LODGE, Judge.
On August 14, 2000, United States Magistrate Judge Mikel H. Williams issued his report and recommendation in this matter. Docket No. 59. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1), the parties had ten (10) days in which to file written objections to the report and recommendation. On August 21, 2000, Plaintiffs filed their objections (Docket No. 60). On August 31, 2000, Defendant responded to Plaintiffs' objections (Docket No. 61).
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), a district court judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. U.S. v. Ramsing, 874 F.2d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations made by the magistrate judge.
II. ANALYSIS
1) Background
This is the second time this Court has addressed the claims asserted by Plaintiffs in the above-entitled matter. Plaintiffs are husband and wife, Frank Chapin and Sydney Gutierrez-Chapin, (hereinafter "the Chapins") and Frank L. Chapin, P.A. (hereinafter "the corporation"). The Defendant is the United States. On November 24, 1999, this Court, acting in part on the recommendations of Magistrate Williams, granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss filed by the Defendants. On December 27, 1999, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion, which is the subject of the August 14, 2000 report and recommendation, addresses Plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief and Plaintiffs' claim for wrongful levy under 26 U.S.C. § 7426.
This Court entered the following order: (1) dismissal of the individual federal defendants from the suit and substitution of the United States on their behalf; (2) dismissal of Plaintiffs' tax refund claim brought under 26 U.S.C. § 7422 because Plaintiffs failed to file an administrate claim for refund with the IRS and, as a result, there was no waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States for the Plaintiffs' refund action; (3) dismissal of Plaintiffs' civil damage claim brought under 26 U.S.C. § 7432 because the Plaintiffs failed to file the required administrative claim concerning the release of lien with the IRS; (4) dismissal of Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim since the actions alleged to have been taken by the Defendant were taken under color of federal, rather than state, law; (5) dismissal of Plaintiffs' 26 U.S.C. § 7431 claim for failure to allege sufficient facts to state a claim; (6) dismissal of Plaintiffs' 26 U.S.C. § 7433 claim for failure to allege sufficient facts to state a claim; (7) denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' wrongful levy claim under 26 U.S.C. § 7426; and (8) denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' injunction claim. Docket No. 38.
After reviewing all briefing submitted, as well as other pertinent documents in the Court's file, and after having heard oral arguments Magistrate Williams found that Plaintiffs' remaining claims are not claims for which relief could be granted and recommended granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs argue that the magistrate's recommendation was inappropriate because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Jeffrey Siebrecht, the revenue officer, acted knowingly or negligently, whether the levies issued against Plaintiffs were wrongful, and whether the anti-injunction act applies in this action.
2) Plaintiffs' Objections
In reviewing the applicable briefing, it appears to the Court that Plaintiffs have essentially made three objections to the magistrate's recommendations — each of the objections are based on the fact that there are "material facts in dispute." Plaintiffs' first objection is with regard to their claim for civil damages under 26 U.S.C. § 7433. Plaintiffs' second objection is with regard to their wrongful levy claim under 26 U.S.C. § 7426. Plaintiffs' third objection is with regard to their claim for injunction. After articulating the standard for summary judgment to be employed, the Court will deal with each of Plaintiffs' objections in turn.
1. Summary Judgment Standard
Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56 provides, in pertinent part, that judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When applying this standard, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2513 (1986); Hughes v. U.S., 953 F.2d 531, 541 (9th Cir. 1992).
The Supreme Court has made it clear that under Rule 56, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). If the moving party meets that burden, summary judgment will be mandated if the non-moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element which is essential to the non-moving party's case and upon which the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. If the non-moving party fails to make such a showing on any essential element, "there can be no `genuine issue of material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2553.
See also, Rule 56(e) which provides, in part:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleadings, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.
Moreover, under Rule 56, it is clear that an issue, in order to preclude entry of summary judgment, must be both "material" and "genuine." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is "material" if it affects the outcome of the litigation. An issue, before it may be considered "genuine," must be established by "sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute . . . to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir. 1975) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co. Inc., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 withstand a motion for summary judgment, a party
(1) must make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact with respect to any element for which it bears the burden of proof; (2) must show that there is an issue that may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party; and (3) must come forward with more persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary when the factual context makes the non-moving party's claim implausible.
British Motor Car Distrib. v. San Francisco Automotive Indus. Welfare Fund,
882 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1989) (
citation omitted).
