RUST v. CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT

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Docket Number

No. 14541

Attorney(S)

Jones, Jones, Bell, Close and Brown, and Will Kemp, Las Vegas, for Appellant. Thomas J. Moore, Las Vegas, for Respondents.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant Dayle K. Rust was a long-serving employee of the Clark County School District, holding positions as assistant principal and principal for seventeen years, including three years as principal of Vegas Verde Elementary School. In the fall of 1979, Rust took a planned ten-day leave of absence to meet his son returning from a religious mission in Europe. Although Rust had accumulated over forty days of leave under a previously liberal district policy, a recently enacted policy limited administrators’ use of leave to five school days per year or two consecutive days except in emergencies. Rust’s request for ten consecutive days was denied, but he proceeded with his trip regardless. Upon his return, Rust was suspended and subsequently dismissed for "insubordination." The district court affirmed the dismissal, and Rust appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the dismissal of Rust for insubordination was supported by legal cause under the applicable statutes and administrative standards.
Whether the district’s unilateral change in leave policy and Rust’s subsequent absence constituted insubordination justifying dismissal.
Whether the penalty of dismissal was appropriate given the circumstances of Rust’s absence and prior service.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Richardson v. Bd. Regents, 70 Nev. 347, 269 P.2d 265 (1954)	Definition of legal cause for removal of public employees; insubordination as willful disregard of orders.	Used to explain that legal cause must be substantial and directly related to job performance, not merely any cause deemed sufficient by the employer.
Ex rel. Whalen v. Welliver, 60 Nev. 154, 104 P.2d 188 (1940)	Legal cause must relate to qualifications or duties affecting public interest.	Quoted to emphasize that cause must affect the rights and interests of the public and the fitness of the employee.
Paulson v. Civil Service Commission, 90 Nev. 41, 518 P.2d 148 (1974)	Review of administrative dismissal decisions for legal cause.	Supported the court’s duty to review administrative findings to ensure legal cause exists.
Lapinski v. City of Reno, 95 Nev. 898, 603 P.2d 1088 (1979)	Standards for reviewing public employee dismissal.	Reinforced the principle that dismissal must be based on substantial cause affecting job performance.
Board of Trustees v. Holso, 584 P.2d 1009 (Wyo. 1978)	Definition of insubordination as persistent refusal to obey reasonable orders.	Used to clarify that insubordination requires a persistent course of willful defiance, not a single act.
Midway School Dist. of Kern County v. Griffeath, 172 P.2d 857 (Cal. 1946)	Dismissal for a single unauthorized absence is insufficient cause.	Referenced to support the view that a single instance of absence without permission does not justify dismissal.
Oakdale Union School District v. Seamen, 104 Cal.Rptr. 64 (Cal.App. 1972)	Limits on dismissal for unauthorized absence.	Used as precedent for rejecting dismissal based on a single absence.
Tucker v. Bd. of Ed. of Town of Norfolk, 418 A.2d 933 (Conn. 1979)	Dismissal standards for insubordination related to absence.	Supported the principle that dismissal requires more than one isolated incident.
Beverlin v. Board of Ed. of Lewis County, 216 S.E.2d 554 (W.Va. 1975)	Dismissal for unauthorized absence was arbitrary and capricious; absence did not harm employer.	Applied to find Rust’s dismissal excessive since no harm resulted and the reason for absence was laudable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the dismissal under the statutory grounds of insubordination, defined as willful disregard or defiant refusal to obey reasonable orders. The district had changed its leave policy shortly before Rust’s requested absence and denied his request for ten consecutive days of leave. Rust proceeded with the trip, resulting in suspension and dismissal. The court examined whether this single absence constituted insubordination warranting dismissal. It emphasized that insubordination requires a persistent course of willful defiance, not a single isolated act. The court noted that Rust made preparations to ensure school operations were not disrupted and that the district did not claim any detrimental effect on students or the school. The reason for Rust’s absence was personal but deserving of consideration. Relying on precedents, the court concluded that the dismissal was arbitrary and capricious and that the penalty imposed was excessive under the circumstances.

