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PSK, LLC d/b/a OVERHEAD DOOR COMPANY OF CEDAR RAPIDS AND IOWA CITY, Plaintiff, v. RANDY HICKLIN d/b/a A-1 AMERICAN GARAGE DOOR REPAIR, ADVANCED GARAGE DOOR REPAIR, and/or OVER HEAD AAA GARAGE DOOR REPAIR; and DANETTA HICKLIN, d/b/a A-1 AMERICAN GARAGE DOOR REPAIR, ADVANCED GARAGE DOOR REPAIR, OVER HEAD AAA GARAGE DOOR REPAIR, AFFORDABLE OVERHEAD GARAGE DOOR REPAIR and AMERICAN CERTIFIED DOOR CO., Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN CONWAY, Senior District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on All Claims Except Excessive Force and State Tort Claim for Battery, filed April 13, 2010 (Doc. 8) ("Motion"). Having reviewed the parties' submissions and the relevant law, the Court will GRANT the Motion, as set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises from a traffic stop on July 13, 2009 and Defendants' subsequent arrest of Plaintiff. Notice of Removal (Doc. 1), Ex. A at ¶ 7. Plaintiff asserts claims for (I) battery relating to his allegedly unlawful arrest and Defendants' alleged use of excessive force; (II) unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment when Plaintiff "posed no imminent threat to Defendants and had only allegedly committed a traffic violation"; (III) unlawful arrest in violation of Plaintiff's alleged Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest "to be free of arrests for minor traffic violations"; (IV) unlawful retaliation against Plaintiff for exercising his "First Amendment right to voice objection to police treatment of him"; and (V) "false imprisonment and interference with rights under New Mexico law." See generally Notice of Removal, Ex. A.

Defendants' Motion argues that all claims except for those alleging excessive force and state-law battery (i.e., Count I) should be dismissed with prejudice. Defendants argue they had probable cause and legal authority to arrest Plaintiff for a traffic violation; therefore, they cannot be held liable for any violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. In support of their argument, Defendants submit the affidavit of Arresting Officer Denise Walker stating that she pulled Plaintiff over after observing him fail to come to a complete stop at a stop sign. Motion at Ex. A, ¶ 3. When Plaintiff appeared agitated, Officer Walker called for backup. Id. at ¶ 5. Plaintiff was argumentative and more agitated when approached with citations, so Officer Walker and Sergeant Taylor ordered him to get out of his car. Id. at ¶ 6. Plaintiff refused to get out of the car and resisted Sergeant Taylor's efforts to remove him from the car. Id. In the resulting struggle, Plaintiff knocked Officer Walker to the ground. Id. at ¶ 7. Defendants decided to arrest Plaintiff after he refused to get out of his car and resisted being removed from the car. Id. at ¶ 6.

In response to Defendants' Motion, Plaintiff submits an affidavit from his attorney pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). Pl.'s Response to Defs.' Motion, filed April 30, 2010 ("Resp.") at Ex. 1. The affidavit claims that Plaintiff's attorneys received a copy of the belt tape from the underlying incident prior to filing his Complaint, but the tape is difficult to hear. Id. at ¶¶ 2-3. As a result, Plaintiff would like time "to have the original belt tape professionally reproduced to improve the sound quality." Id. Plaintiff further requests time to take the depositions of Defendants "to determine whether they can remember" what is on the belt tape. Id. at ¶ 5. Plaintiff also would like to obtain documents containing any reviews of the incident, statements made by Defendants, and Defendants' standard operating procedure related to traffic stops. Id. at ¶ 6.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A "genuine" issue of fact exists where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the issue either way. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).

In response to a motion for summary judgment, a party "may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must — by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule — set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). The party opposing summary judgment must present specific, admissible facts from which a rational trier of fact could find in his favor. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). However, the Court must consider the record, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Adler at 670 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 265).

A motion for summary judgment may be denied, or additional time may be permitted for response where "a party opposing the motion shows by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). The Tenth Circuit has held that an affidavit that meets the requirements of Rule 56(f) will identify: (1) "the probable facts not available," (2) why those facts cannot be presented currently, (3) "what steps have been taken to obtain these facts," and (4) "how additional time will enable [the party] to" obtain those facts and rebut the motion for summary judgment." Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Health Care Mgmt. Partners, Ltd., 616 F.3d 1086, 1096 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Comm. for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1522 (10th Cir. 1992)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. No Further Discovery Is Required for Summary Judgment

In his "Counsel's Rule 56(F) Affidavit," Plaintiff acknowledges receipt of the belt tape containing a recording of Plaintiff's encounter with Officer Walker. Resp. at Ex. 1, ¶ 2. Plaintiff admits he received the belt tape "[p]rior to filing this lawsuit." Id. Given that the lawsuit was filed in state court on January 26, 2010 and the Motion was filed nearly three months later on April 13, 2010, the Court finds that Plaintiff has had sufficient time in which to have the belt tape enhanced. Moreover, having reviewed the docket in this case, it appears that Plaintiff has by now obtained all the outstanding discovery identified in the Rule 56(f) affidavit. Pl.'s Third Motion to Extend All Pre-Trial Deadlines, filed Sept. 7, 2010 (Doc. 26). As such, the Court finds that additional time is not necessary to enable Plaintiff to rebut the motion for summary judgment.

Independent of any further discovery, Plaintiff admits he could have submitted an affidavit disputing certain "facts leading up to the charges," denying, for instance, the allegation that he refused to exit his vehicle and the charge of battery. Resp. at 3. However, there is no such affidavit in the record. Instead, Plaintiff requests that the Court provide him with an additional opportunity "to supplement the record with his affidavit and the belt tape in his possession prior to the Court ruling on this motion for summary judgment." Id. at 4. As Plaintiff's counsel is no doubt aware, this is not how summary judgment works. Plaintiff's response "must — by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule — set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). "If the opposing party does not so respond, summary judgment should, if appropriate, be entered against that party." Id. B. No Violation of the Fourth Amendment Exists

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. A routine traffic stop, although it is for a limited purpose and is only a brief stop, is a "seizure" to which the Fourth Amendment applies. United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2001). The reasonableness of such a seizure "depends on `whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.'" Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

Once a driver has been pulled over for a traffic violation, a police officer's additional request that the driver get out of his car is only a de minimus intrusion into the driver's personal liberty. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977).

The police have already lawfully decided that the driver shall be briefly detained; the only question is whether he shall spend that period sitting in the driver's seat of his car or standing alongside it. Not only is the insistence of the police on the latter choice not a "serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person," but it hardly rises to the level of a "petty indignity." Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 17, 88 S.Ct. at 1877. What is at most a mere inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer's safety.
Id. Plaintiff's suggestion that Defendants lacked "a lawful basis to order Plaintiff from his car," Resp. at 4, is therefore legally incorrect.

Defendants' custodial arrest of Plaintiff is also lawful under the Fourth Amendment in that there is no dispute that Defendants had probable cause to initiate the traffic stop. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that "[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender").

Plaintiff suggests a further violation of the Fourth Amendment in that the traffic stop in this case may have been unlawfully prolonged. Resp. at 5 ("[w]ithout a deposition of Defendants and radio dispatch logs showing length and course of detention, Plaintiff has no idea what precipitated the order of Plaintiff to exit the car and whether the activity of Defendants deprived Plaintiff of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures"). The Tenth Circuit "assess[es] the reasonableness of a traffic stop based on an observed violation by considering the scope of the officer's actions and balancing the motorist's legitimate expectation of privacy against the government's law-enforcement-related interests." Holt, 264 F.3d at 1220. In the absence of some reasonable suspicion of the driver's illegal activity or the driver's consent to questioning, the general rule is that "once the motorist has produced a valid license and proof that he is entitled to operate the car, he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject to further delay by police for additional questioning." Id. at 1221 (internal quotation omitted).

Plaintiff fails to set forth any summary judgment facts that would enable a reasonable jury to find there was an unlawfully prolonged stop in this case. For instance, there is no admissible evidence showing when Plaintiff was stopped, ordered out of his car, or arrested. Plaintiff does not explain why these facts are not presented or what efforts he has made to discover these facts, let alone how additional time would enable him to gather these facts. Given Plaintiff's presence throughout the encounter, the Court fails to understand how his own information or belief as to the lapse of time could be unavailable to him. Plaintiff's failure to appropriately respond to the Motion dictates that summary judgment should be entered as to Count II, including all claims for violation of the Fourth Amendment.

