a cash basis your financial statement would say I have zero income and a million dollars in expenses. I lost a million dollars. That would be on the cash basis. Under general accepted accounting principles, none of those costs would be expensed until a lot was sold.
Mr. Murray also described the risk of land development business as "enormous" during the early stages of a project. He explained that it is an extremely capital intensive business which starts with putting capital at risk before you even own a piece of property. He stated: "It is not unusual for us to spend $50,000 to $100,000 getting a property surveyed, getting property soil tested, preparing drainage, engineering preliminary drawings to determine whether it's even feasible to own it." He added:
As Mr. Murray stated, the real estate business is a "risky business." Evidence of record indicated that problems with asphalt on one project could potentially lead to significant additional expenses, while additional costs were incurred on another project due to storms. Mr. Wilson also pointed to the possibility of Hunter losing money due to a civil lawsuit filed pertaining to a project completed several years prior to the parties' separation. With regard to the storm damage, Mr. Wilson testified that on one occasion heavy storms caused "wash outs" which led to approximately $30,000.00 in damages.
If we purchase the property we then have to pay the purchase price, in cash most of the time. Occasionally we find a seller who's willing to finance it, but that's rare. So, you now have spent money to determine if you want to own it. You then spend money to own it, and then you begin spending money to develop it so that you wait, sometimes, years before you see a profit.
The value of the Management Agreement to Hunter necessarily fluctuates year by year due to the nature of this type of work and such fluctuations can be drastic. Moreover, it was agreed by the parties that the most accurate value of a project could be determined at the completion of a project. This is also reflected by Ms. Wilson's testimony during the May 8, 2008, hearing regarding her 2004 tax returns which showed significant income resulting in net profits of nearly $12 million to Hunter. She explained that the large payment that year resulted from an "accumulation of work for the previous, lets's say, year and a half, two years." It is safe to assume that had a court utilized the construction spending theory in considering that project during its infancy, that Ms. Wilson would not have received any of those profits regardless of any efforts from Hunter prior to payment of the net profits.
This is evidenced by the parties income taxes during a three year period from 2004-2006, wherein, based upon Hunter's profits, the parties made approximately $12 million, $5 million, and $1.8 million, respectively.
Ms. Wilson also argues that the circuit court erred by relying upon certain documents that were admitted into evidence by the family court over her counsel's objection for lack of authentication. She contends that these documents were the basis for the circuit court's adoption of Mr. Wilson's construction spending theory to determine the value of the manager fees. Given our final disposition of this case, which includes remanding it to the family court for further proceedings relating to the value of Hunter's manager fees, it is not necessary to address the admission of the documents. Nonetheless, after reviewing the evidence of record and the transcript of the May 9, 2008, hearing, it is clear that the principal argument below was not based on the ability to authenticate documents as is argued in Ms. Wilson's brief herein. In fact, these were the same types of documents relied on by Ms. Wilson's expert in preparing his opinion. Instead, the primary argument was regarding the alleged lateness of providing the information to Ms. Wilson's counsel. Mr. Wilson's counsel maintained that many of the documents were already admitted, while others they had just received from NLP and immediately delivered them to Ms. Wilson. The circuit court listened to arguments on this issue for a considerable period of time (nearly thirty pages of the transcript) and ultimately admitted the evidence over Ms. Wilson's objection.
As discussed, instead of identifying the amount of work that Hunter did as of the time of separation, and thereafter calculating to what extent that work was directly attributable to the final net profits received by Hunter on each individual project, Mr. Wilson's construction spending theory completely ignored the net profits paid at the completion of a project. Such a theory is only valid if the work done by Hunter in preparation for the sale of the lots had absolutely no value or nexus whatsoever to those later sales and/or profits. The very nature of this type of an agreement between Hunter and NLP is that significant amounts of time and effort are invested in the beginning that will, more often than not, result in substantial profits at the completion of a project. The construction spending theory ignores and attaches no value whatsoever to Hunter's efforts prior to the separation of the parties, and ignores the future payments of profits based, in part, upon those early efforts. Such a result is not equitable, and thus, is simply not reasonable. The circuit court's adoption of the construction spending theory was error and must be reversed.
C. There Is a Value to the Manager Fees Separate and Distinct from a Determination of Goodwill.
Having determined that the circuit court erred in its adoption of the construction spending theory, this case must be remanded for a determination of the value of the manager fees on the projects that existed at the date of separation. It seems that the parties, as well as the lower courts, relied heavily on a discussion of personal versus enterprise goodwill, while ignoring altogether the fact that a separate value attached to the manager fees. For example, both in her brief before this Court as well as throughout the opinion testimony of Mr. Apple, Ms. Wilson seems not to comprehend that a value of goodwill is a potential value that is additional and separate from any actual value that can be attributed to Hunter's manager fees based upon its efforts prior to the parties' separation. In demonstrating the confusion surrounding this concept, Ms. Wilson's counsel even went so far as to argue in her brief before this Court that the
remand by the circuit court clarifies the extent to which the circuit court did not understand
May or even the implications of its own findings on reversal. If the Hunter Company did not
possess enterprise goodwill its value was related only to its physical assets such as furniture and computers, and its cash on hand, as of the date of separation. There was never a dispute regarding the value of the physical assets and the cash on hand as of the date of separation. Retaining jurisdiction would only be appropriate if the Hunter Company possessed "enterprise goodwill" based upon the net profits to be paid in the future pursuant to the Management Agreement.
Likewise, Mr. Wilson's counsel seems not to recognize the possibility that any future profits paid after the date of separation could actually relate back to the pre-separation efforts of Hunter separate from a finding of enterprise goodwill. This is reflected in Mr. Wilson's counsel's question to Ms. Wilson that: "And today you're asking the Court to award the sweat — income from Mr. Wilson's sweat equity after 2005?" Following an objection by Ms. Wilson's counsel, Mr. Wilson's counsel continued: "But Your Honor, the testimony is she did nothing in the business after 2005, she just admitted that, obviously it came from his work, so if she's asking for income after that date, she would have to be asking for exactly what I asked her."
Hunter was a business that the parties started together and carried on together for nearly thirteen years prior to Ms. Wilson's filing for divorce. Throughout those years, Ms. Wilson claims to have sold land, arranged closings, run the office, and inspected land with Mr. Wilson. She further claims that as the business grew, she hired and managed the secretarial staff, trained them, and taught them the office procedures. In addition to her efforts directly related to Hunter, Ms. Wilson states that she spent a lot of time managing the parties' personal affairs such as their 250 acre horse farm. She said this allowed Mr. Wilson to spend more time with Hunter.
As discussed ad nauseam herein, by the date of separation, Hunter had already invested a significant amount of time and preparation to which it is reasonable to assume some value is directly attributable to the final net profits of the projects in existence at the time of the parties' separation. Said another way, Hunter's efforts prior to the parties' separation led to significant profits totaling millions of dollars paid at the completion of the various projects. Given the specific facts of this case, this does not involve enterprise goodwill nor personal goodwill. Instead, it is a value placed on the actual services rendered by Hunter of which payments were delayed until the completion of the project as prescribed by the Management Agreement. While there are distinct differences, it is the type of arrangement that shares some similarity to a contingency fee arrangement between an attorney and client. In fact, Mr. Wilson argues in his brief to this Court:
Similar to a contingent fee contract entered into by an attorney before his/her separation, these development projects may be marital property or have a marital property component. However, their respective values will not be realized, and thus cannot be determined until the projects are completed under the Management Agreements. As such, this Court should retain and continue jurisdiction as to those development projects which are in whole or in part marital property, until the value of the net profits or losses can be properly determined and the value of the marital component ascertained.
