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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a district court order granting the Secretary's motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to amend a prior judgment that mistakenly awarded plaintiff $18,159.82 in attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). The amendment replaced the EAJA fee award with an award pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), which governs attorney fees paid out of the plaintiff's social security benefits rather than agency funds. The procedural history includes:

  1. July 23, 1992: Judgment entered on parties' stipulation regarding plaintiff's period of disability beginning February 15, 1977.
  2. August 10, 1992: Plaintiff moved for fees under the EAJA.
  3. August 28, 1992: District court awarded $4,000 in EAJA fees by judgment on stipulation.
  4. December 2, 1992: Plaintiff moved for approval of an $18,159.82 fee under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b); the Secretary did not oppose.
  5. December 23, 1992: District court entered judgment awarding the fee under the EAJA, mistakenly.
  6. June 18, 1993: Secretary moved to amend the December 23 judgment under Rule 60(b).
  7. August 10, 1993: District court amended judgment to correctly identify § 406(b) as the basis for the fee award, over plaintiff's objection.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the district court properly granted relief under Rule 60(b)(1) to amend the judgment awarding attorney fees under the EAJA.
  2. Whether Rule 60(b)(4) provides a proper basis for relief from a judgment that was void due to lack of due process in awarding EAJA fees without notice to the Secretary.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff-Appellant's Arguments

  • The Secretary's Rule 60(b)(1) motion to amend the judgment was untimely under this circuit's case law.
  • The Secretary had notice that attorney fees were at issue prior to the December 23, 1992 award, satisfying due process requirements.
  • Equities favor the plaintiff retaining the fee award because his disability arose from a service-related injury.

Defendant-Appellee's Arguments

  • The December 23, 1992 judgment awarding fees under the EAJA was a mistake since the fees should have been awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).
  • The Secretary did not oppose the § 406(b) fee motion because she had no notice that the EAJA fee award would be redetermined.
  • Relief from the mistaken judgment is mandatory under Rule 60(b)(4) because the judgment was void for lack of due process.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
United States v. 31.63 Acres of Land, 840 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1988) Standard of review for Rule 60(b) motions: abuse of discretion Used to establish the appellate standard when reviewing the district court's grant of relief under Rule 60(b).
Johnston v. Cigna Corp., 14 F.3d 486 (10th Cir. 1993) Standard for abuse of discretion in Rule 60(b) decisions Supported the standard that an abuse of discretion occurs if the ruling is based on erroneous law or clearly erroneous facts.
Morris v. Adams-Millis Corp., 758 F.2d 1352 (10th Cir. 1985) Timeliness of Rule 60(b)(1) motions regarding mistakes of law Held that Rule 60(b)(1) cannot be used to correct legal mistakes after the time for appeal has expired; applied to find the Secretary's motion untimely.
Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241 (10th Cir. 1991) Rule 60(b)(1) timeliness and procedural requirements Reinforced the principle that untimely Rule 60(b)(1) motions are not permissible.
United States v. Roederer, 11 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 1993) Appellate review and affirmance on alternative grounds Permitted affirmance of the district court's order on Rule 60(b)(4) grounds despite error under Rule 60(b)(1).
Lyons v. Jefferson Bank Trust, 994 F.2d 716 (10th Cir. 1993) Rule 60(b) relief and abuse of discretion; Rule 60(b)(4) mandatory relief for void judgments Guided the court to affirm relief under Rule 60(b)(4) as mandatory and not time-limited, contrasting with Rule 60(b)(1).
V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1979) Rule 60(b)(4) relief for void judgments; no time limit; due process considerations Supported the conclusion that judgments entered without due process are void and subject to mandatory relief under Rule 60(b)(4).
Venable v. Haislip, 721 F.2d 297 (10th Cir. 1983) Relief under Rule 60(b)(4) for void judgments Affirmed that relief under Rule 60(b)(4) is mandatory and not discretionary.
Arthur Andersen Co. v. Ohio (In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litig.), 502 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1974) Due process requirements for judgments to be valid Clarified that judgments inconsistent with due process are void; applied to distinguish prior cases where due process was satisfied from the present case.
Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504 (10th Cir. 1987) Due process and appellate costs Referenced in context of due process and costs on appeal, supporting the court’s restraint in awarding costs to the Secretary despite plaintiff’s conduct.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by reviewing the district court's grant of relief under Rule 60(b)(1) for an erroneous judgment awarding EAJA fees instead of fees under § 406(b). It found the Secretary's Rule 60(b)(1) motion untimely because no timely appeal was filed from the original judgment, consistent with binding circuit precedent that mistakes of law cannot be corrected under Rule 60(b)(1) after the appeal period expires.

However, the court proceeded to consider whether Rule 60(b)(4), which permits relief from void judgments without time limitation, provided a proper basis for amendment. The court emphasized that Rule 60(b)(4) relief is mandatory when a judgment is void, such as when entered without due process. It found the December 23, 1992 judgment void because the Secretary had no notice that the EAJA fee award would be redetermined in the second fee motion proceeding, violating fundamental due process rights.

Given the lack of notice and opportunity to be heard, the court concluded the EAJA fee award was an improbable mistake inconsistent with due process, mandating relief under Rule 60(b)(4). The court also criticized plaintiff and counsel for attempting to retain the erroneous award despite the clear mistake and lack of due process.

Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's amended judgment correcting the fee award to be under § 406(b), effectively returning the $18,159.82 to the Secretary.

Holding and Implications

The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED.

The court held that the district court erred in granting relief under Rule 60(b)(1) because the motion was untimely, but properly granted relief under Rule 60(b)(4) because the original judgment awarding EAJA fees was void for lack of due process. The direct effect of this decision is to uphold the amendment of the fee award from EAJA fees to § 406(b) fees, returning the erroneously awarded funds to the Secretary. No new precedent was established; rather, the court applied existing principles regarding timeliness of Rule 60(b)(1) motions and mandatory relief under Rule 60(b)(4) for void judgments.

EUGENE R. ORNER, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. DONNA E. SHALALA, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH HUMAN SERVICES, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

PAUL KELLY, Jr., Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff appeals from a district court order granting the Secretary's motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) to amend a prior order that mistakenly awarded plaintiff $18,159.82 in attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). The amendment deleted all references to the EAJA and provided, instead, that the fees were awarded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Fees under § 406(b) satisfy a client's obligation to counsel and, therefore, are paid out of the plaintiff's social security benefits, while fees under the EAJA penalize the Secretary for assuming an unjustified legal position and, accordingly, are paid out of agency funds. Thus, the amendment in question effectively returned the $18,159.82 erroneously awarded plaintiff back to the Secretary.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

The following events are essential to a proper understanding of the issues raised by this appeal:

(1) July 23, 1992. Judgment is entered on the parties' stipulation to a period of disability commencing February 15, 1977.
(2) August 10, 1992. Plaintiff moves for fees under the EAJA.
(3) August 28, 1992. The district court enters judgment on the parties' stipulation to an EAJA fee award of $4,000.
(4) December 2, 1992. Plaintiff moves for approval of an $18,159.82 fee under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1728 (i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)). The Secretary is given until December 15 to respond to the motion, but does not oppose it.
(5) December 23, 1992. The district court enters judgment on plaintiff's unopposed motion, but inexplicably awards the requested fee under the EAJA.
(6) June 18, 1993. The Secretary moves to amend the December 23, 1992 judgment, generally citing Rule 60(b).
(7) August 10, 1993. Relying on Rule 60(b)(1), the district court enters an amended judgment, over plaintiff's objection, identifying § 406(b) as the proper basis for the $18,159.82 fee awarded December 23, 1992.

The district court's final order amending judgment in favor of the Secretary consists of a frank acknowledgement that the court had made a mistake and the legal conclusion that the error was correctable under Rule 60(b)(1). See App. at 196-97. We review this decision for an abuse of discretion. United States v. 31.63 Acres of Land, 840 F.2d 760, 761 (10th Cir. 1988); see also Johnston v. Cigna Corp., 14 F.3d 486, 497 (10th Cir. 1993). "A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling [under Rule 60(b)] on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence." Lyons v. Jefferson Bank Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 727 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Cooter Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2461, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990)).

Plaintiff argues that, under this circuit's case law, the Secretary's motion was untimely with respect to Rule 60(b)(1). We agree. This court has held, without qualification, that "a mistake of law cannot be reached under [Rule] 60(b)(1) where [as here] no notice of appeal was timely filed from the order in which the mistake is alleged to have occurred, and the time for filing such a notice of appeal had expired when the [Rule] 60(b) motion was filed." Morris v. Adams-Millis Corp., 758 F.2d 1352, 1358 (10th Cir. 1985); see also Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 89, 121 L.Ed.2d 51 (1992). Consequently, Rule 60(b)(1) was not available to the district court as a basis upon which to grant the Secretary discretionary relief from its judgment regarding EAJA fees.

That conclusion does not end our inquiry, however, as we may affirm challenged decisions of the district court on alternative grounds, so long as the record is sufficient to permit conclusions of law. United States v. Roederer, 11 F.3d 973, 977 (10th Cir. 1993). We recognize that the assessment of a motion for relief from judgment under the various subsections of Rule 60(b) is committed, in the first instance, to the discretion of the district court. Thus, a remand would be the usual disposition following appellate detection of error with respect to any one particular basis for granting such relief. However, as explained below, "remanding on the basis of [the court's] legal error [granting relief under Rule 60(b)(1)] would be pointless, because it would have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to [rule otherwise] under Rule 60(b)[(4)]." Lyons, 994 F.2d at 729.

Unlike its counterparts, Rule 60(b)(4), which provides relief from void judgments, "is not subject to any time limitation." V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224 n. 9 and accompanying text (10th Cir. 1979) ("if a judgment is void, it is a nullity from the outset and any 60(b)(4) motion for relief is therefore filed within a reasonable time"); see also Venable v. Haislip, 721 F.2d 297, 299-300 (10th Cir. 1983). Furthermore, when Rule 60(b)(4) is applicable, "relief is not a discretionary matter; it is mandatory." V.T.A., Inc., 597 F.2d at 224 n. 8; see also Venable, 721 F.2d at 300.

This court has indicated on a number of occasions that a judgment may be void for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) if entered in a manner inconsistent with due process. See, e.g., V.T.A., Inc., 597 F.2d at 224-25; Arthur Andersen Co. v. Ohio (In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litig.), 502 F.2d 834, 842 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034, 95 S.Ct. 516, 42 L.Ed.2d 309 (1974). We ultimately rejected the due process arguments asserted in the cited cases because fundamental procedural prerequisites — particularly, adequate notice and opportunity to be heard — were fully satisfied. Here, in contrast, the Secretary was not given any notice that her EAJA liability, already resolved by stipulated order, would be redetermined in the proceeding on plaintiff's second motion for attorney fees and, given plaintiff's express reliance on § 406(b), had no reason whatsoever to anticipate this development. Accordingly, the Secretary did not oppose the motion, which to all appearances was primarily a matter between plaintiff and counsel. Under the circumstances, entry of the resultant order under the EAJA, which everyone involved concedes was an improbable mistake, cannot be deemed consistent with due process. Therefore, relief was not only appropriate but mandatory under Rule 60(b)(4).

We are very troubled by the conduct of plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel, who were willing to accept the fruits of the district court's obviously mistaken and unlawful EAJA order and, since discovery of the error, have doggedly opposed its correction. Moreover, plaintiff's position that due process was satisfied because the Secretary "had notice that attorney's fees were at issue [prior to the December 23, 1993 award]," Appellant's Reply Brief at 5, is patently disingenuous and misleading. The only pertinent question is whether the Secretary had notice that EAJA fees were — or even possibly could have been — at issue, and the circumstances recited above demonstrate she clearly did not. Finally, plaintiff defends his self-aggrandizing exploitation of an obvious judicial mistake with an audacious non-sequiter: the "equities" are somehow in his favor as he lays claim to funds rightfully belonging to the public fisc, because his underlying disability (for which the government pays him benefits) arose out of a service-related injury, see Appellant's Brief at 11. Only the provisions of Fed.R.App.P. 39(b) and the strictures of due process, see Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1515 (10th Cir. 1987), restrain us from awarding the Secretary her costs on this appeal.

The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED.

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ORNER v. SHALALA
(Jul 19, 1994)