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Case Summary: Lewis Schontz Keeley v. Superior Court of the County of Nevada

Factual and Procedural Background

This application seeks a writ of prohibition to restrain the respondent superior court of Nevada County from trying a proceeding arising out of the divorce action titled "Dora Alice Keeley, Plaintiff, v. Lewis Schontz Keeley, Defendant." The original action was filed in the Superior Court of Placer County for divorce and custody of the parties' minor child. Defendant filed an answer and cross-complaint. W. J. Prewett, son of Judge J. E. Prewett of the Placer County superior court, appeared as attorney for plaintiff.

Because of Judge Prewett's disqualification, Hon. Wm. M. Finch of Glenn County was requested to preside and tried the case; judgment denied divorce to both parties but granted custody to plaintiff with visitation rights for the mother's mother. Later, on July 24, 1914, plaintiff filed a petition in the Placer County action to modify the custody judgment; J. M. Walling appeared as plaintiff's attorney on that petition.

Judge Finch issued an order to show cause setting the petition for hearing on September 28 in Placer County. Separately, on August 29, Judge Prewett (the disqualified judge) made an order transferring the cause to the Superior Court of Nevada County stating that the judge was disqualified, that a proceeding regarding the same subject-matter was pending in Nevada County, and that Nevada County was nearer the litigants; the clerk transmitted the records to Nevada County pursuant to that order.

Petitioner (defendant) alleges the transfer order was made without any motion, notice, stipulation, or knowledge of the parties or their attorneys, that there were no proceedings in Nevada County concerning the matter, and that Judge Finch was qualified and ready to proceed at the scheduled time. Respondent filed a demurrer and answer admitting only the disqualification ground and asserting that petitioner had not appeared in Nevada County or objected there, nor moved to revoke the transfer in Placer County.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order transferring the cause from Placer County to the Superior Court of Nevada County — made without motion, notice, or the parties' agreement — was valid or void.
  2. Whether a writ of prohibition is the appropriate remedy to restrain the Nevada County court from proceeding, given the alleged lack of jurisdiction resulting from the transfer.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The order transferring the cause to Nevada County was made without any motion or application, without notice to or knowledge of either party or their attorneys, and thus was unauthorized.
  • No proceedings regarding the same subject-matter were pending in Nevada County when the transfer order was made.
  • Judge Wm. M. Finch (a qualified judge from another county) was ready and willing to hear the petition at the time set, so the transfer was unnecessary and void.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Respondent admitted the disqualification of Judge Prewett (due to his son's connection) but contended petitioner had not appeared in Nevada County to object nor had petitioner moved in Placer County to revoke the transfer order.
  • Respondent argued that petitioner had not presented any application or objection in the Nevada County court questioning its jurisdiction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bohn v. Bohn, 164 Cal. 536, [129 P. 983] Change of place of trial can only be effected by an order of the court after judicial action is invoked so parties may contest transfer; the court must be applied to for an order of transfer. The court relied on Bohn to support the proposition that the transfer could not be made unilaterally and must follow proper motion and notice procedures.
In re Burch, 168 Cal. 18, [141 P. 813] Discussion that notice contemplated by section 397 of the Code of Civil Procedure is required for transfer motions and that a disqualified judge need not be served but other notice requirements remain; reference to methods for securing a qualified judge. The court cited Burch to emphasize required notice and procedural safeguards for transfers and to describe alternatives when a resident judge is disqualified.
Livermore v. Brundage, (64 Cal. 299), [30 P. 848] Interpreted as not holding that a motion to change place of trial need not be noticed at all; supports the need for notice contemplated by section 397. Used within the court's discussion of Burch to reinforce that notice is required even though a disqualified judge need not be served.
Imperial Land Co. v. Imperial Irrigation District, 166 Cal. 491, [137 P. 234] Suggested methods to secure a qualified judge when the only resident judge is disqualified: call a judge to hold an extra session or obtain a governor's designation of an unbiased judge from another county. The court applied this principle to note that a qualified judge (Judge Finch) was available and ready to proceed, obviating an impermissible transfer.
Baughman v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. 576, [14 P. 208] Prohibition will not ordinarily issue from the appellate court unless the attention of the inferior court has been called to the alleged excess of jurisdiction (i.e., an objection is made in the trial court). The court considered Baughman in assessing whether petitioner should first object in the Nevada County court, but found circumstances (order to show cause and respondent's return) justified issuing the writ.
Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 475 Referenced as part of the line of authority requiring that the inferior court be informed of the claimed excess of jurisdiction before appellate prohibition issues. Cited in support of the general principle that objection should ordinarily be made below; the court nonetheless declined to require that step here given the record.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court determined that the transfer order made by the disqualified judge was "without authority and entirely void" because it was issued without any motion, notice, or opportunity for the parties to be heard. The court applied the principles from Bohn v. Bohn and In re Burch to show that a change of place of trial requires judicial action invoked by motion so that parties can contest the transfer and that notice requirements are implicated by the statutes (citing sections 397 and 398 of the Code of Civil Procedure as discussed in Burch).

The court noted established alternatives to an improper transfer when a resident judge is disqualified (citing Imperial Land Co. v. Imperial Irrigation District) — either calling a judge to hold an extra session or obtaining a governor's designation of another judge — and observed that a qualified judge (Judge Finch) had in fact been made available to try the matter.

Considering whether prohibition was the proper remedy, the court acknowledged the general rule that the inferior court should ordinarily be informed of an alleged excess of jurisdiction before appellate prohibition will issue (citing Baughman and Southern Pacific R. R. Co.). However, because an order to show cause had been issued and the respondent's return suggested the Nevada County judge did not agree with petitioner, the court inferred that pursuing the suggested course in the inferior court would likely be unavailing.

Exercising its discretion and concluding the Nevada County court had no jurisdiction to proceed because the transfer was void, the court decided issuing the writ was the "simplest and most satisfactory course," expecting the records to be returned to Placer County and the Placer court to set aside its former order upon proper motion.

Holding and Implications

Holding: It is ordered that the peremptory writ of prohibition issue.

Implications:

  • The Superior Court of Nevada County is prohibited from proceeding with the transferred matter because the transfer order was void for lack of motion, notice, and opportunity for the parties to be heard.
  • The opinion contemplates the return of the records to Placer County and that the Placer County superior court, upon proper motion, will set aside its transfer order and set the cause for trial (i.e., the direct effect is to restore jurisdiction to Placer County for resolution of the pending matters).
  • The court's action is remedial to correct an asserted excess of jurisdiction; the opinion does not purport to establish a new rule beyond applying existing authorities and procedure cited.

Decision rendered December 21, 1914. Chipman, P. J., and Hart, J., concurred.

LEWIS SCHONTZ KEELEY, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE COUNTY OF NEVADA, Respondent.

BURNETT, J. —

The application is for a writ of prohibition to restrain respondent from trying a certain proceeding growing out of the trial of the action of "Dora Alice Keeley, Plaintiff, v. Lewis Schontz Keeley, Defendant." From the petition it appears that said action was begun in the superior court of Placer County, having for its object a judgment of divorce and the custody of the minor child of said parties. An answer and cross-complaint was filed by defendant seeking similar relief for himself. One W. J. Prewett, the son of Hon. J. E. Prewett, judge of said superior court, appeared in said action as attorney for plaintiff.

Thereafter Hon. Wm. M. Finch, judge of the superior court of Glenn County, was requested by Judge Prewett to preside at the trial of said cause and the latter set the time for said trial. The case was duly tried by Judge Finch and judgment was rendered denying a divorce to each party, but granting to plaintiff the custody of said minor child, providing, however, that the child should be allowed to visit and remain with the mother of defendant four months in each year. The petition further alleges: "That thereafter, on the 24th day of July, 1914, there was served and filed in said action by plaintiff a petition for an order modifying the above mentioned judgment relative to the custody of said minor child, said petition being made by the plaintiff in said action of Keeley v. Keeley, and J. M. Walling appearing as sole attorney for petitioner therein, and the said W. J. Prewett did not appear in said petition as attorney or in any other manner, and never has appeared in said action after the entry of said judgment as aforesaid"; that an order to show cause was made by Judge Finch and set for hearing on September 28, at 10 o'clock A. M., in the superior court of said Placer County, and said order was duly served and filed. On July 24, Judge Prewett also made an order setting said petition for hearing at the same time and place. Thereafter, on August 29, he made the following order:

"Keeley v. Keeley.

"In this case it is made to appear to this court that the judge thereof is disqualified under the law from further acting herein,

"It is further made to appear to this court that a proceeding regarding the same subject-matter is now pending in the superior court of the county of Nevada, state of California,

"It is further made to appear to the court that the county seat of Nevada County is much nearer to the residences of the respective litigants than any county seat of any other county.

"It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the aforesaid cause be and the same is hereby transferred to the superior court of the county of Nevada, state of California; and the clerk of this court is hereby directed and requested to transmit to said superior court of said Nevada County all the records and files in said case."

Having alleged that the clerk obeyed said order, the petition proceeds: "That no motion or any application whatever was made, or ever has been made for or in respect to said last mentioned order, nor was any motion made by either party to transfer said action to the superior court of Nevada County, or any other county; that no request was made by plaintiff to transfer said action to any court; that defendant is informed and believes, and therefore alleges it to be a fact that said order was made without the knowledge of any of the parties or attorneys in said action, and that none of the said parties or attorneys in said action knew or had any intimation whatever that said order would be made, but on the contrary all of said parties were prepared to proceed with the hearing of said petition before said Honorable William M. Finch, Judge as aforesaid, on September 28, 1914, at 10 o'clock A. M., in the superior court of Placer County.

"That neither defendant nor his attorneys ever at any time agreed or stipulated that said action should be transferred to the superior court of Nevada County, or any other county, nor was the said matter ever presented to their notice or consideration, nor was any opportunity afforded either party to agree or disagree to the transfer of said action to any court. . . .

"That there are not now, nor ever have been proceedings regarding the same subject-matter pending in the superior court of Nevada County, and the matter of the custody of said minor child has never been presented to said superior court of Nevada County in any manner. . . .

"That said Honorable William M. Finch is now, and during all the times herein mentioned was qualified to preside in and try said cause, and all matters connected therewith, and your petitioner is informed and believes, and therefore alleges it to be a fact that said Honorable William M. Finch is ready and willing to hear said petition at the time and place set for the same, and to proceed with the determination of all matters pending in said action."

A demurrer and an answer have been filed herein by respondent. None of the allegations of said petition is denied, however, except as to the disqualification of Judge Prewett, it being alleged that he was and is disqualified by reason of his son's connection with the case. The answer also sets forth "that said petitioner, Lewis Schontz Keeley, has not appeared in said superior court of Nevada County at any time, nor has any application been made to, or objection presented in this court to the court proceeding to hear and determine the matter presented or questioning the jurisdiction of this court in said matter," and furthermore, "that no application has at any time been made to the superior court of Placer County, or the judge thereof, asking for a revocation of the order of transfer set forth in the petition herein."

There seems to be no question that the order transferring said cause to the superior court of Nevada County was without authority and entirely void. In Bohn v. Bohn, 164 Cal. 536, [129 P. 983], discussing a change of the place of trial, the supreme court said: "The change can only be effected through an order of the court after its judicial action has been invoked, by bringing the matter on for hearing, where the right of the defendant to the transfer can be contested by the plaintiff. The court must be applied to for an order of transfer."

In the more recent case of In re Burch, 168 Cal. 18, [ 141 P. 813], it is said: "It may be contended that section 398 of the Code of Civil Procedure, alone applies to the motion here considered and that the notice contemplated by section 397 of that code is not necessary. Subdivision 4 of the latter section indicates, however, that the legislature intended such notice to be given. Livermore v. Brundage, ( 64 Cal. 299, [30 P. 848]), does not hold that such a motion need not be noticed at all. It merely decides that the judge who is disqualified need not be served."

Of course, it does not follow that a disqualified judge is compelled to try the cause if no motion is made for a transfer or if the parties do not consent thereto. In such contingency the course for him to pursue is pointed out in said Burch decision in the following language: "In Imperial Land Co. v. Imperial Irrigation District, 166 Cal. 491, [ 137 P. 234] this court suggested two methods whereby a qualified judge may be secured to preside at a trial in a county in which the only resident judge of the superior court is disqualified — one by calling a judge to hold an extra session; another by securing from the governor a designation of an unbiased judge from another county for the particular case." In the present instance, as the petition shows, there was a qualified judge from another county ready and willing to proceed with the hearing. The order in question having been made without motion or notice was, therefore, in excess of jurisdiction and void and it could, manifestly, confer upon the superior court of Nevada County no authority to hear the cause.

It is therefore a case for prohibition unless some other adequate remedy is clearly available.

There is force in the suggestion of respondent, in this connection, that petitioner should appear in the court below and object to any proceeding in the matter on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction of the cause, the inference being that the court would adopt petitioner's view and decline to proceed further. As to this, it is said, in Baughman v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. 576, [14 P. 208]: "It may be added that the petitioner does not distinctly show that objection was made to the proposed action of the superior court on the ground that it would be beyond jurisdiction. It has been repeatedly held here that prohibition will not go from this court unless the attention of the court whose proceedings are sought to be arrested has been called to the alleged excess of jurisdiction. ( Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 475.)"

Ordinarily, no doubt, such course should be pursued, but in this proceeding an order to show cause was issued and from the return of respondent contesting the sufficiency of the petition, we think it is fairly inferable that the learned trial judge of Nevada County does not agree with petitioner and that the course suggested would be unavailing.

At any rate, we have some discretion in the matter and believing as we do that respondent has no jurisdiction, we think the simplest and most satisfactory course is to issue the writ, assuming that respondent will direct the records to be returned to Placer County. The latter court, no doubt, upon the proper motion being made, will set aside its former order and set the cause down for trial.

It is ordered that the peremptory writ issue.

Chipman, P. J., and Hart, J., concurred.

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KEELEY v. SUPERIOR COURT
(Dec 21, 1914)