LOZANO v. CITY OF HAZLETON

22, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5672 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). IRCA is thus "delicately balanced to serve the goal of preventing unauthorized alien employment while avoiding discrimination against citizens and authorized aliens." Collins Foods Int'l 948 F.2d at 554. As we explained earlier, Congress created the office of a Special Counsel to handle discrimination charges, see 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(c), and specifically required that the President fill that position, see 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(c)(1). As also detailed above, Congress authorized administrative law judges to impose on employers found guilty of discrimination civil penalties equivalent to the penalties imposed on employers found guilty of employing unauthorized aliens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(g)(2)(B)(iv)(I)-(III).

The Supreme Court has consistently found state and local laws which alter the careful balancing of objectives accomplished by a federal law to be pre-empted, and so have we. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 144, 109 S.Ct. 971, 103 L.Ed.2d 118 (1989) (finding Florida law pre-empted because it struck the balance between "the encouragement of invention and free competition in unpatented ideas" differently from federal patent law); Rogers v. Larson, 563 F.2d 617, 626 (3d Cir. 1977) (finding Virgin Islands law pre-empted because it struck the balance between "assur[ing] an adequate labor force on the one hand and . . . protect[ing] the jobs of citizens on the other" differently from federal immigration law). Hazleton's IIRAO undermines IRCA's careful balancing of objectives in at least four ways.

First, the IIRAO significantly increases employer burden by creating a separate and independent adjudicative system for determining whether an employer is guilty of employing unauthorized aliens. Hazleton's system fails to reflect the same concern with reducing employer burden as IRCA. In contrast to the federal requirement that a complaint have a "substantial probability of validity," the IIRAO permits investigation of any complaint lodged against an employer regardless of its likely merit. Under Section 4 of the IIRAO, a complaint is valid so long as it includes an "allegation which describes the alleged violator(s) as well as the actions constituting the violation, and the date and location where such actions occurred." IIRAO § 4B. Upon receipt of any such complaint (so long as it does allege a violation on the basis of national origin, ethnicity, or race), Hazleton's Code Enforcement Office must, "within three business days, request identity information from the business entity regarding any persons alleged to be unlawful workers." IIRAO § 4B(2)-(3).

Similarly, the IIRAO provides employers with substantially fewer procedural protections than IRCA. Under IRCA, an employer must be provided with notice and an opportunity for a hearing, and an administrative law judge must find the employer guilty of violating IRCA by a preponderance of the evidence before any sanctions can be imposed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e). That employer also has a right to an administrative appeal and judicial review. See id. In marked contrast, the IIRAO requires Hazleton's Code Enforcement Office to immediately suspend the business license of a business entity which fails to provide requested information about alleged unlawful workers within three business days. See IIRAO § 4B(3). Additionally, if a business entity fails to terminate anyone that Hazleton has decided is an unlawful worker within three business days, the Code Enforcement Office immediately suspends its license. See IIRAO § 4B(4). A business entity that has been "subject to a complaint and subsequent enforcement" can then seek relief in court, but both the procedure and remedies available to that employer are entirely unclear on the face of the ordinance. See IIRAO § 7F.

The crux of this conflict, however, transcends the differences between the IIRAO's prosecution and adjudication system and IRCA's. Rather, it is rooted in the fact that Hazleton has established an alternate system at all. As we have explained, Congress created a comprehensive and carefully balanced prosecution and adjudication system, and foremost among its goals in doing so was to minimize the burden this system would impose on employers. See Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 751 (IRCA "exhaustively details a specialized administrative scheme for determining whether an employer has knowingly employed an unauthorized alien."). We therefore cannot fathom that Congress intended to tolerate the "supplementing" of its carefully crafted system with independent state and local systems, which by their mere existence drastically increase burdens on employers.

Under the IIRAO, a business in Hazleton must worry about two separate systems of complaints, investigations, prosecutions, and adjudications. Furthermore, Hazleton's ordinance is not the only consideration here, given the emerging landscape of local and state regulation in the area. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Pls.` Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350, 121 S.Ct. 1012, 148 L.Ed.2d 854 (2001) (explaining that if one state's tort system is permitted then federal law will have to operate "in the shadow of 50 States' tort regimes [thereby] dramatically increasing] the burdens facing potential applicants — burdens not contemplated by Congress"). If Hazleton's ordinance is permissible, then each and every state and locality would be free to implement similar schemes for investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating whether an employer has employed unauthorized aliens. See Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364, 373, 128 S.Ct. 989, 169 L.Ed.2d 933 (2008) (reasoning that allowing one state to implement its own monitoring system "would allow other States to do the same . . . easily lead[ing] to a patchwork of state . . . laws, rules, and regulations"). As noted above, many states and localities have already tried. A patchwork of state and local systems each independently monitoring, investigating, and ultimately deciding — all concurrently with the federal government — whether employers have hired unauthorized aliens could not possibly be in greater conflict with Congress's intent for its carefully crafted prosecution and adjudication system to minimize the burden imposed on employers.

Although we have been framing this question as one of conflict pre-emption, Hazleton's actions may be subject to field pre-emption as well. "Field preemption arises by implication when state law occupies a `field reserved for federal regulation.'" Bruesewitz, 561 F.3d at 238 ( citing United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 111, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000)). The categories of pre-emption are not "rigidly distinct. Indeed, field pre-emption may be understood as a species of conflict pre-emption: A state law that falls within a preempted field conflicts with Congress' intent (either express or plainly implied) to exclude state regulation." English, 496 U.S. at 79 n. 5, 110 S.Ct. 2270. If Congress, in service of the goal of minimizing employer burden, intended for its adjudicative system to be exclusive, IRCA would occupy the field of prosecuting and adjudicating employers for the hiring of unauthorized aliens.

Second, the IIRAO contravenes congressional objectives by altering the employment verification scheme created by IRCA, and supplemented by IIRIRA and subsequent legislation. While IRCA affords an affirmative defense to any employer who uses the 1-9 process to verify the work authorization of its employees, the IIRAO does not. The IIRAO provides its safe harbor only to employers who use E-Verify. In this way, the IIRAO significantly alters the risk calculus for employers, and coerces use of E-Verify. The IIRAO also directly compels City agencies, City contractors, and all employers twice found guilty of violating the IIRAO to use E-Verify. These provisions contradict congressional intent for E-Verify to remain fully voluntary for the vast majority of employers — a decision that, once again, balances seeking efficacy in employment authorization verification with the goals of minimizing employer burden and preventing employment discrimination. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 878, 120 S.Ct. 1913 (finding state law imposing a specific requirement conflict pre-empted where Congress "deliberately sought variety" and to provide "several different" options). Similarly, they contravene congressional intent for the 1-9 process to serve as a universal protection against sanctions.

Throughout its brief, Hazleton makes much of the fact that the IIRAO does not actually "coerce" employers to use E-Verify (or as we discuss later, to verify the work authorization of independent contractors) because even though safe harbor is provided only to those employers who use E-Verify, employers are given the opportunity to terminate an unauthorized alien before sanctions are imposed, thus making a safe harbor less essential. The argument is the proverbial "red herring."
It is clear that Hazleton significantly incentivizes use of E-Verify. However one characterizes this coercion, it is inconsistent with congressional intent. The IIRAO plainly alters the riskiness of choosing not to use E-Verify (or choosing not to verify the work authorization of independent contractors). The anxiety associated with these choices is itself a burden from which Congress intended to protect employers. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(1), at 16 (limiting the scope of employers' responsibilities to reduce the "concern[s]" of "cautious employers").

As Plaintiffs pointed out at oral argument, if Congress were solely concerned with ensuring that no unauthorized alien ever secured employment in the United States, it would have and could have found a better mechanism for verifying employment authorization than the 1-9 process. The 1-9 process is not foolproof, and yet it remains the default employment verification system twenty-four years after IRCA's enactment. This reflects Congress's determination that E-Verify, which advances certain federal objectives to the detriment of others, is not yet appropriate for mandated use.

At least for certain categories of employees, studies have shown that E-Verify is more effective than the 1-9 process for determining whether an employee is authorized to work in the United States. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Report to Congress on the Basic Pilot Program, June 2004, at 3 (The program "reduced unauthorized employment among participating employers by permitting employers to determine whether the information provided by employees on 1-9 forms is consistent with information on SSA and DHS databases."). However, because of problems with the relevant databases, E-Verify has been alarmingly ineffective in verifying the employment authorization of work-authorized aliens and naturalized citizens, and thus has effectively resulted in discrimination against these groups. See id. ("[T]he tentative nonconfirmation rate was unacceptably high for foreign-born work-authorized employees and was higher than desirable for U.S.-born employees. This created burdens for employees and employers . . . and led to unintentional discrimination against foreign-born persons.").

