A.B Chaudhari, J.:— Heard. Rule. Rule returnable forthwith. All these matters are taken up for final disposal with consent of the learned Counsel for the rival parties.
2. In these Letters Patent Appeals and writ petitions, learned Counsel for both parties made their submissions on the questions, which we have framed in this judgment.
3. Advocate Shri Khapre appearing for the appellant in Letters Patent Appeal No. 368/2011 made the following submissions:
(i) The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was enacted to regulate and make better provisions for the administration of public religious and charitable Trusts in the State of Bombay. Various officers who are required to implement the provisions of the said B.P;T. Act, 1950, namely the Assistant Charity Commissioner, Deputy Charity Commissioner, Joint Charity Commissioner and Charity Commissioner are performing judicial “functions or in respect of some provisions; the quasi-judicial functions. That is evident from the reading of several provisions of the B.P.T Act, 1950, namely sections 22, 22-A, 22-B, 22-C, 41-A, 41-D, 41-E, 50, 50A and 51. If these provisions are carefully perused, it will be seen that the enquiry required to be made under these provisions, is in the nature of enquiry in the judicial proceedings. Rule 7 of the Bombay Public Trusts Rules, 1951 (for short “the B.P.T Rules, 1951) also mentions all these provisions except section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 as to the manner of enquiry to be conducted, namely the procedure prescribed under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 etc. However, Rule 7 will also encompass section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 in view of the words used “or any other enquiry” in the said Rule 7 of the B.P.T Rules, 1951. The learned Single Judge committed an error in omitting to look the said words before taking the help of Rule 7 of the B.P.T Rules, 1951.
(ii) section 80 of the B.P.T Act, 1950 provides for a bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court which clearly indicates that the Charity Commissioners and the other officers are the substitutes for the Civil Court for exercising the powers in the aforesaid provisions. The bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court clearly indicates this position. That being so, the Charity Commissioners and the officers are required to be held as performing the judicial functions of Civil Court or at the most quasi-judicial functions.
(iii) In the provisions abovementioned, important civil rights of the parties to the proceedings are decided and they affect the rights and liabilities of the persons who are parties to the various proceedings under the aforesaid provisions. If the persons are affected because of the orders passed by the Charity Commissioners and the other officers under the various provisions quoted above, there is no reason why the functions of the Charity Commissioner should not be held as judicial or at least quasi-judicial function.
(iv) Even under the provisions of section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950, the Charity Commissioner issues directions and recognizes a particular board of trustees or trustees for management of the Trust and its institutions which would clearly affect the rights and liabilities of various parties and the property, income and the administration of the Trust. Such exercise of power cannot be said to be administrative in nature since important civil rights of the parties are decided under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950. The function under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 of the Charity Commissioner therefore must be held to be judicial or at least quasi-judicial and not the administrative function.
(v) Advocate Shri Khapre also cited several decisions as to when any particular authority said to have passed the quasi-judicial order and what are the tests for finding out the nature of order as quasi-judicial.
(vi) Referring to several decisions of the Single Bench and Division Bench of this Court which we would refer in our judgment, Advocate Shri Khapre argued that the functions of the authority under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 has been found to be quasi-judicial and not the administrative.
(vii) Referring to the decision in the case of SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd., reported in (2005) 8 SCC 618 (Seven Judges) he argued that even the function of the appointment of arbitrator has been found out not an administrative power but has been found to be judicial power. Advocate Shri Khapre cited the following decisions:
(1) 1993 (2) Mh.L.J 1096, Lahudas Sambhaji Karad v. State of Maharashtra.
(2) 1994 (1) Mh.L.J 303, Nathmal Kisanlalji Goenka v. Asstt. Charity Commissioner, Akola.
(3) 2001(4) Mh.L.J 548, Asaram Bhimrao Shinde v. State of Maharashtra.
(4) 2006(4) Mh.L.J 50 : 2006 (5) Bom.C.R 317, Maha Pragya Vidya Nidhi Foundation v. State of Maharashtra.
(5) 2008 (2) Mh.L.J 78, Raghunath s/o Motiram Patil v. State of Maharashtra.
(6) 2008(3) Mh.L.J 833 : 2008 (3) Bom. C.R 676, Dinkar Shankarrao Patil v. Sheshrao Shankarrao Patil (Dr.).
(7) Writ Petition No. 342/2008 decided on 21-7-2008, Nanasaheb Vithobaji Tekade v. Dr. Dayaram Bondkuji Choudhari.
(8) 2009(2) Mh.L.J 745 : 2009(1) Bom.C.R 32, Peoples Education Society v. Manohar Shivappa Modi (Dr.).
(9) 2009 (5) Mh.L.J 457, Gram Vikas Samittee, Shahapur v. Darshanlal s/o Nandlal Malhotra
(10) Writ Petition No. 5373/2009 [2010(7) Mh.L.J 231], Vishwanath s/o Limbaji Bhowate v. State of Maharashtra through its Secretary, Department of Urban Development, Mantralaya, Mumbai
(11) 2011(1) Bom.C.R 486, Sambhaji, Raje Sadashiv Dahatonde v. State of Maharashtra
(12) 2011(1) Mh.L.J 849 : 2011(1) AIR Bom. R. 750 (Nagpur Bench) (Murlidhar Janrao Kale v. State of Maharashtra
(13) AIR (87) 1950 SC 222, Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani (since deceased) and after him his legal representatives (a) Govindram Khushaldas.
(14) (1969) 2 SCC 262 : AIR 1970 SC 150, A.K Kraipak v. Union of India.
(15) (1985) 3 SCC 378 : AIR 1985 SC 1121, Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer.
(16) (1987) 2 SCC 720 : AIR 1987 SC 1802 (1), Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd..
(17) (1998) 1 SCC 318 : AIR 1998 SC 344, State of T. N. v. K. Sabanayagam.
(18) (2002) 5 SCC 685 : AIR 2002 SC 2158, Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare.
(19) 2007(2) Mh.L.J (S.C) 8 : AIR 2007 SC 38, Muni Suvrat Swami Jain S.M.P Sangh v. Arun Nathuram Gaikwad.
(20) (2007) 2 SCC 181, Rajesh Kumar v. D.C.I.T.
(21) AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 702, Kothari Filaments v. Commissioner of Customs (Port), Kolkata.
(22) (2002) 5 SCC 510 : AIR 2002 SC 2308, I.T.I Ltd. v. Siemens Public Communication Network Ltd.
(23) 1975 Mh.L.J (FB.) 816 : 1975 BCI 94 (Nagpur Bench) (Full Bench), Manohar Shyamrao Singanapure v. Ballkrishna Dattatraya Deshpande.
(24) (2005) 8 SCC 618, SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd..
(25) 1970 DGLS (AHC) 698, Syedna Mohammed Burhanuddin the 52nd Dai-Ul-Multaq of the Dawoodi Bohra Community v. Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State Ahmedabad.
(26) MANU/GJ/0331/2002, Navinchandra Jasani v. Pravinchandra Jasani.
(27) 2010 DGLS (AHC) 1206, Balvantbhai Jinabhai Dhami v. Shantilal Kanjibhai Ratanpara.
(28) 2011 DGLS (AHC) 1461, Ratilal Hansraj Gajjar v. Kamleshbhai Narsibhai Khareshha.
(29) (1974) 1 SCC 446 : AIR 1974 SC 1084, State of U.P v. Bansi Dhar.
4. Senior Advocate Shri Manohar with Advocate Shri Sanyal in Letters Patent Appeal No. 549/2011 made the following submissions:
(a) The Charity Commissioner and the officers exercising powers under various provisions of the B.P.T Act, 1950 including section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 are in fact the Courts like the regular judicial Courts. They are the replacements for the regular Civil Courts as in respect of Special Tribunals created under the Special Acts. That being so, there is no reason why they should not be treated as judicial Courts though functioning under a Special Act, namely B.P.T Act, 1950.
(b) Referring to Rule 18 (3) of Chapter XVII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960, Senior Advocate Shri Manohar vehemently argued that the orders passed by any subordinate Court can be challenged only before Single Judge, if the proceedings under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India are filed. There can be no doubt that the Charity Commissioner is subordinate Court to the High Court. At any rate, the further terminology used in Sub Rule 3 of Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 is, order passed by any quasi-judicial authority in any proceeding, which reinforces the submissions and therefore, any order passed by the Charity Commissioner whether as a subordinate Court or as a quasi-judicial authority would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the learned Single Judge only. He also invited our attention to the explanation at the end of Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 and pointed out that the order means any order passed by any judicial or quasi-judicial authority empowered to adjudicate under the abovementioned Statutes. Thus, according to him with reference to explanation to Rule 18, even if an order is passed which is of the administrative nature but by a judicial or quasi-judicial authority, the same will fall in the jurisdiction of Single Judge. Thus, nature of order or jurisdiction exercised is not relevant and explanation takes even administrative orders of such authority into its fold. Thus, Senior Advocate Shri Manohar argued that the Charity Commissioner is a judicial authority or at least quasi-judicial authority and has been empowered to adjudicate under the various Statutes mentioned in the list and also in accordance with the sub-rule (3) of Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960. According to him, there cannot be any doubt about the nature of power exercised by the Charity Commissioner under any of the provisions of the Act so also under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 and under these provisions rights of the parties are adjudicated. When the rights of the parties are adjudicated, there is a binding force to such orders they cannot be termed as administrative orders nor section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 can be termed as of the administrative nature.