C. No Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Exists

Count III of Plaintiff's Complaint asserts an alleged " Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest, created by New Mexico law, to [be] free of arrests for minor traffic violations." Notice of Removal, Ex. A at ¶ 33. Plaintiff contends this right was violated by Defendants when they arrested him, allegedly for a traffic violation. Id. at ¶ 34. Defendants initially claim that arrests for minor traffic violations are constitutional as a matter of law. They cite Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, which holds a police officer may constitutionally arrest an individual even for a minor traffic violation — for example, failure to wear a seat belt. Motion at 6-7. The Atwater decision is consistent with New Mexico law, according to Defendants, in that state statutes relating to traffic violations appear to authorize officer arrests. Id. at 5 (citing NMSA 1978, §§ 66-8-117(A), 66-8-122; and 66-8-123(A)).

As set out below, the Court recognizes that New Mexico law, unlike federal law, does not authorize the custodial arrest of a driver based upon his alleged violation of a minor traffic law. State v. Bricker, 2006-NMCA-052, ¶ 9, 139 N.M. 513, 134 P.3d 800 (holding that "[w]hile [NMSA 1978, § 66-8-123] uses the words `arrest' and `custody,' we believe the Legislature intended those terms to refer to a temporary detention rather than a traditional custodial arrest in which a person is arrested and taken to the police station for booking"). However, New Mexico's more rigorous law does not create a due process right sufficient to support Plaintiff's claim for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1. New Mexico law does not permit custodial arrest for a minor traffic violation

The reasonableness of a custodial arrest following a routine traffic stop is determined under New Mexico law by an assessment of the intrusion upon individual privacy versus the need to promote legitimate governmental interests. Id. at ¶ 22.

[T]hat, under Article II, Section 10, probable cause that a non-jailable offense has been committed does not automatically make arrest reasonable, and that for such arrests to be reasonable, there must be specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the additional] intrusion of a full custodial arrest.
Id. at ¶ 23 (quoting State v. Rodarte, 2005-NMCA-141, ¶ 14, 138 N.M. 668, 125 P.3d 647). Whereas the Fourth Amendment requires only probable cause for the traffic stop to support such an arrest, New Mexico law requires the further step of "articulat[ing] a legitimate reason for the decision to escalate the seizure into a full custodial arrest." Id. at ¶ 24 (quoting Rodarte, 2005-NMCA-141, ¶ 16). Plaintiff seeks to enforce his right under the New Mexico Constitution to be free from arrest for minor traffic violations with his Fourteenth Amendment claim. Plaintiff also pleads state-law claims related to the allegedly unlawful arrest, but these claims are considered in Part D, infra. 2. Plaintiff's arrest does not implicate substantive due process

Plaintiff articulates a constitutional liberty interest in remaining "free of arrests for minor traffic violations." Notice of Removal, Ex. A at ¶¶ 32-35. In support of his claim, Plaintiff cites Montero v. Meyer, 13 F.3d 1444 (10th Cir. 1994) and Summers v. State, 927 F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1991), both procedural due process cases. However, Plaintiff does not appear to assert a violation of procedural due process in his Complaint. His position is not that Defendants, in the process of arresting him, denied him procedures such as notice or an opportunity to be heard. Rather, Plaintiff's complaint appears to be that Defendants should not have arrested him at all. Notice of Removal, Ex. A at ¶¶ 33-34. Plaintiff's Count III under the Fourteenth Amendment is therefore a substantive due process claim. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (noting that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "guarantee[s] more than fair process" and "cover[s] a substantive sphere as well, barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them" (internal quotations omitted)).

To support a substantive due process claim, courts require plaintiffs to show "something more than an ordinary tort." Abeyta v. Chama Valley Ind. Sch. Dist., 77 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir. 1996). Only "a brutal and inhuman abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience" will provide a foundation for such a claim. Id. at 1257-58 (quoting Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff's arrest in this case — even if contrary to New Mexico law — simply does not rise to the level of conscience-shocking.

Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment should govern a claim such as this, which arises from an arrest or seizure. Albright, 510 U.S. 266, 273, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (holding that "[w]here a particular Amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment . . . must be the guide for analyzing these claims.'" Id. at 273 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)). The Tenth Circuit has similarly held that "[t]he more general due process considerations of the Fourteenth Amendment are not a fallback to protect interests more specifically addressed by the Fourth Amendment." Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 919 (10th Cir. 2007). Having failed to demonstrate any violation of the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff cannot now proceed with the same claim pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Summary judgment is therefore appropriate and will be granted as to Plaintiff's Count III, which asserts a federal claim for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

D. State Law Claims Related to the Allegedly Unlawful Arrest

Defendants seek summary judgment not only as to federal claims, but as to all claims except for those alleging excessive force and battery. See generally Motion. The Court will therefore consider whether summary judgment is appropriate as to Plaintiff's claims of unreasonable seizure under the New Mexico Constitution, false imprisonment, and interference with rights under New Mexico law as alleged in Counts I and V. Finding that Defendants have articulated a legitimate reason to escalate their traffic stop of Plaintiff into a full custodial arrest, and finding no genuine dispute as to the material facts in that regard, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Counts I and V, except for claims of excessive force and battery.

Initially, Defendants' proposed material facts are undisputed. They claim that Plaintiff refused to obey their order to get out of his car and resisted their efforts to remove him from the vehicle. Motion at 2. Prior to these incidents, Defendants did not arrest Plaintiff. Id. Only after Plaintiff struggled with Defendants, knocking Defendant Walker to the ground, was Plaintiff placed in handcuffs and arrested. Motion, Ex. A at ¶ 9. Plaintiff's resistance — a material fact that is not disputed by Plaintiff — provides "a legitimate reason for the decision to escalate the seizure into a full custodial arrest." Bricker, 2006-NMCA-052, ¶ 24. Probable cause therefore existed for the arrest under New Mexico law, and Plaintiff cannot sustain his claims for unreasonable seizure, false imprisonment, or other "interference with rights under New Mexico law" related to the arrest.

E. No Violation of the First Amendment Exists

Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that "Defendants wrongfully arrested [him] when he posed no imminent threat to Defendants and had only allegedly committed a traffic violation." Notice of Removal, Ex. A at ¶ 30. He claims the arrest was in retaliation for his objections to police treatment. Id. at ¶ 38.

To substantiate Count IV, alleging retaliation in violation of his " First Amendment right to voice objection to police treatment of him," Plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he was engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the defendants' actions caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) that the defendants' adverse action was substantially motivated as a response to the plaintiff's exercise of constitutionally protected conduct. Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007). These elements are evaluated according to an objective, not subjective, standard. Id. Also required is proof that the government's action lacked probable cause. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 252, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006).

As Defendants point out, Plaintiff does not plead an absence of probable cause for his arrest. Id. In fact, Plaintiff erroneously contends "it is irrelevant to Plaintiff's First Amendment claim that Defendant Taylor may have had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for other crimes." Resp. at 9. Given the Court's ruling on Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim and the undisputed existence of probable cause to pull Plaintiff over for a traffic violation, even under the more rigorous requirements of New Mexico law, Plaintiff's First Amendment claim cannot survive summary judgment.

IV. CONCLUSION

Finding probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest, under federal law as well as New Mexico state law, the Court will GRANT Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on All Claims Except Excessive Force and State Tort Claim for Battery, filed April 13, 2010 (Doc. 8).

ute looking at the telephone book when she noticed an advertisement "on the side printed on it in black . . . that said Overhead Door." Id. at 161. Guse acknowledges that she did not spend a "sufficient amount" of time looking at the telephone book, but she "just basically saw it, and it said `overhead.'" Id. at 162. Guse testified that she was "not thinking that I would have to look for the little red ribbons" and did not memorize their number, so she "just called." Id. When Guse called the telephone number on the advertisement, she thought she was contacting Overhead Door Company of Cedar Rapids and Iowa City. In her deposition, Guse acknowledged that, "If I'd been smarter, I would have looked at that more closely, but it said `overhead' in large letters. There were no red ribbons, because it was only black printing on the phone book." Id. at 162.

The advertisement Guse refers to appears on the bottom of the telephone book and states "OVERHEAD GARAGE DOOR REPAIRS." Pl. App'x at 59, 63. The advertisement includes the Advanced Garage Door Repair Logo and telephone number, and indicates they offer a "FREE Service Call." Id.