As of the last congressionally-mandated evaluation of E-Verify in 2007, foreign-born work-authorized employees were still thirty times more likely to receive tentative nonconfirmations than employees born in the United States, see Westat, Findings of the Web Basic Pilot Evaluation ("2007 Findings") (September 2007), at xxv, and foreign-born United States citizens were seven times more likely to receive erroneous tentative nonconfirmations than work-authorized aliens, see id. This study thus made clear that "further improvements are needed" before E-Verify could be made mandatory. See id., at xxi. Accordingly, through various expansions of the program, Congress has continually required that E-Verify be strictly voluntary for the vast majority of employers. See, e.g., Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub.L. No. 111-83, § 547, 123 Stat. 2177; Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub.L. No. 110-329, Div. A, § 143, 122 Stat. 3574, 3580 (2008); Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion Act of 2003, Pub.L. No. 108-156, §§ 2, 3, 117 Stat. 1944 (2003); Basic Pilot Extension Act of 2001, Pub.L. No. 107-128, § 2, 115 Stat. 2407 (2002).

The voluntariness of the system protects employers as well as employees. E-Verify has costs, including set-up and training expenses. See 2007 Findings, at xxvi; Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 756 (E-Verify has significant costs "in the form of implementation and training expenses."). Given the problems with the system, these costs are not yet a reliable investment. Moreover, E-Verify continues to operate on a trial basis, and absent action by Congress, its statutory authorization will terminate in 2012. See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub.L. No. 111-83, § 547, 123 Stat. 2177. Mandating E-Verify now therefore requires employers to incur costs that may be entirely worthless in the long-run. In all these ways, Congress's refusal to make E-Verify mandatory is consistent with its objective of ensuring that IRCA imposes the "minimum burden necessary . . . to be effective." See 132 Cong. Rec. H10583-01 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Bryant).

Additionally, Hazleton's scheme increases the burden on interstate employers by failing to provide safe harbor for those who use the 1-9 process. As the court explained in Edmondson, "[b]y making the 1-9 system a uniform national requirement, Congress limited the compliance burden on interstate corporations while facilitating uniform enforcement." 594 F.3d at 767. A uniform system reduces costs for employers with multiple locations throughout the country by ensuring that the same human resources procedures can be used in all locations. Hazleton's scheme denies interstate employers who use the 1-9 process the benefits of uniformity. Interstate employers with locations in Hazleton (who wish to ensure safe harbor in all locations) would either have to adhere to different regulations in different locations, or use E-Verify in all locations.

In its defense, Hazleton argues that the other courts that have considered the question of states' and localities' power to mandate E-Verify have concluded that there is insufficient evidence that Congress's refusal to allow the federal government to make E-Verify mandatory reflects an intent to deprive states and localities of the power to do so. In Chicanos Por La Causa, for instance, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that an Arizona law that made use of E-Verify mandatory was not conflict pre-empted. It explained that the fact that "Congress made participation in E-Verify voluntary at the national level . . . did not in and of itself indicate that Congress intended to prevent states from making participation mandatory." See Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 866-67. Similarly, in Gray, the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri declined to interpret "Congress's decision not to make [E-Verify] mandatory as restricting a state or local government's authority under the police powers." Gray, 2008 WL 294294, at * 19. That court reasoned that a locality's mandating of E-Verify is consistent with the federal goal of "greater enforcement." Id.

These decisions, however, fail to afford proper weight to the purposes underlying Congress's decision to retain E-Verify as a voluntary program. Despite its advantages, E-Verify also has significant problems, and accordingly mandating its use interferes with the balancing of interests embodied in IRCA. The conclusion that mandating E-Verify is consistent with the goal of "greater enforcement" thus simply ignores that enforcement is not Congress's only concern. Again, Hazleton has placed a priority on deterring employment of unauthorized aliens, but failed to concern itself with the costs its ordinance imposes on employers and on work-authorized aliens.

There is yet another way in which the IIRAO obstructs the congressional purposes underlying IRCA. The IIRAO coerces employers to verify the work authorization of independent contractors, even though Congress purposely excluded independent contractors from IRCA's verification requirements. Although employers do face liability under IRCA for knowingly utilizing the services of independent contractors who are unauthorized aliens, they are not required to actually verify contractors' work eligibility, as they must with employees. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a). Thus, employers can utilize contractors' services without incurring the expense of verification, or the anxiety of potential sanctions. The IIRAO, on the other hand, does not distinguish between employees and independent contractors, and thus effectively coerces businesses to verify their contractors' authorization. See IIRAO § 4A. In so doing, the IIRAO fundamentally alters a business's relationship with its contractors and undermines the careful balancing of objectives Congress intended.

In drafting IRCA, Congress explicitly declined to sanction employers based on the work authorization status of "casual hires (i.e., those that do not involve the existence of an employer/employee relationship)." H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(1), at 11, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5661. This was not an unreasoned choice, but part of the crafting of the statute to minimize the burden placed on employers. As the court explained in Edmondson, "[e]mployers are not required [under federal law] to verify the work eligibility of independent contractors" because it "would increase the burdens on business." 594 F.3d at 767. Businesses utilize independent contractors, in part, to reduce the costs and liabilities associated with procuring labor when an enduring and structured relationship is not needed. Compelling businesses to concern themselves with the work authorization status of contractors alters this relationship, and also raises costs.

Ironically, the IIRAO is equally problematic for pre-emption purposes because it only coerces but does not directly require verification of independent contractors' work authorization, while imposing sanctions on employers if their contractors are unauthorized. Although earlier versions of the bills that became IRCA did not require employers to use an employment verification system, Congress ultimately decided that a mandatory and uniformly used employment verification system must be a counterpart of employer sanctions. Absent that requirement, Congress concluded, employers would too often "guess" about their prospective hires' work authorization. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(1), at 23, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5672 ("[T]he bill does provide substantial protections against discrimination in the form of a uniform verification process for all new hires."); S.Rep. No. 99-132, at 23 ("To be nondiscriminatory . . . any employee eligibility system must apply equally to each member of the U.S. workforce."). Guesswork unavoidably yields discrimination in hiring, and that result could not be more at odds with congressional intent.

Plaintiffs also argue that the IIRAO stands as an obstacle to IRCA in several other ways. They argue that it: requires employers to verify the employment authorization of casual domestic laborers, another group purposefully excluded from IRCA's verification requirements; requires unions to verify the work authorization of members they refer for work in certain instances, when unions operating in this capacity were also purposefully excluded from IRCA's verification requirements; and denies to employees the "cure period" available under federal law to establish work authorization after receiving a tentative non-confirmation from E-Verify. Hazleton contests that the IIRAO's employment provisions operate in these ways, and the language of the ordinance in ambiguous. Furthermore, the district court did not make any findings that would allow us to resolve these claims. Accordingly, we do not factor these considerations into our pre-emption analysis. As we have explained, "hypothetical" conflicts usually will not support a finding of preemption. See Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 310, 108 S.Ct. 1145.

Hazleton's failure to balance its sanctions with anti-discrimination protections is a final area in which the employment provisions of the IIRAO significantly conflict with IRCA. Congress was clear that "a mechanism to remedy any discrimination that [occurs because of employer sanctions] must be a part of employer sanctions legislation. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(1), at 22, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5672. Hazleton contends that IRCA's anti-discrimination provision fully accomplishes the congressional goal of deterring unlawful discrimination, and that it is not compelled to duplicate federal efforts. Hazleton misses the point.

While drafting IRCA, Congress heard testimony that imposing employer sanctions would create economic incentives for employers to discriminate against workers who appeared to be of foreign origin. If hiring unauthorized aliens were penalized, but discriminating against authorized foreign workers were not, employers might rationally choose not to hire anyone who appeared "foreign" in an effort to avoid entirely the threat of sanctions. See, e.g., 132 Cong. Rec. S16879-01 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement Of Sen. Hart) ("The employer sanctions in the legislation will undoubtedly act as an incentive for businesses to `play it safe' and refuse to hire individuals whose status may be in question. This would mean that [B]lacks, Hispanics, and Asians would encounter new difficulties in getting hired."). Consequently, Congress decided that IRCA must allow judges to impose on employers who discriminate in hiring penalties of the exact same magnitude as imposed on employers who hire unauthorized aliens. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A)(i)-(iii) with 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(g)(2)(B)(iv)(I)-(III).

The IIRAO's employment provisions upset this careful balance. By imposing additional sanctions on employers who hire unauthorized aliens, while not penalizing those who discriminate, Hazleton has elected to place all of its weight on one side of the regulatory scale. This creates the exact situation that Congress feared: a system under which employers might quite rationally choose to err on the side of discriminating against job applicants they perceive to be foreign. This is inconsistent with IRCA and therefore cannot be tolerated under the Supremacy Clause.