(c) Referring to provisions of section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure and other provisions of the B.P.T Act, 1950, namely section 41-A to section 41- E, sections 51 and 52, he argued that the authorities have been created under the Act with a view to have adjudication under the provisions of the B.P.T Act, 1950 rather than under the Code of Civil Procedure and that is why perusal of all these provisions under the Act clearly indicate that the nature of power of the Charity Commissioner is obviously judicial or at the most quasi-judicial in some cases. Even the word used under section 41-A, namely “find” shows that there has to be objective satisfaction of the Charity Commissioner which can be achieved only through the judicial process adjudication of the rights of the parties. That is why section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 involves adjudicatory process and will have to be held as the provision providing judicial or quasi-judicial authority and power.
(d) The opening words of section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950, namely “Subject to” is in contradiction to the word “notwithstanding”. The Charity Commissioner can also issue general directions under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 but then such directions affect the rights of the parties and whenever the rights of the parties are affected in the adjudicatory process, the nature of order will have to be held to be a judicial order or quasi-judicial order.
(e) The fact that section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 does not provide for any appeal or revision is not decisive of the nature of provision as administrative. There are many such provisions of different Acts, which do not provide for appeals and revisions but still have been held to be quasi-judicial orders under such type of provisions. Therefore, whether or not appeal or revision is provided against such order under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 will be of no relevance.
(f) Supporting submissions made by Senior Advocate Shri Manohar, Advocate Shri Sanyal argued that even under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 a definitive judgment is rendered by the authority and evidence is required to be seen documentary as well as on affidavit by the authority to come to conclusion as to whether ingredients of section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 exist or not. If the Charity Commissioner wants to marshal or analyze the evidence by way of affidavit or documentary, there is no reason to hold such provision administrative in nature looking to the predatory effect on the parties. He relied on the decision in the case of K. Shamrao v. Assistant Charity Commissioner, reported in (2003) 3 SCC 563 : AIR 2003 SC 1828.
5. Advocate Shri Gode for respondent Nos. 5 and 6 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 226/2011 also argued that the Charity Commissioner gives directions to hold elections holding that the elections were not held even though they were actually held and such proceedings are nothing but adjudicatory proceedings, deciding the rights of the parties and therefore, the orders passed under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 are of judicial or quasi-judicial nature.
6. Advocate Shri Wachasundar for respondent in Letters Patent Appeal No. 226/2011 invited our attention to Chapter VI of the B.P.T Act, 1950 regarding “control” and argued that control contemplates both administrative and quasi-judicial orders and insofar as section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 is concerned, rights of the parties are decided and therefore, the orders are of quasi-judicial nature because they result into civil consequences.
7. Per contra, Senior Advocate Shri Gordey with Advocate Shri Thakre for appellants in Letters Patent Appeal No. 226/2011 argued that an order under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 is purely administrative and there is nothing in the said provision to show that order passed thereunder will be of judicial or quasi-judicial nature. He invited our attention to the statement of objects and reasons so also sections 53 to 56 B of the B.P.T Act, 1950. With his assistance we have seen the relevant provisions of the B.P.T Act, 1950. He further argued that to find out the nature of provision, usual tests should be applied i.e the nature of such provision, the status of the authority in which it is placed, the manner of exercise of power and the final outcome of the exercise of power. According to him, if these tests are applied, it will be amply clear that the provisions of section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 will have to be held to be administrative in nature and the orders passed thereunder of the administrative nature.
8. Recapitulating the various provisions under the B.P.T Act, 1950, he argued that the Act nowhere speaks about any of the rights of the Trustees. In other words, the Act does not at all recognize that Trustees have any right qua the Trust. However, whenever there is a misconduct or mismanagement, the B.P.T Act, 1950 provides for the liabilities and the punishment. The submission that important civil rights of the Trustees are decided under the provisions shown to this Court, according to him, is not correct because the B.P.T Act, 1950 does not recognize any rights in the Trustees. If the Trustees have any so called rights, the same may be under their bye-laws or Rules and Regulations but they are not under the B.P.T Act, 1950. Those bye-laws, Rules or Regulations do not have any statutory force but they are at the most contract between them inter se. Role of the Trustees is, therefore, clearly subordinate to the Trust and the B.P.T Act, 1950 has placed the interest and welfare of the Trust as paramount consideration. The provisions of section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 was brought into force for implementing other provisions of the B.P.T Act, 1950 more effectively looking to the possible mischiefs, mismanagement, loss of the Trust property and so on and so forth. The power has been given under section 41-A of the B.P.T, Act, 1950 to abruptly check such type of mischiefs to the property and administration of the Trust and such a power cannot be held as a judicial or quasi-judicial power. According to Senior Advocate Shri Gordey, however, there are some provisions where the Charity Commissioner exercises judicial or quasi-judicial power but then the same test cannot be applied to section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950. Referring to the provisions of section 37 to section 40 of the B.P.T Act, 1950, Senior Advocate Shri Gordey argued that even the satisfaction to act under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 is not left to the whims of the Charity Commissioner but after obtaining the investigation reports etc. and then making subject to satisfaction before issuing any order under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950. According to him, that is a reason why no appeal or revision has been provided against the order under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950. The submission that Rule 7 of the B.P.T Rules, 1951 contemplates other enquiries is also wrong. According to Senior Advocate Shri Gordey because section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 does not anywhere contemplate holding of enquiries before making any order, the word “find” has to be understood not as a finding but has been used for subjective satisfaction of the Charity Commissioner, He further argued that section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 opens with the words “Subject to”, meaning thereby their Legislature did not want to make order under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 binding on the parties for all times to come.
9. Advocate Shri Chandurkar for respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 549/2011 invited our attention to the various provisions of the B.P.T Act, 1950 as was done by the other Counsel. He argued that the words “enquiry, finding and decision” have been used differently in different sections of the B.P.T Act, 1950. According to him, these three words have been deliberately used in different provisions but none of these terms are to be found in section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950. This is an indicator of the fact that the Legislature did not want that for exercising of power under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950, the Charity Commissioner should hold enquiry, record a finding and record a decision which would then bind the parties. Reiterating his argument, Advocate Shri Chandurkar submitted that the use of these words and the absence thereof in section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 clearly shows the nature of power. The Legislature has deliberately used the words “to issue direction” rather than making use of the above words. Therefore, according to him, the order made under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 will be the nature of directions only and will have no binding effect. The fact that no appeal is provided against such direction is an indicator of the fact that the Legislature did not want any delay in the process of acting for the protection of charities and the administration of the Public Trust. He referred to section 79D Schedule B of the B.P.T Act, 1950 and Advocate Shri Khapre also replied the same but we need not look into those minute details. According to Advocate Shri Chandurkar, there is no right of hearing under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950. Since no hearing is contemplated under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950, directions made under the orders are not binding on the parties for all times to come.
10. Senior Advocate Shri Gordey and Advocate Shri Chandurkar cited the following decisions:
(A) 2001 (4) Mh.L.J 548, Asaram Bhimrao Shinde v. State of Maharashtra.
(B) (2011) 2 SCC 258, Automotive Tyre Manufactures Association v. Designated Authority.
(C) 1995 A1HC 3177, Janata Commercial Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Second Additional District Judge, Akola.
(D) (1998) 4 SCC 343, Saiyad Mohammad Bakar E1-Edroos (Dead) by L.Rs v. Abdulhabib Hasan Arab.
(E) 2009 (6) ALL MR 883, Arun Vasantrao Betkekar v. Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy, Anushakti Bhavan,
(F) AIR 1965 SC 507, Shankarlal Aggarwala v. Shankarlal Poddar
(G) AIR 1953 SC 53, The State of Madras v. C.P Sarathy
(H) (1990) 2 SCC 746, Neelima Misra v. Harinder Kaur Paintal
(I) (1996) 2 SCC 66, Sultan Singh v. State of Haryana
(J) (1980) 3 SCC 402, R.R Verma v. Union of India
(K) (1982) 1 SCC 71, Gulam Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh
(L) (1973) 2 SCC 232, State of Andhra Pradesh v. S.M.K Parasurama Gurukul.
(M) AIR (87) 1950 SC 222, Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani (since deceased) and after him his legal representatives (a) Govindram Khushaldas
(N) (2003) 4 SCC 557, Canara Bank v. Debasis Das
(O) 1992 (1) G.L.H 331, Syedna Mohammed Burhanuddin the 52nd Dai-Ul-Multaq of the Dawoodi Bohra Community v. Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State Ahmedabad.
