Ordered that the judgments are affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, resolution of issues of credibility is primarily a matter to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses, and its determination should be accorded great deference on appeal ( see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 644-645; People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410). Upon the exercise of our factual review power ( see CPL 470.15), we are satisfied that the verdicts of guilt were not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v Romero, supra).
Specifically with regard to indictment No. 1505-01, the defendant's contention that the evidence of his guilt was wholly circumstantial and that the trial court erred in failing to give a special circumstantial evidence charge is unpreserved for appellate review, as the defendant did not request a circumstantial evidence charge or object to the charge as given ( see CPL 470.05; see also People v Brown, 209 AD2d 532, 532; People v Burgos, 170 AD2d 689, 689). We decline to reach the issue in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction ( see CPL 470.15 [c]; [6] [a]).
The imposition of consecutive sentences was proper ( see People v Day, 73 NY2d 208, 212; People v Brathwaite, 63 NY2d 839, 843; People v Almeda, 10 AD3d 367, 368; People v Clark, 191 AD2d 576). Furthermore, the sentences imposed were not excessive ( see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.