In Graham v. Graham, 195 W. Va. 343, 345-346, 465 S.E.2d 614, 616-617 (1995), this Court explained:
Moreover, in a number of cases we have indicated that the existence of an ascertainable present value is not the key determinant of whether the interest should be considered marital property. Instead, we have stated that, given the broad legislative definition of marital property, several types of expectancies, or near expectancies, with little or no present value, are marital property for equitable distribution purposes. For example, a contingent fee contract entered into by an attorney during marriage was held to be marital property under W. Va. Code, 48-2-1(e)(1).
Metzner v. Metzner, 191 W. Va. 378,
446 S.E.2d 165 (1994). Somewhat similarly, in
Hardy v. Hardy, 186 W. Va. 496,
413 S.E.2d 151 (1991), we held that the economic losses attributable to a personal injury claim during marriage were "property" for marital distribution purposes. Lastly, and more significantly, in
Smith v. Smith, 190 W. Va. 402,
438 S.E.2d 582 (1993), and a number of prior cases, we have held that pension benefits were "property" for marital distribution purposes.
See also,
Langdon v. Langdon, 182 W. Va. 714,
391 S.E.2d 627 (1990); and
Cross v. Cross, 178 W. Va. 563,
363 S.E.2d 449 (1987).
In Syllabus Point 3 of Metzner v. Metzner, 191 W. Va. 378, 446 S.E.2d 165 (1994), this Court explained, "[w]hen a contingent fee contract is acquired during marriage, it is `marital property' within the meaning contemplated by West Virginia Code § 48-2-1(e)(1)." Moreover, "[i]n the event that post-separation work on a case in which a contingency fee award is ultimately obtained can be identified, such work must be accounted for and any monies attributable to such work should be treated as separate property within the meaning of West Virginia Code § 48-2-1(f) (1992)." Syllabus Point 4, White v. Williamson, 192 W. Va. 683, 453 S.E.2d 666 (1994). In addition, "[c]ontingent and other future earned fees which an attorney might receive as compensation for cases pending at the time of a divorce should be treated as marital property for purposes of equitable distribution. However, only that portion of the fee that represents compensation for work done during the marriage is actually "marital property" as defined by our statute. Because the ultimate value of a contingent fee case remains uncertain until the case is resolved, a court must retain continuing jurisdiction over the matter in order to determine how to effectuate an equitable distribution of this property." Syllabus Point 5, Metzner.
Mr. Wilson specifically stated during the January 7, 2008, hearing that Ms. Wilson was entitled to half of the efforts of Hunter up to the date of separation. Mr. Wilson even acknowledged during his testimony that the Management Agreement itself had value. This is not in dispute. Mr. Wilson then said, and we agree, that his efforts after the date of separation are not subject to equitable distribution. Mr. Wilson further opined that the value of Hunter was its net profits, cash on hand, minimal furnishings, and any sums due to it from NLP based upon the Management Agreement. To this end, the Management Agreement is the exclusive methodology to earn money for Hunter. Accordingly, we now hold that profits of a business that are based upon a future contingency or obligation are subject to equitable distribution upon the dissolution of a marriage, but only that portion of the profits for work done during the marriage is actually "marital property." In determining the amount of profits subject to equitable distribution, sound valuation methods must be used, and it may be necessary for a court to retain continuing jurisdiction over the matter until such profits are determined in order to effectuate an equitable distribution of this property.
In this case, Ms. Wilson, as co-owner of Hunter, was entitled to half of the manager fees for the work that was completed on the existing projects at the date of separation. Having found that the circuit court erred in its adoption of the construction spending theory, this case must be remanded to the family court to determine the value of those manager fees. Upon remand, and in light of the inadequacies of the evidence contained in the record below, the family court shall hold a new hearing for the purpose of allowing both parties to present new evidence, consistent with this opinion, with regard to the value of the manager fees.