(P) 1996 (3) Gujarat.Law Reporter 307, Acharyashree Mahaprabhujini Ranavaswala Bethak Mandir Trust, Godhra v. Chokshi Ratilal Chandulal
(Q) Navinchandra Jasani v. Pravinchandra Jasani decided on 7th August, 2002.
(R) 1993 (2) Mh.L.J 1096, Lahudas Sambhaji Karad v. State of Maharashtra
(S) 2008 (2) Mh.L.J 78, Raghunath s/o Motriam Patil v. State of Maharashtra
(T) 2007 (1) Bom. C.R 742 (Nagpur Bench), Vijay Pundlikrao Gohod v. Vidarbha Youth Welfare Society
11. Advocate Shri Shirsat for respondent No. 2 in Writ Petition No. 4046/2011 and Advocate Shri Jibhkate for the petitioner in Writ Petition No, 4322/2011 also supported the arguments advanced by Senior Advocate Shri Gordey and Advocate Shri Chandurkar.
12. The arguments thus were concluded and we closed the case for judgment.
13. The following questions are framed in the light of the submissions made above by the learned Counsel for the rival parties.
(1) Whether the functions and powers exercised by the Charity Commissioner under the various provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 are only judicial in nature?
… No. They are judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative inquisitive and as parens patriae (parent of).
(2) Whether the nature of provision of section 41-A of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and the directions issued by the Charity Commissioner thereunder are adjudicatory of any dispute or lis or administrative?
…The nature of section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 and the directions issued thereunder are administrative only.
14. The Bombay Trusts Act, 1935 which lacked proper machinery was replaced by the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. It was enacted by the then State of Bombay when it was found that there was need to check the activities of the Trusts operating in the then Bombay State. Even after reorganization of the States, namely Gujarat and Maharashtra, the said Act continues to apply with some changes in the States of Gujarat and Maharashtra. The State of Gujarat after reorganization added section 41-A effective from 13-9-1962 while the State of Maharashtra added sections 41-A to 41-E by Maharashtra Act No. XX of 1971 w.e.f 18.5.1972 Thus, the State of Maharashtra added five new sections i.e from sections 41-A to 41-E while the State of Gujarat added only one section i.e section 41-a. By Notification No. 12674-P dated 10-6-1975 the State of Maharashtra conferred power under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 to be exercised also by Deputy Charity Commissioner and Assistant Charity Commissioner within their respective jurisdiction. Section 41-A for Gujarat reads thus:
FOR GUJARAT
“Section 41-A. Power of Charity Commissioner to issue directions to trustees and other persons.— (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Charity Commissioner may, from time to time, issue directions to any trustee of a public trust or any person connected therewith to ensure that such trust is properly administered and the income thereof is properly accounted for or duly appropriated and applied to the objects and for the purposes of the trust.
(2) It shall be the duty of every such trustee and person to comply with a direction issued to him under sub-section (1).
Section 41-A for Maharashtra reads thus;
FOR MAHARASHTRA
“Section 41-A. Power of Commissioner to issue directions for proper administration of the trust.— (1) Subject to the provision's of this Act, the Charity Commissioner may from time to time issue directions to any trustee of a public trust or any person connected therewith, to ensure that the trust is properly administered, and the income thereof is properly accounted for or duly appropriated and applied to the objects and for the purposes of the trust; and the Charity Commissioner may also give directions to the trustees or such person if he finds that any property of the trust is in danger of being wasted, damaged, alienated or wrongfully sold, removed or disposed of.
(2) It shall be the duty of every trustee or of such person to comply with the directions issued under sub-section (1).
15. We have carefully considered the submissions made by Advocate Shri Khapre, Senior Advocate Shri Manohar, Shri Sanyal, Shri Gode, Shri Wachasundar Advocates on one side and Senior Advocate Shri Gordey, Shri Chandurkar, Shri Jibhkate, Shri Thakre and Shri Shirsat Advocates on the other side.
16. It is true that section 80 of the B.P.T Act, 1950 creates a bar of jurisdiction since disputes and questions arising under the Scheme of the Act are required to be decided only by the authorities created under the Act. Some of the provisions like 22, 41-D, 41-E etc. do show that the jurisdiction of the authority to decide is ‘judicial’, and even the manner of enquiries is also as per the procedure in Presidency/Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. It is also true that the authorities under the Act are subordinate to High Court and under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, power of Superintendence can be exercised qua these authorities. These submissions, however, overlook the fact that the Legislature has not created the authorities to perform only judicial functions. Further it is not necessary that an authority who is judicial authority cannot be ordained by the particular provisions of Law to perform quasi-judicial or administrative and even investigative functions also. We, thus, proceed to deal with these submissions more elaborately keeping in mind the various dicta, principles of interpretation and various provisions of the B.P.T Act, 1950 as follows:
17. Prior to the Amendment of 1972 in Maharashtra a Division Bench of this Court in the case of The The Charity Commissioner, Bombay v. The Municipality Of Taloda*, decided on 28-8-1962 [1962 Indian Law Reports (Bombay Series) 732] was called upon to decide the question about the nature of power exercised by the Charity Commissioner under the provisions of the B.P.T Act, 1950. A question was also raised about locus standi of the Charity Commissioner to file appeal against the decision of District Court. The Division Bench of this Court held that the power exercised by the Charity Commissioner under various provisions of the B.P.T Act, 1950 is not only judicial or quasi-judicial but also administrative, inquisitive and even as a delegate of the powers of the Governmental supervision over the Trusts. The Court also upheld the authority or locus of the Charity Commissioner to file a suit/appeal against the decision of the District Court in the Higher Court as a representative of the crown or Government as parens patriae (parent of). Looking to the animus imponentis i.e intention of legislature the Division Bench held that it would not construe the provisions of the B.P.T Act, 1950 to make them nugatory.
As to the role of Charity Commissioner in discharging the duties, powers and functions under the B.P.T Act, 1950, the Apex Court in the case of Saiyad Mohammad Bakar El-Edroos (Dead) By LRs. v. Abdulhabib Hasan Arab, reported in (1998) 4 SCC 343 said while considering the provision for framing scheme under section 50-A of the Act, thus:
“This empowers the Charity Commissioner to frame, amalgamate or modify a scheme for the proper management of a public rust. Under sub-section (1) he could initiate proceedings for the proper management or administration of a public trust and to frame and settle a scheme. He has two options - either to initiate proceedings suo motu or when two or more persons having interest in the public trust make an application before him, in writing, in the prescribed manner. We find, the object of the aforesaid Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 as revealed through its preamble is to regulate and make better provisions of the administration of public, religious and charitable trusts within the State of Maharashtra. The Charity Commissioner is appointed through a notification under section 3 having very wide powers and duties conferred primarily under section 69 Chapter VII and other provisions of the Act. It has been the concern of legislatures to provide with such laws and entrust officers with such power to regulate, supervise the management and functioning of a public trust and endowment in a manner so as to give optimum benefit to the public at large. It was primarily this lack of proper machinery the Bombay Trust Act, 1935 was replaced by the present aforesaid Act of 1950. It is for this reason the Charity Commissioner and other set of officers are created as watchdogs for effective control and supervision of public trusts of all kind. Section 35 confers power on the Charity Commissioner in a given circumstance to issue general or special order to permit the trustees of any public trust to invest money in any manner. Before alienating any immovable property of a public trust, a previous sanction of the Charity Commissioner is required under section 36, maintain a register of movable and immovable properties to be in a manner as prescribed by the Charity Commissioner under section 36-B, power of inspection and supervision under section 37. Under section 39, a report is to be submitted to him regarding findings on the question, whether or not a trust or the person connected with the trust has been guilty of gross negligence, breach of trust, misappropriation or misconduct which resulted in loss to the trust. He can issue orders on such reports under section 40 and can direct the resultant loss to be charged from such defaulting person, payable to the public trust under section 41. Section 41-A empowers him to issue directions for proper administration of the trust and institute inquiries on receipt of complaints under section 41-B. He can suspend, remove or dismiss any trustee of a public trust on receipt of report under section 41-B. Any person interested in a public trust may apply to the Charity Commissioner under section 47-A for the appointment of a new trustee etc. In cases of breach of public trust including negligence, misconduct etc., he can file suit against such public trust or trustee under section 50 and notwithstanding this in cases he has reason to believe that for proper management or administration of a public trust he may frame and settle a scheme under section 50-A. Section 69 gives duties, functions and powers of the Charity Commissioner. It is in this background section 50-A, for the questions raised, has to be screened. Thus, we find that the Charity Commissioner is crowned with very wide powers to check and control the irregularities, malpractices and misconduct in the functionings of any public trust. Also to supervise, regulate, settle a scheme for the proper management or administration of a public trust, in fact involved in almost every step of the functioning of a public trust.”