I. The Magid Survey

In early 2010, Plaintiff hired Robert M. Crawford, Ph.D., of Frank N. Magid Associates to conduct a market research study among both general consumers and current customers of Overhead Door Company of Cedar Rapids and Iowa City. General consumers and Plaintiff's customers were asked whether a company or companies come to mind when they hear the word "overhead." 68% of consumers said yes, while 81% of Plaintiff's customers said yes. Of the consumers, 60% associate the term "overhead" with Plaintiff and 39% associate it with Dan's Overhead Doors More. Of Plaintiff's customers, 83% associate the term with Plaintiff and 22% associate "overhead" with Dan's Overhead Doors More. With respect to market-wide association of the term "overhead," the Magid Survey reveals the following: (1) of general consumers, 41% associate the term with Overhead Door Company of Cedar Rapids and Iowa City, 26% associate the term with Dan's Overhead Doors More and 32% do not associate a particular company with "overhead" and (2) of Plaintiff's customers, 68% associate "overhead" with Overhead Door Company of Cedar Rapids and Iowa City, 18% associate it with Dan's Overhead Doors More and 19% do not associate "overhead" with a particular company.

J. The Hicklins' "Certified" Technicians

In their telephone directory advertisements, and on shirts worn by Advanced Garage Door Repair technicians, the Hicklins represent that their technicians are "certified." See Pl. App'x at 183 (depicting shirt bearing "Certified Technicians" insignia). The technicians' certification is based solely on a list that Randy Hicklin created. In other words, no independent entity certified the Hicklins' technicians. Randy Hicklin testified that he has trained his technicians based on the same criteria "since 2002." Pl. App'x at 40. One of the Hicklins' technicians, Lance Cross, testified that Randy Hicklin trained and certified him when he was hired.

"After [Plaintiff] challenged the Hicklins' use of the term `certified' in connection with [their] technicians, the Hicklins removed the word from Yellow Pages advertising." Pl. Statement of Facts at ¶ 78. Randy Hicklin removed the term "certified" because he "didn't know if [he] was doing something wrong by putting that in there." Pl. App'x at 49. Randy Hicklin testified that his doubts resulted from Plaintiff bringing the instant action.

VII. ANALYSIS

The Hicklins ask the court to grant summary judgment in their favor on all claims. The court addresses each claim, in turn.

A. Infringement Claims

Plaintiff's infringement claims require proof of two essential elements. First, Plaintiff must establish it has a protectible interest in the mark at issue. Commercial Sav. Bank v. Hawkeye Fed. Sav. Bank., 592 N.W.2d 321, 326 (Iowa 1999); Duluth News-Tribune v. Mesabi Publ'n, Inc., 84 F.3d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 1996). Second, if Plaintiff has a protectible interest, it must prove that the Hicklins have infringed upon that right. Commercial Sav. Bank, 592 N.W.2d at 326; Duluth News-Tribune, 84 F.3d at 1096. Infringement is judged by asking whether there is a likelihood of confusion among consumers. Commercial Sav. Bank, 592 N.W.2d at 329; Duluth News-Tribune, 84 F.3d at 1096.

Plaintiff's infringement claims are: common law service mark infringement (Count I), common law trade name infringement (Count II) and service mark infringement under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act (Count III). Because these claims require proof of the same elements, the court considers them together.

The Hicklins contend that Plaintiff's infringement claims fail for any one of three reasons. First, they argue that the term "overhead" is generic and entitled to no trademark protection. Second, they argue that, even if the term is descriptive, it is entitled to no protection because it has not acquired secondary meaning. Third, they argue that even if Plaintiff can establish a protected interest in the term "overhead," there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the likelihood of confusion. First, the court considers whether Plaintiff has a protectible interest in the term "overhead." If Plaintiff has such an interest, the court will address the likelihood of confusion.

Plaintiff refers to both "Overhead" and "Overhead Door Company of Cedar Rapids and Iowa City" as its unregistered service marks. See Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 14-15. In the Motion for Summary Judgment, however, the Hicklins focus entirely on Plaintiff's claims with respect to the term "overhead," arguing that "there is no evidence that [the Hicklins'] advertisements have mimicked the use of [Overhead Door Company of Cedar Rapids and Iowa City.]" Brief in Support of Hicklins' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Hicklins' Brief") (docket no. 68-1) at 3 n. 3. In its Resistance, Plaintiff likewise focuses solely on the Hicklins' use of the term "overhead" and does not argue that the Hicklins have utilized or otherwise infringed upon "Overhead Door Company of Cedar Rapids and Iowa City." Accordingly, the court limits its analysis to whether the Hicklins' have infringed upon any protected interest Plaintiff may have in the term "overhead."

1. Strength of a mark

To determine whether a mark is sufficiently distinctive to deserve protection, both federal and Iowa courts classify marks into one of four categories, ranging from weakest to strongest: (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; or (4) arbitrary or fanciful. See Commercial Sav. Bank, 592 N.W.2d at 327 (listing categories for purposes of common law infringement claims under Iowa law); Duluth News-Tribune, 84 F.3d at 1096 (listing categories for purposes of Lanham Act infringement claims).

2. "Overhead" is a generic term

Generic marks, which merely describe "the general category, type, or class of goods, services or business," are not entitled to trademark protection. Commercial Sav. Bank, 592 N.W.2d at 327 n. 2; see also Duluth News-Tribune, 84 F.3d at 1096 ("[A] generic term is one that is used by the general public to identify a category of goods, and as such merits no trademark protection."). In other words, a "`generic' mark is the common name of a product or service — `the genus of which the particular product is a species.'" Home Builders Ass'n of Greater St. Louis v. L L Exhibition Mgmt. Inc., 226 F.3d 944, 949 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Park `N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)). "A generic term does not identify the source of a product, but rather indicates the basic nature of the product." Schwan's IP, LLC v. Kraft Pizza Co., 460 F.3d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 2006). A generic term "is not afforded trademark protection even if it becomes associated with only one source, . . . for a competitor must be able to describe his goods as what they are." Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

"In deciding genericness, evidence of the relevant public's understanding of a term `may be obtained from any competent source.'" Id. (quoting In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). Thus, genericness may be established "with evidence such as `newspapers and other publications, generic use by competitors, generic use of the term by the party bringing suit, and use of the term by third parties in trademark registrations.'" Id. at 974-75 (quoting Nartron Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 305 F.3d 397, 406 (6th Cir. 2002)); see also Steak n Shake Co. v. Burger King Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 983, 992 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (noting that a court may consider "dictionaries, newspapers, consumer surveys, advertisements, and other publications").

At the outset, Plaintiff insists that the classification of a mark is a fact question for the jury. Plaintiff correctly notes that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "[h]ow a particular word has been used and how it has been understood by the public is a question of fact" and the "correct categorization of a given term is also a factual issue." WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, 724 F.2d 1320, 1325-26 (8th Cir. 1984). However, numerous courts, including the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that a mark may be found generic as a matter of law. See Schwan's, 460 F.3d at 976 (affirming grant of summary judgment on grounds that the term "Brick Oven" is generic); Best Buy Warehouse v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 920 F.2d 536, 537 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant where district court "held that the phrase `best buy' is generic as a matter of law"). Accordingly, the classification of the term "overhead" as generic is an issue amenable to resolution on summary judgment.

Several courts have considered the proper classification of terms in similar circumstances and found them to be generic. In Schwan's, the plaintiff claimed it had a protectible interest in the term "Brick Oven." 460 F.3d at 974. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this claim, holding that "summary judgment was appropriate and that the district court correctly held that Brick Oven, as used to identify pizza, is a generic term." Id. at 975. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that, among other things, the term simply refers to a pizza that is cooked in a brick oven, the plaintiff's frozen pizza competitors had used the term to describe their products, and a retail trade magazine's website used the term generically when describing market growth. Id.

Similarly, in Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the term "light" is generic when used with "beer." 561 F.2d 75, 80 (7th Cir. 1977). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered the dictionary definition of the word "light" and noted that the term "has been widely used in the beer industry for many years to describe a beer's color, flavor, body, or alcoholic content, or a combination of these or similar characteristics." Id.

The reasoning employed in the Miller Brewing and Schwan's cases leads the court to conclude that the term "overhead" is generic when used in connection with garage doors. The Hicklins put forth evidence showing that Plaintiff's competitors use the term "overhead" to describe their products and services. For example, one company in the parties' market operates and advertises under the name "Dan's Overhead Doors More." Hicklins' App'x at 185. A competitor's use of the term supports a finding of genericness. See Schwan's, 460 F.3d at 975 (holding that use of the term "brick oven" by plaintiff's frozen pizza competitors supported district court's finding that term was generic).