Hazleton attempts to parry the thrust of this argument by again relying on the decisions in Chicanos Por La Causa and Gray. Those courts rejected the argument that licensing laws that revoked the licenses of businesses who employed unauthorized aliens were likely to increase discrimination, and would contravene IRCA absent an anti-discrimination component.

We believe those decisions undervalue the emphasis Congress placed on preventing discrimination, and the pain-staking care Congress took to achieve that objective. For example, the courts in both Chicanos Por La Causa and Gray demanded proof that employer sanctions result in discrimination. That is puzzling because Congress has already addressed that question. Although Congress could not have been certain that one-sided sanctions would lead to future discrimination when it enacted IRCA, it was sufficiently troubled by the likelihood to commit to preventative action. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(11), at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757 (The "House of Representatives recognized [the] potential for this unfortunate cause and effect relationship between sanctions enforcement and resulting employment discrimination"). Notably, Congress also required the Comptroller General to report, three years after IRCA's enactment, on whether employer sanctions had resulted in discrimination. The Comptroller General concluded that employer sanctions had caused "widespread discrimination." U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/TGGD-90-31, Testimony on Immigration Reform: Employer Sanctions and the Question of Discrimination (1990).

Congress stated repeatedly that countervailing anti-discrimination protections must be a part of any employer sanctions legislation, see H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(11), at 4, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757, 5761 ("[I]f there is to be sanctions enforcement and liability, there must be an equally strong and readily available remedy if resulting employment discrimination occurs.") (emphasis added), and we think this just as true when states and localities regulate in this area. To be consistent with federal law, states and localities that use regulatory enactments to sanction employers who have been found guilty of employing unauthorized aliens under IRCA must impose sanctions of equal severity on employers found guilty of discriminating.

Hazleton attempts to shield its legislative efforts from pre-emption based on the doctrine of "concurrent enforcement," but this could not be less persuasive. As Hazleton itself acknowledges, "concurrent enforcement activity is authorized" only where "state enforcement activities do not impair federal regulatory interests." Hazleton's Br. 57 (quoting Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by, HodgersDurgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999)) (emphasis added). Hazleton claims that the IIRAO satisfies this standard because "the employment provisions . . . were drafted with meticulous care to match the terminology and scope of federal law." Hazleton's Br. 58. Given our discussion thus far, we need not belabor here explaining why this assertion is wrong. Simply put, Hazleton has enacted a regulatory scheme that is designed to further the single objective of federal law that it deems important — ensuring unauthorized aliens do not work in the United States. It has chosen to disregard Congress's other objectives — protecting lawful immigrants and others from employment discrimination, and minimizing the burden imposed on employers. Regulatory "cherry picking" is not concurrent enforcement, and it is not constitutionally permitted.

Notably, this is not the first time that we have confronted a local law that skews the federal government's careful balancing of objectives in the regulation of alien employment. We addressed a similar situation over thirty years ago in Rogers v. Larson, 563 F.2d 617 (1977). There, the Government of the Virgin Islands had enacted a law which called for the replacement of certain nonimmigrant alien workers with qualified citizens or lawful permanent resident workers, if and when such workers became available. Nonimmigrant aliens brought suit arguing that the territorial law was pre-empted by the INA, and in particular by federal regulations guaranteeing nonimmigrant aliens' employment for definite periods of time. We agreed.

In striking down the Virgin Islands' legislative effort as an obstacle to the congressional purposes underlying the INA, we made clear that the fact that the two statutory schemes shared purposes in common did not save the territorial law from pre-emption. Rather, the laws were directly at odds with each other because they "str[uck] the balance between [the] goals differently." Id. at 626. The Virgin Islands statute struck the balance "more in the direction of protection of citizen-workers," and federal law struck it more in the direction of protection of employers and alien workers. Id. "Because of the different emphasis the two statutory schemes place[d] on the purposes of job protection and an adequate labor force," the Virgin Islands provision was invalid under the Supremacy Clause. Id. The same is just as true here.

It is, of course, not our job to sit in judgment of whether state and local frustration about federal immigration policy is warranted. We are, however, required to intervene when states and localities directly undermine the federal objectives embodied in statutes enacted by Congress. The employment provisions of the IIRAO "stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution" of IRCA's objectives, Hines, 312 U.S. at 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, and thus are pre-empted.

2. Housing Provisions

Our final inquiry addresses Plaintiffs' claim that the housing provisions of the IIRAO and the RO are pre-empted. The district court agreed with Plaintiffs, and so do we.

Before delving into the substance of this analysis, however, we must first consider whether the presumption against pre-emption applies to the housing provisions. The district court did not distinguish between the employment and housing provisions in addressing the presumption; it summarily concluded that both operate in the field of "immigration," and that because of the "history of significant federal presence" in that area, the presumption did not apply. Lozano, 496 F.Supp.2d at 518 n. 41. We have explained why that conclusion was erroneous as applied to the employment provisions, which under DeCanas, fall within the states' historic police powers. The housing provisions, however, raise a very different issue. As the District Court for the Northern District of Texas explained in Farmers Branch III, "[l]ocal regulation that conditions the ability to enter private contract for shelter on federal immigration status is of a fundamentally different nature than . . . restrictions on employment." 701 F.Supp.2d 835, 855-56.

The parties characterize the housing provisions of the RO and the IIRAO in starkly different terms. Hazleton maintains that the housing provisions regulate rental accommodations, and thus, like the employment provisions, fall within the state's historic police powers. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that these provisions regulate who may live in Hazleton based on immigration status, and that regulating which aliens are permitted to reside in the United States is a historically federal function far beyond the police powers of any state.

Although we realize that a state certainly can, and presumably should, regulate rental accommodations to ensure the health and safety of its residents, and that such regulation may permissibly affect the rights of persons in the country unlawfully, see DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355, 96 S.Ct. 933, we cannot bury our heads in the sand ostrich-like ignoring the reality of what these ordinances accomplish. Through its housing provisions, Hazleton attempts to regulate residence based solely on immigration status. Deciding which aliens may live in the United States has always been the prerogative of the federal government. Hazleton purposefully chose to enter this area of "significant federal presence." Locke, 529 U.S. at 108, 120 S.Ct. 1135. Accordingly, we will not presume non-preemption.

The rest of our analysis flows directly from our conclusion that Hazleton's housing provisions regulate which aliens may live there. Under DeCanas, a state or locality may not "regulate immigration," which the Supreme Court has defined as any attempt to determine "who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain." DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355, 96 S.Ct. 933. Such power is delegated by the Constitution exclusively to the federal government, and even if Congress had never acted in the field, states and localities would be precluded from doing so. See id. Thus, over a century ago, the Supreme Court explained that: "[t]he doctrine is firmly established that the power to exclude or expel aliens is vested in the political departments of the [federal] government, to be regulated by treaty or by act of Congress." Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296, 302, 22 S.Ct. 686, 46 L.Ed. 917 (1902). Whether Hazleton inadvertently stumbled into this exclusively federal domain, or decided to defiantly barge in, it is clear that it has attempted to usurp authority that the Constitution has placed beyond the vicissitudes of local governments.

The housing provisions of the IIRAO and the RO are also field pre-empted by the INA. As the Supreme Court explained in DeCanas, the central concern of the INA is with "the terms and conditions of admission to the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country." 424 U.S. at 359, 96 S.Ct. 933. The "comprehensiveness of the INA scheme for regulation of immigration and naturalization," id., plainly precludes state efforts, whether harmonious or conflicting, to regulate residence in this country based on immigration status.

We recognize, of course, that Hazleton's housing provisions neither control actual physical entry into the City, nor physically expel persons from it. Nonetheless, "[i]n essence," that is precisely what they attempt to do. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 160, 109 S.Ct. 971. "It is difficult to conceive of a more effective method" of ensuring that persons do not enter or remain in a locality than by precluding their ability to live in it. Id.

At oral argument, Hazleton posited that aliens lacking lawful status could still reside in the City through purchasing a home, or through staving with friends. The response is as disingenuous as it is unrealistic. There is nothing on this record that suggests that the people whom the residential provisions are aimed at could avail themselves of such options. Even if they were viable alternatives for some, however, many others still would be excluded, and that is sufficient for these provisions to be pre-empted.

We point out that they could stay with friends only if those friends owned property and did not rent. Authorized occupants of apartments who permit persons lacking lawful immigration status to stay with them are also fined under the RO: "$1000 for each . . . Occupant . . . that does not have an occupancy permit" and $100 per day per any such Occupant until the violation is corrected. RO § 10b.