18. We, thus, find from the scheme of the B.P.T Act, 1950 that section 3 enables the Charity Commissioner subject to the general or special orders of the Government to superintend the administration and carry out the provisions of the Act. The purpose of the provisions would appear hereafter. Section 37 gives a general power to the Charity Commissioner and others therein mentioned to enter on and inspect any property belonging to a public trust, to call for or inspect any extract from any proceeding of such trust as well as any books of account in possession of the trustees as also any returns, statements etc. Sub-section (2) of section 37 creates a liability in the trustees to afford all convenience and reasonable facilities for such examination. Under section 38 he is entitled to refer the matter to an auditor to look into the management and under section 38 to call upon any of the defaulting trustees to give explanation, under section 40 to determine if any loss is caused by the management to the public trust and under section 41 to surcharge any of the defaulting trustees and the manager. This clearly shows that the Charity Commissioner has an inquisitional jurisdiction or power over public trusts. Section 42 of the B.P.T Act, 1950 states that the Charity Commissioner to be corporation sole and shall have perpetual succession and common seal and may sue and be sued in the Corporate name. That is an indicator of the purely administrative function to be performed by him. Section 57 of the B.P.T Act, 1950 establishes a fund called the Public Trusts Administration Fund to vest in the Charity Commissioner and every public trust is liable to contribute towards this fund. The constitution of the fund and its contribution to it by the public charities in the State could not be without any purpose. It is meant for the expenses of establishment of the Charity Commissioner and his subordinates the purpose of which is the effective control and supervision over public trusts by the Charity Commissioner, Section 68 of the B.P.T Act, 1950 which defines the duties and powers of the Charity Commissioner gives a power of superintendence over public trusts. Section 50 of the B.P.T Act, 1950 gives a right to the Charity Commissioner to institute a suit in cases of breach of trust for recovery of possession of property belonging to any public trust or for directions where they are necessary and it also provides that if any other person wants to institute a suit on behalf of the Charity he must obtain sanction of the Charity Commissioner.
19. Thus, looking to the scheme of the Act and the ratio of these decisions it is clear that the function of the Charity Commissioner while acting under the provisions of the Act is administrative, judicial as well as quasi-judicial and even that he acts as a watchdog and a delegate of the Government for superintendence and control over the Public Trusts. Not only that the Division Bench of this Court in the decision cited supra went to the extent of saying, with which we fully agree, that Charity Commissioner acts even as a litigant on behalf of the Trust he having been empowered to file appeals or other proceedings before the Court or he is even entitled to defend on behalf of the Public Trusts or actions of Charity Commissioner under the B.P.T Act, 1950. Thus, taking survey of all these decisions and the nature of powers and functions performed by the Charity Commissioner, we hold that the Charity Commissioner functions as an administrative, inquisitive, quasi-judicial as well as judicial authority under the different provisions of the B.P.T Act, 1950 and has also to act/defend as a litigant for the public trusts as parens patriae.
20. We further proceed to consider the submissions made by Counsel for both sides on the nature of provision and the exercise of power under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950. True it is that section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 uses the word ‘find’. But that does not mean that any finding is required to be given by the authority. The said word ‘find’ has to be given its plain and ordinary meaning and should not be read as ‘finding’. It can at the most contemplate availability of material or satisfactory material to proceed to issue directions. The said word is then used only in the last part of sub-section (1) of section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 commencing from the word ‘and’ with reference to ‘property of the trust’. Thus, on a subjective satisfaction of the Charity Commissioner, directions in relation to property of the Trust can be issued to act in emergent situations. Now we proceed to make a survey of various decisions and also to cull out the principles of statutory interpretation in our exercise to find out the nature of power exercised by the Charity Commissioner and the nature of the provision of section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950.
21. On 23-4-1970 a Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in the case of Syedna Mohammed Burhanuddin The 52nd Dai-Ul-Multaq of The Dawoodi Bohra Community v. Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State Ahmedabad, reported in 1970 DGLS (AHC) 698, was required to interpret the provisions of section 41-A of the B.P.T, Act, 1950. It held that section 41-A (as applicable to Gujarat) is not ultra vires provision of Article 25(1) and 26 (b) and (c) of the Constitution. It also held that section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 does not impinge on any fundamental right enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. Importantly, it held that issuance of directions under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 is not quasi-judicial function but the same is administrative function or the administrative act. It did hold that the principle of natural justice or the hearing was thus excluded and there was no need to hear before passing any order under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950. However, it held in paragraph No. 51 of the judgment that unless there was imminent danger to the Trust and depending upon the factors attendant to the issuance of such direction under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 the Charity Commissioner should afford opportunity of hearing. The said Division Bench decision in the case of Syedna Mohammed Burhanuddin The 52nd Dai-Ul-Multaq of The Dawoodi Bohra Community v. Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State Ahmedabad, cited supra, was followed by three Single Judges of that Court in the case of Navinchandra Jasani v. Pravmchandra Jasani (MANU/GJ/0331/2002), Balvantbhai Jinabhai Dhami v. Shantilal Kanjibhai Ratanpara (2010 DGLS (AHC) 1206 and Ratilal Hansraj Gijjar v. Kamleshbhai Narsibhai Kharechha (2011 DGLS (AHC) 1461.
22. Again coming to the interpretation of section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950, in the case of Lahudas Sambhaji Karad v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 1993(2) Mh.L.J 1056 a Single Bench of this Court held that acting under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 the Charity Commissioner cannot interfere with the process of election of the Governing Body or Managing Committee of a Public Trust and section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 does not contemplate such a power.
In the case of Nathmal Kisanlalji Goenka v. Asstt. Charity Commissioner, Akola, reported in 1994(1) Mh.LJ 303 another Single Judge held that Charity Commissioner acting under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 is empowered to issue directions to hold the elections by secret ballot and that the object of section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 was to streamline the administration in the affairs of the Public Trust.
In the case of Asaram Bhimrdo Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2001(4) Mh.L.J 548 a Single Judge of this Court held that the Charity Commissioner acting tinder section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 does not have any authority or jurisdiction to appoint any ad hoc Committee or Board of Trustees or remove any Trustee(s). Similar view was taken in the case of Raghunath s/o Motiram Patil v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2008 (2) Mh.L.J 78 and in the case of Dinkar Shankarrao Patil v. Sheshrao Shankarrao Patil (Dr.), reported in 2008(3) Mh.L.J 833 : 2008 (3) Bom.C.R 676 (D.B).
In the case of Maha Pragya Vidya Nidhi Foundation v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2006(4) Mh.L.J 50 : 2006 (5) Bom. C.R 317 a Division Bench of this Court held that acting under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 the Charity Commissioner has overall jurisdiction to supervise even the elections of the Trust and issue directions, if necessary.
In the case of Peoples Education Society v. Manohar Shivappa Modi (Dr.), reported in 2009(2) Mh.L.J 745 : 2009 (1) Bom. C.R 32 a Single Judge of this Court having found on facts of the said case held that the Assistant Charity Commissioner misused his powers under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 by making orders, which were adverse to the interests of the persons, who were not made party to the said proceedings and even issuing directions of enrollment of new members and disposing of as many as 1057 proceedings under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 within a period of about five months on Camp at Kolhapur. In the said fact situation, the Court held that hearing was essential before adverse orders were passed against the persons, who were not even party to the proceedings.
In the case of Murlidhar Janrao Kale v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2011(1) Mh.L.J 849 : 2011 (1) AIR (Bombay) 750 a Division Bench of this Court, one of us A.B Chaudhari, J. speaking for the Bench held that the Director of Education did not have any authority or power to recognize a particular Board of Trustees or Trustees and such the power vested with the Charity Commissioner under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 for issuing directions to recognize a Trustee/Trustees, Board of Trustees or the persons connected with the Trust for ensuring proper administration of the Trust. This Court disagreed with both the propositions stated in the judgment dated 28.8.1999 in First Appeal No. 345/1998 by a Single Judge of this Court that ‘somebody’ other than whose name is found in Public Trust register can be empowered under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950, but the Division Bench held that only Trustees or persons connected with the Trust and not ‘somebody’ could be empowered. This Court also disagreed with the second proposition that in the absence of any order under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 recognizing or empowering any Trustee(s), only those persons whose names are entered in the Public Trust register can continue to manage the affairs of the Trust. Thus, the Division Bench laid down the ratio in the said judgment that Director of Education does not have any authority or power to decide which Board of Trustees or Trustees shall run the management of the Trust or the institutions and such a power could be exercised by the Charity Commissioner under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950.
23. In the case of Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., reported in (1987) 1 SCC 424 : AIR 1987 SC 1023 as to the mode of interpretation, the Apex Court in paragraph No. 33 stated thus:
“33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With those glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place….”