As noted earlier, the Hicklins provide evidence, including telephone directory excerpts and United States Patent and Trademark Office filings, which reflect that, nationally, numerous third parties use the term "overhead" to market and sell their goods or services. To the extent such evidence is relevant, the court finds that it supports a finding that the term "overhead" is generic. See Schwan's, 460 F.3d at 975 (stating that "use of the term by third parties in trademark registrations" may be indicative of genericness); Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that the "widespread generic use of `duck' and `duck tours' by other companies around the country" "indicates that when consumers hear the term `duck tours,' they associate it primarily with a product rather than a source").

Plaintiff's reaction to Dan's Overhead Doors More's use of "overhead" also supports the term's genericness. Fauchier testified that Plaintiff never had "issues" with Dan's Overhead Doors More and never reported any potential infringement based on the use of the term "overhead." "Generic use by competitors which has not been contested" by Plaintiff is one type of evidence useful to prove the term's genericness. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 12:13 (4th ed. 2010) (hereinafter, "McCarthy"). Plaintiff's apparent acquiescence to Dan's Overhead Doors More's use of the term "overhead" further illustrates the word's generic status.

The dictionary definition of "overhead" also supports a finding of genericness. "The dictionary definition of a word is an appropriate and relevant indication of the ordinary significance and meaning of words to the public." WSM, Inc., 724 F.2d at 1327. Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary defines the adjective "overhead" as "operating, lying, or coming from above" or "having the driving part above the part driven." Available at http://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/overhead (last visited December 2, 2010). Merriam-Webster's indicates that the first known use of "overhead" was in 1874. Id. In this case, the term "overhead" simply describes an object — here, a door — that operates or comes from above.

Plaintiff advances several arguments against a genericness finding. First, Plaintiff contends that many of its customers associate the term "overhead" with "a company, not a generic product or service." Resistance at 8. Similarly, Plaintiff posits that the Magid Survey confirms the term is not generic because it shows "`both consumers and customers associate the term `overhead' with a particular source of goods and services, namely Overhead Door Company of Cedar Rapids and Iowa City.'" Resistance at 8 (quoting Magid Survey, Pl. App'x at 167).

The Magid Survey does not alter the court's conclusion that "overhead" is a generic term. Plaintiff's reliance on the Magid Survey ignores the distinct role such evidence plays in cases involving a "coined" term versus those involving a term commonly used prior to its association with the product or service at issue. See Hunt Masters, Inc. v. Landry's Seafood Rest., Inc., 240 F.3d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 2001) ( cited with approval in Schwan's, 460 F.3d at 975) (holding that customer survey was irrelevant as to whether the phrase "crab house" was generic where the plaintiff did not claim to have first coined the term). Customer survey evidence is most often used where the term at issue "began life as a `coined term'" but is "alleged to have become generic through common usage." Id. (citing Miller Brewing, 605 F.2d at 995). However, when the relevant term is not a "coined term" but rather "was commonly used prior to its association with the products at issue[,]" "it is not necessary to determine whether the term has become generic through common use. . . ." Hunt Masters, 240 F.3d at 255.

The Hunt Masters court listed "aspirin," "teflon" and "thermos" as examples of "coined" terms. Id.

Plaintiff does not claim that it coined the term "overhead" or that the word otherwise began life as a coined term. It appears that the term was commonly used before its association with the products involved in this case. Accordingly, the Magid Survey is irrelevant with respect to whether "overhead" is a generic term. See Schwan's, 460 F.3d at 975-76 ("Brick Oven was commonly used before either party began labeling their frozen pizzas with the term, and it was not error for the district court to omit the survey evidence from its genericness analysis.").

For similar reasons, the court rejects the significance Plaintiff attaches to the anecdotal evidence of customer association of the term "overhead" with Plaintiff's business. As with the Magid Survey, Plaintiff's argument "does not recognize that evidence of public understanding is not an issue of fact in the case of a common word used in accordance with its accepted meaning." Team Cent. Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 606 F. Supp. 1408, 1413-14 (D. Minn. 1985); see also First Nat'l Bank Trust Co. of Colombia, Mo. v. First Nationwide Bank, No. 8704218-CV-C-9, 1990 WL 64768, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 9, 1990) (holding that, because the term at issue was not an invented word, the buyer understanding test did not apply and the "only question" was whether the term was "a commonly used and commonly understood term prior to its association with plaintiff's bank").

In Team Central, the district court rejected the plaintiff's claim that documented instances of public confusion were evidence that the defendant was using the term "`Team Xerox' as a trademark, i.e., to identify the source of its products." 606 F. Supp. at 1413. As with the term "team" in Team Central, the Hicklins use the term "overhead" in accordance with its accepted meaning. "`Once a term is proven to be generic, evidence of purported buyer association of the term with a single source will not change the result.'" Id. at 1414 (quoting McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 12:15 (2d Ed. 1984)); see also Steak n Shake, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 993 (holding that consumer survey was irrelevant as to whether term was generic and noting that "[a]t most, [the consumer study]

is directed at consumer awareness of the term and consumer familiarity with Steak n Shake, which advertises heavily that it is `Famous for Steakburgers.'"). The anecdotal evidence of Plaintiff's customers associating the term "overhead" with Plaintiff's business does not alter the generic nature of the term.

Plaintiff argues that "overhead" is descriptive, rather than generic, because "the telephone directories do not contain a listing for `overhead' garage doors." Resistance at 9. Rather, "[t]he publishers use categories for `doors' and `garage doors.'" Id. Plaintiff cites no authority for this proposition. In any event, the court finds it is without merit. As previously discussed, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Schwan's held that the term "Brick Oven" is generic when used in reference to pizza. Plaintiff's position would appear to counsel the opposite result if, when searching the phone book for restaurants serving brick oven style pizza, one had to look under a "pizza" category rather than a "brick oven pizza" category. The genericness of a term is not synonymous or co-extensive with that term's stature as a separate category in a telephone directory. The court finds that the term "overhead" may be a generic term regardless of whether that term supports a separate section of the phone book.

Plaintiff's argument is essentially an effort to expand the scope of the "genus" of the product at issue from "overhead doors" to simply "garage door." See Resistance at 8 (citing Fauchier's testimony that "the whole industry is called the garage door business"). To the extent that Plaintiff implicitly argues that an adjective such as "overhead" cannot be a generic term, the court disagrees. See Nat'l Nonwovens, Inc. v. Consumer Prods. Enter., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 2d 245, 252 (D. Mass. 2005) (rejecting plaintiff's attempt to define the genus of products as "fabric" or "felt" rather than "wool felt" as a "subtle rhetorical move that attempts to abstract to a higher level of generality"). As the court explained in National Nonwovens, "although the term `beer' correctly identifies both `light beer' and `honey brown,' the existence of this general term has not prevented courts from finding both specific terms to be generic." Id. (citing Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding "honey brown" generic); Miller Brewing, 561 F.2d 75 (holding "light beer" generic)). Likewise, although the terms "door" or "garage door" correctly identify an "overhead" door, the existence of more general terms does not preclude a finding that "overhead" is a generic term. See 2 McCarthy § 12:10 ("[M]ost people would intuitively agree that in the following examples that include a noun and a modifier, the combination should be regarded as a generic name, not available for ownership by any one seller: red wine; dinner table; flat screen TV; laptop computer; woman's business suit.").

For the foregoing reasons, the court holds that "overhead" is a generic term when used in connection with garage doors. As a generic term, Plaintiff cannot establish a protectible interest in the term "overhead." See Commercial Sav. Bank, 592 N.W.2d at 327 n. 2; Duluth News-Tribune, 84 F.3d at 1096. Therefore, the court shall grant the Motion for Summary Judgment to the extent it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's claims for common law service mark infringement (Count I) and common law trade name infringement (Count II). The court shall also dismiss Count III of the Second Amended Complaint insofar as it alleges service mark infringement in violation of Lanham Act § 43(a).

3. Likelihood of confusion

In light of the court's finding that Plaintiff does not have a protectible interest in the term "overhead," it need not consider the likelihood of confusion.

B. Lanham Act Unfair Competition Claims

Plaintiff alleges in Counts III and IV that the Hicklins have engaged in unfair competition under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that the Hicklins' "use of the term `overhead' in the context of their advertising and other representations to consumers and potential consumers . . . constitutes unfair competition and/or a false designation of origin." Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 29. Plaintiff alleges that the Hicklins' conduct is "likely to deceive and has deceived customers and potential customers into believing that [the Hicklins'] garage door installation and repair services are those of [Plaintiff] and/or are affiliated with [Plaintiff]." Id. at ¶ 30. In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that the Hicklins have "misrepresented the nature, characteristics, qualities or geographic origin of their services and commercial activities. . . ." Id. at ¶ 35.