We also recognize that Hazleton's housing provisions regulate presence only within its city limits, not the entire country. This does not change the analysis. To be meaningful, the federal government's exclusive control over residence in this country must extend to any political subdivision. Again, it is not only Hazleton's ordinance that we must consider. If Hazleton can regulate as it has here, then so could every other state or locality. See Rowe, 552 U.S. at 373, 128 S.Ct. 989. As the District Court for the Northern District of Texas reasoned: "we can imagine the slippery slope . . . if every local and state government enacted laws purporting to determine that . . . [certain persons] could not stay in their bounds. If every city and state enacted and enforced such laws . . . the federal government's control over decisions relating to immigration would be effectively eviscerated." Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch ("Farmers Branch I"), No. 3:08-cv-1551-B, Hrg. Tr. at 136 (N.D.Tex. Sept. 12, 2008). Indeed, the record strongly suggests that Hazleton's mayor intended these provisions to be at the forefront of exactly such an evisceration. See supra note 31.

The housing provisions of the IIRAO and the RO are also conflict pre-empted by the INA. As the district court explained, these provisions attempt to effectively "remove" persons from Hazleton based on a snapshot of their current immigration status, rather than based on a federal order of removal. This is fundamentally inconsistent with the INA.

Hazleton goes to great lengths to defend its housing provisions as providing for an accurate assessment of tenants' immigration status, and only denying housing to those whom the federal government confirms are here unlawfully. Even assuming Hazleton is correct, this argument does not advance Hazleton's cause; rather, it highlights the fundamental misconception at the heart of these ordinances. Through its housing provisions, Hazleton attempts to remove persons from the community based on current immigration status. However, as Justice Blackmun explained in Plyler: "the structure of the immigration statutes makes it impossible for the State to determine which aliens are entitled to residence, and which eventually will be deported." 457 U.S. at 236, 102 S.Ct. 2382 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

Under federal law, an unlawful immigration status does not lead instantly, or inevitably, to removal. Under most circumstances, a federal removal hearing under section 240 of the INA is required. Absent certain limited exceptions, this proceeding is the "sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted to the United States or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3). As we explained in detail above, knowing whether the government will decide to initiate proceedings against a particular alien is as impossible as trying to predict the outcome of such a proceeding once initiated.

The federal government has discretion in deciding whether and when to initiate removal proceedings. See Juarez, 599 F.3d at 566. As the district court found, the government purposefully exercises its discretion not to prosecute in certain instances, and thereby tacitly allows the presence of those whose technical status remains "illegal." See Lozano, 496 F.Supp.2d at 531 n. 56. Furthermore, once the government initiates these proceedings, whether they will result in removal is far from certain. A judge may award discretionary relief saving a removable alien from removal, or even adjusting that alien's status to that of lawful permanent resident. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. Thus, for these reasons, it is simply:

impossible for a State to determine which aliens the Federal Government will eventually deport, which the Federal Government will permit to stay, and which the Federal Government will ultimately naturalize. Until an undocumented alien is ordered deported by the Federal Government, no State can be assured that the alien will not be found to have a federal permission to reside in the country, perhaps even as a citizen. Indeed, even the Immigration and Naturalization Service cannot predict with certainty whether any individual alien has a right to reside in the country until deportation proceedings have run their course.

Plyler, 457 U.S. at 241 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 2382 (Powell, J., concurring).

Stitched into the fabric of Hazleton's housing provisions, then, is either a lack of understanding or a refusal to recognize the complexities of federal immigration law. Hazleton would effectively remove from its City an alien college student the federal government has purposefully declined to initiate removal proceedings against. So too would Hazleton remove an alien battered spouse, currently unlawfully present, but eligible for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident under the special protections Congress has afforded to battered spouses and children. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2). In each of these instances, as in every single instance in which Hazleton would deny residence to an alien based on immigration status rather than on a federal order of removal, Hazleton would act directly in opposition to federal law.

See Julia Preston, Students Spared Amid an Increase in Deportations, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 2010.

Hazleton attempts to avoid this result by again relying on the concept of "concurrent enforcement" to defend its housing provisions. According to Hazleton, its housing provisions mirror the INA's prohibition against "harboring," which imposes criminal penalties on:

Any person who . . . knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any place, including any building or any means of transportation.

8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). Hazleton contends that since federal courts have consistently found that providing housing to aliens lacking lawful immigration status constitutes unlawful "harboring," its housing provisions do no more than concurrently enforce federal law. Hazleton is wrong.

As we have explained, Hazleton's housing provisions operate in a field which the federal government exclusively occupies. Therefore, even if Hazleton's housing provisions did concurrently enforce federal law, this would not save them; even harmonious regulation is pre-empted here. However, Hazleton is also plainly incorrect in claiming that its housing provisions "mirror" federal law. The federal prohibition against harboring has never been interpreted to apply so broadly as to encompass the typical landlord/tenant relationship.

8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) criminalizes harboring an alien, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien came to, or remains in, the United States in violation of law. The statute, however, does not define the term "harboring," and the Supreme Court has yet to do so. As a result, the breadth of the term is currently in dispute among the Circuit Courts of Appeals. Some courts, our own included, have found that culpability requires some conduct that helps to conceal an alien from authorities. We, along with the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, define "harboring" as conduct "tending to substantially facilitate an alien's remaining in the United States illegally and to prevent government authorities from detecting the alien's unlawful presence." United States v. Ozcelik, 527 F.3d 88, 100 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Kim, 193 F.3d 567, 574 (2d Cir. 1999) (Harboring "encompasses conduct tending substantially to facilitate an alien's remaining in the United States illegally and to prevent government authorities from detecting his unlawful presence.") (emphasis added). Thus, we have held that "harboring" requires some act of obstruction that reduces the likelihood the government will discover the alien's presence. It is highly unlikely that a landlord's renting of an apartment to an alien lacking lawful immigration status could ever, without more, satisfy this definition of harboring. Renting an apartment in the normal course of business is not in and of itself conduct that prevents the government from detecting an alien's presence.

It is true that other Courts of Appeals have held that a showing of concealment is unnecessary, and that conduct which merely "substantially facilitates an alien's remaining in the country illegally" is sufficient to constitute harboring. See, e.g., United States v. Tipton, 518 F.3d 591, 595 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal alteration omitted). However, even under the more lenient tests of these jurisdictions, we are not aware of any case in which someone has been convicted of "harboring" merely because s/he rented an apartment to someone s/he knew (or had reason to know) was not legally in the United States.

Notably, all the cases cited by Hazleton for that proposition involve defendants who played a much more active role in helping an alien remain in the United States. See, e.g., Tipton, 518 F.3d at 595 (defendant employer who employed and housed six unauthorized alien employees, provided them with transportation and money to purchase necessities, and maintained counterfeit immigration papers for them guilty of harboring); United States v. Zheng, 306 F.3d 1080, 1082 (11th Cir. 2002) (defendant employer who permitted ten to twenty unauthorized alien employees, who were overworked and underpaid, to live at his house in "barrack-like accommodations" without paying rent guilty of harboring); Kim, 193 F.3d at 574-75 (defendant employer who advised unauthorized alien employees to change names and acquire false documentation guilty of harboring); United States v. Sanchez, 963 F.2d 152, 155 (8th Cir. 1992) (defendant employer who paid to rent an apartment for unauthorized alien employees, provided them with transportation to and from work, and offered to obtain immigration papers for them guilty of harboring). None of these cases involve anything verging on a simple landlord/tenant relationship. Rather, the fact that so many of these cases involve employers emphasizes that something much more is needed to turn renting a residential unit into harboring.

Furthermore, regardless of the breadth of the term "harboring" in and of itself, there is no question that harboring is illegal under federal law only if a defendant knew or was in reckless disregard of the harbored alien's immigration status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a). Hazleton argues that the housing provisions of the IIRAO similarly only prohibit renting to persons known to lack lawful immigration status. This isolated reading of the IIRAO is misleading. Taken together, the IIRAO and the RO not only prohibit the knowing harboring of (defined to include the rental of housing to) certain aliens, but also make legal immigration status a qualification for occupancy of rental housing. Although the typical landlord might never know of her/his tenant's immigration status, Hazleton's provisions collectively require that any provider of rental housing be put on notice about the immigration status of potential renters. See Lozano, 496 F.Supp.2d at 493 (Espinal testified that "he understood the ordinances to require that he obtain information on immigration status from tenants that he normally would not seek.").

Although the federal government does not intend for aliens here unlawfully to be harbored, it has never evidenced an intent for them to go homeless. Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F)(i) (explaining that an alien noticed to appear for a removal proceeding must immediately provide the Attorney General "with a written record of an address . . . at which the alien may be contacted respecting [the] proceeding."). Common sense, of course, suggests that Hazleton has absolutely no interest in reducing aliens without legal status to homelessness either. No municipality would benefit from forcing any group of residents ("legal" or "illegal") onto its streets. Rather, it appears plain that the purpose of these housing provisions is to ensure that aliens lacking legal immigration status reside somewhere other than Hazleton. It is this power to effectively prohibit residency based on immigration status that is so clearly within the exclusive domain of the federal government.

In sum, we find the housing provisions of Hazleton's ordinances pre-empted regulations of immigration, and both field and conflict pre-empted by the INA.

