Factual and Procedural Background
Appellant A pleaded guilty to participating in the activities of an organised crime group contrary to section 45(1) of the Serious Crime Act 2015 and was sentenced to 27 months’ imprisonment. Appellant B was convicted of conspiracy to supply cocaine and had pleaded guilty to conspiracy to supply cannabis; he received concurrent sentences of six years six months and four years six months respectively. [1][2]
The offending involved the supply of cocaine and cannabis in the City. Appellant B acted as a drug runner, while Appellant A assisted the leader of the organised crime group by facilitating drug dealing, allowing premises to be used as a stash house, and handling drugs and money. [3][4][5][6][7]
Both appellants appealed against sentence with permission. [8]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Appellant A’s sentence was manifestly excessive and whether immediate custody was necessary, having regard to the statutory maximum, her role, personal mitigation, and the impact on her young children. [9][10][11][12]
- Whether Appellant B’s role had been wrongly assessed as significant rather than lesser, and whether insufficient account had been taken of the shorter duration of his involvement and his personal mitigation. [13][14][15]
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant A’s Arguments
- The sentencing judge gave insufficient weight to Appellant A’s relationship with the group leader, her good character, her lesser role, and her responsibility for five young children. [9]
- Immediate custody would cause exceptional hardship because the children would lose both parents during their incarceration. [9]
- The sentence was manifestly excessive and failed to reflect the lower statutory maximum for the offence. [9]
Appellant B’s Arguments
- The starting point was too high because Appellant B became involved only at a late stage and supplied a more limited quantity of drugs. [13]
- His role was lesser because he merely delivered drugs under direction for a daily payment. [13]
- Insufficient weight was given to his substantial personal mitigation, including the effects of military service on his mental health. [13]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v Crimes [2019] EWCA Crim 1108 |
Sentences for participation in organised crime under section 45 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 should focus on punishment, deterrence, and public protection. Analogous sentencing guidelines may provide limited assistance. [16][10] |
The Court distinguished the inherently criminal conduct in Crimes from much of Appellant A’s conduct, which was criminal because of its connection with organised crime. It concluded that the sentencing approach in the present case had produced an excessive starting point. [17][11] |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
For Appellant A, there was no definitive guideline for the section 45 offence. The sentencing court therefore had to consider the statutory maximum, relevant appellate decisions, and guidelines for analogous offences. [10]
The Court considered the activities underlying Appellant A’s conviction, including facilitating drug dealing, providing a stash house, disposing of drugs and paraphernalia, and handling drugs and money. Some of those activities would not independently constitute criminal offences without the organised-crime connection. [17]
The Court also considered the guideline for permitting premises to be used for drug supply, while recognising that it was not strictly analogous and could provide only limited assistance. It concluded that a starting point of approximately three years or more was too high. A starting point of no more than 30 months was appropriate; mitigation reduced this to 24 months, and credit for the guilty plea reduced it to 21 months. [18][11]
In deciding whether to suspend the sentence, the Court relied on Appellant A’s realistic prospect of rehabilitation, low risk of reoffending, good character, and responsibility for five very young children, including one with significant learning disabilities. Continued imprisonment would deprive the children of both parents. The Court held that seriousness alone did not require immediate custody and that there could be no blanket rule requiring imprisonment in every such case. [12][19]
For Appellant B, the Court upheld the finding that he had a significant role, producing an eight-year starting point. However, it held that insufficient account had been taken of his shorter involvement and lower level of trust compared with another participant. [14][15]
The Court placed Appellant B’s sentence at the lower end of the category-two range, namely six years six months, and then made a further reduction of 18 months for the fewer aggravating features and substantial personal mitigation. [15]
Holding and Implications
Both appeals were allowed. Appellant A’s sentence of 27 months’ imprisonment was quashed and replaced with 21 months’ imprisonment suspended for two years, with no additional requirements. [20][21]
Appellant B’s sentence of six years six months was quashed and replaced with five years’ imprisonment. [22]
The decision directly reduced both appellants’ sentences. The opinion did not establish a new precedent; it applied existing sentencing principles to the particular facts and mitigation in each case. [11][21][22]