The court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the defense application to call an expert witness on battered women's syndrome on the ground that, under all the circumstances, defendant did not lay a sufficient foundation (see, People v. Cronin, 60 N.Y.2d 430;People v. Diaz, 51 N.Y.2d 841) or make an adequate offer of proof. We note that there was overwhelming evidence that defendant personally inflicted vicious abuse and severe injuries upon the deceased, her four-year-old child, entirely of her own volition and ill-will toward the child, and that the purported abuser, defendant's husband, was not even present during some of this abuse. The People's theory that defendant failed to protect the child from abuse by defendant's husband was only a minor component of the case.
The court's participation in the examination of witnesses was within reasonable limits and did not deprive defendant of a fair trial (see,People v. Moulton, 43 N.Y.2d 944; People v. Gonzalez, 228 A.D.2d 340, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 1021). Defendant's challenges to the court's charge do not warrant reversal since the charge as a whole conveyed the proper standards (see,People v. Coleman, 70 N.Y.2d 817).
We perceive no basis for reduction of sentence. The court's Biblical reference during sentence does not establish that sentencing was based on improper criteria.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.