24. The statement of objects and reasons insofar as State of Maharashtra is concerned when section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 was brought on the Statute Book reads thus;
“Objects and Reasons :
Under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, the powers of the Charity Commissioner were considerably limited and hence many a time it was found by him difficult to enforce the effective working of the public trusts. Several instances of constant mis-appropriation and misuse of trust funds and abuse of powers by trustees were noticed by the Charity Commissioner. There were no powers with the Charity Commissioner to withhold the trustees from continuing any loss and causing further damage to the trust funds and properties. For this purpose, either the Charity Commissioner or the persons interested were required to go to a Court of Law. This took long time. Many a time, the persons interested advised to approach the Court of Law to redress their grievances, did not approach the Court either for want of finance or, some other reasons with the result that the defaulting trustee remained in possession of trust affairs and continued causing more damage to the trust. In order to stop such trustees from doing abusive acts detrimental to the interest of the trust it was felt necessary to invest the Charity Commissioner with more powers of Civil Courts regarding removal, dismissal, suspension of trustees, issuing injunctions and directions to trustees, appointing receivers etc.
More than 18 years had passed since the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was made applicable to the then Bombay State. It was felt that unless the Act was completely overhauled by giving necessary powers to the Charity Commissioner, it would not be possible to effectively supervise the administration and management of the public trusts. Such powers were found in Madras and Orissa Acts and the recent Act called the Charities Act, 1960, enacted by the British Parliament. Inherent powers, power of removal and dismissing the trustees, appointment of Receiver, injunction, submission of budget estimates are some of the powers which the Charity Commissioners are entrusted with under Madras and Orissa Acts and English Act (Charities Act, 1960). The Charity Commissioners were Judicial Officers of the status of District Judges who were already enjoying some of the powers under the Civil Procedure Code and there was no reason why the same powers should not be given to them while administering the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 and supervising the trusts. It was felt that unless these powers were given, supervision of trusts would be ineffective. Since the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 did not contain any such provisions, it was found necessary, in view of the past experience of 18 years, to make such provisions in the said Act and also to make other consequential provisions.
Section 29. - It inserts new sections 41-A, 41-B, 41-C and 41-D in the principal Act.
Section 41-A empowers the Charity Commissioner to issue directions to any trustee or any person connected with the trust to ensure that the trust is properly administered, and the income thereof is properly accounted for or duly appropriated and applied to the objects and for the purposes of the trust.”
25. We are aware that the statement of objects and reasons accompanying Bill when introduced in the legislature cannot be used to determine a true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of Statute. They cannot be used except for the limited purpose of understanding background and the antecedents leading to the State of legislation. Keeping in mind the above settled principles in the matter of interpretation, we proceed to determine the questions involved.
26. Chapter VI of the B.P.T Act, 1950 provides for the provisions regarding ‘control’. In this Chapter VI of the B.P.T Act, 1950 as earlier stated five sections i.e sections 41-a to 41-E were brought on the Statute Book together w.e.f 15.6.1972 in the State of Maharashtra. Section 41-B of the B.P.T Act, 1950 relates to the power of Charity Commissioner to institute enquiries. Section 41-C of the B.P.T Act, 1950 obligates the persons collecting moneys etc. for religious or charitable purpose to inform Charity Commissioner. Section 41- D of the B.P.T Act, 1950 provides for suspension, removal and dismissal of trustees. Section 41-D (5) and (6) of the B:P.T Act, 1950 provides for appeals against the order passed by Charity Commissioner, suspending, removing or dismissing a Trustee. Section 41-E of the B.P.T Act, 1950 is a power to act for protection of Charities. It empowers the Charity Commissioner to issue temporary injunction for protecting the properties of Trusts from being wasted, damaged or improperly alienated, removed or disposed of. Section 41-E (5) of the B.P.T Act, 1950 provides for appeal to the District Court.
Section 41-E (7) of the B.P.T Act, 1950 gives a finality to the order of the Charity Commissioner regarding temporary injunction subject to the appellate order of the District Court.
Sub-section (1) of Section 41-E of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 reads thus:
“41-E (1) Where it is brought to the notice of the Charity Commissioner either by the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner through his report or by an application by at least two persons having interest supported by affidavit:
(a) that any trust property is in danger of being wasted, damaged or improperly alienated by any trustee or any other person, or
(b) that the trustee or such person threatens or intends to remove or dispose of that property, the Charity Commissioner may by order grant a temporary injunction or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of such property, on such terms as to the duration of injunction, keeping an account, giving security, production of the property or otherwise as he thinks fit.”
27. There is a marked distinction between the provisions of section 41-a in Gujarat and Maharashtra inasmuch as the last part, namely the following part is not to be found in sub-section (1) of section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 in the case of Gujarat;
“and the Charity Commissioner may also give directions to the trustees or such person if he finds that any property of the trust is in danger of being wasted, damaged, alienated or wrongfully sold, removed or disposed of”.
In other words, the said last part is applicable only in Maharashtra. The Charity Commissioner is empowered to give directions to the Trustees or such person, if he finds that any property of the Trust is in danger of being wasted, damaged, alienated or wrongfully sold, removed or disposed of. The said last part as aforesaid has also been elaborately inserted in clause (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 41-E of the B.P.T Act, 1950 i.e power to act for protection of Charities. Reading of Section 41-E of the B.P.T Act, 1950 and the purpose thereof and the said last part of section 41-A(1) of the B.P.T Act, 1950 quoted above shows duplication of the said part of provision for protection of Charities. As earlier stated section 41-A to Section 41-E of the B.P.T Act, 1950 were brought on the Statue Book together and the legislature was fully aware about this duplication of power under sections 41-A and 41-E of the B.P.T Act, 1950. The only difference in the language of the two provisions is that section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 speaks of giving directions and Section 41-E of the B.P.T Act, 1950 speaks of granting temporary injunction for protection of properties of the charitable Trusts.
28. The wisdom of the legislature to provide for duplication of provisions or power in the same Chapter VI of the B.P.T Act, 1950 cannot be questioned and it is also well settled that the legislature does not enact the provisions superfluously and there is a definite object for the aforesaid duplication of the provisions and power given to the Charity Commissioner by the legislature. On behalf of the State qua Public Trusts in the State, Charity Commissioner has been empowered to act parens patriae and for that purpose Legislature has conferred this ancillary power in section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 on the Charity Commissioner.
29. It appears that the powers under Section 41-E or 41-D of the B.P.T Act, 1950 being judicial powers and appeals having been provided against such order in the said provisions, the legislature in order to enable the Charity Commissioner to act in the emergent or similar situations incorporated the last portion in sub-section (1) of section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 for stopping or preventing or for protecting the properties of the Trust upon finding the same to be endangered. As to the first part of sub-section (1) of section 41-A of the B.P.T, Act, 1950, similar is the power given to the Charity Commissioner for issuing directions for quick action for ensuring proper administration of the Trust and for protecting or supervising the income of the Trust and application thereof for the Trust. In order to prevent any mischief in the administration or income or property of Trust or before any order under Section 41-E or 41-D or other enabling provisions of the B.P.T Act, 1950 is passed, the provision of section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 has been inserted. In other words, in order to act urgently to prevent any mischief to the properties or income of the Trust or in order to prevent any mischief or damage in the matter of proper administration of the Trust or from causing disappearance of evidences etc. the said provision has been inserted in Chapter VI of the B.P.T Act, 1950. This attracts the ‘Mischief Rule’ for interpretation,
30. In Heydon's case, the fourth proposition for sound construction of a Statute was stated thus:
“Fourth proposition :— The true reason of the remedy; and the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and to pro privato commodo and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent or the makers of the Act, ‘pro bono publico’.
In the case of Philips Medical Systems (Cleveland) Inc. v. Indian MRI Diagnostic and Research Limited, reported in (2008) 10 SCC 227 in paragraph No. 17, the Apex Court held that when an amendment is made to an Act, or when a new enactment is made, Heydon's mischief rule is often utilized in interpreting the same.
In the case of Sri Ram Saha v. State of West Bengal, reported in (2004) 11 SCC 497 : AIR 2004 SC 5080 the Apex Court as to the ‘purposive interpretation’ in paragraph No. 18 said thus:
“18. It is well-settled principle of interpretation that a statute is to be interpreted on its plain reading; in the absence of any doubt or difficulty arising out of such reading of a statute defeating or frustrating the object and purpose of an enactment, it must be read and understood by its plain reading. However, in case of any difficulty or doubt arising in interpreting a provision of an enactment, Courts will interpret such a provision keeping in mind the objects sought to be achieved and the purpose intended to be served by such a provision so as to advance the cause for which the enactment is brought into force. If two interpretations are possible, the one which promotes or favours the object of the Act and purpose it serves, is to be preferred. At any rate, in the guise of purposive interpretation, the Courts cannot re-write a statute. A purposive interpretation may permit a reading of the provision consistent with the purpose and object of the Act but the Courts cannot legislate and enact the provision either creating or taking away substantial rights by stretching or straining a piece of legislation.”
