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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Mason Frazier appealed from a Hopkins County District Court conviction for assault with intent to rape, for which he received a two-year penitentiary sentence. [1][2] The alleged victim was Frazier’s wife, Emma Frazier. They had married in 1889 and continued living as husband and wife until 1902, although she later refused further cohabitation and sought an unsuccessful divorce. [3] During the alleged incident, Frazier attempted to exercise what he believed were his marital rights; his wife resisted and escaped. [3]

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the wife could testify against her husband in a prosecution for assault with intent to rape. [4]
  2. Whether a husband could be guilty of assault with intent to rape his wife. [4]

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The wife was not competent to testify against him in this type of prosecution. [4]
  • He could not legally be guilty of assault with intent to rape his wife. [4]

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State v. Haines, 51 La. Ann. 731 Authority supporting the rule that a husband cannot be guilty of actual rape against his wife. Cited among authorities supporting reversal. [4]
State v. Evans, 138 Mo. 116 Authority supporting the marital-rape rule. Cited by the court in support of its conclusion. [4]
State v. Williamson, 22 Utah 248 Authority supporting the rule that a husband cannot commit actual rape against his wife. Cited by the court as supporting authority. [4]
People v. Estrada, 51 Cal. 600 Authority supporting the marital-rape rule. Cited by the court in support of reversal. [4]
Commonwealth v. Bogerty, 8 Gray (Mass.) 489 Authority supporting the rule concerning a husband’s inability to commit actual rape against his wife. Cited among the authorities relied upon by the court. [4]
Gonzales v. State, 62 S.W. Rep. 1060 A Texas decision that practically reached the same conclusion, although the issue was not expressly discussed. The court treated it as additional support for its analysis. [4]

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the statute defining rape, which addressed forcible intercourse without consent, intercourse with an insane woman, and intercourse with a girl under fifteen, subject to an express exception when the girl was the accused’s wife. [4]

Under the statute, the wife’s status could be shown at trial in the various rape situations, except for the specifically governed under-fifteen provision. The court concluded that the marital relationship barred prosecution for actual rape by the husband against his wife. [4]

The court relied on the legal concept of matrimonial consent: by entering the marriage relationship, the wife gave a consent that the law would not allow her to retract in order to charge her husband with rape. [4] The court further stated that the authorities consistently held that a husband could not himself be the actual perpetrator of rape against his wife, although a husband could potentially be liable in a different situation involving forcing his wife to submit to another man. [4]

Because the alleged victim was the appellant’s wife, the court held that the facts did not establish a violation of the law. [3][4][5]

Holding and Implications

Reversed and remanded. [5][6] The conviction was set aside because a husband could not be guilty of assault with intent to rape his wife, and the wife could not testify against him in that character of case. [7][8][4] The opinion discusses no broader implications beyond the direct effect on the conviction and subsequent proceedings; no new precedent was set.

MASON FRAZIER v. THE STATE.

Assault With Intent to Rape — Husband and Wife.

A man cannot be guilty of actual rape or assault with intent to rape upon his wife, nor can she be a witness against him in such character of case.

DAVIDSON, PRESIDING JUDGE.

Appellant was charged by indictment with assault with intent to rape Emma Frazier. The facts disclose that she was his wife; that they were married in 1889, and had lived as husband and wife until 1902. As the result of their marriage four children were born, the oldest being 14 at the time of the trial and the youngest 8. That sometime during the year 1902, prosecutrix informed appellant that she would no longer cohabit with him, and this she termed a "separation." Later on she undertook to obtain a divorce from her husband, which was refused by the court. They remained in the same house: she sleeping in one room, with her little girl, and appellant in another room with the boys. Appellant supported the family, provided for their wants, attended to the business about the place and farm, and prosecutrix performed the ordinary duties devolving upon the wife in regard to household matters, doing the cooking and such kindred things; and they all ate at the same table. On the occasion of the alleged assault, appellant entered her room, and rather vigorously insisted upon what he believed to be his rights as a husband. She resisted and fled into the room where the boys were sleeping. Appellant followed her in there and again renewed his efforts. She finally escaped, however, and the matter ended. We deem it unnecessary to go any farther into the details.

Two important questions suggested can be condensed into: First, objections to the use of the wife as a witness against the husband in this character of case; and second, appellant could not be guilty of an assault to rape his wife. Both of these contentions, in our judgment, are correct. Our statute with reference to rape provides for the punishment of a man who undertakes to have forcible connection with a woman without her consent; second, where the woman is insane; and third, on a girl under 15 years, with or without consent, provided she is not the wife of the accused. It has never been held necessary, so far as we are aware, to allege in an indictment that an assaulted woman was not the wife of the accused; nor would it be so in this State, except for the latter clause of the statute with reference to a girl under 15 years of age. The fact that she is the wife of the accused can be shown upon the trial under all the phases of rape, except where our statute expressly provides, in regard to a girl under 15. So far as we are aware all the authorities hold that a man cannot himself be guilty of actual rape upon his wife. One of the main reasons being the matrimonial consent which she gives when she assumes the marriage relation, and which the law will not permit her to retract in order to charge her husband with the offense of rape. There have been cases arising where the husband forced his wife to submit to the embraces of another man, in which he was held guilty of rape; but we are aware of no case holding that the husband can be guilty of the offense where he himself is the actual party to the intercourse. This question has come in different forms, sometimes in exceptions to the introduction of the witness' testimony against the husband; sometimes upon moving to quash the indictment, and sometimes by force of the fact that he was the husband. But in all the cases it is said, so far as we are aware, wherever the question has been adjudicated, that the husband cannot be himself guilty of actual rape upon his wife. 23 Amer. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 2nd ed., p. 849, note 6; State v. Haines, 51 La. Ann., 731; State, v. Evans, 138 Mo., 116; s.c. 60 Am. St. Rep., 549; State v. Williamson, 22 Utah 248; s.c. 83 Am. St. Rep., 780; People v. Estrada, 51 Cal. 600; Com. v. Bogerty, 8 Gray (Mass.), 489; 2 Archibald Cr. Plead. and Prac., p. 158. While the question was not expressly discussed, it is also practically so decided in Gonzales v. State, 62 S.W. Rep., 1060, which is a Texas case.

Because the facts do not show a violation of the law, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

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FRAZIER v. THE STATE
(Apr 19, 1905)