Section 43(a) provides, in part: "Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services . . . uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin" which is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or to deceive, "shall be liable in a civil action. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). "The typical Lanham Act claim involves one of two factual patterns: (1) a defendant's false advertising of its goods or services; or (2) the selling or `palming off' by a defendant of its goods by use of a competitor's name." Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1241 (8th Cir. 1994).

1. Passing off

Plaintiff's unfair competition claim alleged in Count III is essentially a claim of passing off. "Passing off," as its name implies, "occurs where a company sells its goods or services under the pretense that they are the goods or services of another." DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932, 937 (8th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff contends that the Hicklins "deliberately styled their advertising to palm off their services as coming from [Plaintiff]." Resistance at 19. Plaintiff also argues that the Hicklins have misrepresented their business as Overhead Door Company of Cedar Rapids and Iowa City.

"The terms `palming off' and `passing off' are used interchangeably to refer to various types of activities or trade practices which lead the consumer to believe he or she is purchasing one product when actually he or she is purchasing another product." Roulo v. Russ Berrie Co., Inc., No. 82 C 2668, 1986 WL 4718, at *5 n. 2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 1986).

a. Legal background

The court's finding that "overhead" is a generic term does not bar Plaintiff's passing off claim. The term's generic status merely means that it is "not protected from copying." Home Builders Ass'n, 226 F.3d at 950. However, if a generic mark "has acquired secondary meaning, § 43(a) relief may be appropriate to require the copier to take reasonable measures to eliminate public confusion as to the source of its competing product or service." Id.; see also WSM, Inc., 724 F.2d at 1331 n. 5 ("Even a generic mark may be entitled to protection from unfair competition if the mark is `so associated with its goods that the use of the same or similar marks by another company constitutes a representation that its goods came from the same source.").

Stated differently, "[r]egardless of whether its mark is registered or even registrable, the plaintiff may show that its mark is `so associated with its goods that the use of the same or similar mark by another company constitutes a representation that its goods come from the same source.'" Metric Multistandard Components Corp. v. Metric's, Inc., 635 F.2d 710, 714 (8th Cir. 1980) (quoting Joshua Meier Co. v. Albany Novelty Mfg. Co., 236 F.2d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 1956)); see also Forschner Group, Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co., Inc., 904 F. Supp. 1409, 1416 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Although genericness prevents a word or phrase from attaining trademark protection, it does not prevent a court from determining whether a competitor's later use of that word or phrase is unfair.") (collecting cases). "If the plaintiff can establish that use of its mark by a competitor constitutes such a false designation of origin or false representation and if the public is likely to be confused by that use, the plaintiff is entitled to protection under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act." Metric, 635 F.2d at 714.

When a generic term is involved, "a competitor's use of that name, without more, does not give rise to an unfair competition claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act." Blinded Veterans Ass'n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1989). However, "such a claim `might be supportable if consumer confusion or a likelihood of consumer confusion arose from the failure of the defendant to adequately identify itself as the source of the product.'" Id. (quoting Liquid Controls Corp. v. Loquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 1986)). Similarly, a plaintiff may establish passing off if the defendant has engaged in potentially confusion-generating practices. Cf. Miller Brewing, 605 F.2d at 997 (rejecting passing off claim because the defendant adequately identified itself as the source of its beer, did not use a "confusingly similar dress" and did not use "advertising calculated to lead to confusion").

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals likewise requires something more than the mere use of a generic term to sustain a passing off claim. See Home Builders Ass'n, 226 F.3d at 950 (noting that, even if the plaintiff's trade dress were functional, plaintiff was entitled to § 43(a) relief where the district court found that the defendant "intentionally attempted to trade on [the plaintiff's] good will and reputation," its actions "have caused actual confusion among consumers" and the defendant's corrective actions "were inadequate to end the confusion"); Metric, 635 F.2d at 714 (holding that, even if the plaintiff's mark were generic, the defendant violated § 43(a) because it "created a great likelihood of confusion when it used the name `Metric's' in conjunction with catalogues that were nearly exact copies of [the plaintiff's] sales materials").

To recover for unfair competition in the form of passing off, Plaintiff must show: "1) an association of origin between the mark and the first user, that is, secondary meaning; and 2) a likelihood of consumer confusion when the mark is applied to the second user's good[.]" Genesee Brewing Co., 124 F.3d at 150 ( cited with approval in Home Builders Ass'n, 226 F.3d at 950) (citation and quotation marks omitted). However, the Hicklins may still "escape liability if [they have] `used every reasonable means to prevent confusion' as to the source of [their] products[.]" Id. (quoting Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121 (1938)). The court turns to consider whether the term "overhead" has acquired secondary meaning, and, if so, whether a likelihood of confusion exists. b. Secondary meaning

The threshold issue is whether consumers associate the term "overhead" with a particular manufacturer of garage doors and/or provider of garage door repair services. "To establish secondary meaning, the user must show that the mark or symbol by long and exclusive use and advertising in the sale of the user's goods has become so associated in the public mind with such goods that it serves to identify them and distinguish them from the goods of others." Co-Rect Prods., Inc. v. Marvy! Adver. Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 1330 (8th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). "[T]he ultimate inquiry is whether in the consumer's mind the mark denotes a single thing coming from a single source." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

It is unclear whether the type of "secondary meaning" necessary to establish passing off is precisely the same as the "secondary meaning" in questions of trademark protection. See Blinded Veterans Ass'n, 872 F.2d at 1045 n. 22 (noting that "the association between a generic term and one particular source" is sometimes referred to as "`de facto secondary meaning'") (quoting McCarthy § 12:15 at 562-65); Vanwyk Textile Sys., B.V. v. Zimmer Mach. Am., Inc., 994 F. Supp. 350, 377-79 (W.D.N.C. 1997) (considering "whether Section 43(a) passing off claims, as distinct from infringement claims, require formal proof of secondary meaning"). Regardless, for purposes of passing off, a plaintiff must show, at minimum, that "people associate the generic term" with the plaintiff. See Blinded Veterans Ass'n, 872 F.2d at 1046 n. 24 ("Because we have ruled out the question of trademark protection, [the plaintiff] is not called upon to show `secondary meaning' in that setting. [The plaintiff] nevertheless must show . . . that people associate the generic term . . . with [the plaintiff]."). A leading commentator has observed that the notion of a generic term with secondary meaning is incongruous. See McCarthy § 12:46 ("Once determined to be generic, any proof of `secondary meaning' or trademark significance seems contradictory to the very concept of a `generic name.'"). However, McCarthy also recognizes the viability of a passing off claim involving a generic term if the user can show "some false or confusing usage by the newcomer above and beyond mere use of the generic name." Id. at § 12:48. "This might include, for example, packaging and advertising words or graphics which, in combination with the generic term, cause mistake or confusion as to source." Id.

Direct evidence of secondary meaning most often comes in the form of consumer testimony and surveys. See Heartland Bank v. Heartland Home Fin., Inc., 335 F.3d 810, 819 (8th Cir. 2003) (Smith, J., concurring) (citing 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 15.30 (4th ed. 1999)). Circumstantial evidence typically includes: (1) exclusivity, length and manner of use; (2) the amount and manner of advertising; (3) the amount of sales and number of customers; (4) an established place in the market; and (5) proof of intentional copying. Id. Because direct evidence of secondary meaning may be difficult to obtain, circumstantial evidence "can be sufficient to meet a party's burden of proof to establish a claim." Heartland Bank, 335 F.3d at 820 (Smith, J., concurring).

The court finds there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the term "overhead" has acquired secondary meaning. The Overhead Door distributorship has existed as Overhead Door Company of Cedar Rapids and Iowa City since 1956. Plaintiff has used the term in its d/b/a name and advertising efforts since 2004. The Hicklins argue that Plaintiff's use of the term "overhead" is not exclusive, particularly in light of Dan's Overhead Doors More. However, whether a plaintiff's use is exclusive is just one of several factors from which an inference of secondary meaning may be found.

Other factors, including Plaintiff's advertising efforts, amount of sales, evidence of customer association and/or confusion and proof of intentional copying could also support a jury finding of secondary meaning. Since 2007, Plaintiff has produced substantial revenue through residential sales and service. See Pl. App'x at 24. Plaintiff's advertising and marketing efforts include trade shows, apparel, yellow pages advertisements, radio and television. Plaintiff's records indicate that, since 2005, it has spent fairly substantial sums on these items. Since 2004, Fauchier avers that Plaintiff's overall marketing and advertising expenditures have been relatively substantial, and Plaintiff's financial records partially confirm this information. See id. at 23; Hicklins' Supp. App'x at 288-306. The term "overhead" permeates many of Plaintiff's advertisements.