31. It is thus clear upon adopting the settled principles in interpreting statute that section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 gives ancillary or additional powers to the Charity Commissioner to suppress the apprehended mischief to the property and income of the Trust and also in the administration of the Trust. Such a power also exists on judicial side in Section 41-E of the B.P.T Act, 1950. But this power under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 has been given to him to act in case doing of anything which is about to be done or is being done is causing or is likely to cause injury or annoyance or is against public interest or the interest of the object and purpose of the Trust or which may lead to breach of peace. He can thus act in emergency. In such a eventuality, and the satisfaction being subjective satisfaction of the authority, the hearing before making any order may not be possible in each case. We further find that the term “from time to time” has been deliberately utilised in section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950, which manifestly suggests that the Charity Commissioner can issue directions number of times, may even change, modify, amend or annul such directions as per the exigencies. Such orders can in no event partake the character of quasi-judicial or judicial order. Then no appeal or revision is provided against such order/s. That is why we think that the nature of provision is ‘administrative’. The submission made by Senior Advocate Shri Manohar about explanation to Rule 18 in Chapter XVII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960, does not impress us. The reason is Charity Commissioner when makes a direction under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950, he does not act as either judicial or quasi-judicial authority. Secondly, while acting under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950, he does not make any ‘order’ but issues direction/s. There is a deliberate absence of the word ‘order in section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950.
32. There is one more reason which we discuss further for saying so. section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 opens with the words “Subject to the other provisions of this Act” The term “subject to” has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary as subservient, inferior, obedient to, governed or affected by. In the case of Province of Madras represented by the Collector of Salem v. K.R.C.S Balkrishna Chetty and Sons, a registered firm, reported in AIR 1956 Madras 377, it was held as “conditional upon”. Now looking to the opening words of section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950, we find that any action or order made thereunder must yield pro tanto (to such an extent) to any orders made under the other provisions of the Act. We have already held that the functions performed by the Charity Commissioner are multiple viz. administrative, judicial quasi-judicial, as parens patriae and even as a litigant. We instead of making further analysis would like to make a propitious choice of the following apt observations from the Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. Meerut v. Lakshmi Chand, reported in AIR 1963 SC 677 (para 11).
“11. …Often the line of distinction between decisions judicial and administrative is thin: but the principles for ascertaining the true character of the decisions are well-settled. A judicial decision is not always the act of a judge or a tribunal invested with power to determine questions of law or fact: it must however be the act of a body or authority invested by law with authority to determine questions or disputes affecting the rights of citizens and under a duty to act judicially. A judicial decision always postulates the existence of a duty laid upon the authority to act judicially. Administrative authorities are often invested with authority or power to determine questions, which affect the rights of citizens. The authority may have to invite objections to the course of action proposed by him, he may be under a duty to hear the objectors, and his decision may seriously affect the rights of citizens but unless in arriving at his decision he is required to act judicially, his decision will be executive or administrative. Legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of citizens, does not make the determination judicial: it is the duty to act judicially which invests it with that character. …”
33. It will also be profitable to refer to the following relevant extract from the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Gulam Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (1982) 1 SCC 71. (page 108).
“But the fact that the parties and particularly the aggrieved party are heard before such an order is made merely ensures fair play and observance of audi alteram partem rule which are regarded as essential in the performance of any executive or administrative function and the further fact that a revision lies against the order of the Executive Magistrate either to the Sessions Court or to the High Court removes the vice of arbitrariness, if any, pertaining to the section. In fact, in the three decisions of this Court which were relied upon by counsel for respondents 5 and 6 namely Babulal Parate case, K.K Misra case and Madhu Limaye case where the constitutionality of section 144 of the old code was challenged on the ground that it amounted to unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of a citizen under Article 19(1) of the Constitution, the challenge was repelled by relying upon these aspects to be found in the provision. In our view, however, these aspects cannot make the order a judicial or quasi-judicial order and such an order issued under section 144 of the present code will have to be regarded as an executive order passed in performance of an executive function where no lis as to any rights between rival parties is adjudicated but merely an order for preserving public peace is made and as such it will be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution.”
34. The reason for making this provision subject to other provisions of the Act is apparent and the intention of the Legislature is manifest not to allow any act or direction under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 to affect the rights of any party.
35. We, thus, hold that power exercised by the Charity Commissioner is administrative in nature and the Charity Commissioner does not act as judicial or quasi-judicial authority under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950, and thus answer question Nos. 1 and 2 accordingly.
36. Before parting with the judgment, we would like to add a few lines on the aspect of principles of natural justice.
In the case of Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association v. Designated Authority, reported in (2011) 2 SCC 258, the Apex Court in paragraph No. 80 concluded thus:
“80. It is thus, well settled that unless a statutory provision, either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of principles of natural justice, because in that event the court would not ignore the legislative mandate, the requirement of giving reasonable opportunity of being heard before an order is made, is generally read into the provisions of a statute, particularly when the order has adverse civil consequences which obviously cover infraction of property, personal rights and material deprivations for the party affected. The principle holds good irrespective of whether the power conferred on a statutory body or Tribunal is administrative or quasi-judicial. It is equally trite that the concept of natural justice can neither be put in a straitjacket nor is it a general rule of universal application.”
37. Thus, looked at the principles enunciated by the Apex Court, even though the act or order under section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950 is of the administrative nature, it would be always desirable to afford opportunity of being heard to the concerned party unless there is some imminent danger. This is to prevent any damage or reflection on the management of the Trust or the Trustees running the same.
Per - B.P Dharmadhikari, J.:— 38. Bestowed with advantage of the judgment, written carefully by my esteemed Brother, I put the following as additional reasons for concurring with it.
39. To me the phrase — “Subject to provisions of this Act,” means the directions proposed must not be inconsistent with scheme of Bombay Public Trust Act (BPT Act) and are in the nature of stop-gap arrangement, subject to further orders under relevant sections and continue to hold field till they are replaced by suitable orders either under such other section or under section 41-A. As such directions could not have been issued to persons “connected with Trust” in its absence. This section needs to be construed as a substantive provision inserted with definite intention of filling in the vacuum recognized by State Legislature as perceived from Scheme of Bombay Public Trust Act, which also derives support from Statement of Object and Reasons. “Person connected to the trust” is wider than “interested person”. Even a person who accidentally comes in possession of movable property of public trust is amenable to directions under section 41-A. These directions may have some bearing on right to hold or enjoy the property or post, but then they are issued to protect a more coveted and pious purpose i.e charity itself. Between interest of an individual and an interest of Trust/Charity, precedence is given to later and former is made to suffer for the time being who, if aggrieved, has an option to have such direction varied under relevant sections and to obey the directions till then. There is no challenge before us to validity of section 41-A in any manner. Legislature has found it expedient to invest Charity Commissioner with certain powers of Civil Court but then has, at the same time, kept powers given to Court intact. It therefore has not substituted ‘Court’ by ‘Charity Commissioner’. When certain directions issued under other sections may be quasi-judicial in nature, directions under section 41-A of same nature or more drastic, can be viewed as not quasi-judicial? Answer is obviously “yes”, because under section 41-A, directions of various nature can be issued from time to time in order to preserve or protect charity/Trust. Section 41-A is obviously subject to sections dealing with Courts. Hence, directions envisaged under section 41-A are of same nature as can be expected from a Court but then of provisional nature to last till Court or competent Forum is approached and it, either continues, cancels or modifies the same. The Court/competent Forum can be approached in the mode and manner envisaged under Bombay Public Trust Act for such purpose. Investment of such powers with Charity Commissioner, use of words like - “subject to other provisions of this Act” “from time to time” and “finds” or then not defining/limiting the scope or nature of directions to be issued to get over the mischief s contemplated in which the directions can be issued and permitting the “officer” to issue such wide range of directives all show that a guardian or watch-dog has been given those powers to enable him to function more efficiently. Under section 41-A, interest of Trust is supreme and Trustees or person connected, are not seen as relevant at all, as immediate aim is to secure the Trust or Charity. Bombay Public Trust Act does not envisage any “lis” between Trust interest or need to issue such directions and the person to whom the direction is issued, at least for purposes of section 41-A. Once need to issue such directions is felt, section 41-A permits directions on matters regulated by even other sections due to words “subject to other provisions of this Act”. Type of directions i.e normally understood as quasi-judicial or then as administrative, is not of any importance insofar as this scheme of section 41-A is concerned. If situations demand mixed type of directions, even same can be issued thereunder. As the entire thrust is to defeat any or any further loss or injury to Charity, to preserve or protect it, Legislature has noted impossibility of holding any formal inquiry before embarking upon said exercise to issue directions as delay is found to defeat the objective and has necessitated the introduction of section 41-A. Section 41-A powers can be exercised by all Officers i.e Deputy Charity Commissioner and Assistant Charity Commissioner, who operate at base level. Hence, directions of nature normally seen as quasi-judicial can be issued by said “officer” in administrative exercise of his powers and in diligent discharge of his duties. Effort is to make administrative authority more effective and efficient. By reading the requirement of compliance with principles of natural justice into section 41-A, very purpose of its introduction will be lost. Even the purpose of making such direction “subject to other provisions” will be defeated and those words would become nugatory.
40. Change brought in scheme of BPT Act by adding section 41-A also warrants attention. Section 41-A as added in Gujarat does not employ following words - “and the Charity Commissioner may also give directions to the trustees or such person, if he finds that any property of the trust is in danger of being wasted, damaged, alienated or wrongfully sold, removed or disposed of”. Section 41-E has been added by to Statute by very same amendment and its language also assumes importance here. It reads:—
“41-E. Power to act for protection of Charities.— (1) Where it is brought to the notice of the Charity Commissioner either by the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner through his report or by an application by at least two persons having interest supported by affidavit :
(a) that any trust property is in danger of being wasted, damaged or improperly alienated by any trustee or any other person, or
(b) that the trustee or such person threatens or intends to remove or dispose of that property, the Charity Commissioner may by order grant a temporary injunction or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of such property, on such terms as to the duration of injunction, keeping an account, giving security, production of the property or otherwise as he thinks fit:
(2) The Chanty Commissioner shall in all such cases, except where it appears that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay, before granting an injunction, give notice of the facts brought to his notice to the trustee, or the person concerned.
(3) After hearing the trustee or person concerned and holding such inquiry as he thinks fit, the Charity Commissioner may confirm, discharge or vary or set aside the order of injunction or pass any other appropriate order.
(4) In case of disobedience or breach of any injunction, any of its terms or any order passed under this section, the Charity commissioner may apply to the Court, which may, after hearing the Charity Commissioner and the party affected, order the property of such person, guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in jail for a term not exceeding six months. No attachment under this sub-section shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold, and out of the proceeds, the Court may award such compensation as it thinks fit, and shall pay the balance, if any, to the person entitled thereto, and thereupon, the temporary injunction granted, or any order passed, by the Charity Commissioner, under this section, if in force shall stand vacated, or as the case may be cancelled.
(5) A trustee or a person against whom the order of injunction or any other order under this section is passed may, within ninety days of the date of communication of such order, appeal to the Court against such order.
(6) The order of the Court-attaching the property of such person or detaining such person in civil prison shall be a decree appealable to the High Court.
(7) The order of the Charity Commissioner shall, subject to any order of the Court or in appeal, be final.”
Thus contingencies added by State Legislature in Maharashtra as relevant under Section 41-A are also cognizable under Section 41-E, The Gujarat Legislature has not added similar provision. But then Section 41-E requires either a report of subordinates i.e Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or an application by two interested persons to the Charity Commissioner which discloses the possibilities as laid down therein. Thus, under this provision, the Charity Commissioner cannot act of his own when he himself “finds” these situations. As, he acts on report of others or then on grievance of others, the Legislature has stipulated compliance with principles of natural justice. An ex parte order is possible only when it “appears” to Charity Commissioner that issuing notice to other side will take time and render orders needed to be passed infructuous. After hearing other side, order of injunction, ex parte or otherwise, is to be either confirmed, discharged or varied or set aside. Charity Commissioner can pass any other appropriate order also. This power remains intact and when section 41-A is scrutinized in this background, it at once becomes clear that section 41-A is not intended to be duplication of power which can be exercised under Section 41-E(2). Charity Commissioner himself is privy to decision to take recourse to section 41-A and hence, lie is, authorized to act with speed, as desired by the Legislature. After issuing a particular direction, the Charity Commissioner can also evaluate the resultant situation and give a supplementary or consequential or totally independent and different direction as he “finds” warranted to meet the ends. That is why the Legislature has conferred upon him power to issue directions from “time to time”. This power under section 41-A is “subject to Section 41-E” also. Thus, this discussion is also conducive to administrative nature of said power.
41. It also gets re-enforced when one considers the other heads of contingencies in which issuance of the directions under section 41-A is contemplated. Perusal of section 50 of bpt act shows a mechanism for filing of Suit by or against or relating to public trusts or trustees or others. Whenever a breach of public trust, negligence, misapplication or misconduct on part of trustee is alleged, or when a direction or decree is required to recover possession of trust property or to follow it or recover it's proceeds, or for accounts of such property from a trustee, ex-trustee, alienee, trespasser or any other person, including a person holding adversely to public trust (not a tenant or licensee), when the direction of Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any public trust or for securing any declaration or injunction in favour of such trust, the Charity Commissioner can “after making such inquiry as he thinks necessary”, institute a suit, whether contentious or not, in a Court to obtain appropriate reliefs specified in clauses “a” to “q” of section 50. Section 51 enables persons having interest, who intend to file a suit of such type to move the Charity Commissioner for his consent. These sections or the scheme and operation is also not affected by section 41-A. All inquiries under BPT Act are equated with judicial enquiries under section 193, 219 and 228 of Indian Penal Code by its section 74 while section 75 deems Charity Commissioner and other officers, a Civil Court for sections 345 and 346 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Thus, power to issue directions for these purposes is made available to the Charity Commissioner by Legislature under, section 41-A. Categories of persons against whom reliefs can be sought as evident from section 50 as also tenant or licensee are covered by the phrase “any person connected therewith” employed in section 41-A.
42. Placement of section 41-A in BPT Act also needs due evaluation. Scheme of BPT Act shows that purpose of creation of Trust or then intention of settler is given primacy and paramount importance. Charity Commissioner as constituted thereunder is not a quasi-judicial authority but has substantial administrative functions and also some legislative powers. BPT Act contains important procedural checks to see that Trust does not deviate from desired path. When various provisions construed as conferring quasi-judicial powers are seen, the prime objective behind them is to protect Trust or Charity from any injurious or prejudicial interference. If no such occasion is created by the ideal Trustees or by those developing connection with the Trust and they honour the “trust-obligation” and also fulfil all procedural requirements, those quasi-judicial powers may not be required to be exercised at all. Thus, purpose is to secure compliance or to resolve disputes inter se in the interest of Charity. Other powers are mostly, concerned with supervision or regulation of actual functioning of Charitable Trust by Charity Commissioner as a guardian. Section 50-A powers may be resorted to only to have proper “Constitution” or Scheme to guide Trustees in fulfilling the obligations accepted by them. Section 41-A does not prejudice any other provision of BPT Act or affect its operation. It cannot be construed as modifying scheme of BPT Act. It has been brought on statute book to supplement the powers of Charity Commissioner and to enable him to be a more effective instrument of protection or preservation of Charity. Hence, remedies available either to Charity Commissioner or to Trustees or to those interested or getting connected with Trust before prescribed authorities under BPT Act or Court are not curtailed. Respective jurisdiction of such authorities or Court is also not abridged. The basic structure of enactment continues to be same only with an extra power. Section 41-A therefore calls for interpretation consistent with its purpose and in harmony with other sections.
43. Need for such an approach is already recognized by this Court vide judgment reported in 2002(5) Mh.L.J 660 : AIR 2002 Bom. 342, Bomi Jal Mistry v. Jt. Charity Commissioner. Here the Division Bench reproduces paragraph No. 18 of an earlier judgment of the Division Bench of this Court reported in 1989 Mh.L.J 1048 : AIR 1990 Bom 189, The Charity Commissioner, Maharashtra State, Bombay v. Smt. Shantidevi Lalchand Chhaganlal Foundation Trust, Bombay:—
“12. The first and foremost question that needs to be addressed is the scope and ambit of the authority of the Charity Commissioner under S. 36 of the Act proposed transaction. Reliance was placed by both the sides on a decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in, AIR 1990 Bom 189. The Charity Commissioner Maharashtra State, Bombay v. Smt. Shantidevi Lalchand Chhaganlal Foundation Trust, Bombay. We have closely examined that decision. In our view, the Objectors or Petitioners are under some misconception that this judgment holds of the immovable property of the public trust and to authorize the trustee to dispose of any immovable property of the public trust under section 36(1)(c) are entirely distinct. It is in this background the observations in the said decision will have to be understood. In our view, it would be apposite to reproduce para. 18 of the said decision which in substance is the ratio of the said decision. The same reads thus:—
Para 18. On consideration of the viz. the ………………… Charity Commissioner under section 36 of the Act and the Civil Court under section 50, Cl. (iii) and sub-clauses (i) and (g). In the very nature of things, the Charity Commissioner is in a. better position to scrutinize specific transactions, consider all the terms and conditions, consider the interest, benefit and protection of the trust and he is also in a better position to invite tenders or offers, scrutinize the same and put necessary conditions as he may think fit to impose. He is an officer who is well conversant with problems of public trust. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine the Civil Court undertaking the work of inviting tenders, scrutinizing the same and then selecting the best in order to protect the interest or benefit of the trust. The provisions of sections 36 and 50 of the Act will have to be understood and interpreted harmoniously in such a way as to see that none is rendered redundant and both become operative. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes. Twelfth Edition, in Chap. 9 at page 187 deals with construction to avoid collision with other provisions. It is stated :—
“If two sections of the same statute are repugnant, the known rule is that the last must prevail.” But, on the general principal that an author must be supposed not to have intended to contradict himself, the court will endeavor to construe the language of the legislature in such a way as to avoid having to apply the rule, leges posteriors priores contraries abrogant.”
