Hillside Vill. v. Smith

PER CURIAM

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3. Before Judges Reisner and Rothstadt. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Special Civil Part, Bergen County, Docket No. LT-5606-15. Myra G. Metzger argued the cause for appellant (Northeast New Jersey Legal Services, attorneys; Ms. Metzger, on the briefs). Bruce E. Gudin argued the cause for respondent (Ehrlich, Petriello, Gudin & Plaza, P.C., attorneys; Mr. Gudin, on the brief). PER CURIAM

In this summary dispossession action, defendant-tenant Sandra Smith appeals from the Special Civil Part's judgment of possession that it entered in favor of her landlord, plaintiff Hillside Village after a bench trial. The court found that it had jurisdiction under the Anti-Eviction Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 to -61.12, to consider the matter because plaintiff had served defendant with the notice to quit and demand for possession (Notice) required by N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.2. After considering the proofs adduced at trial, the court found that plaintiff established good-cause for eviction under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(c), because it proved that defendant caused damage to her apartment. On appeal, defendant argues that the Special Civil Part lacked jurisdiction because the Notice was defective. In addition, she contends the court failed to make adequate findings to support her eviction for causing damage to the property, it did not resolve disputed facts, interfered with her right to cross-examination, and "refused to consider defendant's claim for reasonable accommodation under the federal Fair Housing Act," 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3619.

We have considered defendant's arguments in light of the record and our review of applicable legal principles. We vacate the entry of the judgment and remand the matter to the Special Civil Part for dismissal of plaintiff's complaint as we conclude the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider this matter on the grounds plaintiff asserted and, even if it did, its findings were insufficient to establish the cause for eviction relied upon by plaintiff.

The following facts were generally not in dispute and can be summarized from the record as follows. Plaintiff owns the housing complex in Ridgefield known as Hillside Village, where defendant has resided for the last fifty years in a rent controlled apartment, located in a 174-unit complex. On July 17, 2015, local fire, health, and building officials responded to a call of a gas odor emanating from defendant's apartment. The officials found defendant's apartment in a dilapidated condition; the kitchen sink had fallen through the cabinets, other kitchen cabinets had collapsed off the wall, the bathroom faucet would not turn off, the bathroom had holes in the ceilings, the paint and wallpaper were peeling, the doors did not fit properly in their frames, the carpets were extremely stained and worn, and the walls were moldy. Additionally, the apartment was generally unsanitary as defendant had hoarded an immense amount of personal items, garbage, and debris.

The same day, the Fire Prevention Bureau, Division of Property Maintenance, issued plaintiff eleven violations for defendant's apartment. The Building Department's Housing Inspector "red-tagged" the apartment as unfit for human occupancy, which required defendant to vacate the apartment. According to local officials, by July 22, 2015, several of the eleven violations were abated, but the apartment remained unfit for human occupancy.

On July 20, 2015, plaintiff served defendant with the Notice required by N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(c) and N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.2, that stated defendant had willfully or by gross negligence caused or allowed destruction, damages, or injury to the premises. Specifically, the notice advised that defendant's tenancy was being terminated effective July 23, 2015, and set forth the "legal authority" for her removal, based exclusively on her practice of hoarding. It stated:

LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR YOUR EVICTION: State law, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1c, provides that a tenant may be evicted for the following reason:
c. The person has willfully or by reason of gross negligence caused or allowed destruction, damage or injury to the premises by willfully or by reason of gross negligence having caused or allowed destruction, damage, or injury to the premises.
Specifically, you have violated your Lease and State Law in that you willfully, or by reason of gross negligence, caused or allowed destruction, damage, or injury to the premises. You have created and tolerated a grossly unsanitary, malodorous and unhealthy environment within your leased premises by having engaged in hoarding like behavior, filling the apartment with household refuse, clothes, bags of household items, and plastic
bottles strewn throughout the apartment and piled everywhere such that it is impossible to properly walk through the apartment. The condition you have created and are maintaining represents an extreme health hazard, a safety hazard and a potential fire hazard. The extreme clutter results in an excessive accumulation of dirt since the apartment cannot be properly cleaned or maintained.
The items indicated are blocking the proper ingress to and egress from the unit and results in an inability to reach the windows should an emergency exist. This is a fire and life safety hazard. In the event emergency personnel had to access the premises their efforts would be hampered by the conditions in your unit. The foregoing condition in which you maintain your apartment unit violates your lease agreement and also violates local and state health ordinances. The foregoing acts disturb the peaceful and quiet enjoyment of your neighbors, constitute a fire hazard, cause rodent and insect infestation in your unit and the surrounding areas, and violate local and state health ordinances, which threatens the health, safety, and well-being of yourself, the Landlord's employees, and of your neighbors who also reside in the premises. This activity jeopardizes the safety and welfare of the building.
On July 17, 2015 the Fire Department and the Health Department were dispatched to your unit after a [sic] receiving a report of noxious gas emanating from your unit. They attempted to gain entry into your apartment by knocking on your door but you refused to open the door. Instead, you turned the volume on your television up high in an attempt to drown out the sound of them banging on your door. Finally, they had to climb in through the window to gain entry into your premises.
Upon investigation, your unit was found to be in deplorable condition. Your entire apartment is overly cluttered with excessive amounts of clothes, boxes, debris, construction tools, plastic contractor pails, bags of plastic bottles, a supermarket shopping cart, litter and debris, and personal items piled high everywhere throughout your apartment such that it is impossible to walk through the apartment. The inspector for the Health Department declared the unit unsafe for human occupancy and "Red Tagged" the unit requiring all occupants to immediately vacate.
Further, you are in violation of The New Jersey Administrative Code including N.J.A.C. 5:10-5.4 which states in relevant part:

(b) Occupants of each unit of dwelling space shall be responsible to the extent of their own use and activities for keeping the interior thereof safe and sanitary.

The condition you have created and are maintaining represents an extreme health hazard, a safety hazard and a potential fire hazard. The extreme clutter and your failure to perform basic housekeeping activities resulted in an excessive accumulation of dirt and filth; since the apartment has not been properly cleaned or maintained, this increases the risk of insect and rodent infestation in the building. This clutter is blocking the ingress to and egress from the rooms inside your apartment and results in an inability to reach the windows should an emergency exist. This is a fire and life safety hazard. In the event emergency personnel had to access the premises their efforts would be hampered by the conditions in your unit.
The Acts Complained of threaten and endanger the health, safety and wellbeing of
yourself, the landlord's employees, the building, and your neighbors who are also residents of the building.
5. The foregoing acts constitute willful or grossly negligent damage or destruction to the premises in violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(c), and consequently you must now make arrangements to quit and vacate the apartment and return the keys to the Landlord by the date specified above. If you fail to vacate the premises and return the keys as directed, legal action against you will be commenced and the landlord shall hold you liable for all associated costs and attorney's fees incurred as a result of your actions.

Defendant did not comply with the Notice by delivering possession to plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a complaint for possession. Prior to trial, however, defendant remediated much, if not all, of the litter and debris that cluttered the apartment.

At the ensuing trial, the Fire Code Official and Property Maintenance Inspector, the State Housing Inspector and acting Building Inspector, and the Health Inspector all testified as to their observations of the apartment from July 17, 2015. In addition to testifying about the debris and clutter, the officials testified that the kitchen sink had collapsed into the cabinets, the cabinets had collapsed off the walls, the floors were in poor condition, the paint was peeling, the doors were unable to shut properly, the bathroom had holes in the ceiling, the bathroom faucet remained on constantly with water flowing at full power, and the grossly filthy and moldy conditions were unfit for human habitation. None of the physical damage to which they testified had been mentioned in the Notice.

Plaintiff's property manager testified as to the condition and maintenance history of defendant's unit. She stated she was unaware of the conditions in defendant's apartment, that she had frequently been in contact with defendant, and that defendant only made one maintenance request in the past five years — for a doorknob in a common area. The property manager testified that she saw the apartment on July 17th and confirmed that the Notice adequately reflected what she saw that day.

Defendant also testified and explained she was aware of damage in her apartment, told the superintendent about it, but no one came to make a repair. Defendant denied that she caused the physical damage, such as the collapsed sink and fallen cabinets. She admitted that the clutter accumulated due to personal setbacks associated with her mother's death that hampered her ability to care for the apartment. Defendant also stated she had the apartment cleaned up after July 17th because the property manager told her that her things had to be removed so plaintiff could repair the apartment.

At the conclusion of the testimony, the court placed its decision on the record and amplified its findings on September 9, 2015. The court, while evidently referring to exhibits admitted into evidence, stated "Anyone can see the condition of the apartment, can see the damage in the apartment . . . ." It found the Notice to be "in compliance with the statute as to service," and with "Carteret " as it was sufficiently "specific." The court stated that the Notice was based upon "the property manager['s] . . . visit[ to] the premises on . . ., July 17th and found the damage that's been complained of and that she served the . . . [Notice]."

As to the cause of the damage, the court assumed it was caused by defendant "[s]ince defendant lived there alone" and defendant "did not controvert the damage that was shown on the photographs. The Court therefore felt that pursuant to the [Act], there were damages to the premises, that went well beyond normal wear and tear and that therefore the cause had been proven by the landlord." Other than referencing the witnesses' testimony about the apartment, the photographs, and the reports, the court did not identify the specific damage caused by defendant or whether that damage was willfully caused by her or as a result of her gross negligence. The court only stated that the "photographs . . . showed that the premises were clearly damaged. There's not even an issue -- not even a question about that."

The court entered the judgment but stayed the issuance of the warrant of removal.