2. Analysis
a. Civil Damages Claim — 26 U.S.C. 7433
In their first objection to the magistrate's report and recommendation, Plaintiffs appear to re-argue a civil damages claim under 26 U.S.C. § 7433 that was previously analyzed and dismissed by this Court in its Order of November 24, 1999. Docket No. 60 at 2, 4. As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that there is no motion for reconsideration pending. Furthermore, this Court has not been presented with newly discovered evidence, has not been notified that the November 24, 1999 decision was either clearly erroneous or manifestly unjust, and has not been informed of an intervening change in controlling law; accordingly, the Court will not re-visit its previous decision to dismiss this claim. See School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1236 (1994).
b. Wrongful Levy Claim — 26 U.S.C. § 7426
Next, Plaintiffs appear to be arguing that there are material facts in dispute as to: (1) whether the corporate plaintiff was wrongfully levied upon when $4,039.10 was collected for a balance due of $404.55; (2) whether the levy on the Panhandle State Bank was wrongful because it stated that $14,550.45 was owing; and (3) whether Plaintiff Sydney Gutierrez-Chapin's property was wrongfully levied upon when a backup withholding was applied to her New York Life annuity. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' arguments are preposterous and without merit.
26 U.S.C. § 7426 states, in pertinent part, that:
any person (other than the person against whom is assessed the tax out of which such levy arose) who claims an interest in or lien on such property and that such property was wrongfully levied upon may bring a civil action against the United States.
Thus, there are three prerequisites for establishing a § 7426 waiver. First, the person must not be one "against whom is assessed the tax." Second, the person must claim a legally cognizable "interest" in the property, Third, the property must have been "wrongfully levied upon."
(1) The $4,039.10 Levy on the Corporate Plaintiff
First, Plaintiffs allege that the Plaintiff Corporation was wrongfully levied upon when $4,039.10 was collected for a balance due of $404.55. While not clearly stated, Plaintiffs' argument appears to be based on their assertion that the corporation does not owe any tax liability. To the extent that this is Plaintiffs' argument, the Court is without jurisdiction to determine whether the tax amount is owed because Plaintiffs admit that they have not filed the requisite claim for refund.
To the extent that Plaintiffs are otherwise attempting to state a claim under § 7426, Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the prerequisites for bringing such a civil action, The Court is without jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiffs' repeated argument that the corporation did not owe the tax liability and there is no evidence that the corporate plaintiff was not the one against whom the tax was assessed. The Corporate plaintiff was the taxpayer in question and, aside from the general allegations of Plaintiffs, there is no evidence that the money received was not applied to the corporation's outstanding 941 tax liability.
It appears to the Court that Plaintiffs believe that all moneys collected must have been applied to the personal tax liabilities of the individual Plaintiffs because the corporation did not owe any taxes. After reviewing the record, the Court finds this argument factually groundless. There is nothing in the record to support such an assertion except the insufficient general allegations made by counsel.
(2) The $14,550.45 Levy
Next, Plaintiffs argue that the levy on the bank account was wrongful because it stated that $14,550.45 was owing. While Plaintiff may be correct in their argument that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Corporate plaintiff owes taxes in the amount of $14,145.45 at the time of the levy; the Court does not have jurisdiction to determine whether the tax amount is owed because the Plaintiffs admit that they have not filed the requisite claim for refund.
(3) The Backup Withholding
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff Sydney Gutierrez-Chapin's property was wrongfully levied upon when a backup withholding was applied to her New York Life annuity.
Backup withholding is authorized by 26 U.S.C. § 6331. Backup withholding is not a levy; accordingly, to claim a refund of backup withholding, a taxpayer must file a claim for refund with the IRS as required by 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a). This requirement is jurisdictional.See Yuen v. United States, 825 F.2d 244, 245 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). Here, the jurisdictional requirements have not been met because there is no evidence in the record that the Plaintiffs have filed with the IRS a claim for a refund of backup withholding.
c. The Anti-Injunction Act
Finally, the report and recommendation recommends granting summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' injunction claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, Magistrate Williams found no wrongful levy because each of the individual levies were released and the monies received from the levy directed at the corporation's bank account was applied to the corporation's outstanding tax liabilities. Plaintiffs generally aver that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the anti-injunction act applies in this action.
The Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421, provides that suits may not be maintained for the purposes of restraining the collection or assessment of taxes. There is an exception to this restriction if the plaintiff can prove that the IRS initiated a wrongful levy. 26 U.S.C. § 7426.
Plaintiffs generally object to the magistrate's recommendation as to this claim and specifically object to the magistrate's finding that because the levies were released, there could be no wrongful levies. While not completely clear, it appears to the Court that Plaintiffs are objecting to the magistrate's finding no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the levies were released. However, aside from arguments of counsel, which are not evidence for purposes of a Rule 56 motion, there is no evidence contradicting the revenue officer's declaration that the levies were released. The "levy" allegedly assessed against Plaintiff Sydney Gutierrez-Chapin's New York Life annuity is a backup withholding and, as explained supra. different then a levy. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of an element which is essential to their case.
III. ORDER
Acting in part on the recommendations of Magistrate Judge Williams, based on the foregoing, and this Court being fully advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 39) is GRANTED. This matter is hereby dismissed in its entirety.