Additionally, Plaintiff offers the testimony of several customers that they associate the term "overhead" with Overhead Door Company of Cedar Rapids and Iowa City. This type of evidence is generally "most probative of secondary meaning. . . ." Frosty Treats, Inc. v. Sony Computer Entm't Am., Inc., 426 F.3d 1001, 1005 (8th Cir. 2005). These customers also testified that, when they attempted to contact Overhead Door Company of Cedar Rapids and Iowa City, they mistakenly called the Hicklins' business. See Am. Ass'n for Justice v. The Am. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 698 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1143 (D. Minn. 2010) (holding that fact issue existed as to secondary meaning, in part because two attorneys mistakenly sent membership dues to the defendant). Finally, as explained more fully below with respect to the likelihood of confusion, the court finds that the record contains sufficient evidence for a juror to conclude that the Hicklins intentionally used and emphasized the term "overhead" in their advertisements in an effort to confuse or deceive consumers. See Frosty Treats, 426 F.3d at 1005 (noting "the existence of intentional copying" as one type of circumstantial evidence that may establish secondary meaning).

The court agrees with the Hicklins that the Magid Survey is irrelevant to secondary meaning because it seeks consumer opinions in February 2010 — approximately three years after the Hicklins entered the market. The user of a mark must "show that secondary meaning existed prior to the date on which the defendant commenced using the same or similar mark." Co-Rect Prods., Inc., 780 F.2d at 1330. It is undisputed that the Magid Survey was conducted in and measures consumer opinions as of February 2010. Thus, the Magid Survey is irrelevant as to whether the term "overhead" had acquired secondary meaning when the Hicklins entered the market in early 2007. See Schwan's IP, LLC v. Kraft Pizza Co., 379 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1024 (D. Minn. 2005) (holding that consumer survey was "irrelevant for the establishment of secondary meaning" because it was conducted months after the defendant's product entered the market). Robert Crawford, who conducted the Magid Survey, confirmed this problem in his deposition: Q. Would it be true that the statement of your two opinions found [in the Magid Survey] are as of February 28th, 2010? A. That's correct. Q. One cannot infer whether they would be valid or reliable one month, three months, six months, one year before then. Would that be a fair statement? A. Yeah. Yes. Hicklins' App'x at 21. Accordingly, the court finds that the Magid Survey fails to demonstrate secondary meaning at the time the Hicklins entered the market.

Even if the Magid Survey were relevant, the court finds that its results provide little support for a claim of secondary meaning. The Magid Survey shows that consumers use the term "overhead" to identify multiple companies — namely, Plaintiff and Dan's Overhead Doors and More — and associate the term "Garage Door" with the same sources. The Magid Survey provides, at best, marginal support for secondary meaning. See McCarthy § 15:42 ("A survey should reveal that respondents use the designation or trade dress to identify a single source, not that the [plaintiff] is listed as the first among several sources with which respondents associate the designation or trade dress.").

The lack of relevant survey evidence does not preclude Plaintiff from establishing secondary meaning. See Heartland Bank, 335 F.3d at 819 (Smith, J., concurring) (noting that secondary meaning may be shown by circumstantial evidence, even in the absence of consumer surveys). Here, Plaintiff offers evidence of secondary meaning in the form of customer testimony. Coupled with the other evidence outlined above, the court finds that a jury could reasonably infer that the term "overhead" has acquired secondary meaning. Accordingly, the court must turn to consider whether there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to a likelihood of confusion.

c. Likelihood of confusion

As previously noted, the Hicklins' mere use of the term "overhead" is not enough for Plaintiff to succeed on its passing off claim. Plaintiff must also show that the Hicklins' use of that term creates a likelihood of confusion among consumers. For trademark infringement purposes, a court must consider six factors in deciding whether a likelihood of confusion exists:

It is somewhat unclear whether a court should weigh the same factors in assessing the likelihood of confusion in a passing off claim. Compare Borescopes R Us v. 1800endoscope.com, LLC, No. 3-09-00102, 2010 WL 2991042, at *12-13 (M.D. Tenn. July 26, 2010) (choosing to apply similar eight-factor test to unfair competition passing off claim) with Forschner Group, 904 F. Supp. at 1420 n. 15 (declining to apply multi-factor test to unfair competition claim and stating that, "[a]lthough a `likelihood of confusion' is indeed the cornerstone of both unfair competition and trademark infringement analysis, [the multi-factor test] presupposes the existence of a valid trademark"). However, courts weigh similar factors regardless of whether they explicitly apply the same standard applicable to trademark infringement cases. Accordingly, the court shall apply the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' multi-factor test.

1) the strength of the trademark; 2) the similarity between the parties' marks; 3) the competitive proximity of the parties' products; 4) the alleged infringer's intent to confuse; 5) evidence of actual confusion; and 6) the degree of care reasonably expected of potential customers.
Duluth News-Tribune, 84 F.3d at 1096. "These factors do not operate in a mathematically precise formula" and the court should use them "at the summary judgment stage as a guide to determine whether a reasonable jury could find a likelihood of confusion." Id. "Factual disputes regarding a single factor are insufficient to support the reversal of summary judgment unless they tilt the entire balance in favor of such a finding." Id.

i. Strength of Plaintiff's mark

As explained above, the term "overhead" is generic. As the weakest type of mark, the court concludes that this factor weighs against a likelihood of confusion.

ii. Similarity between the parties' marks

In considering the similarity between the parties' marks, the court "must look to the overall impression created by the marks, not merely compare individual features." Luigino's, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 830 (8th Cir. 1999). The court "may consider the marks' visual, aural, and definitional attributes and compare the trade dress of products in determining whether the total effect conveyed by the two marks is confusingly similar." Id.

A review of the parties' marks reveals both similarities and differences. Perhaps most noticeably, both parties tend to emphasize the word "overhead." See, e.g., Pl. App'x at 59, 67, 75 and 97. While "[t]he use of identical dominant words does not automatically mean that two marks are similar," Luigino's, 170 F.3d at 830, "exact similitude of the two marks is not required for a finding of likelihood of confusion." Iowa Paint Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Hirshfield's Paint Mfg., Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 983, 993 (S.D. Iowa 2003). At minimum, the Hicklins' emphasis on the term "overhead" creates a similarity between the parties' advertisements. See id. at 994 ("Where the dominant portions of marks [are] the same, confusion is more likely."). This is particularly true because the parties' goods and services are virtually the same. See SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980) ("Where the products are closely related, less similarity in the trademark is necessary to support a finding of infringement.").

While both parties' advertisements emphasize the word "overhead," they generally do so differently. The Hicklins' tend to feature the term as the largest item in the advertisement. See Pl. App'x at 75. Plaintiff, on the other hand, emphasizes the term through repetition. See id. (featuring term "overhead" five times).

The Hicklins argue that the marks are dissimilar because, while Plaintiff uses its "red ribbon" mark, the Hicklins do not feature the term "overhead" in a red ribbon logo or use the same font or size as the Overhead Door company logo. Hicklins' Brief at 14. The Hicklins also note that their advertisements feature their own logos, either for A-1 American Garage Door Repair or Advanced Garage Door Repair. The court agrees that these differences make the parties' advertisements more visually distinct. On the other hand, the Hicklins acknowledge that they have, at times, featured the term "overhead" in red font, which may tend to make some of their advertisements more similar to Plaintiff's use of the red ribbon. The court also discounts the emphasis the Hicklins' place on their use of company logos. While the use of a company name or house mark may decrease the likelihood of confusion, Iowa Paint, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 994, these features of the Hicklins' advertisements are uniformly drowned out by the presence of and emphasis on the term "overhead." See, e.g., Pl. App'x at 67, 72 and 97 (depicting advertisements that, despite including "Advanced Garage Door Repair" logo, feature the term "overhead" as the largest aspect of advertisement).

Perhaps most importantly, in considering the parties' marks, the court "`must attempt to recreate the conditions in which buying decisions are made, and . . . what a reasonable purchaser in market conditions would do.'" Iowa Paint, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 993 (quoting Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs, Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 504 (8th Cir. 1987)). In other words, "caution should be exercised to avoid putting too much stock in a subjective inspection done in-chambers that is devoid of market characteristics." Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp., 815 F.2d at 504.