This appeal followed.

In reviewing the trial judge's determination, we accord substantial deference to the judge's special role as a fact finder. See Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (instructing that a trial court's findings are generally binding on appeal "when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence"). Such "[d]eference is especially appropriate when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility." Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)). That said, we review de novo a trial court's determinations on questions of law. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

Based on our de novo review of the legal issues, we conclude that, although there was no dispute that defendant's apartment was damaged and in an uninhabitable condition, the court lacked jurisdiction because the Notice was deficient. Also, even if it had jurisdiction, the court's findings did not support the entry of the judgment for possession under the Act based upon damage to the apartment.

N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(c) authorizes a tenant's eviction for causing damage to the landlord's premises if the tenant "has willfully or by reason of gross negligence caused or allowed" such damage. "The legislative intent of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(c) requires actual damage to the landlord's property for there to be a cause of action for eviction," Les Gertrude Assocs. v. Walko, 262 N.J. Super. 544, 549 (App. Div. 1993), and that it be willfully caused by the tenant or the result of the tenant's gross negligence. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(c). The damage must be actual damage to the landlord's property, not simply maintaining offensive or noxious conditions. See Ivy Hill Park Section III v. Smirnova, 362 N.J. Super. 421, 426-28 (Law Div. 2003). "Gross negligence is conduct that comes somewhere between 'simple' negligence and the intentional infliction of harm, or, 'willful misconduct.'" Id. at 425 (citing Clarke v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 357 N.J. Super. 362, 370 (App. Div. 2003)). At trial, a landlord must therefore prove that its tenant not only caused damage, but did so through conduct that amounts to more than simple negligence. See Muros, supra, 268 N.J. Super. at 596-97.

This construction of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(c), requiring that the tenant's actions or inactions must be more culpable than ordinary negligence, is consistent not only with the text of that provision, but with the general legislative policies of the Act. "[T]he dominating principle in construing the Act [is] that it must be construed liberally with all doubts construed in favor of a tenant[.]" 224 Jefferson St. Condo. Ass'n. v. Paige, 346 N.J. Super. 379, 389 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 172 N.J. 179 (2002); accord Cashin v. Bello, 223 N.J. 328, 336 (2015).

In order for a court to be able to consider a landlord's claim under the Act, a landlord must strictly comply with its notice requirements. "The Act reflects a public policy barring dispossess actions except upon strict compliance with the notice and procedural requirements of the Act," regardless of whether "the landlord has acted in good faith or the tenant has not been prejudiced." 224 Jefferson St. Condo. Ass'n., supra, 346 N.J. Super. at 383 (citations omitted). "[A]bsent strict compliance with the requirements of the Act, a court is without jurisdiction to entertain a summary dispossession action." Id. at 384 (citations omitted).

The notice to quit cannot merely state a legal conclusion; it must contain particularized facts set forth in an explicit, detailed statement. See Carteret Props., supra, 49 N.J. at 124-25. "The Legislature's purpose in requiring landlords to specify in detail the cause for termination is, in part, to allow tenants an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense before trial [and to] recognize[] a tenant's general right to know as much as possible about any eviction proceeding brought against him or her." Aspep Corp. v. Giuca, 269 N.J. Super. 98, 103 (Law Div. 1993).

The notice requirement for a cause of action based upon damage to the property, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(c), is set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.2, which states:

No judgment of possession shall be entered for any premises covered . . . unless the landlord has made written demand and given written notice for delivery of possession of the premises. . . . For an action alleging . . . injury to the premises under subsection c [of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1,] . . . three days' notice prior to the institution of the action for possession. . . . The notice . . . shall specify in detail the cause of the termination of the tenancy . . . .
[Ibid.]

The Notice served by plaintiff in this case did not specify any actual damage to defendant's apartment. It only referenced the unsanitary conditions and hazards created by her accumulation of debris and litter - a serious condition, but not actual damage. For that reason, the court did not have jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's complaint, other than to enter an order of dismissal.

Even if the contents of the Notice could be construed to allege actual damage to the apartment, the Notice did not mention any of the structural damage, broken faucets, collapsed cabinets and the like about which witnesses testified at trial. Those damages identified during the trial, but not mentioned in the Notice, therefore, could not be relied upon by the court in its assessment of whether defendant willfully caused damage to the premises or allowed the damage to occur through her gross negligence. Moreover, the court made no findings as to the specific damage it relied upon or whether defendant willfully caused any of that damage or whether it occurred as a result of defendant's gross negligence. Without a finding that defendant willfully caused damage or allowed it to occur through her gross negligence, we would be constrained to vacate the judgment of possession, even if plaintiff had served a notice that complied with the Act's requirements.

The judgment of possession is vacated and the matter remanded for entry of an order dismissing the complaint with prejudice. We do not retain jurisdiction.

Vacated and remanded. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.

CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION