B.N Kirpal, J. (Oral)— The short question which arises for consideration in this case is whether the appeal filed by the petitioners against the certification of the Standing Orders was within time or not.
The order certifying the Standing Orders was passed on 4th January, 1991 and the same was despatched on 7th January, 1991. The petitioners received the said order on 9th January, 1991 and an appeal was filed on 6th February, 1991.
By the impugned order the appeal was dismissed for the reason that it was barred by time. The appellate authority came to the conclusion that the day on which the order was sent viz., 7th January, 1991 was not to be excluded in computing the period of limitation of 30 days as prescribed by Section 6 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. He observed that the provisions of the limitation expired on 5th February, 1991. The Appellate Court did not have the power to grant extension of time and, therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
It appears to us that while the appellate Court may be right in observing that the provisions of the limitation act were not attracted, nevertheless the attention of the Appellate Court was not drawn to Section 9 of the General Clauses Act. In Section 6 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 it is, inter alia, provided that any person who is aggrieved of the order of the Certifying Officer may, “within 30 days from the date on which copies are sent….” file an appeal. The word used in this Section 6, on which emphasis has to be laid is “from”. Section 9(1) of the General Clauses Act clearly provides that when in any Central Act or Regulation the word used is “from”, then, the first day in a series of days shall be excluded. Section 9 of the General Clauses Act was clearly applicable to the present case and the effect of the same would be that 7th January, 1991 had to be excluded while computing the period of limitation. It is not disputed that with the exclusion of 7th January, 1991 the limitation would have expired on 6th February, 1991 and, accordingly, the appeal so filed by the petitioners was within the period of limitation.
For the aforesaid reasons a writ of certiorari is issued quashing the order dated 16th/18th March, 1992 of the Appellate Authority and the Appellate Authority is directed to hear the appeal of the petitioners on merits and dispose of the same in accordance with law.
There will be no order as to costs.
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