ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
As the Supreme Court properly determined, because the alleged defamatory statements were communications made by one person to another upon a subject in which they both had an interest, the statements are protected by a qualified privilege (see Foster v. Churchill, 87 N.Y.2d 744, 751; Bopp v. Institute for Forensic Psychology, 227 A.D.2d 363, 364; Matter of Levine v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 186 A.D.2d 743, 745; Kasachkoff v. City of New York, 107 A.D.2d 130, 135). Moreover, the complaint fails to allege malice on the part of the defendants (see Lowinger v. Jacques, 204 A.D.2d 175, 176; Kasachkoff v. City of New York, supra, at 135-136).
In addition, in light of the fact that the defendants were agents of Pace University, they cannot be held liable for purportedly inducing it to breach its contract with the plaintiff, particularly since they were acting within the scope of their authority (see Kartiganer Assoc. v. Town of New Windsor, 108 A.D.2d 898, 899). Accordingly, the complaint was properly dismissed.
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.
O'BRIEN, J.P., FRIEDMANN, H. MILLER and CRANE, JJ., concur.