Factual and Procedural Background
On 7 September 2026, the High Court refused to quash a decision of the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (“IPAT”) affirming an international protection officer’s recommendation that the Applicant receive neither refugee status nor subsidiary protection. [1]
The Applicant sought a certificate under section 5(6)(a) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000, as amended, to appeal on points of law of exceptional public importance. [2] The application was refused, and costs were awarded to the Second Respondent in respect of both proceedings. [3][4]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether IPAT was required, consistently with fair procedures and objective assessment, to consider its own recent decisions and explain any departure from materially comparable decisions concerning country-of-origin information (“COI”). [5][6]
- Whether IPAT satisfied its duty of objective assessment and adequate reasoning by relying on selected COI without addressing allegedly conflicting COI, and whether the High Court could supply an explanation for any omission. [6]
- Whether either proposed point satisfied the statutory test for certification under section 5(6)(a). [2][7]
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant’s Arguments
- The Applicant argued that the judgment set the threshold for legally relevant inconsistency too high and that limiting the consistency principle to the “same transaction” was difficult to reconcile with the reasoning in PPA v Refugee Appeal Tribunal. [8]
- The Applicant proposed that IPAT should consider relevant recent decisions concerning the same objective country-of-origin issue and explain departures from them. [6][8]
- The Applicant argued that IPAT had not addressed materially conflicting COI and that the High Court might improperly be supplying an explanation absent from IPAT’s decision. [9]
Respondents’ Position
- The Second Respondent submitted that the proposed duty would create, rather than resolve, legal uncertainty, particularly because its parameters and application to adverse decisions were unclear. [10]
- The Applicant ultimately conceded that the second point did not transcend the facts of the case. [11]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Glancré Teoranta v An Bord Pleanála [2006] IEHC 250 |
Principles governing certification of a point of law of exceptional public importance. |
The Court applied the agreed “Glancré principles”, including the requirement that legal uncertainty arise in the daily operation of the law and that certification be exercised sparingly. [7][12][13][3] |
| PPA v Refugee Appeal Tribunal [2007] 4 IR 94 |
Fair procedures require a reasonable mechanism for consistency in the interpretation and application of law in similar cases, and relevant prior decisions may be significant without being binding factual precedents. |
The Court held that PPA concerned access to relevant prior decisions on request, not a duty on IPAT to review all of its own recent decisions. [8][14][15][16][17][18] |
| COI v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2007] 2 ILRM 471 |
Authority supporting the limitation of the consistency principle to the same transaction. |
The Court treated this case as part of a consistent line of authority establishing that limitation as settled law. [19][20] |
| JN v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & Ors [2009] 1 IR 146 |
Authority supporting the same-transaction limitation on consistency. |
The Court relied on it as part of the settled line of authority. [19][20] |
| RC (Algeria) v IPAT [2018] IEHC 694 |
Authority supporting the same-transaction limitation on consistency. |
The Court relied on it as part of the settled line of authority. [19][20] |
| MH v IPAT [2023] IEHC 372 |
Authority supporting the same-transaction limitation on consistency. |
The Court relied on it as part of the settled line of authority. [19][20] |
| LA v IPAT [2026] IEHC 49 |
Authority supporting the same-transaction limitation on consistency. |
The Court relied on it as part of the settled line of authority. [19][20] |
| Manzeke v SSHD [1997] Imm AR 524 |
Referenced in support of the discussion concerning reliance on decisions addressing the general situation in a particular part of the world. |
The Court noted that the Applicant could identify and present relevant tribunal decisions and was not prevented from doing so. [21] |
| Shirazi v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 1562 |
A different conclusion being open on the same facts, or reached by another tribunal on similar facts, is not by itself a ground of appeal or review. |
The Court used this reasoning to reject a general duty requiring IPAT to compare its decision with every other decision addressing similar COI. [22][23][24][25] |
| Tkhelidze v Georgia, App no 33056/17 (ECtHR, 8 October 2021) |
Discussed in relation to the COI available concerning domestic violence in Georgia. |
The Court distinguished the material before the ECtHR from the more recent COI before IPAT and held that the materials were not materially conflicting. [26][27] |
| Case C-556/17 Tourbarov v Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal, ECLI:EU:C:2019:626 |
The requirement for a full and ex nunc examination of relevant facts and law in an international protection application. |
The Court held that newer COI superseded older material rather than conflicting with it. [27] |
| GK v Minister for Justice [2002] 2 IR 418 |
A claimant alleging that a decision-maker ignored representations must provide direct or inferential evidence supporting that allegation. |
The Court found that the Applicant had not produced such evidence. [28][29] |
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Court held that the certification test was governed by the ten principles distilled in Glancré. [7]
On the first proposed point, the Court found that the Applicant’s argument had not been advanced at the judicial review hearing and, more fundamentally, that the authority relied upon did not support the proposed broad duty. [30][20][18]
The Court distinguished PPA, which concerned access to relevant prior tribunal decisions requested by an appellant. It did not establish a duty requiring IPAT, on its own initiative, to review all recent decisions concerning a particular country situation and explain any departure from them. [14][16][17][18]
The Court considered that the same-transaction limitation was supported by a consistent line of authority and therefore represented settled law. The proposed duty would also create uncertainty concerning recency, materiality, and whether adverse as well as favourable decisions had to be considered. [19][20][10]
The Court further reasoned that, where evidence permits more than one conclusion, requiring IPAT to compare its reasoning with every other decision addressing similar evidence would add length and delay without improving fairness or consistency. A system of binding factual precedent would be a matter for the Minister, the Oireachtas, or both, rather than a judicially created duty. [23][24][31][25]
On the second proposed point, the Court found that there had been no materially conflicting COI. The material before IPAT was more recent than the material before the European Court of Human Rights in Tkhelidze; newer COI superseded older COI rather than conflicting with it. [26][27]
The Court also rejected the argument that it had supplied an explanation absent from IPAT’s decision. The requirement for an ex nunc assessment was an established legal principle, and the Applicant had provided no evidence that IPAT ignored material placed before it. [27][29]
The Court noted that the second point had effectively been abandoned at the hearing because it did not transcend the facts of the case. [11]
Holding and Implications
The application for a certificate permitting an appeal was refused. The Court held that neither proposed point satisfied the high threshold under section 5(6)(a), and that the first point also failed because it disclosed no relevant legal uncertainty or affirmative public benefit. [32][13][3]
The Applicant was ordered to pay the Second Respondent’s costs of both the substantive proceedings and the certification application. [4] No new precedent was set; the decision applied existing principles concerning certification, consistency, procedural fairness, and the assessment of updated COI. [20][12][27]