Holding and Implications

The court reversed the district court’s judgment affirming Rust’s dismissal and remanded the case to the school district Board of Trustees for imposition of a penalty consistent with the court’s opinion.

The direct effect of this decision is to prevent Rust’s dismissal for a single instance of unauthorized leave under the changed policy, requiring a lesser penalty. The court did not establish a new precedent beyond applying existing standards for insubordination and administrative dismissal, reaffirming the necessity of substantial cause and proportionality in disciplinary actions against public employees.

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DAYLE K. RUST, APPELLANT, v. CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, A GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY OF CLARK COUNTY; BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT; VIRGINIA BROOKS BREWSTER; HELEN C. CANNON; DONALD R. FAIS; ROBERT FORBUSS; JAMES H. LYMAN; THOMAS SEMMENS AND JANET SOBEL, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS SCHOOL BOARD TRUSTEES; CLAUDE G. PERKINS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SUPERINTENDENT OF THE CLARK COUNTY SCHOOLS, RESPONDENTS.

OPINION

By the Court, MOWBRAY, J.:

Appellant Dayle K. Rust (Rust) was an employee of the Clark County School District for over twenty years. For seventeen of those years he served as assistant principal, or principal, of elementary schools in the district, the last three years as principal of Vegas Verde Elementary School. In the fall of 1979, Rust took a long-planned leave of absence of ten school days in order to meet his son, who was completing a religious mission in Europe. Because his request for such leave was denied, on the basis of a recently-enacted district policy severely curtailing school administrators' ability to use previously accumulated leave days, Rust was suspended from his duties on his return, and ultimately dismissed from the employ of the Clark County School District, on the ground of "insubordination." Because we find that under the particular circumstances presented by this case the action of the respondent Clark County School District Board of Trustees in dismissing appellant after twenty years of service was arbitrary and capricious, we reverse the judgment of the district court affirming the decision of the board.

In the fall of 1977, appellant's son left on a two year mission abroad, under the auspices of a church of which Rust is also a member. At that time Rust made a commitment to his son that at the conclusion of his mission, Rust would join him in Europe and accompany him home. Rust's plans were predicated upon a long-standing district policy which allowed liberal use of earned leave days.

Rust proceeded to make preparations to effectuate his plans, including arranging with his church to meet its requirements by becoming a missionary himself for the period of the trip, and purchasing the required tickets. Rust made no secret of his plans, and indeed discussed them with the Associate Superintendent for Personnel some eight months before his departure. He spent evenings and weekends making the necessary preparations so that the school would run smoothly during his absence.

Unfortunately for Rust, sixteen days before his planned departure on October 3, 1979, the district, following inconclusive collective bargaining on the issue with district administrators, unilaterally changed its leave policy by limiting administrators' use of earned leave to no more than five school days per year, or two days in succession, except in cases of "emergency." Rust then had accumulated over forty days of leave, of which he sought to use ten days in succession. Rust's request for leave was denied by his supervising administrator on September 25, as was his request for reconsideration. Rust indicated that he nevertheless intended to fulfill his commitment by completing the trip as planned, and preparations were made for administration of the school in his absence. On October 1, the district presented Rust with a formal admonishment repeating the denial of the request for leave and specifying that "defiance of this directive may result in your immediate demotion, dismissal or nonrenewal of contract," on the ground of insubordination, or failure to comply with reasonable board requirements, citing NRS 391.312(1)(d) and (k).

NRS 391.312 provides in pertinent part:

(1) [A]n administrator may be demoted, suspended, dismissed or not reemployed for the following reasons:

. . . .
(d) Insubordination;
. . . .

(k) Failure to comply with such reasonable requirements as a board may prescribe;

. . . .

On October 3, Rust left for Europe as planned. When he returned to school on October 18, he was presented with a Notice of Suspension, announcing the district's decision to suspend Rust immediately from his position as principal of Vegas Verdes Elementary School and as an administrator with the Clark County School District, "in the best interests of the children of the district." The Notice further announced the intent of the district to initiate dismissal proceedings.