VII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm in part and reverse in part the district court's order permanently enjoining Hazleton's enforcement of the IIRAO and the RO.

VIII. APPENDIX

A. The Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance (Ordinance 2006-18, as amended by Ordinances 2006-40 and 2007-7)

ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION RELIEF ACT ORDINANCE BE IT ORDAINED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF HAZLETON AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1. TITLE

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "City of Hazleton Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance."

SECTION 2. FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF PURPOSE

The People of the City of Hazleton find and declare:

A. That state and federal law require that certain conditions be met before a person may be authorized to work or reside in this country.

B. That unlawful workers and illegal aliens, as defined by this ordinance and state and federal law, do not normally meet such conditions as a matter of law when present in the City of Hazleton.

C. That unlawful employment, the harboring of illegal aliens in dwelling units in the City of Hazleton, and crime committed by illegal aliens harm the health, safety and welfare of authorized U.S. workers and legal residents in the City of Hazleton. Illegal immigration leads to higher crime rates, subjects our hospitals to fiscal hardship and legal residents to substandard quality of care, contributes to other burdens on public services, increasing their cost and diminishing their availability to legal residents, and diminishes our overall quality of life.

D. That the City of Hazleton is authorized to abate public nuisances and empowered and mandated by the people of Hazleton to abate the nuisance of illegal immigration by diligently prohibiting the acts and policies that facilitate illegal immigration in a manner consistent with federal law and the objectives of Congress.

E. That United States Code Title 8, subsection 1324(a)(1)(A) prohibits the harboring of illegal aliens. The provision of housing to illegal aliens is a fundamental component of harboring.

F. This ordinance seeks to secure to those lawfully present in the United States and this City, whether or not they are citizens of the United States, the right to live in peace free of the threat crime, to enjoy the public services provided by this city without being burdened by the cost of providing goods, support and services to aliens unlawfully present in the United States, and to be free of the debilitating effects on their economic and social well being imposed by the influx of illegal aliens to the fullest extent that these goals can be achieved consistent with the Constitution and Laws of the United States and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

G. The City shall not construe this ordinance to prohibit the rendering of emergency medical care, emergency assistance, or legal assistance to any person.

SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS

When used in this chapter, the following words, terms and phrases shall have the meanings ascribed to them herein, and shall be construed so as to be consistent with state and federal law, including federal immigration law:

A. "Business entity" means any person or group of persons performing or engaging in any activity, enterprise, profession, or occupation for gain, benefit, advantage, or livelihood, whether for profit or not for profit.

(1) The term business entity shall include but not be limited to selfemployed individuals, partnerships, corporations, contractors, and subcontractors.

(2) The term business entity shall include any business entity that possesses a business permit, any business entity that is exempt by law from obtaining such a business permit, and any business entity that is operating unlawfully without such a business permit.

B. "City" means the City of Hazleton.

C. "Contractor" means a person, employer, subcontractor or business entity that enters into an agreement to perform any service or work or to provide a certain product in exchange for valuable consideration. This definition shall include but not be limited to a subcontractor, contract employee, or a recruiting or staffing entity.

D. "Illegal Alien" means an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States, according to the terms of United States Code Title 8, section 1101 et seq. The City shall not conclude that a person is an illegal alien unless and until an authorized representative of the City has verified with the federal government, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, subsection 1373(c), that the person is an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States.

E. "Unlawful worker" means a person who does not have the legal right or authorization to work due to an impediment in any provision of federal, state or local law, including but not limited to a minor disqualified by nonage, or an unauthorized alien as defined by United States Code Title 8, subsection 1324a(h)(3).

F. "Work" means any job, task, employment, labor, personal services, or any other activity for which compensation is provided, expected, or due, including but not limited to all activities conducted by business entities.

G. "Basic Pilot Program" means the electronic verification of work authorization program of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, P.L. 104-208, Division C, Section 403(a); United States Code Title 8, subsection 1324a, and operated by the United States Department of Homeland Security (or a successor program established by the federal government.)

SECTION 4. BUSINESS PERMITS, CONTRACTS, OR GRANTS

A. It is unlawful for any business entity to knowingly recruit, hire for employment, or continue to employ, or to permit, dispatch, or instruct any person who is an unlawful worker to perform work in whole or part within the City. Every business entity that applies for a business permit to engage in any type of work in the City shall sign an affidavit, prepared by the City Solicitor, affirming that they do not knowingly utilize the services or hire any person who is an unlawful worker.

B. Enforcement: The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall enforce the requirements of this section.

(1) An enforcement action shall be initiated by means of a written signed complaint to the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office submitted by any City official, business entity, or City resident. A valid complaint shall include an allegation which describes the alleged violator(s) as well as the actions constituting the violation, and the date and location where such actions occurred.

(2) A complaint which alleges a violation on the basis of national origin, ethnicity, or race shall be deemed invalid and shall not be enforced.

(3) Upon receipt of a valid complaint, the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall, within three business days, request identity information from the business entity regarding any persons alleged to be unlawful workers. The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall suspend the business permit of any business entity which fails, within three business days after receipt of the request, to provide such information. In instances where an unlawful worker is alleged to be an unauthorized alien, as defined in United States Code Title 8, subsection 1324a(h)(3), the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall submit identity data required by the federal government to verify, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, section 1373, the immigration status of such person(s), and shall provide the business entity with written confirmation of that verification.

(4) The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall suspend the business permit of any business entity which fails correct a violation of this section within three business days after notification of the violation by the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office.

(5) The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall not suspend the business permit of a business entity if, prior to the date of the violation, the business entity had verified the work authorization of the alleged unlawful worker(s) using the Basic Pilot Program.

(6) The suspension shall terminate one business day after a legal representative of the business entity submits, at a City office designated by the City Solicitor, a sworn affidavit stating that the violation has ended.

(a) The affidavit shall include a description of the specific measures and actions taken by the business entity to end the violation, and shall include the name, address and other adequate identifying information of the unlawful workers related to the complaint.

(b) Where two or more of the unlawful workers were verified by the federal government to be unauthorized aliens, the legal representative of the business entity shall submit to the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office, in addition to the prescribed affidavit, documentation acceptable to the City Solicitor which confirms that the business entity has enrolled in and will participate in the Basic Pilot Program for the duration of the validity of the business permit granted to the business entity.

(7) For a second or subsequent violation, the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall suspend the business permit of a business entity for a period of twenty days. After the end of the suspension period, and upon receipt of the prescribed affidavit, the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall reinstate the business permit. The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall forward the affidavit, complaint, and associated documents to the appropriate federal enforcement agency, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, section 1373. In the case of an unlawful worker disqualified by state law not related to immigration, the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall forward the affidavit, complaint, and associated documents to the appropriate state enforcement agency.

C. All agencies of the City shall enroll and participate in the Basic Pilot Program.

D. As a condition for the award of any City contract or grant to a business entity for which the value of employment, labor or, personal services shall exceed $10,000, the business entity shall provide documentation confirming its enrollment and participation in the Basic Pilot Program.

E. Private Cause of Action for Unfairly Discharged Employees (1) The discharge of any employee who is not an unlawful worker by a business entity in the City is an unfair business practice if, on the date of the discharge, the business entity was not participating in the Basic Pilot program and the business entity was employing an unlawful worker.

(2) The discharged worker shall have a private cause of action in the Municipal Court of Hazleton against the business entity for the unfair business practice. The business entity found to have violated this subsection shall be liable to the aggrieved employee for: (a) three times the actual damages sustained by the employee, including but not limited to lost wages or compensation from the date of the discharge until the date the employee has procured new employment at an equivalent rate of compensation, up to a period of one hundred and twenty days; and (b) reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

SECTION 5. HARBORING ILLEGAL ALIENS

A. It is unlawful for any person or business entity that owns a dwelling unit in the City to harbor an illegal alien in the dwelling unit, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, unless such harboring is otherwise expressly permitted by federal law.

(1) For the purposes of this section, to let, lease, or rent a dwelling unit to an illegal alien, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, shall be deemed to constitute harboring. To suffer or permit the occupancy of the dwelling unit by an illegal alien, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, shall also be deemed to constitute harboring.

(2) A separate violation shall be deemed to have been committed on each day that such harboring occurs, and for each adult illegal alien harbored in the dwelling unit, beginning one business day after receipt of a notice of violation from the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office.

(3) A separate violation of this section shall be deemed to have been committed for each business day on which the owner fails to provide the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office with identity data needed to obtain a federal verification of immigration status, beginning three days after the owner receives written notice from the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office. B.

B. Enforcement: The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall enforce the requirements of this section.

(1) An enforcement action shall be initiated by means of a written signed complaint to the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office submitted by any official, business entity, or resident of the City. A valid complaint shall include an allegation which describes the alleged violator(s) as well as the actions constituting the violation, and the date and location where such actions occurred.

(2) A complaint which alleges a violation on the basis of national origin, ethnicity, or race shall be deemed invalid and shall not be enforced.

(3) Upon receipt of a valid written complaint, the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, section 1373(c), verify with the federal government the immigration status of a person seeking to use, occupy, lease, or rent a dwelling unit in the City. The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall submit identity data required by the federal government to verify immigration status. The City shall forward identity data provided by the owner to the federal government, and shall provide the property owner with written confirmation of that verification.

(4) If after five business days following receipt of written notice from the City that a violation has occurred and that the immigration status of any alleged illegal alien has been verified, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, section 1373(c), the owner of the dwelling unit fails to correct a violation of this section, the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall deny or suspend the rental license of the dwelling unit.

(5) For the period of suspension, the owner of the dwelling unit shall not be permitted to collect any rent, payment, fee, or any other form of compensation from, or on behalf of, any tenant or occupant in the dwelling unit.

(6) The denial or suspension shall terminate one business day after a legal representative of the dwelling unit owner submits to the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office a sworn affidavit stating that each and every violation has ended. The affidavit shall include a description of the specific measures and actions taken by the business entity to end the violation, and shall include the name, address and other adequate identifying information for the illegal aliens who were the subject of the complaint.

(7) The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall forward the affidavit, complaint, and associated documents to the appropriate federal enforcement agency, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, section 1373.

(8) Any dwelling unit owner who commits a second or subsequent violation of this section shall be subject to a fine of two hundred and fifty dollars ($250) for each separate violation. The suspension provisions of this section applicable to a first violation shall also apply.

(9) Upon the request of a dwelling unit owner, the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, section 1373(c), verify with the federal government the lawful immigration status of a person seeking to use, occupy, lease, or rent a dwelling unit in the City. The penalties in this section shall not apply in the case of dwelling unit occupants whose status as an alien lawfully present in the United States has been verified.

SECTION 6. CONSTRUCTION AND SEVERABILITY

A. The requirements and obligations of this section shall be implemented in a manner fully consistent with federal law regulating immigration and protecting the civil rights of all citizens and aliens.

B. If any part of provision of this Chapter is in conflict or inconsistent with applicable provisions of federal or state statutes, or is otherwise held to be invalid or unenforceable by any court of competent jurisdiction, such part of provision shall be suspended and superseded by such applicable laws or regulations, and the remainder of this Chapter shall not be affected thereby.

SECTION 7. IMPLEMENTATION AND PROCESS

A. Prospective Application Only. The default presumption with respect to Ordinances of the City of Hazleton — that such Ordinances shall apply only prospectively — shall pertain to the Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance. The Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance shall be applied only to employment contracts, agreements to perform service or work, and agreements to provide a certain product in exchange for valuable consideration that are entered into or are renewed after the date that the Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance becomes effective and any judicial injunction prohibiting its implementation is removed. The Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance shall be applied only to contracts to let, lease, or rent dwelling units that are entered into or are renewed after the date that the Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance becomes effective and any judicial injunction prohibiting its implementation is removed.

The renewal of a month-to-month lease or other type of tenancy which automatically renews absent notice by either party will not be considered as entering into a new contract to let, lease or rent a dwelling unit.

B. Condition of Lease. Consistent with the obligations of a rental unit owner described in Section 5.A., a tenant may not enter into a contract for the rental or leasing of a dwelling unit unless the tenant is either a U.S. citizen or an alien lawfully present in the United States according to the terms of United States Code Title 8, Section 1101 et seq. A tenant who is neither a U.S. citizen nor an alien lawfully present in the United States who enters into such a contract shall be deemed to have breached a condition of the lease under 68 P.S. Section 250.501. A tenant who is not a U.S. citizen who subsequent to the beginning of his tenancy becomes unlawfully present in the United States shall be deemed to have breached a condition of the lease under 68 P.S. Section 250.501.

C. Corrections of Violations — Employment of Unlawful Workers. The correction of a violation with respect to the employment of an unlawful worker shall include any of the following actions:

(1) The business entity terminates the unlawful worker's employment.

(2) The business entity, after acquiring additional information from the worker, requests a secondary or additional verification by the federal government of the worker's authorization, pursuant to the procedures of the Basic Pilot Program. While this verification is pending, the three business day period described in Section 4.B.(4) shall be tolled.

(3) The business entity attempts to terminate the unlawful worker's employment and such termination is challenged in a court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. While the business entity pursues the termination of the unlawful worker's employment in such forum, the three business day period described in Section 4.B.(4) shall be tolled.

D. Corrections of Violations — Harboring Illegal Aliens. The correction of a violation with respect to the harboring of an illegal alien in a dwelling unit shall include any of the following actions:

(1) A notice to quit, in writing, issued and served by the dwelling unit owner, as landlord, to the tenant declaring a forfeiture of the lease for breach of the lease condition describe in Section 7.B.

(2) The dwelling unit owner, after acquiring additional information from the alien, requests the City of Hazleton to obtain a secondary or additional verification by the federal government that the alien is lawfully present in the United States, under the procedures designated by the federal government, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, Subsection 1373(c). While this second verification is pending, the five business day period described in Section 5.B.(4) shall be tolled.

(3) The commencement of an action for the recovery of possession of real property in accordance with Pennsylvania law by the landlord against the illegal alien. If such action is contested by the tenant in court, the dwelling unit owner shall be deemed to have complied with this Ordinance while the dwelling unit owner is pursuing the action in court. While this process is pending, the five business day period described in Section 5.B.(4) shall be tolled.

E. Procedure if Verification is Delayed. If the federal government notifies the City of Hazleton that it is unable to verify whether a tenant is lawfully present in the United States or whether an employee is authorized to work in the United States, the City of Hazleton shall take no further action on the complaint until a verification from the federal government concerning the status of the individual is received. At no point shall any City official attempt to make an independent determination of any alien's legal status, without verification from the federal government, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, Subsection 1373(c).

F. Venue for Judicial Process. Any business entity or rental unit owner subject to a complaint and subsequent enforcement under this ordinance, or any employee of such a business entity or tenant of such a rental unit owner, may challenge the enforcement of this Ordinance with respect to such entity or individual in the Magisterial District Court for the City of Hazleton, subject to the right of appeal to the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas. Such an entity or individual may alternatively challenge the enforcement of this Ordinance with respect to such entity or individual in any other court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with applicable law, subject to all rights of appeal.

G. Deference to Federal Determinations of Status. The determination of whether a tenant of a dwelling is lawfully present in the United States, and the determination of whether a worker is an unauthorized alien shall be made by the federal government, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, Subsection 1373(c). A determination of such status of an individual by the federal government shall create a rebuttable presumption as to that individual's status in any judicial proceedings brought pursuant to this ordinance. The Court may take judicial notice of any verification of the individual previously provided by the federal government and may request the federal government to provide automated or testimonial verification pursuant to United States Code Title 8, Subsection 1373(c).

B. Rental Registration Ordinance

(Ordinance 2006-13)

ESTABLISHING A REGISTRATION PROGRAM FOR RESIDENTIAL RENTAL PROPERTIES; REQUIRING ALL OWNERS OF RESIDENTIAL RENTAL PROPERTIES TO DESIGNATE AN AGENT FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS; AND PRESCRIBING DUTIES OF OWNERS, AGENTS AND OCCUPANTS; DIRECTING THE DESIGNATION OF AGENTS; ESTABLISHING FEES FOR THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE REGISTRATION OF RENTAL PROPERTY; AND PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS BE IT ORDAINED BY THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE CITY OF HAZLETON AND IT IS HEREBY ORDAINED AND WITH THE AUTHORITY OF THE SAME AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATION.