One wav in which repugnancy can be avoided is by regarding two apparently conflicting provisions as dealing with distinct matters or situations.”
Taking into considerations the various provisions of the Act which make the Charity Commissioner as the main protector of the public trusts and the guardian custodian of the properties of the public trusts, we feel that the Charity Commissioner under the provisions of section 36 has the exclusive jurisdiction to deal with principle of interpretation that what is prohibited directly cannot be permitted to be achieved indirectly.”
Understood thus, we have no hesitation in observing that which has been specifically inserted by Amendment of 1971, virtually otiose.”
44. Useful elaboration on dogmatism and pragmatism insofar as principles of natural justice are concerned is contained in recent judgment reported in AIR 2011 SC 3711, Justice P.D Dinakaran v. Hon'ble Judges Inquiry Committee, where the Hon'ble Apex Court observes and notes:—
“In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India ((1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597) (supra), a larger Bench of seven Judges considered whether passport of the petitioner could be impounded without giving her notice and opportunity of hearing. Bhagwati, J, speaking for himself and for Untwalia and Fazal Ali, JJ, gave a new dimension to the rule of audi alteram partem and declared that an action taken in violation of that rule is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The learned Judge referred to Ridge v. Baldwin (1964) AC 40, State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei (AIR 1967 SC 1269) (supra), re H.K(An Infant) (supra) and A.K Kraipak v. Union of India ((1969) 2 SCC 262 : AIR 1970 SC 150) (supra) and observed :
“The audi alteram partem rule is intended to inject justice into the law and it cannot be applied to defeat the ends of justice, or to make the law “lifeless, absurd, stultifying, self-defeating or plainly contrary to the common sense of the situation”. Since the life of the law is not logic but experience and every legal proposition must, in the ultimate analysis. be tested on the touchstone of pragmatic realism, the audi alteram partem rule would, by the experimental test, be excluded, if importing the right to be heard has the effect of paralyzing the administrative process or the need for promptitude or the urgency of the situation so demands. But at the same time it must be remembered that this is a rule of vital importance in the field of administrative law and it must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. It is a wholesome rule-designed to secure the rule of law and the court should not be too ready to eschew it in its application to a given case. True it is that in-questions of this kind a fanatical or doctrinaire approach should be avoided, but that does not mean that merely because the traditional methodology of a formalized hearing may have the effect of stultifying the exercise of the statutory power, the audi alteram partem should be wholly excluded. The court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent permissible in a given case. It must not be forgotten that “natural justice is pragmatically flexible and is amenable to capsulation under the compulsive pressure of circumstances”. The audi alteram partem rule is not cast in a rigid mould and judicial decisions establish that it may suffer situational modifications. The core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have a reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise. A fair opportunity of being heard following immediately upon the order impounding the passport would satisfy — is in conformity with the requirement of Article 21 and does not fall foul of that article.”
45. section 41-a thus appears to be an exceptional provision by which the Legislature has conferred much needed powers on a guardian of a Trust or upon a watch-dog to make that personality more effective and practical. State Legislature recognized that a stitch in time may avoid future nine and this legislative wisdom is not in dispute before us. However, once real purpose behind such a provision is perceived, one need not foresee all the situations in which it may be used. Past working of the BPT Act and contingencies where it fell short to deliver the desired results prompted Legislative Assembly to add section 41-A by amendment. Mischiefs sought to be eliminated are broadly narrated by it. Precedents looked into by us show that wide nature of directives are possible under it and considering the human nature, it is not possible to speculate about the situations which may be required to be effectively confronted with in order to preserve and protect the Charity. The protection needed may be from insiders or even outsiders. Directions contemplated may vary from purely administrative like removing or installing a particular/proper sign board to putting some immediate fetters upon exercise of his civil right by anybody connected with the Trust or then asking him to take some positive step. All such directions are induced by primary concern to protect the Charity or Trust and need to act with utmost urgency for it. As per Statement of Objects and Reasons explaining need of introduction of such a provision, powers of Court are intended to be conferred upon Charity Commissioner and hence, possibility of such directions encroaching upon civil rights cannot be always ruled out. But then that possibility cannot be used to frustrate the legislative exercise particularly when nobody has doubted need of such power with a Guardian to enable him to be proficient. “Heads of objects” to ensure or safeguard which the power can be used clearly rule out any “lis” between Trust or Charity on one hand and person subjected to the directions on the other. This discussion reveals that “Law” does not recognize any “lis” between the person to whom such direction is addressed and the Charity or Trust. Even if such a “lis” may exist, it is made secondary and primacy is given to protecting or preserving the Charity. Words “from time to time” show legislative intention to enable, the Guardian or Watch-dog to act with utmost speed when he “finds” need therefor. In an ideal situation, there cannot be any opposition by a person interested in Trust or Charity to efforts undertaken for its preservation or protection. Directions issued whether having civil consequence or not are deliberately made subject to other provisions where such “lis” can be inquired into and redressed. But promptitude with which Legislature wants Charity Commissioner to act shows that at that stage power being exercised is projected as and to be seen as an administrative power only. This need to act fast eclipses all other considerations at least at that stage.
46. The power given therefore is drastic but in larger interest where civil rights are made subservient to preservation of Charity. It therefore needs to be resorted to only when occasion therefor arises and hence, that scrutiny by officer like Charity Commissioner, though subjective, must be honest and after satisfying that no other equally efficacious remedy is available to meet the emergent situation. Such other power may not be vested with or delegated to officer who comes across the said emergent situation and is expected to proceed to protect and preserve the Charity. All this implies that section 41-A negates an opportunity of hearing and hence, process is not quasi-judicial at all. As per section 42 Charity Commissioner is a corporation sole with perpetual succession, a common seal and may sue or be sued in his corporate name. Scheme of BPT Act constitutes him a guardian officer or watchdog possessing necessary administrative as also quasi-judicial. Purpose is to ensure that the trust is properly administered and normally nobody will oppose a direction issued with that aim. Same can be said in regard to direction which seeks to see that its income is properly accounted for or duly appropriated and applied to the objects and for the purposes of the Trust. Directions which save the property of the Trust from being wasted, damaged, alienated or wrongfully sold, removed or disposed of cannot be viewed differently. These directions can be issued to any trustee or any person connected therewith. Trustees, because of obligation accepted by them, cannot deny such power to Charity Commissioner to act in the interest of Charity. A person who gets connected with Trust also impliedly consents to such a statutory power. He may get connected because of civil contract or due to circumstances beyond his control like finding some lost item of Trust property. When immediate steps are felt necessary by a Guardian of Charity, in this background, it is clear that exercise of powers under section 41-a of bpt act cannot be even thought of as quasi-judicial. This casts more onerous duty on the officer using it. It is also to be kept in mind that directions issued must be commensurate with mischief to be avoided and, normally not of irreversible nature. They may attain that status and become final as nobody may seek any modification in it, but that does not mean that in all emergencies, directions of irreversible nature cannot be issued. Officer exercising section 41-A power has to attempt to pass an interlocutory or interim order till other regular forum or remedy can be approached for such preservation of Trust/Charity or for vindication of his rights by the person to whom the direction is issued. If this is not possible, then only a direction of permanent nature may be issued. Looking to the wide nature of power, I feel that said section may be required to be used with circumspection, and as circumstances warranting it may be unforeseen and may surface all of a sudden, subjective satisfaction must be demonstrated. Merely because consequences are provided for disobedience of such directions, the power exercised cannot be viewed as quasi-judicial. If directions as required to be issued are allowed to be flouted with impunity, the very purpose of existence of section 41-A gets defeated.
PER COURT.
47. Accordingly Letters Patent Appeal No. 226/2011, 368/2011 and 549/2011 are allowed. The order of learned Single Judge to the extent, the same dismisses Writ Petition Nos. 949/2011, 3521/2011 and 4847/2010 are set aside. The rest of the impugned order/judgment in Writ Petition No. 4847/2010 is maintained as it is. These Writ Petitions are restored back to file. Place the said Writ Petitions before appropriate Division Bench for further consideration of the controversy involved therein on merits.
48. Writ Petition Nos. 4046/2011 and 4322/2011 are correctly filed before the Division Bench of this Court. The same shall also be listed before the appropriate Division Bench for consideration of the controversy involved therein on merits.
49. Rule is made absolute in all the matters. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Rule made absolute.section 41-A of the B.P.T Act, 1950.
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