Ms. Wilson maintains that the circuit court abused its discretion when it remanded the case to the family court to determine the actual profits for two of the six real estate projects in spite of the fact that the parties agreed that the date of separation was May 31, 2005, for purposes of the valuing the marital estate. She contends that the remand highlights the circuit court's misunderstanding of May, supra, in that, "if Hunter does not possess enterprise goodwill, as the circuit court found, then . . . retaining jurisdiction is only appropriate if Hunter possesses enterprise goodwill based upon net profits to be paid in the future pursuant to the Management Agreement."
Conversely, Mr. Wilson states that the construction spending theory adopted by the circuit court allows for the determination of actual profits earned both before and after the date of separation. As such, he contends that the case was properly remanded to the family court to accurately distribute the marital estate. He points out that W. Va. Code § 48-7-104(1) requires continuing jurisdiction since all marital manager fees cannot yet be determined. W. Va. Code § 48-7-104(1), in part, provides:
After considering the factors set forth in section 7-103, the court shall:
(1) Determine the net value of all marital property of the parties as of the date of the separation of the parties or as of such later date determined by the court to be more appropriate for attaining an equitable result. Where the value of the marital property portion of a spouse's entitlement to future payments can be determined at the time of entering a final order in a domestic relations action, the court may include it in reckoning the worth of the marital property assigned to each spouse. In the absence of an agreement between the parties, when the value of the future payments is not known at the time of entering a final order in a domestic relations action, if their receipt is contingent on future events or not reasonably assured, or if for other reasons it is not equitable under the circumstances to include their value in the property assigned at the time of dissolution, the court may decline to do so; and
(A) Fix the spouses' respective shares in such future payments if and when received; or
(B) If it is not possible and practical to fix their share at the time of entering a final order in a domestic relations action, reserve jurisdiction to make an appropriate order at the earliest practical date;
If a valuation is made after a contingent or other future fee has been earned through the personal services or skills of a spouse, the portion that is marital property shall be in the same proportion to the total fee that the personal services or skills expended before the separation of the parties bears to the total personal skills or services expended. The provisions of this subdivision apply to pending cases when the issues of contingent fees or future earned fees have not been finally adjudicated.
This issue has been resolved by this Court's reversal, in part, and remand of this case to the family court.
While Ms. Wilson contends that the manager fees should be determined based upon the testimony of her expert, Mr. Apple, a review of that evidence reveals glaring problems that ultimately make his opinions and projections unreliable in their entirety with regard to an accurate determination of the actual value of Hunter at the time of the parties' separation. Mr. Apple explained during the May 9, 2008, hearing, that he based his valuation upon the individual project projections that were provided to him by Mr. Wilson. He also said that due to the way the documents were prepared, that it was impossible to separate projections from actual figures. Importantly, Mr. Apple declared that his valuation of Hunter for purposes of determining a value of future profits at the time of the parties' separation was limited to a review of only three projects, i.e., The Springs, WestVaco, and WestVaco Greenbriar, which is also known as Overlook at Greenbriar. In response to the questions from Mr. Wilson's counsel, Mr. Apple testified as follows:
Q. . . . It's my understanding you looked at three projects. Were you aware that there were other projects that were also at some stage of construction or completion at the time of separation?
A. No. It's my understanding these were the only three that were incomplete at the date of separation.
Q. So you did not look at any documents or financial statements that relate to a subdivision known as [The] Point.
A. I have copies of some of those known as [The] Point. Yes.
Q. You have the documents, but you didn't use them in your analysis?
A. Correct.
Q. And were you aware that there were engineering expenses, and work was being done on that project at the time of separation?
A. No.
Mr. Apple was then questioned regarding another active project of Hunter known as Ashton Woods.
Q. There is also a project known as Ashton Woods. Were you provided documents about Ashton Woods?
A. I have seen documents on Ashton Woods. Yes.
Q. And so your analysis does not address the manager fees that were receivable or urged and any expenses that may have been charged against those manager fees?