The following words, when used in this ordinance, shall have the meanings ascribed to them in this section, except in those instances where the context clearly indicates otherwise. When not inconsistent with the context, words used in the present tense include the future; words in the plural number include the singular number; words in the singular shall include the plural, and words in the masculine shall include the feminine and the neuter.

a. AGENT — Individual of legal majority who has been designated by the Owner as the agent of the Owner or manager of the Property under the provisions of this ordinance.

b. CITY — City of Hazleton

c. CITY CODE — the building code (property Maintenance Code 1996 as amended or superceded) officially adopted by the governing body of the City, or other such codes officially designated by the governing body of the City for the regulation of construction, alteration, addition, repair, removal, demolition, location, occupancy and maintenance of buildings and structures.

d. ZONING ORDINANCE — Zoning ordinance as officially adopted by the City of Hazleton, File of Council #95-26 (as amended).

e. OFFICE — The Office of Code Enforcement for the City of Hazleton.

f. DWELLING UNIT — a single habitable unit, providing living facilities for one or more persons, including permanent space for living, sleeping, eating, cooking and bathing and sanitation, whether furnished or unfurnished. There may be more than one Dwelling Unit on a Premises.

g. DORMITORY — a residence hall offered as student or faculty housing to accommodate a college or university, providing living or sleeping rooms for individuals or groups of individuals, with or without cooking facilities and with or without private baths.

h. INSPECTOR — any person authorized by Law or Ordinance to inspect buildings or systems, e.g. zoning, housing, plumbing, electrical systems, heat systems, mechanical systems and health necessary to operate or use buildings within the City of Hazleton. An Inspector would include those identified in Section 8 — Enforcement.

i. FIRE DEPARTMENT — the Fire Department of the City of Hazleton or any member thereof, and includes the Chief of Fire or his designee.

j. HOTEL — a building or part of a building in which living and sleeping accommodations are used primarily for transient occupancy, may be rented on a daily basis, and desk service is provided, in addition to one or more of the following services: maid, telephone, bellhop service, or the furnishing or laundering of linens.

k. LET FOR OCCUPANCY — to permit, provide or offer, for consideration, possession or occupancy of a building, dwelling unit, rooming unit, premise or structure by a person who is not the legal owner of record thereof, pursuant to a written or unwritten lease, agreement or license, or pursuant to a recorded or unrecorded agreement or contract for the sale of land.

l. MOTEL — a building or group of buildings which contain living and sleeping accommodations used primarily for transient occupancy, may be rented on a daily basis, and desk service is provided, and has individual entrances from outside the building to serve each such living or sleeping unit.

m. OCCUPANT — a person age 18 or older who resides at a Premises.

n. OPERATOR — any person who has charge, care or control of a Premises which is offered or let for occupancy.

o. OWNER — any Person, Agent, or Operator having a legal or equitable interest in the property; or recorded in the official records of the state, county, or municipality as holding title to the property; or otherwise having control of the property, including the guardian of the estate of any such person, and the executor or administrator of the estate of such person if ordered to take possession of real property by a Court of competent jurisdiction.

p. OWNER — OCCUPANT — an owner who resides in a Dwelling Unit on a regular permanent basis, or who otherwise occupies a nonresidential portion of the Premises on a regular permanent basis.

q. PERSON — any person, partnership, firm, association, corporation, or municipal authority or any other group acting as a single unit.

r. POLICE DEPARTMENT — the Police Department of the City of Hazleton or any member thereof sworn to enforce laws and ordinances in the City, and includes the Chief of Police or his designee.

s. PREMISES — any parcel of real property in the City, including the land and all buildings and structures in which one or more Rental Units are located.

t. RENTAL UNIT — means a Dwelling Unit or Rooming Unit which is Let for Occupancy and is occupied by one or more Tenants.

u. ROOMING UNIT — any room or groups of rooms forming a single habitable unit occupied or intended to be occupied for sleeping or living, but not for cooking purposes.

v. TENANT — any Person authorized by the Owner or Agent who occupies a Rental Unit within a Premises regardless of whether such Person has executed a lease for said Premises.

SECTION 2. APPOINTMENT OF AN AGENT AND/OR MANAGER

Each Owner who is not an Owner-occupant, or who does not reside in the City of Hazleton or within a ten (10) mile air radius of the City limits, shall appoint an Agent who shall reside in the City or within a ten (10) mile air radius of the City limits.

SECTION 3. DUTIES OF THE OWNER AND/OR AGENT

a. The Owner has the duty to maintain the Premises in good repair, clean and sanitary condition, and to maintain the Premises in compliance with the current Codes, Building Codes and Zoning Ordinance of the City of Hazleton. The Owner may delegate implementation of these responsibilities to an Agent.

b. The duties of the Owner and/or Agent shall be to receive notices and correspondence, including service of process, from the City of Hazleton; to arrange for the inspection of the Rental Units; do or arrange for the performance of maintenance, cleaning, repair, pest control, snow and ice removal, and ensure continued compliance of the Premises with the current Codes, Building Codes and Zoning Ordinance in effect in the City of Hazleton, as well as arrange for garbage removal.

c. The name, address and telephone number of the Owner and Agent, if applicable, shall be reported to the Code Enforcement Office in writing upon registering the Rental Units.

d. No Dwelling Unit shall be occupied, knowingly by the Owner or Agent, by a number of persons that is in excess of the requirements outlined in 2003 International Property Maintenance Code, Chapter 4, Light, Ventilation, and Occupancy Limits, Section PM-404.5, Overcrowding, or any update thereof, a copy of which is appended hereto and made a part hereof.

SECTION 4. NOTICES

a. Whenever an Inspector or Code Enforcement Officer determines that any Rental Unit or Premises fails to meet the requirements set forth in the applicable Codes, the Inspector or Code Enforcement Officer shall issue a correction notice setting forth the violations and ordering the Occupant, Owner or Agent, as appropriate, to correct such violations.

The notice shall:

1) Be in writing;

2) Describe the location and nature of the violation;

3) Establish a reasonable time for the correction of the violation.

b. All notices shall be served upon the Occupant, Owner or Agent, as applicable, personally or by certified mail, return receipt requested. A copy of any notices served solely on an Occupant shall also be provided to the Owner or Agent. In the event service is first attempted by mail and the notice is returned by the postal authorities marked "unclaimed" or "refused", then the Code Enforcement Office or Police Department shall attempt delivery by personal service on the Occupant, Owner or Agent, as applicable. The Code Enforcement Office shall also post the notice at a conspicuous place on the Premises. If personal service directed to the Owner or Agent cannot be accomplished after a reasonable attempt to do so, then the notice may be sent to the Owner or Agent, as applicable, at the address stated on the most current registration application for the Premises in question, by regular first class mail, postage prepaid. If such notice is not returned by the postal authorities within five (5) days of its deposit in the U.S. Mail, then it shall be deemed to have been delivered to and received by the addressee on the fifth day following its deposit in the United States Mail.

c. For purposes of this Ordinance, any notice hereunder that is given to the Agent shall be deemed as notice given to the Owner.

d. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that any notice that is given to the Occupant, Owner or Agent under this ordinance shall have been received by such Occupant, Owner or Agent if the notice was served in the manner provided by this ordinance.

e. Subject to paragraph 4.d above, a claimed lack of knowledge by the Owner or Agent, if applicable, of any violation hereunder cited shall be no defense to closure of rental units pursuant to Section 9, as long as all notices prerequisite to such proceedings have been given and deemed received in accordance with the provisions of this ordinance.

f. All notices shall contain a reasonable time to correct, or take steps to correct, violations of the above. The Occupant, Owner or Agent to whom the notice was addressed may request additional time to correct violations. Requests for additional time must be in writing and either deposited in the U.S. Mail (post-marked) or hand-delivered to the Code Enforcement Office within five (5) days of receipt of the notice by the Occupant, Owner or Agent. The City retains the right to deny or modify time extension requests. If the Occupant, Owner or Agent is attempting in good faith to correct violations but is unable to do so within the time specified in the notice, the Occupant, Owner or Agent shall have the right to request such additional time as may be needed to complete the correction work, which request shall not be unreasonably withheld.

g. Failure to correct violations within the time period stated in the notice of violation shall result in such actions or penalties as are set forth in Section 10 of this ordinance. If the notice of violation relates to actions or omissions of the Occupant, and the Occupant fails to make the necessary correction, the Owner or Agent may be required to remedy the condition. No adverse action shall be taken against an Owner or Agent for failure to remedy a condition so long as the Owner or Agent is acting with due diligence and taking bona fide steps to correct the violation, including but not limited to pursuing remedies under a lease agreement with an Occupant or Tenant. The City shall not be precluded from pursuing an enforcement action against any Occupant or Tenant who is deemed to be in violation.

SECTION 5. INSURANCE

In order to protect the health, safety and welfare of the residents of the City, it is hereby declared that the city shall require hazard and general liability insurance for all property owners letting property for occupancy in the City.

a. Minimum coverage; use of insurance proceeds. All Owners shall be required to obtain a minimum of fifty thousand ($50,-000.00) dollars in general liability insurance, and hazard and casualty insurance in an amount sufficient to either restore or remove the building in the event of a fire or other casualty. Further, in the event of any fire or loss covered by such insurance, it shall be the obligation of the Owner to use such insurance proceeds to cause the restoration or demolition or other repair of the property in adherence to the City Code and all applicable ordinances.

b. Property owners to provide City with insurance information. Owners shall be required to place their insurance company name, policy number and policy expiration date on their Rental Property Registration form, or in the alternative, to provide the Code Enforcement Office with a copy of a certificate of insurance. A registration Certificate (see Section 6 below) shall not be issued to any Owner or Agent unless the aforementioned information has been provided to the Code Enforcement Office. The Code Enforcement Office shall be informed of any change in policies for a particular rental property or cancellation of a policy for said property within thirty (30) days of said change or cancellation.