The Hicklins' argument that the parties' advertisements are "very different" when "presented side by side," Hicklins' Brief at 14, ignores the requirement that any potential similarity between the parties' marks should be viewed in light of how the typical consumer encounters the advertisements. See Iowa Paint, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 993 (noting that a side-by-side comparison is not the appropriate test, particularly where the consuming public will never have the opportunity for such a comparison). The customer testimony Plaintiff offers suggests that customers may seldom encounter the parties' advertisements in a side-by-side fashion. See, e.g., Pl. App'x at 145 (testimony of Jeffrey DeFrance

The court notes that, in some instances, the parties' advertisements appear on the same page of the telephone book. See Hicklins' App'x at 202. However, nothing suggests this is always the case. See id. at 195.

that he called after "glanc[ing] at" the telephone book and seeing advertisement on the bottom). Thus, while there are several distinctions between the parties' advertisements when considered side by side, the court finds they are entitled to less weight due to the circumstances in which the consuming public encounters them. Considering the relatedness of the parties' products and services, as well as the circumstances in which a typical consumer encounters their advertisements, the court finds that this factor weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion.

iii. Competitive proximity of the parties' products

The parties both sell garage door products and repair services and directly compete in the same geographic region. See Duluth News-Tribune, 84 F.3d at 1097 (declining to analyze this factor where "[n]either party contests that both papers provide regional and local news coverage and that they directly compete in the Iron Range"). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion.

iv. The Hicklins' intent to confuse

To establish a passing off claim under § 43(a), Plaintiff need not prove that the Hicklins intended to confuse or deceive consumers. Blinded Veterans Ass'n, 872 F.2d at 1045. However, an intent to deceive "retains potency" and "when present, it is probative of a likelihood of confusion." Id. Here, Plaintiff offers evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that the Hicklins intended to confuse consumers into thinking that their products and services were those of Plaintiff. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion.

The Hicklins admittedly placed numerous advertisements in telephone directories which feature the term "overhead" as the most prominent part of the advertisement. Randy Hicklin created several of these advertisements and acknowledges that he intentionally emphasized the term "overhead." With respect to an advertisement in the April 2010 Dex directory, Randy Hicklin acknowledges that he told a Dex representative to make the term "overhead" "as bold as possible." Pl. App'x at 47. Similarly, for the Iowa City Dex directory dated November 2009, Randy Hicklin created a mock up of the advertisement and later wrote in the margin of the advertisement that the term "overhead" should be "MUCH LARGER BOLD STRETCHED OUT." Id. at 105.

The Hicklins' emphasis of the term "overhead" in their advertisements could support a finding that they were attempting to cause purchasers to believe their products and services were those of Plaintiff. See Metric, 635 F.2d at 714 (noting that the defendant's use of the "significant word" in the plaintiff's tradename tended to cause purchasers to believe the products were being purchased from the plaintiff); Genesee Brewing, 124 F.3d at 151 (holding that evidence could support a likelihood of confusion, in part because the defendant had "chosen to emphasize the words `Honey Brown' on its label, rather than the words `Red River Valley' or `Honey Brown Ale'). Like the defendants in Metric and Genesee Brewing, the Hicklins chose to emphasize the term "overhead" over any other aspect of their advertisements, including their own d/b/a names, A-1 American Garage Door Repair or Advanced Garage Door Repair.

Plaintiff also points to testimony of two instances in which a representative of the Hicklins' either misrepresented to the customer that they had, in fact, contacted Plaintiff, or implied as much by remaining silent. Jeffrey DeFrance testified that when he mistakenly called the telephone number on one of the Hicklins' advertisements for Advanced Garage DoorRepair, he "asked twice, is this Overhead Door Company of Cedar Rapids and Iowa City?" Pl. App'x at 145. DeFrance testified that the woman who answered said yes and that, "if she'd have said, we're Advanced Overhead Door, we're not Overhead Door, then I would have just. . . . Then I would have called Overhead Door." Id. Similarly, Shari Saari testified that the Hicklins' technician said nothing after Saari pointed to an Overhead Door sticker on her garage and said, "you have been here before." Id. at 137.

The court finds that the Hicklins' decision to emphasize the term "overhead" more than any other feature — including their own logos — in many of their advertisements, coupled with evidence that they may have misrepresented their business as that of Plaintiff, could support a finding that they intended to confuse customers as to the source of their products or services. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion.

v. Evidence of actual confusion

Several of Plaintiff's customers testified that they called the Hicklins' businesses when, in fact, they were trying to contact Plaintiff. The Hicklins argue that the "mistakes" of these customers are attributable to their inattentiveness rather than actual confusion. Hicklins' Br. at 15. The court agrees that some customers acknowledged they should have exercised more care when searching the telephone book, such as looking for the "red ribbon" logo or opening the telephone book to the Yellow Pages, rather than relying on an advertisement on the cover or bottom.

Greg Allen, Jack McArtor, Shari Saari, Jeffrey DeFrance, Linda Norton and Karen Guse all testified that, although they were trying to reach Plaintiff, they contacted one of the Hicklins' businesses.

To the extent that Plaintiff's evidence of customer confusion is attributable to the customers' inattentiveness, these instances do not support a likelihood of confusion. See Duluth News-Tribune, 84 F.3d at 1098 (discounting instances of misdirected mail and phone calls because such evidence was "de minimis" and reflected "inattentiveness on the part of the caller or sender rather than actual confusion"). However, "actual confusion is not essential" to finding a likelihood of confusion. SquirtCo., 628 F.2d at 1091; see also Aveda Corp. v. Evita Mktg., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 1419, 1430 (D. Minn. 1989) ("It is the likelihood of confusion that serves as the test for infringement, not actual confusion. The plaintiff is not required to prove any instances of actual confusion."). Thus, while Plaintiff has not provided evidence of widespread customer confusion, and several of its cited examples may be explained by customer carelessness, these facts would not preclude a finding that a likelihood of confusion exists.

vi. Potential customers' degree of care

The Hicklins offer no argument or evidence bearing on this consideration. Plaintiff, however, argues that it supports a likelihood of confusion because "[s]everal customers testified that they spent only a few minutes glancing at the phone book before being duped by the Hicklins' advertising." Resistance at 17. "Consumers typically exercise little care in the selection of inexpensive items that may be purchased on impulse." Gateway, Inc. v. Companion Prods., Inc., 384 F.3d 503, 510 (8th Cir. 2004). The record does not reflect the price of the parties' goods, but one could infer that the purchase of a residential garage door is not the prototypical "impulse buy" and likely costs more than, say, a can of "Beer Nuts." See Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 926-27 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that customers would exercise little care in selecting "inexpensive snack foods" that are "not generally on a shopper's grocery list"). The significance and/or price of a garage door itself indicates that customers are more likely to exercise a higher degree of care.

However, the parties also provide garage door repair services, and Plaintiff points to several instances in which its customers quickly scanned the telephone book in search of Plaintiff's business before making a call. In some instances, Plaintiff's customers did not even open the telephone book after noticing an advertisement or coupon on the cover or bottom of the directory. This may be the most likely response in the event of an unexpected garage door malfunction. For example, customer Jeffrey DeFrance testified he simply "glanced at" the telephone book on top of his refrigerator before calling because his garage door had broken and he had "no way to lock [his] house. . . ." Pl. App'x at 145. Similarly, Linda Norton testified that she spent "[v]ery little" time looking at the telephone book before making a call and she "did not look inside the phonebook" after noticing a coupon on the cover of the telephone book. Id. at 153. Karen Guse testified that she spent between 30 seconds and one minute before dialing the number listed on the bottom of the telephone book because she "just basically saw it, and it said `overhead.'" Id. at 162. This testimony, although somewhat limited, shows that the degree of care reasonably expected of Plaintiff's potential customers may contribute to a likelihood of confusion.