A. No. It was my understanding that both of those projects manager fees had been paid prior to separation.
Q. Okay. And who gave you that information?
A. Don't know if I determined that from the documents or whether [Ms. Wilson] told me that. It could have been either one or both.
Q. Okay. So if, if there is evidence that these projects were ongoing; there were manager fees, either payable or receivable at the time of separation and after separation, would you agree that your report is incomplete?
A. Yes.
When Mr. Apple was questioned further regarding the three projects he actually did review, he explained that his projections were based upon information that was dated as of October 2007, and that those projects were not completed at that time. In response to questions by Mr. Wilson's counsel, Mr. Apple agreed that if he had used actual numbers of closed projects as a part of his valuation, where there was a final determination of the amount of manager fees that had actually been earned, versus projections of what that number would be, that the actual numbers would have been more accurate. When questioned further regarding his projections for the project known as The Springs, he admitted that he did not know anything regarding whether or not the roads were finished or whether or not the infrastructure was completed. He also stated that he did not know any information as to what stage of completion that project was at the time of his valuation. Moreover, in providing a value on The Springs project, he based his opinion upon projected sales of lots with little to no consideration given to future project debts or payments to NLP even though he recognized during his testimony that "no net profits are paid until the debts are paid off." Mr. Apple agreed that his opinions "are projections and are not based on the actual final numbers on any of these projects." Mr. Wilson's counsel then asked Mr. Apple:
Q. I guess just to make sure we're all on the same page, are you aware that the final information on these projects that have been closed was provided to Ms. Wilson's attorneys, you just haven't analyzed it; is that right?
A. I don't know.
It is clear that Mr. Apple's opinion failed to consider at least three projects that were active at the time of the parties' separation. Moreover, with regard to the projects that he actually did review, Mr. Apple admitted that a better source for valuation would have been the consideration of the final information on those projects at the time of their completion. Furthermore, evidence was admitted showing that much of the information, which was not considered for his expert opinion, was in Mr. Apple's possession and/or in the possession of Ms. Wilson's counsel prior to his testimony. Moreover, it was agreed upon at a March 20, 2006, hearing, more than two years prior to Mr. Apple's May 9, 2008, testimony, that Mr. Apple was permitted to have direct contact with Mr. Wilson at any point to expedite the delivery of any documents that he needed to prepare his opinion regarding the value of Hunter's manager fees at the time of the parties' separation. Mr. Apple's opinion further failed to take into consideration numerous future costs of the various projects that he did review, which necessarily resulted in inaccurate and inflated projected net profits. He also failed to consider in his opinion a value of Hunter's manager fees separate and distinct from any goodwill at the time of the parties' separation.
Mr. Wilson's counsel maintained in correspondence to the family court, which is included in the record, that Mr. Apple did not contact Mr. Wilson at any time.
In spite of the fact Mr. Apple relied upon lot sales in forming his projections, giving little consideration to future project expenses, he admitted during testimony that he was aware of the fact that real estate development projects, such as the ones between Hunter and NLP, were uncertain and included significant risk. He also agreed that at the time of his testimony that the real estate market was in a slump and that a lot of inventory remained unsold. He further recognized that financial problems associated with the embattled economy at that time also effected the marketplace. Nonetheless, these factors were not considered in his ultimate valuation of Hunter.