SECTION 6. RENTAL REGISTRATION AND LICENSE REQUIREMENTS

a. No Person shall hereafter occupy, allow to be occupied, advertise for occupancy, solicit occupants for, or let to another person for occupancy any Rental Unit within the City for which an application for license has not been made and filed with the Code Enforcement Office and for which there is not an effective license. Initial application and renewal shall be made upon forms furnished by the Code Enforcement Office for such purpose and shall specifically require the following minimum information:

1) Name, mailing address, street address and phone number of the Owner, and if the Owner is not a natural person, the name, address and phone number of a designated representative of the Owner.

2) Name, mailing address, street address and phone number of the Agent of the Owner, if applicable.

3) The street address of the Premises being registered.

4) The number and types of units within the Premises (Dwelling Units or Rooming Units) The Owner or Agent shall notify the Code Enforcement Office of any changes of the above information within thirty (30) days of such change.

b. The initial application for registration and licensing shall be made by personally filing an application with the Code Enforcement Office by November 1, 2006. Thereafter, any new applicant shall file an application before the Premises is let for occupancy, or within thirty (30) days of becoming an Owner of a currently registered Premises. One application per property is required, as each property will receive its own license.

c. Upon receipt of the initial application or any renewal thereof and the payment of applicable fees as set forth in Section 7 below, the Code Enforcement Office shall issue a Rental Registration License to the Owner within thirty (30) days of receipt of payment.

d. Each new license issued hereunder, and each renewal license, shall expire on October 31 of each year. The Code Enforcement Office shall mail license renewal applications to the Owner or designated Agent on or before September 1 of each year. Renewal applications and fees may be returned by mail or in person to the Code Enforcement Office. A renewal license will not be issued unless the application and appropriate fee has been remitted.

SECTION 7. FEES.

a. Annual License Fee. There shall be a license fee for the initial license and an annual renewal fee thereafter. Fees shall be assessed against and payable by the Owner in the amount of $5.00 per Rental Unit, payable at the time of initial registration and annual renewal, as more specifically set forth in Section 6 above.

b. Occupancy Permit Fee. There shall be a one-time occupancy permit fee of $10.00 for every new Occupant, which is payable by the Occupant. For purposes of initial registration under this ordinance, this fee shall be paid for all current Occupants by November 1, 2006. Thereafter, prior to occupying any Rental Unit, all Occupants shall obtain an occupancy permit. It shall be the Occupant's responsibility to submit an occupancy permit application to the Code Enforcement Office, pay the fee and obtain the occupancy permit. If there are multiple Occupants in a single Rental Unit, each Occupant shall obtain his or her own permit. Owner or Agent shall notify all prospective Occupants of this requirement and shall not permit occupancy of a Rental Unit unless the Occupant first obtains an occupancy permit. Each occupancy permit issued is valid only for the Occupant for as long as the Occupant continues to occupy the Rental Unit for which such permit was applied. Any relocation to a different Rental Unit requires a new occupancy permit. All Occupants age 65 and older, with adequate proof of age, shall be exempt from paying the permit fee, but shall be otherwise required to comply with this section and the rest of the Ordinance.

1. Application for occupancy permits shall be made upon forms furnished by the Code Enforcement Office for such purpose and shall specifically require the following minimum information:

a) Name of Occupant

b) Mailing address of Occupant

c) Street address of Rental Unit for which Occupant is applying, if different from mailing address

d) Name of Landlord

e) Date of lease commencement

f) Proof of age if claiming exemption from the permit fee

g) Proper identification showing proof of legal citizenship and/or residency

2. Upon receipt of the application and the payment of applicable fees as set forth above, the Code Enforcement Office shall issue an Occupancy Permit to the Occupant immediately.

SECTION 8. ENFORCEMENT

a. The following persons are hereby authorized to enforce this Ordinance:

1. The Chief of Police

2. Any Police Officer

3. Code Enforcement Officer

4. The Fire Chief

5. Deputy Fire Chief of the City of Hazleton.

6. Health Officer

7. Director of Public Works

b. The designation of any person to enforce this Ordinance or authorization of an Inspector, when in writing, and signed by a person authorized by Section 8.a to designate or authorize an Inspector to enforce this Ordinance, shall be prima facie evidence of such authority before the Magisterial District Judge, Court of Common Pleas, or any other Court, administrative body of the City, or of this commonwealth, and the designating Director or Supervisor need not be called as a witness thereto.

SECTION 9. FAILURE TO CORRECT VIOLATIONS.

If any Person shall fail, refuse or neglect to comply with a notice of violation as set forth in Section 4 above, the City shall have the right to file an enforcement action with the Magisterial District Judge against any Person the City deems to be in violation. If, after hearing, the Magisterial District Judge determines that such Person or Persons are in violation, the Magisterial District Judge may, at the City's request, order the closure of the Rental Unit(s), or assess fines in accordance with Section 10 below, until such violations are corrected. Such order shall be stayed pending any appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County.

SECTION 10. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THIS ORDINANCE; PENALTIES

a. Except as provided in subsections l0.b and l0.c below, any Person who shall violate any provision of the Ordinance shall, upon conviction thereof after notice and a hearing before the Magisterial District Judge, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than $100.00 and not more than $300.00 plus costs, or imprisonment for a term not to exceed ninety (90) days in default of payment. Every day that a violation of this Ordinance continues shall constitute a separate offense, provided, however, that failure to register or renew or pay appropriate fees in a timely manner shall not constitute a continuing offense but shall be a single offense not subject to daily fines.

b. Any Owner or Agent who shall allow any Occupant to occupy a Rental Unit without first obtaining an occupancy permit is in violation of Section 7.b and shall, upon conviction thereof after notice and a hearing before the Magisterial District Judge, be sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 for each Occupant that does not have an occupancy permit and $100 per Occupant per day for each day that Owner or Agent continues to allow each such Occupant to occupy the Rental Unit without an occupancy permit after Owner or Agent is given notice of such violation pursuant to Section 4 above. Owner or Agent shall not be held liable for the actions of Occupants who allow additional occupancy in any Rental Unit without the Owner or Agent's written permission, provided that Owner or Agent takes reasonable steps to remove or register such unauthorized Occupant(s) within ten (10) days of learning of their unauthorized occupancy in the Rental Unit.

c. Any Occupant having an occupancy permit but who allows additional occupancy in a Rental Unit without first obtaining the written permission of the Owner or Agent and without requiring each such additional Occupant to obtain his or her own occupancy permit is in violation of Section 7.b of this ordinance and shall, upon conviction thereof after notice and a hearing before the Magisterial District Judge, be sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 for each additional Occupant permitted by Occupant that does not have an occupancy permit and $100 per additional Occupant per day for each day that Occupant continues to allow each such additional Occupant to occupy the Rental Unit without an occupancy permit after Occupant is given written notice of such violation by Owner or Agent or pursuant to Section 4 above.

SECTION 11. APPLICABILITY AND EXEMPTIONS TO THE ORDINANCE

The provisions of the ordinance shall not apply to the following properties, which are exempt from registration and license requirements:

a. Hotels, Motels and Dormitories.

b. Rental Units owned by Public Authorities as defined under the Pennsylvania Municipal Authorities Act, and Dwelling Units that are part of an elderly housing multi-unit building which is 75% occupied by individuals over the age of sixty-five.

c. Multi-dwelling units that operate under Internal Revenue Service Code Section 42 concerning entities that operate with an elderly component.

d. Properties which consist of a double home, half of which is let for occupancy and half of which is Owner-occupied as the Owner's residence.

SECTION 12. CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION

All registration information collected by the City under this Ordinance shall be maintained as confidential and shall not be disseminated or released to any individual, group or organization for any purpose except as provided herein or required by law. Information may be released only to authorized individuals when required during the course of an official City, state or federal investigation or inquiry.

SECTION 13. SAVINGS CLAUSE

This ordinance shall not affect violations of any other ordinance, code or regulation existing prior to the effective date thereof and any such violations shall be governed and shall continue to be punishable to the full extent of the law under the provisions of those ordinances, codes or regulations in effect at the time the violation was committed.

SECTION 14. SEVERABILITY

If any section, clause, provision or portion of this Ordinance shall be held invalid or unconstitutional by any Court of competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not affect any other section, clause, provision or portion of this Ordinance so long as it remains legally enforceable without the invalid portion. The City reserves the right to amend this Ordinance or any portion thereof from time to time as it shall deem advisable in the best interest of the promotion of the purposes and intent of this Ordinance, and the effective administration thereof.

SECTION 15. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Ordinance shall become effective immediately upon approval. This Ordinance repeals Ordinance number 2004-11 and replaces same in its entirety.

SECTION 16.

This Ordinance is enacted by the Council of the City of Hazleton under the authority of the Act of Legislature, April 13, 1972, Act No. 62, known as the "Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law", and all other laws enforceable the State of Pennsylvania.