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Docket Number

Docket No. 88232.

Attorney(S)

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, James R. Samuels, Prosecuting Attorney, and Jann Ryan Baugh, Assistant Attorney General, for the people. State Appellate Defender (by Rolf E. Berg), for defendant on appeal.

Judges

PER CURIAM.

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Smart Summary

People v. Chapman, Docket No. 88232 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1987)

Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant was convicted by a jury of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, third offense, MCL 257.625; MSA 9.2325, and sentenced to forty to sixty months' imprisonment. Three months prior to trial, defendant filed a petition requesting a psychiatric evaluation to determine his "criminal responsibility" and his ability to assist counsel in preparing a defense. At the petition hearing, defense counsel conceded that the defendant was competent to stand trial and limited the defense argument to whether the defendant was legally insane at the time of the offense. The trial court denied the petition, finding no basis for an insanity defense. The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in denying the request for a psychiatric evaluation. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's request for a psychiatric evaluation under the statute governing notice and examinations when asserting an insanity defense (MCL 768.20a; MSA 28.1043).
Whether the defendant may assert an insanity defense based on long-term alcoholism and neurological damage sustained from head injuries, even if voluntary intoxication is also implicated.
Whether the petition for a psychiatric evaluation constituted sufficient notice of the defendant's intent to assert an insanity defense and whether the prosecutor waived any required notice by failing to object.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
People v Matulonis, 115 Mich. App. 263; 320 N.W.2d 238 (1982)	That insanity resulting from long-term voluntary alcohol abuse is a valid defense even if the defendant was also intoxicated at the time of the offense.	The court relied on Matulonis to conclude the defendant could assert an insanity defense based on long-term alcoholism and related neurological damage.
People v Conrad, 148 Mich. App. 433; 385 N.W.2d 277 (1986), lv den 424 Mich. 908 (1986)	That the statute does not automatically preclude assertion of an insanity defense if a person is rendered insane by voluntary ingestion of a drug.	The court cited Conrad to support the proposition that voluntary ingestion does not necessarily bar an insanity defense where ingestion produced insanity.
People v Giuchici, 118 Mich. App. 252, 263; 324 N.W.2d 593 (1982)	The purpose of the notice requirement is to protect the public and avoid unfair surprise to the prosecution; notices of insanity may be amended to add witnesses as they become known.	The court applied Giuchici to find the petition served the purpose of notice and that failure to list witnesses was not fatal because such notice may be amended.
People v Luckett, 52 Mich. App. 33; 216 N.W.2d 460 (1974)	The prosecution can waive required notice (here referenced by analogy to alibi notice) by failing to object.	The court analogized Luckett to conclude the prosecutor waived any required notice by failing to object to the petition.
People v Hence, 110 Mich. App. 154, 174; 312 N.W.2d 191 (1981)	A defendant may be deemed to have waived notice of proposed alibi rebuttal witnesses by failing to object (cited by analogy for waiver principles).	The court cited Hence to support the waiver analysis regarding the prosecutor's failure to object to the defendant's petition.
People v Smith, 103 Mich. App. 209, 211; 303 N.W.2d 9 (1981)	The Court of Appeals had implied that granting or denying an independent psychiatric evaluation was within the trial court's discretion.	The court noted Smith as authority for the view that trial courts had been treated as having discretion, then contrasted that view with its statutory construction of MCL 768.20a(2).
People v Dumont, 97 Mich. App. 50, 55; 294 N.W.2d 243 (1980)	Similar implication that trial court discretion applied to independent psychiatric evaluations.	The court cited Dumont to acknowledge prior implications of discretionary authority but ultimately interpreted the statute as mandatory.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in several distinct steps, based on the text of the opinion:

Availability of Insanity Defense: The court first determined that the defendant could assert an insanity defense in this case. Although voluntary intoxication alone may not support an insanity defense (see statutory limitation MCL 768.21a(2); MSA 28.1044(1)(2)), the court distinguished long-term alcoholism and neurological damage from simple intoxication and cited People v Matulonis and People v Conrad to support the proposition that insanity resulting from long-term voluntary alcohol abuse (or rendering by voluntary ingestion) can be a valid defense.
Sufficiency of the Petition as Notice: The court found the petition seeking psychiatric evaluation was sufficient notice of intent to assert an insanity defense. It relied on the stated purpose of the notice requirement—to protect the public and avoid unfair surprise—and concluded the petition served to alert the prosecutor. Although the petition did not list witness names as required by statute (MCL 768.20a(1); MSA 28.1043(1)), the court cited authority that such a notice may be amended to add witnesses as they become known (Giuchici).
Waiver by the Prosecutor: The court held the prosecutor waived any objection to the sufficiency of the notice by failing to object at the time, citing analogies in Luckett and Hence where failure to object resulted in waiver of notice requirements.
Mandate to Order Forensic Examination: The court examined the statutory provision MCL 768.20a(2); MSA 28.1043(1)(2), which states that upon receipt of notice of intent to assert insanity, the court "shall order" an examination at the center for forensic psychiatry (or by other qualified personnel). The court contrasted earlier cases that had implied trial-court discretion (Smith, Dumont) with the statutory text. It construed the Legislature's use of "shall" in subsection (2) as removing the trial court's discretion to deny a psychiatric evaluation by the forensic center when the defendant has asserted an insanity defense, and observed that subsection (3) explicitly allows the defendant an independent psychiatric evaluation at his or her own expense or, if indigent, at county expense.
Conclusion and Remedy: Based on the above, the court concluded the trial court erred in denying the defendant's request for a psychiatric evaluation and reversed the defendant's OUIL conviction, remanding the case for proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The trial court's denial of defendant's petition for a psychiatric evaluation was erroneous; the conviction is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Implications:

The court interpreted MCL 768.20a(2); MSA 28.1043(1)(2) to require (by use of "shall") that a court order a defendant who has given notice of intent to assert an insanity defense to undergo an examination by the center for forensic psychiatry (or other qualified personnel) and therefore held the trial court lacked discretion to deny such an examination in these circumstances.
The decision directly affects the parties by reversing the defendant's OUIL conviction and remanding for further proceedings, including ordering the statutorily required psychiatric examination. The opinion does not purport to establish broader new precedent beyond its statutory interpretation and application to the facts of this case.

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PEOPLE v CHAPMAN

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, third offense, MCL 257.625; MSA 9.2325. Sentenced to forty to sixty months imprisonment, defendant appeals as of right from his conviction.

Three months prior to trial, defendant filed a petition for a psychiatric evaluation to determine his "criminal responsibility" and "[a]bility to assist counsel in preparing a defense." At the hearing on the petition, defense counsel conceded that defendant was competent to stand trial and limited his argument to whether defendant was legally insane at the time of the offense. The trial court denied the petition, finding no basis for an insanity defense. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's request for a psychiatric evaluation. We reverse the trial court's decision.

First, defendant may assert an insanity defense in this case. We recognize that voluntary intoxication may not provide the basis for an insanity defense. MCL 768.21a(2); MSA 28.1044(1)(2). Defendant's claim, however, is based on the effects of his long-term alcoholism and neurological damage caused by several head injuries. Insanity resulting from long-term voluntary alcohol abuse is a valid defense even though the defendant may also have been intoxicated at the time of the offense. People v Matulonis, 115 Mich. App. 263; 320 N.W.2d 238 (1982). See also People v Conrad, 148 Mich. App. 433; 385 N.W.2d 277 (1986), lv den 424 Mich. 908 (1986) (statute does not automatically preclude for all time the assertion of an insanity defense if a person is rendered insane by the voluntary ingestion of a drug).

Second, the petition requesting a psychiatric evaluation was sufficient notice of defendant's intent to assert an insanity defense. The purpose of the notice requirement is to protect the public and to avoid unfair surprise to the prosecution at trial. People v Giuchici, 118 Mich. App. 252, 263; 324 N.W.2d 593 (1982). While not labeled as a notice, the petition served the purpose of alerting the prosecutor to the possibility that defendant planned to assert insanity. It is also true that the petition did not list the witnesses defendant intended to call to support his claim as required by MCL 768.20a(1); MSA 28.1043(1)(1). However, a notice of insanity may be amended to include the names of witnesses as the names become known to the defendant. Guichici, supra.

In addition, the prosecutor waived the required notice by his failure to object. Cf. People v Luckett, 52 Mich. App. 33; 216 N.W.2d 460 (1974) (the prosecution can waive notice of alibi by failing to object), and People v Hence, 110 Mich. App. 154, 174; 312 N.W.2d 191 (1981) (a defendant will be deemed to have waived notice of proposed alibi rebuttal witnesses by failing to object).

Finally, the trial court did not have the authority to deny defendant's request for a psychiatric examination at the forensic center. MCL 768.20a(2); MSA 28.1043(1)(2) provides in part:

Upon receipt of a notice of an intention to assert the defense of insanity, a court shall order the defendant to undergo an examination relating to his or her claim of insanity by personnel of the center for forensic psychiatry or by other qualified personnel, as applicable, for a period not to exceed 60 days from the date of the order.

This Court has implied that the decision to grant or deny a defendant's request for an independent psychiatric evaluation is within the discretion of the trial court. People v Smith, 103 Mich. App. 209, 211; 303 N.W.2d 9 (1981); People v Dumont, 97 Mich. App. 50, 55; 294 N.W.2d 243 (1980). However, the subsection of the statute allowing independent psychiatric evaluation states:

The defendant may at his or her own expense, or if indigent, at the expense of the county, secure an independent psychiatric evaluation by a clinician of his choice on the issue of his or her insanity at the time the alleged offense was committed. [MCL 768.20a(3); MSA 28.1043(1)(3).]

We construe the Legislature's use of the word "shall" in subsection (2) as depriving the trial court of the discretion to deny a psychiatric evaluation by the forensic center when the defendant has asserted an insanity defense.

Defendant's OUIL conviction is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

PEOPLE v. CHAPMAN