Ms. Wilson argues that due to Mr. Apple's "unrebutted expert testimony," that the circuit court was precluded from reversing the family court. This Court has held that: "`A measure of discretion is accorded to a family [judge] in making value determinations after hearing expert testimony. However, the family [judge] is not free to reject competent expert testimony which has not been rebutted. This statement is analogous to the rule that "[w]hen the finding of a trial court in a case tried by it in lieu of a jury is against the preponderance of the evidence, is not supported by the evidence, or is plainly wrong, such finding will be reversed and set aside by this Court upon appellate review." Syllabus Point 1, in part, George v. Godby, 174 W. Va. 313, 325 S.E.2d 102 (1984), quoting Syllabus Point 4, Smith v. Godby, 154 W. Va. 190, 174 S.E.2d 165 (1970).' Syl. Pt. 1, Bettinger v. Bettinger, 183 W. Va. 528, 396 S.E.2d 709 (1990)." Syllabus Point 4, Helfer v. Helfer, 224 W. Va. 413, 686 S.E.2d 64 (2009). Nonetheless, this Court has further explained, "`[t]he testimony of expert witnesses on an issue is not exclusive and does not necessarily destroy the force or credibility of other testimony. The jury has a right to weigh the testimony of all witnesses, experts and otherwise; and the same rule applies as to weight and credibility of such testimony.' Syllabus Point 2, Webb v. Chesapeake O. Ry. Co., 105 W. Va. 555, 144 S.E. 100, cert. denied, 278 U.S. 646, 49 S.Ct. 82, 73 L.Ed. 559 (1928)." Syllabus Point 6, Frye v. Kanawha Stone Co., Inc., 202 W. Va. 467, 505 S.E.2d 206 (1998).
Based upon the record below, which includes Mr. Apple's complete testimony before the family court, it is clear that without reviewing all of the projects in process at the time of separation, it is impossible to render an accurate and reliable opinion within a reasonable degree of accounting certainly with regard to the value of Hunter's manager fees at the time the parties separated. Moreover, with regard to the number of projects, the record below demonstrates there has consistently been, and appears to still be, significant confusion among the family court, the circuit court, both parties, and the numerous witnesses regarding even the actual number of active projects which had begun prior to the parties' separation. This is of particular import given the fact that the value of the manager fees can only be determined by considering the work done for each project at the date of separation.
An example of the confusion, with regard to the number of projects, can be found in a May 12, 2008, "Joint Trial Order," wherein the family court states: "The parties agree there were four (4) said projects as of the date of separation, being Overlook at Greenbriar, The Springs a[t] Shepherdstown, West Vaco I and The Point. Petitioner alleges there may be another West Vaco project." That same language citing the agreement that there were four projects is also included in the family court's May 8, 2008, pretrial order. Neither order referenced two other projects known as Ashton Woods and Crossings on the Potomac. Next, during his opening statement at the May 8, 2008, hearing, Mr. Wilson's counsel states: "So there will be testimony about these various construction projects and to be more specific, Your Honor, there were five projects that were in existence and were in some stage of development at the time the parties separated." Mr. Wilson's counsel then listed those five projects as: Ashton Woods, Crossings on the Potomac, Westvaco, Springs at Shepherdstown, and Overlook at Greenbrier. Mr. Wilson's counsel did not mention the project known as The Point. Then, within the family court's November 21, 2008, final divorce order, the family judge references five projects. Nonetheless, without any discussion or explanation, the circuit court, through its March 25, 2009, final order, states as fact numerous times that there were six pending projects at the time of separation. Then, on three occasions during the body of the circuit court's order, wherein the family court's order was reversed, the circuit court stated emphatically that at the time of the parties' separation, Hunter was involved in the management of six real estate projects and listed them as: Ashton Woods, Crossings, Overlook at Greenbrier, The Springs at Shepherdstown, WestVaco, and The Point. Finally, in their briefs before this Court, both parties maintain that there were six projects in existence at the time of the parties' separation. It is difficult to understand how so many individuals could have failed to reconcile this problem given the fact that this case has been ongoing for more than five years since the parties' May 31, 2005, separation.
During the January, 7, 2008, hearing, and at other times, the family judge expressed his frustration with the case being continued "at least six times" at the parties' request. In another example, in the family court's September 5, 2007, denial of a request for a continuance, the court noted: "This case has been pending since June 2005; there have been multiple continuances; final hearing has been set for 4 months; there is insufficient court time available to reschedule expeditiously; and denial is necessary to ensure compliance with the RPPFC."