Such proceedings were subsequently undertaken, and the respondent Board of Trustees on July 10, 1980, upon recommendation of a hearing officer, issued its decision dismissing Rust from its employ. The district court affirmed.

On appeal, Rust raises a number of procedural statutory and constitutional issues, many of which we find without merit. However, we do agree that under the circumstances presented, appellant's conduct did not warrant the drastic remedy of dismissal.

This Court has long taken seriously its duty to review the evidence before the findings of administrative boards on cases involving dismissal of public employees to determine whether legal cause for removal has been shown. See, e.g., Richardson v. Bd. Regents, 70 Nev. 347, 351-352, 269 P.2d 265, 268 (1954), citing Ex rel. Whalen v. Welliver, 60 Nev. 154, 104 P.2d 188 (1940); Paulson v. Civil Service Commission, 90 Nev. 41, 518 P.2d 148 (1974); Lapinski v. City of Reno, 95 Nev. 898, 603 P.2d 1088 (1979). As we have consistently reiterated, legal cause is "not any cause which the officer authorized to make such removal may deem sufficient." Rather, such cause "must be one which specifically relates to and affects the administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public. The cause must be one touching the qualifications of the officer or his performance of his duties, showing that he is not a fit or proper person to hold the office." Ex rel. Whalen v. Welliver, 60 Nev. at 158, 104 P.2d at 190-191, quoting Sausbier v. Wheeler, 299 N.Y.S. 466, 472 (App.Div. 1937).

In this case, the district has predicated its action upon a charge of "insubordination." We have defined this term as "a willful disregard of express or implied directions, or such a defiant attitude as to be equivalent thereto. `Rebellious,' `mutinous,' and `disobedient' are often quoted as definitions or synonyms of `insubordinate.'" Richardson v. Bd. Regents, supra, 70 Nev. at 367, 269 P.2d at 276. We suggested that the authority of the superior to promulgate the order, or the "reasonableness of the order in question" might also be considered in an appropriate case. Id.

"Insubordination" has elsewhere been defined as "`constant or continuing intentional refusal to obey a direct or implied order, reasonable in nature, and given by and with proper authority.'" Board of Trustees v. Holso, 584 P.2d 1009, 1015 (Wyo. 1978), quoting Ray v. Minneapolis Board of Education, Special School District No. 1, 202 N.W.2d 375, 378 (Minn. 1972). The Wyoming court also noted that "[t]he better-reasoned decisions place emphasis on the presence of a persistent course of willful defiance." 584 P.2d at 1016. Thus, a number of courts have refused to find cause supporting dismissal in a single instance of being absent without prior permission of school authorities. See, e.g., Midway School Dist. of Kern County v. Griffeath, 172 P.2d 857 (Cal. 1946); Oakdale Union School District v. Seamen, 104 Cal.Rptr. 64 (Cal.App. 1972); Tucker v. Bd. of Ed. of Town of Norfolk, 418 A.2d 933 (Conn. 1979); Beverlin v. Board of Ed. of Lewis County, 216 S.E.2d 554 (W.Va. 1975).

In Beverlin the court found that dismissal for an unauthorized absence, on the ground of insubordination, was arbitrary and capricious. 216 S.E.2d at 559. The court stressed that the pupils did not suffer in his absence, and that the reason for his absence was laudable. Here, the district does not claim that the students or the school were detrimentally affected by Rust's absence, for which he apparently made dutiful advance preparation. Further, the reason for his absence, while personal, is deserving at least of consideration and respect. As the court said of Beverlin, his "unexcused absence best might be described as an error of judgment, resulting in no harm to his employers." Id. at 558.

It appearing that the penalty is excessive, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case with instruction to return the matter to the school district Board of Trustees for imposition of a penalty consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.

MANOUKIAN, C.J., and SPRINGER, and GUNDERSON, JJ., and GRIFFIN, D.J., concur.

The Governor designated the Honorable Michael R. Griffin, Judge of the First Judicial District Court, to sit in the place of THE HONORABLE THOMAS L. STEFFEN, Justice, who voluntarily recused himself. Nev. Const., art. 6, section 4.