DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant's statements to the police were voluntary (see, People v. Sohn, 148 A.D.2d 553, 556; People v. Woods, 141 A.D.2d 588; People v. Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d 35, 38). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the deception used by the police officers to obtain his statements did not render them involuntary (see, People v. Hassell, 180 A.D.2d 819, 820; People v. Ingram, 208 A.D.2d 561; People v. Foster, 193 A.D.2d 692).
The defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination in the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges. The fact that the prosecutor peremptorily challenged three potential jurors of the same race did not constitute a pattern of discrimination (see, People v. Penick, 229 A.D.2d 405, citing People v. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d 263; People v. Jenkins, 84 N.Y.2d 1001, 1003; cf., People v. Mondello, 191 A.D.2d 462).
The defendant's contention that the jury verdict was repugnant on the ground that he was acquitted of murder in the second degree but convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree was not raised before the discharge of the jury, and thus, his claim is unpreserved for appellate review (see, People v. Satloff, 56 N.Y.2d 745; People v. Baeza, 125 A.D.2d 318; People v. Rivera, 112 A.D.2d 327). In any event, the respective crimes contain materially different elements (see, People v. Rivera, supra).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 270.05), or without merit.