This Court found numerous factual errors within the circuit court's March 25, 2009, order. For example, on page two of the order, the circuit court states, "at the time of the parties' separation on June 1, 2005,. . . ." As stated, the parties stipulated to May 31, 2005, as their date of separation. Moreover, the listed amounts provided in that order regarding the stipulated amounts for the net marital estate, the amount advanced by Mr. Wilson towards Ms. Wilson's share, and even the agreed upon amount of marital debt, were all incorrect as provided in the circuit court's final order. While there are many additional examples, the point is that the accuracy of an order by a court is of utmost importance to the administration of justice.
This Court has explained that: "Equitable distribution . . . is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the parties' property as marital or nonmarital. The second step is to value the marital assets. The third step is to divide the marital estate between the parties in accordance with the principles contained in [former] W. Va. Code, 48-2-32 [now W. Va. Code § 48-7-103]." Syllabus Point 1, in part, Whiting v. Whiting, 183 W. Va. 451, 396 S.E.2d 413 (1990). Unfortunately, as discussed herein, the parties submitted little credible evidence as to the value of Hunter's manager fees. It is the responsibility of the parties, not the court, to propose values to marital property and the parties are bound by the evidence they present. As we said in Syllabus Point 8 of Mayhew v. Mayhew, 197 W. Va. 290, 475 S.E.2d 382 (1996), "[t]he burden is on both parties to the litigation to adduce competent evidence on the values to be assigned in equitable distribution cases." Likewise, in Syllabus Point 3 of Roig v. Roig, 178 W. Va. 781, 364 S.E.2d 794 (1987), this Court stated, "When the issue in a divorce proceeding is the equitable distribution of marital property, both parties have the burden of presenting competent evidence to the trial court concerning the value of such property."
Based upon all the above, in particular our conclusion that the value of Hunter's manager fees are separate and distinct from a determination of personal or enterprise goodwill, this case will be remanded to the family court for further proceedings consistent herein. To that end, and based on the lack of accurate and/or complete information contained in the record by way of testimony or documentary evidence on this issue, the family court must take additional evidence, solely for the purpose of making appropriate calculations to determine the value of Hunter's manager fees at the time of the parties' separation for a final determination regarding that value for purposes of equitable distribution. The evidence in the record indicates that four of the six projects are completed, while the remaining two projects, WestVaco and The Point, were 95.3 percent and 82.3 percent complete, respectively, as of March of 2008. Given that it is now more than two-and-one-half-years later, it may be that all six of the projects are now completed, which will provide for a determination of the value of Hunter's manager fees at the date of separation. In the event that either or both of the two projects remain unfinished, the family court shall retain jurisdiction and make a final determination upon their completion.
In summary, the circuit court erred in denying Ms. Wilson's motion for reconsideration. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Hunter did not have an enterprise goodwill value for purposes of equitable distribution. Therefore, the circuit court properly reversed the family court's November 21, 2008, holding which ordered Mr. Wilson to pay Ms. Wilson the sum of $4,914,582.50 based upon a finding of enterprise goodwill. However, the circuit court did commit reversible error in its order by requiring Ms. Wilson to pay Mr. Wilson the sum of $894,286.00 based upon a construction spending theory. This Court has determined that Hunter's manager fees on the projects at the date of separation are subject to equitable distribution. However, it is impossible to calculate the fees based upon the current evidence of record. Thus, after thoroughly reviewing the record and considering all of the parties' arguments, this Court remands this case to the family court to award the appropriate relief consistent with this opinion. Upon remand, the family court shall hold a hearing for the sole purpose of determining an accurate value of Hunter's manager fees at the time of the parties' May 31, 2005, separation. After the evidence is taken, the trial court should make thorough findings of fact and conclusions of law in reaching its valuation, and should then proceed to the division of any such fees that are ascertained to be marital property.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the final order of the Circuit Court of Berkeley County dated June 4, 2009, is reversed. Likewise, the final order of the circuit court dated March 25, 2009, is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, and remanded to the family court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed, in part, reversed, in part, and remanded with directions.