The Hicklins argue, albeit in reference to the issue of actual confusion, that these individuals' mistakes "can be attributed to inattentiveness on the part of the caller rather than actual confusion." Hicklins' Brief at 15. However, the issue here is not what a perfectly attentive customer would do, but what amount of care can reasonably be expected of potential customers. See Luigino's, 170 F.3d at 831 ("[W]e must stand in the shoes of the ordinary purchaser, buying under the normally prevalent conditions of the market and giving the attention such purchasers usually give in buying that class of goods.") (quotation marks omitted). The Hicklins provide no evidence suggesting that the ordinary customer would exercise any more care than that displayed by the customers Plaintiff has identified. Accordingly, the court finds that this factor weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion.

d. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to both secondary meaning and a likelihood of confusion. Because several of the factors discussed above weigh in Plaintiff's favor, summary judgment on this issue is inappropriate. See Eniva Corp. v. Global Water Solutions, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1052 (D. Minn. 2006) (denying defendant's summary judgment motion on infringement claim because "three of the likelihood of confusion factors favor" the plaintiff). Accordingly, the court shall deny the Motion for Summary Judgment to the extent it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's passing off claim under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 2. False advertising

Plaintiff asserts that the Hicklins have engaged in false advertising by: (1) "claiming to have `certified' technicians" and (2) "misleading consumers that the Hicklins are based locally by using a phone number with a (319) area code that is answered in Sioux City." Resistance at 19. To establish a claim under the false or deceptive advertising prong of the Lanham Act, Plaintiff must prove:

(1) a false statement of fact by the defendant in a commercial advertisement about its own or another's product; (2) the statement actually deceived or has the tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its audience; (3) the deception is material, in that it is likely to influence the purchasing decision; (4) the defendant caused its false statement to enter interstate commerce; and (5) the plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a result of the false statement, either by direct diversion of sales from itself to defendant or by a loss of goodwill associated with its products.
United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir. 1998).

The false statement necessary to establish a Lanham Act violation generally falls into one of two categories: (1) commercial claims that are literally false as a factual matter; and (2) claims that may be literally true or ambiguous but which implicitly convey a false impression, are misleading in context, or likely to deceive consumers.
Id.

Plaintiff contends that the Hicklins' claim of "certified" technicians is "per se false" because the only certification came from Randy Hicklin. Resistance at 19. "If a plaintiff proves that a challenged claim is literally false, a court may grant relief without considering whether the buying public was actually misled; actual consumer confusion need not be proved." United Indus., 140 F.3d at 1180. The court disagrees with Plaintiff that the Hicklins' claim of "certified" technicians is literally false simply because Randy Hicklin provided the certification. Plaintiff apparently takes issue with the fact that the Hicklins' technicians were not certified by an "independent entity" or an "objective third party." Pl. Statement of Facts at ¶ 77. However, Plaintiff offers no evidence that the Hicklins have ever claimed — on an advertisement, shirt or otherwise — that their technicians were certified by anyone in particular. The technicians were, in fact, certified — Randy Hicklin certified them. Therefore, the court finds that the Hicklins' claim of "certified" technicians is not literally false.

Plaintiff also takes issue with the Hicklins' "Advanced Garage Door Certified Checklist" ("Checklist"). Pl. App'x at 184. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that "the only written description of the meaning of the certification was created after [Plaintiff] filed this lawsuit." Resistance at 19-20. Regardless of when the Checklist was reduced to writing, Randy Hicklin testified that he has trained his technicians based on the same criteria "since 2002." Pl. App'x at 40. Further, Lance Cross testified that Randy Hicklin trained and certified him when he was hired. In any event, Plaintiff does not dispute that Randy Hicklin actually engaged in a training and certification process with the Hicklins' technicians. Accordingly, the court fails to see the materiality of when the Checklist was formally put on paper.

Although the Hicklins' claim regarding "certified" technicians is not literally false, literally true or ambiguous claims are actionable if they "nevertheless have a tendency to mislead or deceive the consumer. . . ." United Indus., 140 F.3d at 1182. Even assuming, without deciding, that the Hicklins' statements regarding certification have a tendency to mislead or deceive consumers, this portion of Plaintiff's claim fails. "Where a claim is not literally false but is misleading in context, proof that the advertising actually conveyed the implied message and thereby deceived a significant portion of the recipients becomes critical." Id. Here, Plaintiff offers no evidence to support a finding that any consumers were deceived by the Hicklins' claim of "certified" technicians. Accordingly, the court shall grant summary judgment in the Hicklins' favor with respect to this portion of Plaintiff's false advertising claim.

The Hicklins are also entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's false advertising claim based upon the Hicklins' use of a (319) area code. Plaintiff does not argue that there is anything literally false about the Hicklins' use of a (319) telephone number. For example, Plaintiff does not contend that the Hicklins affirmatively represent to the public that calls to its (319) number are answered within that area code. Accordingly, Plaintiff must offer proof that the Hicklins' claims actually "deceived a significant portion of the recipients. . . ." Id. As with the Hicklins' "certified technicians" claims, Plaintiff offers no evidence that a single recipient of the Hicklins' advertising, much less a "significant" portion, was somehow deceived by the Hicklins' use of a (319) area code. See id. (discussing importance of evidence of consumer impact). Accordingly, the court finds that summary judgment is appropriate with respect to Plaintiff's false advertising claim based upon the Hicklins' use of a (319) area code.

The court notes that this aspect of Plaintiff's false advertising claim would fail on other grounds as well. For example, Plaintiff sets forth no evidence or argument on the materiality of the Hicklins' use of a (319) area code. That is, that such use has or would influence the consumers' purchasing decision. United Indus. Corp., 140 F.3d at 1180.

C. Iowa Code Section 548.113

Plaintiff claims that the Hicklins' conduct "has diluted the distinctive qualities" of the term "overhead" and "will continue to cause dilution unless enjoined." Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 40. Iowa Code section 548.113 ("Section 548.113") allows the owner of a "famous" mark to obtain injunctive relief against another's use of the mark if that use "causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the owner's mark. . . ." Iowa Code § 548.113. Although relief under the statute is generally limited to an injunction, a court may award treble damages and attorneys' fees if the defendant "willfully intended to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the owner's mark." Id.

The Hicklins analogize Plaintiff's Section 548.113 claim to a trademark dilution claim under the Lanham Act, and contend that summary judgment is appropriate because Plaintiff cannot establish that its purported mark "overhead" is "famous." The Hicklins also claim that Plaintiffs cannot establish any actual dilution.

The parties cite no case applying Section 548.113, and the court has found none. However, the statute — and Plaintiff's claim thereunder — is clearly directed at trademark dilution. "Dilution occurs when consumers associate a famous mark with a new product." Luigino's, 170 F.3d at 833. "Normally, the doctrine applies in cases where similar marks are used on dissimilar goods." Id. (quoting Pro-Phy-Lac-Tic Brush Co. v. Jordan Marsh Co., 165 F.2d 549, 553 (1st Cir. 1948)). Therefore, courts typically hold that a dilution claim fails where the parties are competitors who sell similar goods or services. See Sensient Tech. Corp. v. SensoryEffects Flavor Co., 613 F.3d 754, 771 n. 4 (8th Cir. 2010) (Colloton, J., concurring in the judgment in part) (concurring in the dismissal of a claim under a Missouri anti-dilution statute "because this is a dispute between competitors who sell similar goods"); Luigino's, 170 F.3d at 833 (affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendant on plaintiff's dilution claim where both parties marketed low-fat frozen entrees); see also McCarthy 24:74 (opining that "antidilution law is out of its proper place in a case of competing parties"). In light of the fact that the parties are competitors who sell similar goods and services, Plaintiff's state law dilution claim fails.

Furthermore, the term "overhead" has not achieved the requisite "famous" status for protection under the statute. See WSM, Inc., 724 F.2d at 1332 ("Since `opry' is not an arbitrary, coined or fanciful term, it is not a distinctive mark entitled to protection under the Missouri anti-dilution statute."); McCarthy § 24:87 (noting that, for purposes of Lanham Act dilution claims, "when a mark is found to be too weak to be infringed by the traditional likely confusion test, then it is necessarily too weak to be diluted"). Accordingly, the court finds that summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff's anti-dilution claim under Section 548.113.

VIII. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

(1) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (docket no. 70) is DENIED IN PART and DENIED AS MOOT IN PART;
(2) The Hicklins' Motion to Strike (docket no. 90) is DENIED;
(3) The Hicklins' Objections and Appeal (docket no. 98) are DENIED AS MOOT; and
(4) The Hicklins' Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 68) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:
(a) The Hicklins' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to Count I, Count II, Count IV and Count V of the Second Amended Complaint;
(b) The Hicklins' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to Count III of the Second Amended Complaint to the extent such count alleges service mark infringement in violation of Lanham Act § 43(a); and
(c) The Hicklins' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED with respect to Count III of the Second Amended Complaint to the extent such count alleges passing off in violation of Lanham Act § 43(a).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 2nd day of December, 2010.

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PSK, LLC v. HICKLIN (N.D.Iowa 12-2-2010)
(Dec 2, 2010)