ORDER
JAMES CACHERIS, Senior District Judge
Upon consideration of the July 8, 2010, Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge designated to conduct a hearing in this matter, no objection having been filed within ten days, and upon an independent review of the record, it is hereby
ORDERED that the court adopts as its own the findings of fact and accepts the recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, and the proposed Order submitted by the plaintiff is this day entered.
the named defendant may be perfectly willing to comply with my demands and happy to do so without arguing, as defendants do here, that the case should not proceed because I have no right to govern his relationship with the third party or affect the absent third party's rights. This Court expressed similar concerns regarding the view of the judicial power offered by the dissent in
Nat'l Wildlife — which the majority today overrules — when discussing environmental suits brought under MCL 324.1701(1) of the Michigan environmental protection act:
Under th[e former dissenting] view of the "judicial power," "any person," for example, could seek to enjoin "any person" from mowing his lawn with a gas-powered mower because such activity allegedly creates air pollution and uses fossil fuels when other alternatives are available. "Any person" could sue "any person" for using too much fertilizer on his property, or allowing too much runoff from a feedlot on his property. "Any person" could sue "any person" from using excessive amounts of pesticides in his home or garden or farm. "Any person" could sue "any person" for improperly disposing of used petroleum-based oils. "Any person" could sue "any person" for improper backyard grilling practices, excessive use of aerosol sprays and propellants, or wasteful lawn watering. [ 471 Mich at 649-650.]
At least the scenarios presented in
Nat'l Wildlife involved suits against the allegedly offending party; here, the majority permits plaintiffs to maintain suit despite the absence of the students they seek to punish.
Members of the executive branch are thus vulnerable to suits filed by any person claiming a substantial interest in their affairs. I note the following timely illustration of what may arise. In the midst of the city of Detroit's ongoing financial woes and the ongoing crisis in its public school system, an activist group joined teachers and school board members to sue Robert Bobb, the emergency financial manager of the: Detroit Public Schools, seeking to challenge the salary terms of his contract with the Governor and the state superintendent of schools. A circuit court judge dismissed the suit, concluding that the plaintiffs did not have legal standing. Marisa Schultz, Judge throws out lawsuit over Financial Manager Bobb's pay, Detroit News, July 29, 2010. Under the majority's new approach, their suit seems tenable because all they have to allege is an ill-defined "substantial interest" in the management of local schools.
Consistent with the majority's deconstruction of Michigan's guiding legal principles over the last two years, the result boils down to this: in this state, anyone has standing to sue anyone else, any time. As in McCormick, 487 Mich 180, for example, where the majority significantly lowered the threshold for suits against Michigan drivers under our automobile no-fault insurance scheme, the majority continues to encourage litigation at a high cost to individuals, the courts, local governments and local officials. This complete destabilization of established law benefits no one.
See McCormick, 487 Mich at 286-287 (MARKMAN, J., dissenting) ("By nullifying the legislative compromise that was struck when the no-fault act was adopted — a compromise grounded in concerns over excessive litigation, the over-compensation of minor injuries, and the availability of affordable insurance — the Court's decision today will restore a legal environment in which each of these hazards reappears and threatens the continued fiscal soundness of our no-fault system.").
V CONCLUSION For each of these reasons, I dissent. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, which reached the correct result and properly applied the law of this state. The majority's conclusion that plaintiffs have standing here is devoid of any analysis and incorrect under any meaningful test. Its decision to grant standing here under an amorphous new test of its own making is unprincipled and opportunistic; in its haste to overrule yet another precedent of this Court, it grants teachers the right to sue for expulsion of children from our public schools without any regard for the students' rights. Finally, its choice to eschew the well-established Lee test aggregates limitless power in the courts, is contrary to our constitution, and will'only damage the rule of law in our state.
YOUNG and MAKKMAN, JJ., concurred with CORRIGAN, J.